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Overview
The transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy in post-com-
munist states has taken much longer than most observers anticipated. However, 
as a consequence of years of privatization and decentralization, the so-called “East 
European housing model” has now disappeared. Even so, eﬃcient market relations (espe-
cially in the housing ﬁnance system) have developed very slowly, and this has made any 
attempt to introduce major social housing programs unfeasible: in the absence of readily 
available mortgage ﬁnance, the state has continued to help middle-class families address 
their housing problems. If housing is not aﬀordable to the majority of households, the 
inﬂuence of ﬁscally constrained social housing programs is correspondingly limited. 
Several positive changes took place in the 1990s with respect to the legal and insti-
tutional framework of the housing ﬁnance system in the region. However, the creation 
of eﬃcient, market-oriented housing ﬁnance systems in the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States remains a work in progress. 
The objective of this volume is to summarize the experiences of diﬀerent countries in 
the region in developing a housing ﬁnance system from the perspective of basic housing 
issues. This anthology, following an introduction that compares developments across 
the region, consists of three parts: (a) ﬁve “framework presentations,” each describing a 
certain challenge in mortgage lending and ways of addressing it, e.g., its use to address 
housing aﬀordability issues or managing risks to banks associated with mortgage lending; 
(b) a series of country case studies, each of which describes developments in one country 
and focuses on how it addressed the challenges described in the framework papers, and 
(c) a special case study on Germany providing a “contrast” to the transition countries 
showing the main features of a well-established housing ﬁnance system. Appendices at 
the end of the book provide further information for researchers.
The ﬁrst chapter by Mark Stephens provides a conceptual framework for examin-
ing the relationship between housing policy and housing ﬁnance in transition economies. 
It concludes that the development of housing ﬁnance systems cannot be treated as a 
purely technical exercise and that economic objectives will become more important as 
transition economies are integrated into wider regional and global economic systems. 
The issue of housing aﬀordability is discussed by Raymond Struyk in the second 
chapter. The chapter argues that the standard aﬀordability indices have the virtue of 
simplicity, but that this simplicity carries a high price. For one, it masks the roles of the 
multiple factors that determine both household purchasing power and dwelling unit 
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prices. A second problem is that the indices are generally point estimates—they report 
on the situation for the “typical household”—and therefore provide little information 
on the situation for those at other points in the income distribution. Third, there is 
inconsistency in the results across indices for particular cities and countries. Given these 
facts, the results from the more data-intensive mortgage underwriting accounting models 
are strongly preferred for analyzing a country’s or region’s housing aﬀordability. 
Based on generally ill-deﬁned “aﬀordability problems,” the Eastern European and 
CIS nations have enacted an array of housing subsidy schemes to lower the cost of home-
ownership. In the third chapter  Douglas Diamond gives an overview of the rationales 
for subsidy in general and evaluates the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of the speciﬁc set 
of subsidies employed in Central and Eastern Europe since 1995. He concludes that a 
more critical and comprehensive analysis of housing ﬁnance subsidies (and subsequent 
reform) is needed as the region moves into a second decade of such subsidies.
The fourth chapter by Robert Van Order argues that well-designed risk manage-
ment  of the mortgage portfolio is key for an eﬃcient housing ﬁnance system. The chapter 
concludes that for a bank or other ﬁnancial institution it is not the risk of individual 
assets that matters; rather it is the way in which they are combined to aﬀect the risk 
of the overall portfolio that is most important. Balancing credit risk and interest rate 
risks is a major portfolio management problem, in part because the two interact: things 
that help manage interest rate risk, such as issuing variable rate mortgages, can make 
management of credit risk more diﬃcult. 
The ﬁfth chapter by Robert Buckley and Robert Van Order addresses questions about 
the appropriate public role in emerging mortgage markets, particularly the extent to which 
policymakers can or should identify innovations that go on to become the key elements 
(“pearls”) of a well-functioning ﬁnancial system. The authors suggest that rather than 
relying on the private sector to spontaneously innovate and eﬀectively “show the way,” 
most public innovations were designed to do the opposite: control private actions or 
stimulate them within well-deﬁned parameters. Given the situation in transition coun-
tries, it is reasonable to expect mortgage ﬁnance innovations to have beneﬁcial eﬀects. 
However, it will be diﬃcult to say in advance what will work. What, in fact, is the sort 
of innovation that suits the particular environment in such a way that it will be broadly 
diﬀused? This suggests providing incentives—at a minimum a well-functioning legal 
and institutional background, perhaps supplemented by subsidies or guarantees.
The second and third parts of the book consist of country case studies selected to 
cover the range of mortgage ﬁnance development in the region and a western example 
as a reference case from the European Union. 
The Polish case study by Jacek Łaszek shows a relatively developed mortgage market 
in the region, one that has been growing since 1994. Still the market is small in scale 
as compared to advanced EU countries. Major factors of successful development have 
been economic stabilization, decreasing inﬂation and interest rates, growing optimism 
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of consumers, privatization of the banking sector, a market-oriented housing policy, and 
international programs provided by the World Bank and USAID. Today, the market is 
characterized by strong competition with declining margins and increasing loan aﬀord-
ability. Future challenges, resulting from rapid portfolio growth, are better supervision 
and risk management as well as more access to the capital market. 
The case study on Slovenia by Andreja Criman analyzes the role of a public agency, 
the National Housing Fund, which emerged as the most proactive institution in hous-
ing policy. The fund has had a dominant position in the provision of housing loans for 
households and non-proﬁt housing associations. The chapter shows the eﬀect of the 
National Housing Savings Scheme on the mortgage ﬁnance system. Its success made 
it possible for the fund to reduce its lending to individuals and to concentrate on the 
supply side. Nevertheless, its activities have caused some distortions in the develop-
ment of the housing ﬁnance market. Today, the fund operates as a provider of ﬁnancial 
resources mainly for the non-proﬁt sector and as an investor in housing—in order to 
boost housing construction. 
The case study on Hungary by József Hegedüs and Eszter Somogyi analyzes the 
eﬀects of a subsidy program supporting mortgage ﬁnance launched in 2002. As a conse-
quence of the program the ratio of the outstanding loans to GDP increased from 2  to 
10 percent. The chapter looks at both the reasons and consequences of the mortgage 
program, especially its present and future budgetary costs and the distortions it caused. 
The authors argue that this short-term, policy-driven housing program was neither ﬁs-
cally nor socially sustainable.
The case study on Romania by Ileana Budisteanu represents a less developed housing 
ﬁnance system, where the government housing policy has been dominated by a strong 
bias toward owner-occupancy, a laissez-faire attitude toward the existing stock, and 
neglected development of a proper rental sector. Aﬀordability and access to housing 
has been constrained both by macroeconomic volatility and by restricted options and 
immobility in the existing stock. Positive economic developments, starting in 2000, 
stimulated the rapid development of housing mortgage infrastructure. Recent develop-
ment shows a promising mixture of specialized institutions and instruments co-existing 
and competing in an evolutionary process.
The case study on Russia by Elena Klepikova and Natalia Rogozhina starkly illustrates 
the importance of macroeconomic stability. Although development of the legal frame-
work and the training of banks was underway by 1993, signiﬁcant mortgage lending only 
began a year after Russia’s August 1998 economic crisis. Spurred by dynamic household 
income growth in the past several years, banks have responded with impressive yearly 
loan volume increases, thanks in part to the steady improvement since 1996 in the legal 
basis for primary and secondary operations. Russia’s initial secondary market operator, 
the government-owned Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending, has driven lending out-
side of Moscow and St. Petersburg by purchasing loans, thereby helping banks manage 
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interest rate and liquidity risks. At this stage there is a variety of vehicles being used to 
channel funds from capital markets and oﬀshore banks to the mortgage sector.
The case study on Kazakhstan by Friedemann Roy, Aset Mananbaev, and Murat 
Yuldasev describes and analyzes mortgage lending and risk management. Kazakhstan, 
like the other former Soviet republics, entered the transition period with no tradition of 
mortgage lending. The chapter focuses on the role of the Kazakhstan Mortgage Company 
(KMC) within the development of capital markets and the housing sector’s access to 
them. Such access has made a considerable contribution to mortgage market develop-
ment. KMC’s operations are subject to an array of risks (interest rate risk, liquidity risk, 
exchange rate risk, and prepayment risk). Recently KMC was converted from a low risk 
entity into a high risk one that may require state assistance to remain viable. 
A contrast to the Central and Eastern European transition economies is described 
in the chapter on the German mortgage system by Friedemann Roy. The chapter is aimed 
at analyzing and assessing the mortgage lending market in Germany: conditions of the 
housing market, individual lending instruments (the bauspar system, pfandbriefe, two-tier 
models) and the existing risks and risk management techniques. Despite well-established 
credit, interest rate, and liquidity management instruments, the long-term future for 
mortgage lending looks bleak. This is mainly due to a shrinking population and the 
resistance of households to make housing investments for fear of unemployment—a 
fear generated by Germany’s stagnating economy.
This anthology illustrates that, with a common origin, a great variety of diﬀerent 
housing ﬁnance systems emerged, each reﬂecting the historical, economic, and politi-
cal realities of a particular country. The speciﬁc attributes of each new housing ﬁnance 
system can be explained by the combination of the inﬂuences of existing institutions 
(“path dependence”), the eﬃciency of “knowledge transfer,” and the role of local politics. 
Looking at the main funding structures, the cases studied in this book demonstrate that 
diﬀerent countries are following diﬀerent models (characterized by the relative shares of 
contract savings, commercial banks, mortgage banks, and secondary institutions). This is 
not a surprise if we look at the European housing ﬁnance systems that essentially follow 
the same diverse pattern. Even in a single country we can ﬁnd diﬀerent models, for ex-
ample, Germany, where in eﬀect diﬀerent housing models compete with each other.
There are no simple explanations as to why a certain country has chosen a particular 
model. For example, the reason the Polish market has been closed to the big bausparkasse 
banks; why the Slovenians based their institutional development on the Housing Agency, 
or why mortgage banks in Hungary became so important. It would be diﬃcult to explain 
the various developments through the speciﬁc cultural, social, and economic needs of 
each country. Even as path dependent and situational elements were important arbitrary 
factors played a role. Moreover, one should not overlook the eﬀects of the advice and 
marketing of speciﬁc models and instruments by Western aid agencies and by ﬁnancial 
institutions and insurance companies looking to develop new markets.
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3Divergences and Convergences 
in Restructuring Housing Finance 
in Transition Countries1 
by József Hegedüs and Raymond J. Struyk
1. INTRODUCTION
Even 15 years after regime change, transition countries have not yet developed eﬃcient 
new housing ﬁnance systems. Housing has essentially developed as a consequence of 
economic transition, and, despite expectations, has not become an “engine of change.” 
Changes in the housing system2 can be interpreted as “corollaries” of the restructuring 
processes in the political and economic systems such as housing privatization, banking 
reform, company laws, etc. Explicit housing policies served more as “shock absorbers” 
(Struyk 1996) and not as strategies to develop a new housing model. 
Housing privatization was much more a political step to ease possible tensions 
created by economic hardships than a housing restructuring policy.3 In most countries 
privatization preceded legislation on management of newly formed multi-unit residential 
buildings (e.g., Moldavia, Albania, Poland). Typically, no target tenure structure was 
set and no programs for managing aﬀordability were designed. Management of the 
housing stock was left to market processes and the related ad hoc legislation trying to 
correct the most diﬃcult problems. 
The large state owned construction and building material companies were partitioned 
and privatized, and state “development” companies disappeared from the market. These 
were natural consequences of the structural changes in the economy, but they had an 
unpredicted eﬀect on the housing sector. There was no policy to deal with restructuring 
the construction sector systematically. 
Privatization in the ﬁnancial sector was carried out with very little consideration 
to housing. New institutional forms became important after economic stabilization, 
due to pressure from the banking sector as it searched for new opportunities. Basically, 
there were no conscious, well-thought-out policies supporting the development of the 
new housing ﬁnance system. 
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Economic hardship (unemployment, decreasing real income) made new safety net 
programs necessary. Housing considerations played no or little role in designing income 
support programs. Most countries have introduced a housing allowance program, but 
they typically represent a small share (less than 10–15 percent) of total safety net cost. 
Housing problems became an important social issue after the initial transition even 
if public policy had neglected the housing issue for years. Housing conditions wors-
ened (no proper maintenance, low investments) and housing aﬀordability deteriorated 
sharply—both maintaining housing consumption and access to housing. The poor, 
particularly the unemployed, pensioners, and young families with kids, were severely 
hit by the economic decline and cuts in housing subsidies. As a result the size of the 
population facing housing problems became much bigger than a housing policy relying 
strictly on public resources could directly address (Lowe 2003). Thus, besides direct 
programs to the most needy population, such as housing allowances, housing assist-
ance was needed to  make housing aﬀordable for middle income groups. This is why 
developing a housing ﬁnance system is a crucial element of the emerging social housing 
policy in transition countries. 
However, housing policy itself was fragmented within the government (shared 
among diﬀerent ministries and diﬀerent levels of government) and enjoyed no strong 
government support at least until the turn of the century. Thus, housing programs were 
mostly prepared for “desk-drawers” or for election campaigns, except when strong eco-
nomic interests were attached to a program. Then, at the turn of the century, housing 
in transition countries again became an important question. The need for social housing 
programs was registered, but it took some time to realize that social housing programs 
are unrealistic without an eﬃcient housing ﬁnance system. 
Among the many publications4 on housing problems in transition countries, there 
are very few systematic comparative works on housing ﬁnance systems, as Renaud 
noted in his recent paper (2004: 2). This is partly because of the complexity of hous-
ing and partly—probably—because of its “secondary” political importance. Very little 
comparative research has been conducted on housing ﬁnance, and most publications 
are “status reports” oﬀered without an analytic framework. One of the weaknesses of 
the existing comparative works is the poor quality of the data—a consequence of the 
delayed changes in the governance of housing. 
This book is based on a workshop organized in the spring of 2004 in Budapest on 
housing aﬀordability.5 To organize the book, the editors invited leading housing policy 
experts with experience in transition countries to discuss diﬀerent aspects of eﬃcient 
housing ﬁnance. The ﬁrst part of the book contains these framework chapters, which 
cover the issues of housing policy, subsidy, aﬀordability, risk management, and insti-
tutional options of the housing ﬁnance system. In the second part of the book, we use 
case studies from transition countries to illustrate the problems countries are facing in 
developing their housing ﬁnance system. This includes case studies from diﬀerent types 
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of countries—some that have recently joined the EU (Poland), new accession candidates 
(Romania), and countries of the former Soviet Union (Russia and Kazakhstan). In the 
third part of the book we present Germany as a “contrast” case of a mature-market 
housing ﬁnance system. 
The underlining idea of the book is that housing systems in modern welfare states 
combine the advantages of a market economy with social programs. The basic strategic 
question of transition countries is what kind of healthy combination of eﬃciency and 
equity can be developed in the course of structural changes. 
Two approaches must be diﬀerentiated in this respect: 
 1. to detail what was actually done in transition countries—how diﬀerent countries 
tried to introduce market elements and respond to social issues at the same 
time 
 2. to search for the most eﬃcient approach to restructuring the East European 
housing sector. 
The framework chapters address the second issue; the case studies, the ﬁrst. 
We have put together comparative data tables based on information from the au-
thors of the country chapters. Our eﬀorts in this area are an attempt to compensate for 
the general shortcomings and lack of reliable housing ﬁnance information.6 Our other 
critical challenge was the fast pace of changes in the institutional setting and subsidy 
schemes in the region. The framework papers helped to provide a structure for deﬁning 
these changes and interpreting them.
2. TRANSITION AND THE HOUSING SECTOR
Legacy: The East European Housing Model
The main characteristics of the East European housing model (Hegedüs and Tosics 1996) 
were single party political control over the housing sector, the subordinate role of market 
mechanisms, lack of competition among housing agencies (bureaucratic coordination), 
and broad control over the allocation of housing services (huge, non-transparent sub-
sidies). However, under this model several “sub-models” emerged from the responses 
of individual countries to challenges in the process of developing the socialist economy 
(Turner et al 1992). While the main characteristics of the model could be interpreted 
as a structural explanation, the divergences of the model were considered theoretically 
as policy options taken by individual governments.7 The structural conﬂicts (“cracks”) 
were managed by diﬀerent methods, e.g., introducing strict control mechanisms (Bul-
garia, Russia, East Germany) or allowing quasi-market processes (Yugoslavia, Hungary). 
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Diﬀerences in the models could be characterized, for example, by the tenure structure 
(state-owned rental, cooperative housing, and owner occupation) or by the diﬀerent 
housing ﬁnance schemes under the state controlled bank sector. 
The state rental sector was ﬁnanced directly from the budget, but other tenure forms 
like cooperatives and owner occupation in multi-unit buildings were ﬁnanced partly 
through state banks accompanied by a substantial capital grant. Family houses were 
ﬁnanced through “self-help schemes” with limited state loans. 
The diﬀerence between the degree of urbanization and the share of housing ac-
counted for by the public rental sector is an indicator of the need for housing ﬁnance 
in the centrally-planned economies before transition. Urban areas were under stronger 
planning control (less possibility for private or self-help housing investment) and under 
greater demographic pressure (industrialization, etc.). Thus the public rental sector was 
typically an answer to the urban housing problem; in rural areas private ownership was 
more prevalent. However, diﬀerent countries used diﬀerent solutions.8 
Table 1.1 
Share of public sector and urbanization level at the beginning of the 1990s [%]
Share of public rental, 
1990
(1)
Urbanization level 
1997 or 1999
(2)
Difference 
between (2) and (1)
(3)
Russian Federation 67.0 73.1 6.1
Albania 35.5 46.1 10.6
Slovenia 31.0 50.8 19.8
Romania 32.7 55.0 22.3
Serbia and Montenegro 22.2 51.5 29.3
Slovakia 27.7 57.0 29.3
Croatia 24.0 54.3 30.3
Poland 31.6 61.9 30.3
Czech Republic 39.1 74.7 35.6
Hungary 23.0 63.0 40.0
Bulgaria 6.6 67.7 61.1
Source: UN–ECE 2000, 2002.
Diﬀerences between countries were partly due to exogenous factors such as the 
organizational development of the party and the state, economic, and social policy, and 
partly due to the endogenous development of the housing institutions. The outcomes 
of diﬀerent policy options—even among countries with the same level of GDP—were 
quite diﬀerent in terms of the quality and quantity of housing. 
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In conclusion, despite some diﬀerences there were common elements in the housing 
systems in the region that give meaning to the term “East European housing model,” 
e.g., housing estates, poorly-maintained public housing, and rationed “elite” houses for 
the nomenklatura. 
Tenure Structure: Housing Privatization
The transition in 1989/1990 brought about a change in the political structure, and the 
introduction of a democratic political system eliminated the political constraints against 
the establishment of market mechanisms. However, movement toward a market-based 
housing system9 took place in diﬀerent ways and at diﬀerent speeds and thus resulted 
in diﬀerent solutions across countries. 
Even countries with relatively successful transition strategies (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland) postponed structural changes in sectors such as health, education, 
and the social sector.10 Instead they focused on the production and ﬁnancial sectors. 
Housing was squeezed because in certain housing areas there were no basic social bar-
riers to major changes (e.g., the construction industry and building materials). But in 
the area of housing services (water, heating, etc.) it was not possible to introduce market 
mechanisms (price liberalization, collection enforcement) because the cost-recovery 
price of services needed a huge relative price increase in a time of recession (Buckley 
and Mini 2000)—a reality which was not viable politically. Privatization, one of the 
most important housing issues, should be considered in this framework. Decisions on 
privatization were not based on a “policy choice” adopting the “unitary” or the “dual” 
model,11 but were more the result of short-term political interests. The critical question 
was not the tenure structure but the “operation” of the housing sector (Hegedüs and 
Tosics 1996b). Private does not necessarily mean market, and the key question is how 
the market mechanism is introduced as a dominant integrating mechanism. The key 
question in terms of the future direction of the housing models of transition countries is 
not whether the country has implemented “fast” or “slow” privatization, but whether it 
has introduced a change in property management. The diﬀerence between the Bulgarian 
and Czech models does not lie in the extent of privatization, but more in the extent of 
the role market mechanisms play in property management, as Bulgaria did not have 
any public stock to privatize. In this sense, “fast” privatization and “slow” privatization 
do not represent diﬀerent models in themselves.12 
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Table 1.3
Housing privatization [%]
Public rental in 1990 Public rental,
after 2000
% privatized
Albania 35.5 1.0 97.2
Lithuania 60.8 2.4 96.1
Romania 32.7 2.7 91.7
Serbia and Montenegro 22.2 2.8 87.4
Croatia 24.0 2.9 87.9
Bulgaria 6.6 3.0 54.5
Slovenia 31.0 3.0 90.3
Hungary 23.0 4.0 82.6
Armenia 52.5 4.0 92.4
Estonia 61.0 5.2 91.5
Republic of Moldova 21.0 5.5 73.8
Slovakia 27.7 6.5 76.5
Kazakhstan 66.1 6.8 89.7
Latvia 59.0 16.0 72.9
Poland 31.6 16.1 49.1
Czech Republic 39.1 17.0 56.5
Ukraine 47.3 20.0 57.7
Russian Federation 67.0 29.0 56.7
Source: UN–ECE 2002.
As a consequence of widespread housing privatization, social housing policy has lost 
its main asset: public rental housing. The countries with a relatively large public rental 
sector (Russia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland) have postponed struc-
tural changes to the public rental sector (introducing cost recovery rent levels, limiting 
property rights for tenants, etc.). The Latvian government’s concept paper on housing 
outlines an aim to decrease the public rental sector to 10 percent of stock, meaning that 
privatization will continue. In Russia, tenants in the public rental sector retained broad 
property rights until the passage of a new comprehensive housing law in 2004. 
Transition countries faced huge social housing problems, not only because of the 
aﬀordability issue in terms housing services (maintenance and utility costs)—also in 
terms of access to housing. Poland was the ﬁrst to start a social housing program (TBS), 
and later, around 2000, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania began 
new social programs, too. But the demand for these programs was too high for limited 
budget resources. At current program levels it would take several decades to reach the 
European level of social housing (around 15 percent).
10
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The other option for social housing would be implementation of housing allow-
ance programs in the private rental sector. The typical size of the private rental sector 
is 3 to 5 percent. In countries where restitution was legally and practically an option, 
a special private rental sector formed, with legal rights for tenants (for example, 6.7 
percent in the Czech Republic and 7 percent in Slovenia). However, these statistics are 
far from reliable as renting by individual owners is part of the informal economy. Thus, 
there are no social housing programs yet that try to use the private rental sector (as in 
Germany); the only exception is Hungary, which started a program with very limited 
resources in 2005. 
Housing Conditions, Needs, and Investments
At the time of transition housing conditions in East European countries were by-and-
large not better or worse than the housing conditions of countries with similar GDP 
per capita (Hegedüs, Mayo, Tosics 1996). The diﬀerences in the housing conditions 
between Western and Eastern Europe increased during the socialist period, but the same 
process took place as regards general economic development. After 1990, housing needs 
among countries diﬀered greatly, but the general trend was an ease in demographic 
pressure partly because of the decrease in population and partly because internal migra-
tion slowed down. There are, however, some important exceptions—Tirana in Albania, 
Almaty in Kazakhstan, and Moscow in Russia—where substantial internal migration 
has put pressure on the local housing market. 
Figure 1.1 
New construction (units per 1,000 inhabitants) 
by regions (weighted average)13
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Housing investment decreased in most countries, and it has not returned to its end-of-
1980s levels. The highest producing region is Central East Europe, where new construction 
per 1,000 inhabitants is close to 3. But this is similar to the lowest producing European 
countries (Sweden, England, and Italy). New construction in CEE countries seems to be 
increasing. In Hungary by 2004 the number of new units exceeded 1 percent of housing 
stock (4.4 units per 1000 inhabitants), in Poland 4.3 and in Slovenia 3.7 (EU 2004).
In the former Soviet Union (dominated by Russia) the level of new construction is 
at 30 percent of the 1990’s ﬁgure, and it seems to have stagnated over the last 5 years. 
The lowest construction activity is in the Baltic states, which could be explained by 
decreasing demographic pressure.
Basically two types of housing construction existed in the pre-transition period: 
deeply subsidized, urban, multi-unit buildings controlled by the state-owned industry 
and individual, self-built, one-family buildings with a “shallow-subsidy.” The collapse 
of the state construction sector was one factor in the decline in housing construction.14 
Demand for new housing decreased because the housing market behavior had changed 
as a consequence of vanishing construction subsidies. In the transition period, the 
majority of households faced uncertainty in the labor market, and their consumption 
pattern changed as well, partly in response to the expanded range of goods and services 
on oﬀer. To reach the pre-transition level of real housing assets, households had to spend 
much more on housing investment than before to make up for the lost state subsidy. 
This adjustment process took time, but parallel with macroeconomic stabilization, 
construction statistics show results. 
10 to 15 years of underinvestment in housing appears to be an important factor in de-
termining future housing demand. To solve the problem of the large housing estates requires 
substantial investments as well. However, one of the most important obstacles of the new 
investment is aﬀordability, which in turn is related to limited access to housing ﬁnance.
The Legal Background and Bank Sector Reform
Other than a sound, stable macroeconomic environment, the most important prerequi-
site for an eﬃcient housing system is an appropriate legal and regulatory framework with 
a functioning enforcement system. Some of the countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia) inherited a workable system of land registry and basic banking laws for 
foreclosure and other procedures. However, in the socialist period the legal framework was 
“not in proper use,” i.e., the land registry had not been kept up-to-date, actual banking 
practices were not consistent with a market economy, and foreclosure procedures were 
hardly used. In other transition countries, such as Russia and Albania, basic laws were 
missing, such as a law on housing mortgage. Thus, in the ﬁrst part of the 1990s major 
eﬀorts were concentrated on designing or redesigning the legal framework. 
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In establishing the new legal and regulatory framework, the interested ﬁnancial 
institutions played an important role. New private banks were active in lobbying for a 
strong supporting regulatory framework (for example, for contract saving institutions); 
and they were innovative in developing practical solutions to overcome barriers to mort-
gage lending. This is why privatization in the banking sector had a positive eﬀect on the 
development of the legal and regulatory framework for mortgage lending. 
3. HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
Early analyses of transition countries documented very high housing price-to-income 
(P/I) ratios. Ratios with housing prices equivalent to 10–12 years of average household 
income were reported (Renaud 2004). However, the interpretation of these high P/I 
ratios is highly questionable. First, the East European Housing Model (EEHM) was 
represented by a “dual market,” where beside the dominant state sector a private sphere 
was also present. In the state sector there was an “equilibrium” among income, prices, 
cost, and waiting-list length based on bureaucratic coordination (Kornai 1981). But 
in the private sector a quasi-market15 equilibrium was set. The P/I ratio represented 
aﬀordability on the quasi-market sector, but the private sphere typically represented 
only a small part of the housing system. Thus, using the P/I ratio as an indicator of 
pre-transition housing aﬀordability is highly questionable. 
After the collapse of the centrally planned economy, the use of P/I ratio as an aﬀord-
ability indicator is legitimate. The reported P/I ratios in transition countries were very 
high at the beginning of the 1990s but tended to decrease afterwards. The hypothetical 
reasons were decreasing demographic pressure, privatization that increased the supply 
of units on oﬀer, decreasing real income, macroeconomic insecurity, and similar factors. 
As a consequence of these processes, the reported P/I ratio in the second half of the 
1990s went to 4–6, a great improvement but still high compared with some market 
housing systems, such as the US. The number of transactions started to increase at this 
time—a sign of a healthy housing market—but reported mobility rates remained quite 
low in comparison with Western countries. 
At the end of 1990s, housing prices started to increase again as a consequence of 
economic stabilization, but other factors played a role in each case. Because increase in 
average income was lower than the price increases, the increased P/I ratio pointed to an 
aﬀordability problem. It is not easy to demonstrate this trend as price information is quite 
unreliable in transition countries.16 The case studies in this volume detail these trends 
(see particularly those for Slovenia, Romania, and Hungary). In Ljubljana, for example, 
the average asking price increased from 1100 EUR/m2 to 1800 EUR/m2 between 1996 
and 2004, which is a 60–70 percent increase. In Hungary the average price (based on 
national household survey) increased from 1999 to 2003 by 56 percent in real value.17
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To compare the price/income information we designed a small pilot comparison 
based on information related to standard housing units and “standard” income. The 
standard housing units were deﬁned in the following way:18
 Type 1: capital city, unit located 30–45 minutes traveling distance from the center, 
housing estates built in the 1970s and 1980s, average condition, 2 room 
apartment
 Type 2: capital city, good location, suburban, built in the 1990s, 100–120 m2
 Type 3: capital city, unit located in a traditional suburban/village environment, not 
high prestige, family house built before 1990, 100–120 m2
 Type 4: small city with 30–50 thousand inhabitants, housing estates built in 70s 
and 1980s average condition, 2 room apartment
 Type 5: Town/village (less than 30 thousand inhabitants), family house built before 
1990, 100–120 m2.
Table 1.4
Average estimated price of diﬀerent housing unit types in 2004 
[USD]
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Croatia 90,000 210,000 90,000 50,000 70,000
Czech Republic 49,500 100,000 100,000 66,000 46,000
Hungary 50,000 150,000 80,000 35,000 30,000
Kazakhstan 40,000 66,000 35,000 16,500 21,500
Poland 95,000 150,000 123,000 25,000 59,000
Romania 28,000 125,000 44,000 20,000 60,000
Russia 55,000 220,000 180,000 15,000 n.a.
Slovenia 97,000 400,000 291,000 218,000 121,000
Source: Country reports.
While there are clear positive correlations between house prices and the GDP of 
diﬀerent countries, in countries with lower GDP house prices are over-valued. In the 
available price information, one distortion is related to the demand by foreigners in 
capital cities. This part of the market is on the priority list of the real estate industry, 
and it is inevitable that price information of the high-end market dominates the real 
estate advertisements. 
For these calculations, income was deﬁned as follows:
 Type A:  daily rate for cleaning woman in the private sector (USD)
 Type B:  daily rate for a handyman (gardening, construction work) (USD)
 Type C: average net income of public servant (teacher at gymnasium with 5 
 years experience) (USD).
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Table 1.5
Average estimated annual income of diﬀerent working position in 2004 [USD]
 Type A Type B Type C
Croatia 5,200 4,700 7,900
Czech Republic 3,500 5,600 9,100
Hungary 6,500 8,600 5,700
Kazakhstan 700 1,900 1,600
Poland 3,200 4,000 3,800
Romania 2,400 3,600 3,000
Russia 2,100 1,300 900
Slovenia 4,200 7,600 10,800
Source: Country reports.
The ﬁgures in the table highlight the diﬀerences in the valuation of diﬀerent kinds 
of work in diﬀerent countries during transition. Interestingly, a private sector cleaning 
person earns more in Russia than a schoolteacher.  
These P/I ratios in Table 1.6 represent the complexity of the problem caused by 
the structure of the housing market and the job market. The estimated ratios show the 
diﬀerence among the countries in terms of the over-valuation of real estate markets. 
Table 1.6 
Average prices and average household incomes and estimated price-to-income ratios19
Average house price [USD] Household income [USD/year] P/I ratio
Croatia 81,000 12,900 6.3
Czech Republic 64,000 13,700 4.7
Hungary 51,000 13,200 3.9
Kazakhstan 29,000 2,900 9.9
Poland 76,000 7,400 10.3
Romania 46,000 6,000 7.6
Russia 68,000 2,700 25.2
Slovenia 184,000 16,700 11.0
Among the CEE countries, the housing markets of Poland and Slovenia seem to be 
over-valued. Among CIS nations the ratio for Russia is particularly striking.
Housing aﬀordability can be improved either through subsidies or through improv-
ing the accessibility of mortgage loans. Decreasing interest rates in recent years have 
made housing loans more aﬀordable in most regions. The housing aﬀordability index 
(HAI)20 is sensitive to both house prices and interest rates. Using the house price and 
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income data given in Table 1.3, we calculated the housing aﬀordability index (HAI) for 
the countries in the table. The HAI measures the percentage of average housing that can 
be purchased by a household with the income deﬁned above with a loan under typical 
terms, provided the loan-to-value ratio is 80 percent and the maximum monthly pay-
ment is 33 percent of the household’s income. 
Table 1.7
Housing Aﬀordability Index, 2004
Average 
house-price 
[thousand USD]
Household income 
[USD/year]
Maximum 
interest rate 
of a typical loan
HAI
[%]
Croatia 81,000 12,900 8.5 63
Czech Republic 64,000 13,700 7.0 95
Hungary 51,000 13,200 9.5 95
Kazakhstan 29,000 2,900 13.0 30
Poland 76,000 7,400 6.5 45
Romania 46,000 6,000 10.0 46
Russia 68,000 2,700 15.0 10
Slovenia 184,000 16,700 6.5 42
Source: Country reports.
The range of HAI values is impressive, from the Czech Republic and Hungary, where 
95 percent of the cost of the average unit could be covered by a fairly typical household 
using a mortgage loan available on the market, to Russia where the ﬁgure is a mere 10 
percent. Croatia and Romania have quite good index values, with Romania, Poland, 
and Slovenia in less strong positions.
The decline in interest rates led to an increased demand for housing. However there 
is a concern that augmented demand could generate house price increases that would 
again worsen aﬀordability. Overall, the case studies provided a contradictory picture in 
terms of the eﬀects of increased loans on prices: 
 1. Initial house-price increases can be explained by factors exogenous to the housing 
system, such as saving behavior and macroeconomic changes. The real house-
price increases made housing investments proﬁtable and generated demand 
for housing loans. As the housing ﬁnance system responded to these demands, 
house prices increased, and the possibility of the house-price bubble disappeared 
as demand was chocked oﬀ.21 
 2. House-price increases are a response to economic growth and increased avail-
ability of housing loans, where, because of inﬂexible housing output, supply 
cannot keep pace with demand. In the case of Slovenia, Cirman (this volume) 
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found a strong relationship between the volume of loans issued by the National 
Housing Fund and price increases. 
Rigid supply could cause price increases, which can control excess demand as in 
the cases of Poland and Slovenia. However, in Hungary excess demand did not cause a 
sharp increase in house-price inﬂation. 
4. HOUSING GOVERNANCE
Following transition, housing policy has been constrained by ﬁscal control. Housing 
privatization in itself (that is, privatization to the sitting tenants) had a positive short-
term ﬁscal eﬀect, but the privatization of housing ﬁnance and the construction industry 
was more important. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, housing lost its political importance 
and, due to the collapse of the traditional state housing sector, subsidy levels decreased 
very rapidly. Early observers argued that in the socialist period there was a huge under-
investment (Telgarsky and Struyk 1999); but, because of ﬁscal pressure and economic 
crisis, housing investments were even less after transition. Both direct budget subsidies 
and indirect (oﬀ budget) subsidies decreased. Parallel to the restructuring of housing 
services the hidden subsidy transferred through low service prices gradually disap-
peared (or at least decreased). Through the decline in housing output, direct subsidies 
decreased as well. 
We do not have good comparative data for subsidy levels in these countries, but 
0.8–1.2 percent of GDP is typical. This is at the low end of the scale among European 
countries. In the Czech Republic, housing subsidies reached 1.12 percent of GDP (2002), 
but by including hidden subsidies (e.g., subsidies through the below-market rent of the 
municipal sector) it could be estimated at 1.4–1.9 percent of GDP (Sunega 2004). In 
Hungary, housing subsidies grew from 0.8 to 1.7 percent of GDP between 1998 and 
2003.22 The eﬀectiveness of housing reforms was inﬂuenced by institutional structures. 
Housing-related policy tasks were typically distributed between several ministries, and 
as a consequence of decentralization the housing responsibilities were shared between 
the central and local government as well. A National Housing Fund was set up in sev-
eral countries (Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) to manage housing 
programs ﬁnanced partly through the revenue from housing privatization.23 The Polish 
fund was administered by the General Development Bank (BGK), which used funds 
to support a social housing program. These revenues had to be supplemented from the 
budget to operate a substantial program.
One of the exceptions was Slovenia, where the National Housing Fund set up in 1991 
to collect revenue from housing privatization played a proactive role in housing policy. 
It had become the biggest ﬁnancial institution in the housing market by the beginning 
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of 2000.24 The National Housing Agencies in Romania, Albania, and Hungary played 
a less important role, as these agencies could not integrate sector policy. They played no 
greater role than a ministry department, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
At the turn of the century, governments in the region turned to housing policy again 
with the intention to launch social programs. The targets of these new ambitious strate-
gies outlined in government papers have not been realized, with eﬀects on subsidized 
social housing rendered questionable in most cases (Hegedüs 2004). The basic reason for 
this failure is that targeted programs for low-income groups can work only if housing is 
basically aﬀordable for the middle class—and aﬀordability in market societies depends 
heavily on the eﬀectiveness of the housing ﬁnance system. 
5. CREATING A NEW HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
Emergence of the Mortgage Market
Housing ﬁnance development was tied to economic stabilization. Stable macroeconomic 
indicators were preconditions for ﬁnancial development. Transition countries are at very 
diﬀerent stages in terms of their ﬁnancial development, which can be characterized by 
ﬁnancial depth as measured by the ratio of outstanding bank credit to GDP. This can 
be illustrated with ﬁgures for 2002. At that time, one set of countries was at a very low 
level of development, with credit-to-GDP ratio under 30 percent (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Romania); a second set had rather higher values in the 40–60 percent range (e.g., 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland). By comparison, the value for Germany was 145 percent 
(World Bank 2004). As one would expect, emergence of a new housing ﬁnance system 
is closely related to the restructuring of the ﬁnance sector, namely bank privatization 
and abolition of state monopoly institutions.
During the ﬁrst 5–6 years of transition, early attempts to introduce innovations in 
mortgage products and credit enhancements, i.e., indexed loan products and mortgage 
insurance/guarantee schemes, were unsuccessful because of the lack of a stable macro-
economic environment and clear incentives to the private banking sector (Diamond 
1999). There were several explanations for the low level of housing ﬁnance at this time, 
referring both to demand and supply. On the supply side, the argument was that banks 
had more interest in ﬁnancing government debt and the corporate (commercial real 
estate) sector than the housing sector. On the demand side, high interest rates, decreas-
ing real incomes, and high inﬂation were the most important factors. However, some 
observers argued that the behavior of the typical East European homebuyer could be 
an obstacle, as s/he does not like to borrow, does not like to spend much on hous-
ing (more on cars and other durables) and does not relate to the “Western culture of 
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homeownership” (Diamond 1999). The recent boom in the housing mortgage market 
in most of the CEE countries does not support these behavioral arguments, although 
it is possible that behavior has changed. 
In CEE countries, the foremost sign of stabilization was decreasing inﬂation and 
interest rates, which made the growth of the mortgage market feasible.
Even after major institutional changes, such as liberalization of the ﬁnancial system 
and privatization of the banking sector, had taken place, the level of mortgage lending 
remained low until the end of the 1990s. (See Table 1.8, where the ratio of the total 
stock of outstanding housing loans to the GDP is shown.) To provide some perspective, 
note that the average ratio in EU countries is 40 percent. However, in the past few years, 
partly because of macroeconomic changes, partly because of new subsidy schemes, the 
volume of borrowing has increased.
Table 1.8
Ratio of stock of outstanding loans to GDP [%]
 2000 2001 2002 2003
Russia n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.1
Romania n.a. n.a. 0.2 ~1.0 
Poland 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.7
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.6
Czech Republic n.a. 1.4 2 3
Croatia 5.5 5.7 7.6 9.6
Hungary 1.5 2.3 4.8 7.8
Slovenia 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.5
                  Contrast
Germany 54.1 54.1 54 54.3
Note: n.a. no such data available.
Source: country reports.
Funding Issues
In emerging mortgage markets, the basic question was how loan issuance would be 
funded. In the beginning the commercial banks were the only institutions that played 
some role in funding loans. Typically they used deposits or “consortia-loans” to ﬁnance 
the loans they issued. Banks were the ﬁrst ﬁnancial institutions on the market, and 
other players needed alternative funding schemes that required new legislation and 
additional ﬁscal support. 
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Surprisingly, the contract savings institutions were the ﬁrst alternative funding 
scheme (see Table 1.9). They were set up in several countries with varying success. 
Mortgage banks were set up in the middle of the 1990s in the Czech Republic, and later 
in Hungary and Poland, and most recently in Romania. But beside the legal possibility, 
these new institutions needed state support as well, Hungary being a good example. 
As a third approach, a state agency as a funding institution played an important role 
in Slovenia, Poland, and Romania partly using budgetary sources and partly using 
revenues from bond issuances. In Russia secondary institutions were set up in 1997, 
but their possible progress was halted by the ﬁnancial crisis in 1998 and really resumed 
only in 2001, with the government-sponsored Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending 
and Delta Credit, a private organization initiated with donor-support, being by far the 
most important. The new Kazakh secondary institutions were set up in 2000 and they 
have had an increasing role. 
Table 1.9
Primary and secondary institutions and their starting year of operation
 
 
Banks Mortgage 
Banks
Bau-
sparkassen
Secondary 
institutions
State 
agenciesCommercial 
Banks*
Mortgage 
Bond Issuers
Russia Y 2004 1997
Romania Y 2004 2004 1999
Poland Y 1998 1999
Kazakhstan Y 2002 2000 2003
Czech Republic Y 1995 1995 1993 2000
Croatia Y 1997 1997
Hungary Y 1998 1997
Slovenia Y     1991
Contrast
Germany Y Over 
100 years 
ago
Over 
100 years
ago
Y KfW security 
programs 
since 2000
1948
Notes: * Some commercial banks operated before the socialist era, but most restarted operation 
 only after the transition 
  Empty cells means no such institution exists.
Commercial Banks
Commercial banks are the main mortgage provider in transition countries. As a result of 
banking reform (especially privatization), the former monopoly of state-owned savings 
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banks was relaxed. Nevertheless, they often succeeded in maintaining a leading role on 
the market in some form. Competition became the main engine of development. But 
competition was delayed because the new private banks (often with foreign owners) 
considered the mortgage market the most risky area of banking. 
Eventually, with a stable macroeconomic environment and predictable legal 
conditions the mortgage market proved to be a proﬁtable business, which unleashed 
broad-based competition.
The Success of the Bausparkasse Contract Savings Schemes
Contract saving schemes proved to be the most visible institutional innovation in 
housing ﬁnance in transition countries in the 1990s. By 2003 several countries had 
introduced some version of the bausparkasse institutions that originated in Germany; 
most prominent were the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Croatia. A certain 
type of contract saving was used in the pre-transition period (Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Yugoslavia) that had special saving programs linked to special subsidized loans. But 
these ﬁnancial instruments could not operate in a high inﬂationary environment, so 
they disappeared after transition. 
The possible role of contract savings institutions was questioned by several experts 
when they were introduced, and it is not easy to explain their success. On the basis of 
ten years’ experience, we can conclude that there is no clear connection between the 
presence of contract savings institutions and the size of the market, either in terms of 
the volume of the mortgage or the new housing investments. 
The German-type contract savings system was adopted ﬁrst in the Czech Republic 
in 1993, and Slovakia in 1994; Hungary followed in 1997. The role that a contract 
savings institution plays in a country depends very much on the subsidy structure and 
the detailed regulations governing both contract savings and the loan products. In the 
Czech Republic, for example, the bausparkasse contracts became very popular because 
of the deep subsidy, and as a consequence the government spent 0.5 percent of GDP 
supporting contract saving schemes in 2002 (Sunega 2002). While in Slovakia in con-
trast, the government spends only half of that (Dübel 2003).
In Poland certain types of contract savings schemes exist in principle: one is tradi-
tional without institutional backing and the other is the bausparkasse system, which has 
not received political and ﬁnancial support. Poland was the only country that successfully 
resisted the pressure exerted by the bausparkasse lobby group. 
Slovenia followed in a special way by adopting the contract saving scheme. The 
government set up the National Housing Saving Schemes—basically a subsidy scheme 
that households can join through banks. In contrast to the typical solution (Czech, 
Slovak, and Hungarian) there is no specialized ﬁnancial institution. It is a closed subsidy 
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scheme, where the government could limit the total sum of subsidy given in one year, 
while the other schemes are open-ended subsidies.
In Kazakhstan, the main housing bank (Kazkommertsbank) is private and oﬀers 
special saving programs in which the savers will enjoy favorable loan conditions after a 
certain period of savings. 
Mortgage Banking
The two basic options funding housing loans are the bond market accessed by mortgage 
banks and secondary institutions and the commercial banks’ and savings banks’ deposit 
system.25 International experiences show that while the bond-oriented system developed 
faster in the last 20 years, the deposit-based system dominates the European market.26 
In transition countries there are two options for mortgage bond ﬁnance. One op-
tion was chosen by Hungary and Poland, where legislation requires a special mortgage 
bank institution to issue mortgage bonds. The other option, used in the Czech Republic, 
Kazakhstan, and Bulgaria, is where commercial banks are given a license to issue bonds 
backed by housing (mortgage) loans.
The only country that has issued a substantial volume of mortgage bonds is Hun-
gary, where between 2002 and 2004 outstanding mortgage bonds increased from 380 
million EUR to 4,600 million EUR. The Czech Republic, which was considered the 
most developed in respect of mortgage bond ﬁnance, increased its volume in the same 
period from 900 million EUR to 1700 million EUR. Slovakia and Poland have used 
mortgage bonds for housing ﬁnance but at quite a moderate level (Lassen 2004). 
These facts show how fast the housing ﬁnance systems are changing and it is not 
easy to explain the rationale behind the policy decisions for adopting diﬀerent mortgage 
system architectures. 
The Possibility of the Secondary Market
Secondary market institution (SMI) provide a special funding mechanism, where funds 
come from much wider sources like the capital and bond markets in contrast to the 
traditional deposit-based model. In transition countries the rationale for setting up a 
secondary institution is the lack of long-term bank deposits. Banks with short term 
liabilities can fund long-term mortgages with deposits only if they are willing to take 
signiﬁcant interest rate risks. A debate ensued over whether an underdeveloped mortgage-
market SMI will take too high a risk because they do not have suﬃcient information 
about the quality of the mortgage portfolio.27 In practice, Russia was the ﬁrst among 
transition countries to introduce a SMI. A federal Agency for Mortgage Lending was 
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founded in 1996 to encourage mortgage lending by buying mortgage loans from banks 
and then selling them to investors on the secondary market. This program foresees a 
diversiﬁcation of risks between mortgage lenders, a mortgage agency, and an investor 
who buys mortgage securities through the uniﬁed standard for mortgage reﬁnancing. 
Regional Mortgage Agencies were also set up to promote mortgage lending. However, 
in Russia partly because of the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis the development of the mortgage 
market was delayed, although it has evolved very rapidly in the past three years. 
In Kazakhstan, the National Bank established a secondary institution (the Kazakh-
stan Mortgage Company) to reﬁnance banks’ mortgage portfolio. The KMC, implicitly 
guaranteed by the government, purchases mortgage loans from the participating banks 
and then issues securities to investors backed by the purchased portfolio. 
Managing Risks
Managing risk is a major factor explaining the development of the mortgage market in 
transition countries. A stable and predictable legal and regulatory framework is the key 
element in mortgage risk management. However, the ﬁnancial institutions themselves 
have to develop methods to manage risks. High risks, priced properly, lead to unaﬀord-
able interest rates, and a very narrow mortgage market. The framework paper by Robert 
Van Order gives a deep analysis of the element inﬂuencing credit risk and treats other 
types of risks such as interest rate risk and prepayment risk as well. 
The entries in Table 1.10 summarize the main features of credit risk and prepay-
ment risk management in eight transition countries and Germany. While we can give 
an “impression” of the quality of risk management, the country-by-country details 
are very important. As mortgage lending has just started in most transition countries, 
the quality of the new loan portfolios is considered quite good. No country reported 
delinquencies on a mass scale. However, the methods diﬀerent countries develop to 
mange this risk are important.
The table shows that experts from all the countries except Slovenia rate the reli-
ability of their title and lien registrations system as “high.” With respect to foreclosure 
proceedings against borrowers in default, there is an interesting mix of in-court and 
out-of-court procedures as the dominant practice. In Romania, Kazakhstan, and Hun-
gary out-of-court settlements are more common than in-court. While there is quite a 
high level of certainty that the creditor will prevail in obtaining the property to satisfy 
its claim, in three countries—Poland, Croatia, and Slovenia—the process is slow, i.e., 
consistently requiring more than six months.
House-price volatility is an important default factor. Thus reliable system of the 
house-price valuation would be an important “public good” for the ﬁnancial sector. In 
the absence of public information, individual banks have to develop their own valuation 
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service and data base. This has happened in Hungary. The government recently made 
eﬀorts to set up a public data base for reliable market prices. 
Competing banks have also developed a method to improve underwriting mortgages 
in the case of missing information (for example, in the case of underreported income). 
In Hungary, for example, banks underwrite loans with “minimum” income if the loan/
value ratio is under 50 percent, even if the justiﬁed income is below the minimum (the 
payment/income ratio is higher than the 30 percent).
While mortgage default insurance holds the promise of lowering interest rates by 
spreading default risk over a wider pool of loans, it has not been widely adopted to date, 
in part because the short lending history makes the steady-state default experience hard 
to deﬁne and the insurance diﬃcult to price. Among countries included in the table, 
only Poland and the Czech Republic have implemented schemes.
With respect to prepayment risk, banks can reduce their risk by having “lock out” 
periods deﬁned in the loan contract during which prepayment is prohibited. They can 
also charge penalties for prepayment, if the market will accept them. As shown in the 
table, most countries in our sample have legal provisions that ensure borrowers’ right 
to prepay. Banks may still charge penalty fees, however.
High real interest rates are a typical consequence of the high risk levels. However, it 
is also possible that the oligopoly of banks is being exploited to increase proﬁts. A 6–7 
percent margin, i.e., a spread of loan interest rates above the cost of liabilities, is seen 
across the region. This is very high by western standards.
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Loan Products—Risk Management
Traditional housing loans in transition countries could not be called mortgage loans 
because they were not typically secured by the property in question. After transition 
the typical housing loan was relatively short-term (up to ten years), with a low loan-to-
value ratio, and carried a high, variable real interest rate, and, in many countries, was 
denominated in a foreign currency (see Table 1.11 the ﬁrst three most common type 
of loan products).
In the middle of the 1990s special loan instruments were proposed and developed 
in the Central East European countries (Poland, Hungary) tailored to the high inﬂation 
environment in these countries. These instruments had limited success partly because 
of the complexity of the loan product and partly because the high real interest rate 
limited the demand for these products. After inﬂation fell under 10 percent, there was 
no further need for these products.
In the period of high inﬂation, currency-based28 loans could provide safety against 
inﬂation at the cost of exchange-rate risk. In recent years, as a consequence of accession 
to EU, in countries like Poland and Hungary, the currency-denominated loan became 
popular not because of inﬂation but because of the lower real interest rate. In Hungary, 
for example, the subsidized loan is more expensive than the Swiss-frank-based loans 
without the interest rate subsidy because of the diﬀerence in the real interest rate. There 
is a danger that consumers are not able to evaluate these two risk (exchange-rate risk 
and interest rate risk), and in the future delinquency will become a real social issue. 
However, competition has had a positive eﬀect on the market up to now. 
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6. HOUSING FINANCE SUBSIDIES
The positive evolution of housing ﬁnance systems in the region has depended on 
macroeconomic consolidation; without a stable macroeconomic environment private 
funds cannot be drawn into housing ﬁnance, and no housing ﬁnance system can be 
maintained exclusively on public funds (Struyk 1996, Renaud 1996). Mixing housing 
loans and housing subsidies was seen as one of the most important obstacles to the 
development of the housing ﬁnance systems in transition countries. Subsidized hous-
ing loans could crowd out market-rate loans made by private banks. This happened in 
Hungary with the increased new construction subsidy between 1994 and 1998, but 
between 2000 and 2004 diﬀerent subsidies did not substitute, but rather complemented 
private housing ﬁnance. 
Housing subsidies have been in the center of policy discussion. One extreme 
view states that housing subsidies should be restricted only to the neediest groups and 
should be applied as a part of the safety net, because every intervention into the hous-
ing ﬁnance system causes distortions with high public costs. The other extreme is that 
housing subsidies are a necessary part of the housing ﬁnance system and their role is 
unavoidable in development of the housing ﬁnance system. Moreover, the scope of the 
subsidies should include well-oﬀ households in order to maximize the multiplier eﬀects 
of housing investment on the whole economy. The framework paper in this volume by 
Diamond gives a very good overview of the rationale and present practice of housing 
ﬁnance subsidies in transition countries. One of the main conclusions is that the role of 
subsidies should be regarded only in context, and there are no generally “good/eﬃcient” 
or “bad/ineﬃcient” subsidies.29 
Table 1.12 summarizes the housing subsidies associated with home purchase in 
eight countries in the region. Such subsidies are common: six countries aﬀord support 
through income tax advantages, four through subsidies that lower the interest paid by 
the borrower, and four through down payment subsidies. Russia and Hungary have the 
dubious distinction of employing all three subsidy types.
This volume investigates the role the state has had in the transformation of housing 
ﬁnance systems and attempts to identify positive roles the state can play. Two factors could 
explain the diﬀerences among transition countries: the regulatory role of the state and 
housing ﬁnance subsidies. Public intervention has been an important factor in forming 
the housing ﬁnance system, sometimes preventing mortgage market development.30 By 
creating the proper legal environment for the housing ﬁnance system, governments had 
important eﬀects even without direct ﬁnancial intervention. However, state institutions 
even in the absence of a direct subsidy often presented implicit guarantees that could 
contribute to market development. And it is not easy to evaluate the implicit subsidies 
in these systems—just consider the debates on the implicit subsidies among US second-
ary mortgage institutions.
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A good example of strong government inﬂuence on the mortgage market is Kazakh-
stan, where a government guaranteed agency (KCM) contributed to the development 
of the mortgage market. The agency controls almost 10 percent of the market through 
purchasing loans from originating banks. The government provides an income tax 
exemption on the income from income on the bonds sold to ﬁnance the mortgage pur-
chases, suggesting an implicit guarantee. Thus, the cheaper resources (subsidized by the 
government) make it possible to force uncooperative banks to decrease their prices. 
Table 1.12
Loan-related subsidies
Interest 
rate
PIT Down-
payments
Comments
Russia Y Y Y
Romania N N Y Down-payment subsides: 20% up-front grant for 
young first-time buyers under 35 with NHA. 
Poland Y Y N Interest rate subsidies: loans with fixed interest 
(state subsidy to guarantee fixed interest). 
System badly prepared and has no future. 
Personal income tax subsidy: limited size of 
deductions, only for citizens not benefiting from 
previous subsidy systems. So far very limited, 
less than 10% (majority benefited from old 
system), may grow quickly in the future. 
Kazakhstan N N N  
Czech Republic Y Y N  
Croatia N Y N From the tax base, USD 1,960.8 (paid for 
interest) is deductible.
Hungary Y Y Y PIT: 40% of the loan repayment is deducted 
from taxes up to USD 1,154.3 per year 
(in 2004: USD 577.15).
Down-payment subsidy: mainly for newly built 
homes depending on the number of children. 
Slovenia N Y Y PIT: very low since deductions are allowed—
only up to 3% of taxable income, but within 3% 
of taxable income other deductions are allowed 
for money spent for medicine, private health 
insurance, private pension insurance.
Government programs typically attempt to generate mortgage lending for the 
low- and middle-income mortgage markets. These programs generally will fail without 
improvement in the general mortgage sector institutions for the high-income mort-
gage market. In Romania, the NHA program for middle-income households had a 
limited eﬀect because of the lack of liberalization of the mortgage market for high 
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income groups. One can question the success of the Hungarian program that operated 
a generous subsidy scheme open to high income groups. The question is whether the 
development of the high income mortgage market supported by substantial subsidies 
will result in the development of middle-income mortgage markets. The problem is 
that at start-up a subsidy program typically reaches the higher income groups ﬁrst; but, 
when it moves to lower income groups, the subsidy level is often decreased because of 
ﬁscal constraints—the program has become too expensive. Thus, a key issue is setting 
the subsidy at a sustainable level. 
Slovene housing policy has followed a special path. The National Housing Agency 
played an active role forming the housing market, and it adjusted its role to the chang-
ing market conditions. After privatization was completed, it started to act as a mortgage 
institution that raised funds on the market and made subsidized loans with the subsidy 
cost borne by the budget. After 2000 the NHF was transformed into a real estate fund 
that, through investment in construction, will be able to inﬂuence market supply. This 
is an example of a state institution playing an active market role without crowding out 
the private sector. 
7. CONCLUSION
What can we learn from the past 15 years’ experiences? The studies in this book il-
lustrate that from a common point of origin a great variety of housing ﬁnance systems 
emerged, each reﬂecting the historical, economic, and political realities of the particular 
country. The speciﬁc attributes of each new housing ﬁnance system can be explained 
by the combined inﬂuences of existing institutions (“path dependence”), eﬃciency 
of “knowledge transfer,” and the role of local politics. Looking at the main funding 
structures, the cases studied demonstrate that diﬀerent countries are following diﬀerent 
models (characterized with the relative shares of mortgages originated or funded through 
contract savings, commercial banks, mortgage banks, and secondary institutions). This 
is not a surprise if we look at the European housing ﬁnance systems which essentially 
follow the same diverse pattern. Even in a single country we ﬁnd diﬀerent models, for 
example, Germany, where diﬀerent housing models compete with each other.
There are no simple explanations why a certain country has chosen a particular 
model. Why has the Polish market been closed to the big bausparkasse banks? Why did 
the Slovenians base their institutional development on the Housing Agency? Why did 
mortgage banks became so important in Hungary? It would be diﬃcult to explain the 
various developments as well as the speciﬁc cultural, social, and economic needs of the 
country. Arbitrary factors played a role even as path dependent and situational elements 
were important. Moreover, one should not overlook eﬀects of the advice and marketing 
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of speciﬁc models and instruments by Western aid agencies, ﬁnancial institutions, and 
insurance companies looking to develop new markets. 
The basic question is how the institutional developments in themselves aﬀect the 
eﬃciency of the housing ﬁnance system. The term “eﬃciency” has been used in very 
diﬀerent ways in scholarship on the subject, and is not easy to deﬁne. The diﬃculty 
is caused by the fact that we should compare the output, impact, and cost of the pro-
grams, after controlling other eﬀects like macroeconomic and macro-ﬁnancing. One 
important element of an eﬃcient housing (and economic) system is that the standard 
level of housing is aﬀordable for the majority of the population both in the owner-oc-
cupied or rented sector.
The choice between models does not in itself determine the eﬃciency of the hous-
ing ﬁnance system, because it depends on the institutional and technical details inside 
the models such as the existence of competition, the regulatory capacity of the govern-
ment and central bank, and the eﬃciency of the housing subsidies. Eﬃciency is also 
inﬂuenced by the capacity of the housing system (governments, banks, households) to 
correct the rules and their behavior in a timely manner when necessary. The eﬀect of a 
certain combination of ﬁnancial tools depends on several factors such as the real beneﬁt 
to borrowers and lenders, households’ capacity and willingness to take advantage of the 
tools, and the ﬁscal and economic eﬀects of certain solutions. There is broad agreement 
among experts that the contract saving schemes (“bausparkasse”),  contribute less to an 
eﬃcient housing ﬁnance system,than other funding systems.  This approach is generally 
less eﬃcient. In contrast, the eﬃciency diﬀerence between the mortgage-bank dominated 
systems (like Hungary’s) or the retail-bank dominated systems (like in Poland) depends 
on the details of how the systems operate and  therefore their overall regulation.  
One major recommendation is that governments  build their capacity so that public 
policy analyses can improve the legal and ﬁnancial regulations whatever housing ﬁnance 
system they have chosen. Correction of unforeseen negative eﬀects caused by ill-advised 
steps, ineﬃcient institutional arrangements, and regressive subsidies may be the most 
important elements in ultimately determining eﬃciency. It is important to remember 
that public debate on the relative advantages of diﬀerent models is dominated by the 
views of those representing speciﬁc institutional interests. Governments must have the 
capacity to have an independent view on public policy issues and not to be captured 
by special interest groups. 
The basic question is how evolving institutional reforms will inﬂuence the eﬀective-
ness of the housing ﬁnance system. The high growth rate of outstanding mortgages is 
generally a healthy trend but only if the interest rate and liquidity risks of these large 
balances  are properly managed. Governments have to evaluate their policy from the point 
of view of ﬁnancial and ﬁscal sustainability. A short-term “generous” but longer-term 
unfeasible program could cause more damage as supporting the illusion that housing 
is public responsibility.
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This volume demonstrates that without an eﬃcient housing ﬁnance system no 
socially committed housing policy can be developed. A key recommendation based on 
the experiences of the transition countries studied in this volume is that governments 
must undertake the very substantial eﬀorts essential to designing institutional reforms 
where needed, and even  oﬀering the  subsidies that may be  necessary to induce the 
institutional cooperation needed for reform implementation. 
To improve  governance in the housing sector is a key recommendation. It is critical 
for the responsibility of the design and implementation of interventions in both hous-
ing ﬁnance and in housing assistance to be shared among diﬀerent private and public 
stakeholders. Without this type of cooperation, experience suggests that even the best 
administration is inadequate. An additional conclusion is that creation of fair competi-
tion is one of the most important elements of a well-functioning system. 
Social housing policy needs a well-targeted subsidy system. However, on the basis 
of our experiences, targeting is not politically feasible without the support of the middle 
class. If housing is not aﬀordable for the middle- and even upper-middle-income groups, 
subsidy programs will become regressive—helping higher income groups more than 
low income groups.  An eﬃcient mortgage ﬁnance system makes housing aﬀordable for 
the middle class, sometimes through shallow housing subsidy schemes (tax advantages, 
interest rate subsidies, etc.) and frees up budget sources for social programs. 
Increasing the eﬃciency of the housing ﬁnance system turns our attention to the 
immature social housing policies in the region. Fairness and eﬃciency should be com-
plementary and not act as substitutes for each other. 
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ENDNOTES
1 We would like to thank Robert Buckley, Jacek Łaszek, Martin Lux, and Bruce Walker for their useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 The terms “housing system” and “housing sector” are used interchangeably for describing both the 
institutional/legal environment and the technical aspects (housing units, production, and housing 
related services) of the residential living conditions of the population. Housing policy is used to 
describe the legal and ﬁnancial means of intervention used by governments.
3 The common elements of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial schemes used in privatization were their “give-
away” character, meaning that prices were free or not more than 15% of market prices. The negative 
consequences of privatization were related to that fact that management and aﬀordability issues of 
privatized units were neglected. However, it is questionable whether more complicated institutional 
solutions such as housing associations, cooperatives, or shared ownership models could have been 
feasible.
4 See especially Struyk (1996, 2000), Hegedüs, Mayo, and Tosics (1996), Diamond (1999), Lux 
(2003), Dübel (2004), several conferences such as OECD 2000 and UN 2005. 
5 The Metropolitan Research Institute (Budapest), the Institute of Urban Economics (Moscow), and 
the Urban Institute (Washington) carried out a comparative research project on the relation between 
the mortgage market and housing aﬀordability in Budapest and Moscow. Work on this project was 
supported by the US Agency for International Development, through the Thinktank Partnership 
Project, Contract #PCE-I-00-00-00014-00, Task Order #803. The main results of the program were 
published in Hegedüs et al (2004).
6 Data on housing tenure, one of the basic characteristics of the housing system, are very questionable. 
We do not have reliable data on the private rental sectors as private landlords tend to evade registration 
for tax reasons.
7 This approach could be conceived as a “soft structuralist” approach, which combines “rational choice” 
(policy choice or agency choice) with structural elements. In our earlier work we followed this 
argumentation, for example, in the explanation of “self-help” housing in Hungary (Hegedüs 1992). 
8 One of the outliers is Bulgaria, where a high level of urbanization was accompanied by a small pubic 
rental sector. This demonstrates that high levels of homeownership do not mean that the housing 
sector is market oriented. State control over owner-occupation could be as strong as state control over 
public rental (typically, in other countries tenants in the public sector enjoyed important property 
rights).
9 Buckley and Tsenkova (2003: 19) characterized the market-based housing system as one in which 
market mechanisms dominate production, allocation, and consumption of housing; where there 
is suﬃcient competition among agents and institutions in the interrelated markets for housing 
ﬁnance, resources, and services; and governments provide subsidies that are relatively transparent, 
progressively targeted, and budgeted in sustainable ways.
10 While structural changes were postponed in the social service sector, new elements emerged partly 
related to the housing sector. 
11 Kemeny’s two models (Kemeny 1995) are frequently used as real policy options.
12 This problem can be illustrated with the excellent book edited by M. Lux (2003), which had to 
introduce a separate heading for Bulgaria, as a separate model. In an earlier paper, we used the same 
approach (Gerőházi, Hegedüs, and Tosics 2000).
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13 CEE (Central East Europe: the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia; Baltic 
(Baltic states): Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonian; SEE (Southeast Europe): Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, 
Croatia, and Romania; FSU–A (Former Soviet Union—A): the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Moldavia; FSU–B (Former Soviet Union—B): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
14 In the case of Slovenia, Cirman (in this volume) argues that housing construction by  individuals 
remained at the same level, thus the decrease was completely due to state sector withdrawal.
15 “Quasi” because the feedback mechanism to correct the disequilibrium of demand and supply was 
under state control.
16 We have to add that the methodologies used to measure house prices in European countries are far 
from standardized (ECB 2003).
17 It is worth mentioning that in the last decade house prices tend to increase continously in real terms 
in most part of the world. 
18 We used a robust method to determine the P/I ratios in the transition countries. The regional price 
diﬀerences could “disturb” the results. 
19 The average house price was calculated with weights (20% type 1, 5% type 2, 20% type 3, 20% type 
4, and 35% type 5); the average household income was calculated as 25% type A, 25% type B, and 
50 type C for two- earner households. 
20 See Struyk in this volume.
21 See Hegedüs and Somogyi in this volume. 
22 See Hegedüs and Somogyi in this volume.
23 In Hungary, the housing funds were set up at municipal level.
24 See Cirman in this volume. 
25 The size of contract saving cannot provide the funding for a mature housing ﬁnance system.
26 See Buckley and Van Order in this volume.
27 See Van Order in this volume. 
28 The typical currency used for these loans were US dollars, deutschmarks, Swiss franks, and euros. 
29 One illustration of the unproductive debates is the dilemma of cash grants versus interest rate 
subsidies. In general, both have advantages and disadvantages, and its is impossible to balance these 
without understanding the economic and social environment in which they are to be used. 
30 See Buckley and Van Order in this volume.
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 The Role of Housing Finance 
 in the Housing Policy of Transition Countries
 Mark Stephens
 ABSTRACT
 This chapter provides a conceptual framework for examining the relation-
ship between housing policy and housing finance in transition economies. 
The paper distinguishes between first- and second-tier housing objectives, 
and economic objectives. “First-tier” housing objectives are identified as 
basic access and affordability housing objectives. Even the most developed 
housing finance system cannot meet first-tier objectives alone, as many 
households will require subsidies to access owner-occupied housing and 
rented housing will be more suitable for others. The design of the housing 
finance system also impacts on the nature of the wider housing system, 
which itself is subject to legitimate “second-tier” policy choices. These 
include trade-offs such as those between risk and opportunity, opportu-
nity and stability, and cohesion and opportunity; and these may affect a 
government’s view as to the development of its housing finance system. 
The housing system is also relevant to both micro- and macro-economic 
objectives, notably labor mobility and the relationship between housing 
wealth and consumption. It is concluded that the development of housing 
finance systems cannot be treated as a purely technical exercise and that 
economic objectives will become more important as transition economies 
are integrated into wider regional and global economic systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Governments share (in broad terms) an objective of achieving adequate and aﬀordable 
housing for their citizens. This objective is expressed in a number of international dec-
larations. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights speciﬁes that 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing, and medical care” (UN 
1948, Article 25[1]). The Council of Europe’s (revised) Social Charter expresses an ex-
plicit “right to housing” and commits signatories to take measures “to encourage access 
to housing of an adequate standard, to prevent and reduce the state of homelessness 
with a view to its gradual elimination, to make the cost of housing accessible to people 
who do not have suﬃcient resources” (Article 31, quoted in European Housing Forum 
2000). While such “rights” are seldom legally enforceable by individuals, at least they 
express commonly shared aspirations towards which policy can aim. They also provide 
a benchmark for the discussion of policy in the chapter.
This chapter examines the relationship between housing policy and housing ﬁnance 
in transition economies. The paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for exam-
ining this relationship. It draws on examples and evidence from transition economies, 
the EU–15, and the USA, but does not attempt to provide a systematic survey of the 
evidence. Inevitably, it contains many generalizations that will not apply to all of the 
countries in a particular category.
The relationship between housing policy and ﬁnance is explored in three ways.
 • Housing ﬁnance and “ﬁrst-tier” (access and aﬀordability) housing objectives
  Within the wider framework of housing policy, the development of housing 
ﬁnance systems in transition economies is often treated primarily as a technical 
exercise. This approach implies that certain universally applicable principles 
can be applied to these countries with predictable and desirable consequences. 
Moreover, because housing ﬁnance is often treated as a discrete topic, it can 
sometimes be conﬂated with housing policy.1 The ﬁrst aim of this chapter is 
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to examine the way in which housing ﬁnance alone can meet the “ﬁrst-tier” 
housing ﬁnance and aﬀordability objectives outlined in the opening paragraph. 
It also aims to identify the supporting role that wider housing policy can play 
in achieving them.
 • Housing ﬁnance and “second-tier” housing objectives
  The chapter then goes on to widen the discussion beyond the relatively narrowly 
deﬁned “ﬁrst-tier” objectives of housing policy (above).2 Its second objective is to 
explore the ways in which the housing ﬁnance system can inﬂuence the nature 
of the housing system as a whole. It does this by exploring what can be termed 
“second-tier” housing objectives, such as the avoidance of tenure polarization. 
These help to deﬁne the nature of the housing “system.”
 • Housing ﬁnance, the housing system, and economic objectives
  The third purpose of the chapter is to explore the relationship between the 
housing system and the achievement of the economic objectives of housing 
policy. Economic objectives are likely to become more important as economies 
become more integrated into regional or global economic systems, such as, in 
some cases, the European Union. These are deﬁned here as the microeconomic 
consequences of the housing system (for example its role in facilitating or hinder-
ing labor mobility) and its macroeconomic consequences that could arise in the 
future. The latter follows from the Kok report’s analysis relating to the European 
Union’s adoption of the Lisbon Strategy that identiﬁed measures to make the 
EU economy by 2010 “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world” (quoted by Kok 2004: 6).
2. CONTEXT
The term “transition economies” clearly covers a large number of countries that exhibit 
a huge amount of diversity on a range of criteria, ranging from geography and political 
system to economic performance and degree of urbanization. The point does not need 
laboring: just one indicator—per capita income—from a range of transition economies 
shows this varying between almost 70 percent of the EU–15 average (in Slovenia) to 
around 23 percent in Macedonia (Table 12.1).
A legitimate question therefore is whether there is justiﬁcation in examining the 
“transition” economies as a single group when on many indicators there appears to be 
more that divides them from one another than unites them in comparison with other 
(groups of ) countries. A second objection concerns the notion of common destiny that 
is implied in the term “transition” (Kemeny and Lowe 1998). 
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Table 2.1
Real GDP per capita in transition countries, 2002
Country GDP per head as % EU–15
Slovenia 69.5
Czech Republic 61.9
Hungary 53.3
Slovak Republic 46.7
Estonia 41.9
Poland 41.9
Croatia 40.0
Lithuania 39.0
Latvia 36.2
Russian Federation 30.5
Bulgaria 26.7
Romania 26.7
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 22.9
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org).
While both points are relevant, neither is overwhelming. In housing policy terms, 
we can identify a unifying starting point. While it is (universally) acknowledged that 
the so-called “East European housing model” exhibited diversity, many of its underlying 
principles were shared.3 Of particular relevance to this discussion was the absence of 
banking or housing ﬁnance systems in the western sense, i.e. involving collateral-based 
lending and risk assessment. Moreover, a common destiny is not necessarily implied 
by the notion of “transition.” In a broad sense, the common destiny implies democracy 
and market-based economies, but just as there is a variety of democratic systems and 
economic models, so there are varieties of housing systems within them. Much housing 
(and wider political science) literature in the “west” is devoted to examining them. Part 
of the purpose of this article is to emphasize the extent of choice in the development 
of housing policy and its role in shaping wider housing systems and, in turn social and 
economic systems.
So far no robust framework has been developed to characterize the emerging housing 
systems in the transition economies. In relatively crude terms a broad categorization has 
emerged around tenure. There are countries where home-ownership has become domi-
nant (usually where privatization has added to already signiﬁcant home-owner sectors, 
as in Hungary). When home-ownership reaches very high levels, these countries have 
been dubbed “super home-ownership” states (Lowe 2003). In contrast, several coun-
tries, notably the Czech Republic and Poland, have retained signiﬁcant rent-controlled 
sectors (Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2
Levels of home-ownership in transition countries
Country (year) Levels of owner-occupation (oo)/private ownershipa (p)
Super home-ownershipb
Armenia (2001) 96 (p)
Hungary (1994) 96 (oo)
Albania (1998) 95 (oo)
Romania (1999) 95 (p)
Bulgaria (1995) 93 (p)
Slovenia (1994) 88 (oo)
Estonia (2000) 86 (oo)
Intermediate
Slovakia (2001) 73 (oo)
Russia (c. 2001) 68 (p)
Rental
Czech Republic (2001) 59 (oo)
Poland (2000) 55 (oo)
Notes: a) Figures for owner-occupation are often exaggerated, as the ﬁgure for home-ownership is 
sometimes conﬂated with that for private ownership. In the latter case, the ﬁgure may 
include some privately rented housing and the actual level of owner-occupation may be 
several percentage points lower.
  b) The boundary between these categories is arbitrary.
Source: Stephens (2005).
Despite the diﬀerences in tenure patterns, three common features unite these two 
types of “system.” First, the housing systems are sclerotic in that they exhibit high lev-
els of immobility. In the case of home-owner systems this arises in part from the high 
levels of imputed rental income that arise from heavily discounted sales (or in the case 
of some countries of the former Soviet Union virtual give-away) of former state/state 
enterprise housing. In other words owners are not facing the true economic cost of 
their housing consumption which clearly distorts their consumption decisions in the 
direction of over-consumption and immobility. In reality the situation is very similar to 
tenants who enjoy high levels of rent regulation combined with high levels of security 
of tenure. The housing is subject to a large economic (if not ﬁnancial) subsidy, so dis-
torting consumption decisions. Hence there is little incentive to move especially if this 
entails entering the decontrolled sector. Security of tenure, especially where it contains 
succession rights, similarly blurs the distinction between ownership and tenancy. So 
both systems exhibit a high degree of allocative ineﬃciency.
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The second similarity is that both systems exhibit a high degree of inequity based 
on the relatively privileged position of “insiders” against “outsiders.” The “outsiders” are 
left to compete for housing on free market terms in the homeowner or rental sectors. 
The inequity is both horizontal (households that otherwise have similar characteristics 
such as income are treated diﬀerently) and vertical (insiders are generally better oﬀ than 
outsiders). Grabmüllerová (2004) presents particularly vivid ﬁgures on the contrasting 
rental payments of “insiders” in Prague’s rent-controlled sector, who pay around 72 
euros per month for a 60 m2 ﬂat, compared to “outsiders” who pay 240 euros for an 
equivalent ﬂat in the non-controlled sector.
A third similarity of the two systems is that housing ﬁnance arrangements are gener-
ally underdeveloped. An OECD survey of Central European transitional housing and 
mortgage markets in 2003 found that mortgages as a proportion of GDP ranged from 
2 to 8 percent, which compares to an EU–15 average of 45 percent, although there has 
been recent rapid growth in some markets (Shinozaki 2004). This is partly a demand 
question: the insiders (debt-free owners or protected tenants) do not need housing 
ﬁnance, and this helps to account for the low levels of outstanding mortgage debt in 
transition economies. However, there is also a question of supply as evidenced by the 
rather restrictive terms that are usually attached to mortgage ﬁnance (e.g., low loan to 
value ratios, short repayment periods).
In both types of system, there is an obvious need to develop housing ﬁnance systems. 
Moreover, as “insiders” die and more households form (or wish to form), the need for 
housing ﬁnance will grow. So it is unsurprising that this has been the focus of much 
housing policy.
3. HOUSING FINANCE AND FIRST-TIER HOUSING OBJECTIVES
“First-tier” housing policy objectives have been deﬁned as facilitating households’ access 
to housing of an acceptable quality at a price that they can reasonably aﬀord. In this 
regard, the role of a housing ﬁnance system is to bridge the gap between households’ 
incomes and house prices. Within this framework there are two essential constraints 
facing households: an access constraint and an aﬀordability constraint. The ﬁrst of these 
is determined by factors that are largely endogenous to the housing ﬁnance system; the 
second by factors that both endogenous and exogenous to it. They are considered in 
turn and policies that aﬀect them identiﬁed.
The Access Constraint
The ﬁrst constraint is determined by the proportion of a property value that the hous-
ing ﬁnance system is willing to ﬁnance, i.e. the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). This can be 
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characterized as an access constraint. The smaller the LTV, the greater the down payment 
that is required, and the greater the down payment required, the longer households 
must save before they can access owner-occupied housing.
The elements of the housing ﬁnance system that are most obviously linked to 
lenders’ willingness to make high loan-to-value ratio loans are:
 • Certainty of ownership which is derived from a framework that provides unam-
biguous forms of legal title and a system of property registration. The eﬀective 
operation of such systems requires an absence of corruption and low transaction 
costs (fees).
 • Loan security derived from the certainty and speed by which a property can be 
taken into possession by a lender operating through the courts in the event of 
loan default. Again in practice the absence of corruption is a vital element to 
the successful operation of the system.
 • Reliability of property valuation, which requires a professional valuation service. 
In practice a reasonably liquid market is also required for suﬃcient transactions 
of similar properties to provide a basis for valuation. Systems that are based on 
current market value (which in principle should reﬂect price expectations) are 
more likely to produce higher valuations than those based on an attempt to 
establish a “long-term” value or are formulaic. 
 • Minimization of risk of losses, or its movement to a third party, will also enhance 
a lender’s willingness to lend. The higher the LTV, the greater the risk of losses 
arising from foreclosure and resale if prices fall or legal costs are high (or both). 
Insurance can protect lenders against this. 
Policies that can promote a framework to encourage the development of higher 
LTV products include:
 • legal structures relating to property rights and forms of tenure
 • the development of a property register
 • propriety among public oﬃcials involved with property registration and 
courts
 • training relating to evaluators
 • house-price information
 • measures to encourage transactions to get the market moving
 • loan insurance.
Apart from legal structures and the caliber of public oﬃcials there is no inherent 
reason for the state to provide the other services itself. Indeed especially in the case of 
loan insurance there is the danger of the displacement of private sector activity (crowd-
ing out).4 
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The Affordability Constraint
The second constraint arises from the cost of servicing the mortgage. This can be char-
acterized as an aﬀordability constraint, although its manifestation will restrict access. 
For a given income, the three principal determinants of the aﬀordability constraint are 
the term of the mortgage, interest rates, and house prices.
The term of the mortgage (i.e. the number of years over which it is repaid) reﬂects 
the interest rate risk arising from funding long-term assets with short-term liabilities.
The second element (the interest rate) is largely exogenous to the housing ﬁnance 
system and is more broadly linked to economic management:
 • The inﬂation rate impacts on the aﬀordability constraint through the real value 
of interest payments and the front-end loading problem. This describes the 
tendency for the real burden of mortgage servicing to be highest in the earliest 
years of the mortgage. The value of the initial mortgage is (normally) ﬁxed in 
nominal terms which means that its real value is eroded over time, hence the real 
cost of servicing falls over time (assuming positive inﬂation). The “tilt” of a line 
depicting the real value of servicing the loan is steepest when inﬂation is highest 
as this pushes up the nominal (and often real) interest rate while its real value 
declines more rapidly. The aﬀordability problem arising from front-end loading 
often exacerbated when combined with life cycle earnings and commitments. If 
the early years of a mortgage coincide with high family commitments (children), 
but occur while earnings are well below their maximum, the household may 
be characterized as having a life-cycle aﬀordability problem because it will be 
only temporary. It can be contrasted with households who have a permanent 
aﬀordability problem because their earnings are habitually low. A low inﬂation 
rate helps to improve aﬀordability in the critical early years of the mortgage 
(but of course not later on as the real value of payments falls more slowly).
 • The nominal interest rate is likely to be closely related to the inﬂation rate, so 
is really a part of the same question. If the criteria relating to property security 
discussed above are not met, then there may be a signiﬁcant divergence between 
the “general” interest rate set by the monetary authorities and that charged on 
mortgages. Otherwise the principal determinant of the mortgage rate will be the 
“general” interest rate, with competition determining the relatively small diﬀer-
ences that are attributable to the eﬃciency of the housing ﬁnance system itself.
The Supply of Housing Finance
So far the discussion has not addressed the question of housing ﬁnance institutions and 
mortgage instruments, which are often a subject of policy (i.e. particular institutions or 
instruments are provided for in legislation).
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There are four principal questions concerning the role of policy in the supply of 
housing ﬁnance.
 • Specialist Institutions versus Specialist Instruments
  In transition economies as well as in the “advanced” economies mortgage ﬁ-
nance is sometimes supplied by specialist institutions and sometimes specialist 
instruments (either funding or mortgage) are created. 
   There is clearly some advantage for establishing a common framework for a 
specialist funding instrument, such as a mortgage bond. Standardization should 
facilitate market conﬁdence and increase liquidity and marketability. Moreover, 
regulatory, and supervisory issues become more straightforward. The mortgage 
bond has now become a de facto approved instrument in the European Union 
with its common legal deﬁnition for qualiﬁcation for privileged treatment 
on balance sheets. Similarly there may be some justiﬁcation for a recognized 
mortgage/savings product, such as a housing-savings scheme. 
   This is not the same as only allowing such instruments to be used. Nor is it 
clear why the issuance of such instruments/products needs to be conﬁned to a 
single category of (specialist) institution, i.e. a mortgage bank. It is anti-com-
petitive, and since the LTV on such bonds backed by mortgages is restricted 
(normally to 60 percent) a “package” of mortgages is required to meet the access 
objective.
   The nature of mortgage markets (in principle low risk) means that there 
is scope for asymmetry in the argument. While it makes little sense to prevent 
(say) general banks from issuing specialist mortgage funding instruments or 
operating specialist savings/mortgage products (e.g., housing-savings schemes) 
there may be good reason to limit the activities of a retail funded savings banks 
to relatively low risk areas such as housing ﬁnance. This is in part to secure the 
conﬁdence of savers, especially where banking crises have occurred.
 
 • Prescriptive versus Evolutionary Approaches
  Housing ﬁnance instruments or institutions are sometimes considered in a kind 
of à la carte way. For example, a number of types of ﬁnancial institution found in 
the advanced economies might be assessed and the “best” of them adopted. 
   Notwithstanding that transition economies with little banking tradition 
have to start somewhere, this approach does seem to be somewhat dubious. 
Evaluation criteria are rarely objective and in any case indicators may say more 
about the context in which the institutions operate than about their inherent 
(de)merits.
   Moreover, this approach neglects the reality that housing ﬁnance systems 
are part of a wider housing system. So, for example, the widespread adoption of 
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housing-savings schemes in the transition economies cannot be regarded merely 
as a technical device to assist households accumulate suﬃcient funds for a down 
payment. Their existence will inﬂuence the nature of the wider housing system, 
regardless of the other institutions adopted because they change the pattern of 
incentives in favor of the postponement of purchase, which may or may not be 
the desired (second-tier) objective. This theme is developed in the later sections 
of this chapter.
   If the ﬁrst-tier housing objective overrides others, then there is a strong case 
for allowing diﬀerent types of institution to co-exist and for a housing ﬁnance 
system to evolve on the basis of a level playing ﬁeld between institutions. In 
principle this approach can be used to establish what the market can provide, 
so that the role of subsidy is limited to covering what it cannot. This is the 
reverse of the practice frequently pursued where subsidies have been adopted 
as a substitute for ineﬃcient market institutions.5 
   It may be, of course, that other objectives override the access and aﬀordabil-
ity objective, as is acknowledged in the discussion about second-tier objectives 
below. In other words the development of housing ﬁnance systems is not always 
merely a technical exercise, although this is not always acknowledged.
 • Retail versus Wholesale Finance
  The evolution of the United States mortgage system from a retail-funded system 
operated by specialist local savings banks to one where securitization dominates 
is often misunderstood as representing a natural evolution of housing ﬁnance. 
Rather it represented particular events and policies, notably those surrounding 
the Great Depression and the Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s. The ﬁrst of 
these events was exceptional; the second avoidable. The role of government has 
been crucial, hence the US story implies that there is choice (Buckley discusses 
the “path dependency” of ﬁnance institutions further in his chapter).
   Retail and wholesale funded systems reﬂect the availability of particular 
sources of funds. In systems where they operate side by side their competitive-
ness varies over time, although the nature of the mortgage products that are 
produced is certainly biased, i.e. retail systems ﬁnd it easier to support ﬂoating 
rate mortgages and require more sophisticated instruments (e.g., swaps) to 
produce ﬁxed rate mortgages. 
   Securitization has distinct advantages concerning risk allocation and market 
liquidity,6 but it also carries high transaction costs at the outset and scale econo-
mies are vital to make it feasible. It is worth noting that 60 percent of mortgages 
in the EU–15 are still funded by retail sources. The case for co-existence between 
funding types is a sound one, with the market being able to determine the ap-
propriate mix—another case of evolution above prescription.
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 • Horizontal versus Vertical Specialization
  Finally, it is worth noting the breaking down of the nature of institutional 
specialization in some western countries. So far the discussion has reﬂected 
the historic nature of “specialist” mortgage providers, such as mortgage banks, 
as opposed to “non-specialist” general banks (vertical specialization). Current 
trends are towards “unbundling” the mortgage process (origination, process-
ing, management, and ﬁnancing) by, for example, contracting out parts of it 
to specialists. It is true that securitization is sometimes part of this process of 
horizontal specialization, but it is not the only part.
   This is important because an evolutionary approach in transition economies 
does not imply starting with the most rudimentary western model and working 
through each of its stages of development.
4. THE LIMITS TO HOUSING FINANCE
While the development of housing ﬁnance systems in transition economies will greatly 
improve access to housing (assuming a reasonably responsive supply side), it is clear 
that it will never be capable of closing the “gap” between incomes and house prices for 
some, often many, even most households. 
There are two basic reasons for this:
 • There remains an access constraint because 100 percent LTVs are not available. 
In principle the housing ﬁnance system could be developed to provide these, 
but for various reasons does not. There is a legitimate risk question, for example 
(see the discussion of second-tier objectives below).
 • Incomes are too low in relation to house prices/interest rates so the aﬀordability 
constraint is binding. Beyond “low start” mortgages for people facing primarily 
life-cycle (temporary) aﬀordability constraints, there is little more that the hous-
ing ﬁnance system to do in these cases.
An obvious role for housing policy is to widen access to housing for those groups 
facing an overwhelming aﬀordability constraint. Policy can aim at widening access to 
housing ﬁnance or to housing directly.
Policy and the Access Constraint
Policies that aim to overcome the access constraint include:
 • subsidized housing (contract)-savings schemes to help households acquire a 
suﬃcient down payment
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 • deposit-based house purchase certiﬁcates
 • state guarantees on high LTV loans.
Policy and the Affordability Constraint
Policies that aim to overcome the aﬀordability constraint include:
 • interest rate subsidies
 • tax relief on mortgage interest payments.
Many of these policy instruments have been criticized for a variety of reasons.
For example, some contract savings schemes have been quite ineﬃcient because they 
have been open to use as subsidized generic savings schemes and not used for housing. 
For example, Shinozaki (2004) reports that 40 percent of savings in the Polish hous-
ing-savings scheme were not used for housing. Even if designed more eﬃciently there 
are further eﬃciency problems. Some savings that would have occurred anyway will 
be subsidized. Moreover, if higher LTV loans are available, then the perverse impact of 
subsidizing savings tied to down-payments may be to encourage people to postpone entry 
into home-ownership. These are primarily design questions, although some crowding 
out seems to be unavoidable.
Deposit-based house purchase certiﬁcates could solve some of the problems associ-
ated with subsidized contract savings schemes. The funds are tied to housing, they can 
be better targeted through qualiﬁcation criteria and their terms adjusted to local housing 
market conditions, and are clearly tied to subsidizing housing. 
Interest rate subsidies carry some of the same problems as contract savings schemes. 
The deadweight problem is very likely to be especially acute if the subsidy is unrestricted, 
and this helps to explain why schemes are often targeted at certain groups such as ﬁrst 
time buyers or young people. This implies that the subsidy is being aimed at people 
whose aﬀordability constraint is temporary and linked to the life cycle. But there is 
a problem if subsidies are not time-limited as they will subsidize households beyond 
the point that subsidy is required. Hence the subsidy may become regressive and at a 
macro level its cost spirals. The basic point is often made that interest subsidies may be 
a substitute for poor economic management, i.e. are necessitated due to high inﬂation 
and high interest rates. This point is illustrated neatly by the case of Spain in the 1990s 
when market interest rates fell below those associated with subsidized loans, so giving 
rise for demands to allow prepayment.
Tax relief on mortgage interest can give rise to severe distortions. In principle, 
housing can be treated either as an investment good or as a consumption good. If it is 
treated as an investment good, interest payments should be tax deductible but imputed 
rental income should be taxed. If it is treated as a consumption good there should be 
no interest rate deductibility and no tax on imputed rental income. The tendency is for 
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interest relief to be available, but for there to be no equivalent tax on imputed rental 
income. The usual critiques of the subsidy suggest that it is wasteful in that it becomes 
at least partly capitalized into higher prices and tends to be regressive. Tax credits might 
be expected to be less regressive than simple tax relief, but the evidence from Hungary 
suggests that this instrument is also very regressive (MRI information, cited by Dübel 
2004). It was phased out in France and the UK at a time when interest rates were fall-
ing. Since interest rates are still high in some transition economies there is scope for a 
similar move provided that interest rates will fall.
Various principles have been suggested for the better design of subsidy instruments, 
which include transparency, eﬃciency, equity, and administrative eﬃciency. These issues 
are examined in more detail in the chapter by Diamond in this volume.
The Importance of Supply
A danger of focusing on mortgage ﬁnance is that the supply side is neglected, since 
house prices themselves are with incomes the fundamental determinant of aﬀordability. 
With new construction falling in transition economies in the 1990s this is a particularly 
important consideration. In the “west” housing supply elasticities (for new housing) vary 
greatly—from 0.3 in the Netherlands to 2.1 in Germany (Barker 2003). Poor supply 
responses in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands have been associated with 
rapidly rising house-price inﬂation and a widening of the gap between house prices and 
incomes. Ironically much of the impact of relatively eﬃcient housing ﬁnance systems in 
these countries fed through into higher prices so pricing households out of the market. 
In other words the income multiple constraint (the amount that lenders will advance 
in relation to the borrower’s income) prevails over the LTV constraint.
The lesson in principle is simple: clearly, housing policy must consider the supply 
side as well as the demand side. But in the context of the transition economies it leads to 
another question: what is housing ﬁnance for? The mortgage ﬁnance systems in much of 
the West exist to ﬁnance the transaction of second-hand dwellings, and in some countries 
(the USA, UK, and parts of Scandinavia) reﬁnancing for non-housing purposes (equity 
withdrawal, discussed further below). This is all very distant from the ﬁnance of new 
housing supply or renovation programs. These functions will vary between countries 
and may need to be reﬂected in the housing ﬁnance system.
 
Microfinance
In practice there are two additional reasons why not everyone can access housing 
ﬁnance:
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 • Incomes are too uncertain or not adequately documented for lenders to be will-
ing to advance credit, either because lending is too risky or because it becomes 
too expensive to establish a potential borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage.
 • Property rights are not adequately established to allow for secured lending, 
especially where informal housing has evolved and has not yet been fully regu-
larized.
These combine with households whose incomes are perpetually simply too low, i.e. 
who face a permanent aﬀordability constraint. 
These conditions apply most widely in parts of Southeast Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.
The limits of the development of formal housing ﬁnance systems in widening access 
to housing are often not clear because there is still so far to go. But it is notable that in 
parts of Latin America where formal ﬁnance systems have been developed large propor-
tions of the population nonetheless cannot access formal housing ﬁnance.
In these conditions so-called “microﬁnance” has been developed (see Ferguson 
1999). Although it is not the only model, microﬁnance tends to rely on using NGOs to 
connect households who normally would be excluded from housing ﬁnance to formal 
housing ﬁnance institutions. The NGO carries much of the high ﬁxed costs associated 
with establishing that at least quasi-property rights exist and that the household will 
be able to repay the loan. Loans tend to be relatively small, repaid over relatively short 
time periods and at high interest rates. They are therefore unsuited to the purchase of 
whole units outright, but rather much better suited to the incremental improvement 
and expansion of housing units, which may have been self-built or a basic shell provided 
by the government.
It might be added that microﬁnance is also suited to circumstances where public 
ﬁnance constraints limit the availability of subsidies within the “formal” framework 
described above.
5. HOUSING FINANCE AND “SECOND-TIER” HOUSING OBJECTIVES
While “ﬁrst-tier” housing objectives are widely shared by governments, such access and 
aﬀordability issues are clearly not their only concern. A brief consideration of housing 
systems in the “west” makes it clear that housing systems diﬀer and these diﬀerences 
are at least partly attributable to the nature of mortgage ﬁnance institutions and their 
interaction with wider housing policies, including those relating to other tenures.
While Kemeny (1995) has promoted consideration of “whole” housing systems, the 
observations made here are limited to much more restricted and obvious consequences 
of housing ﬁnance systems.
58
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I I  • •  F R A M E W O R K  E L E M E N T S  O F  E M E R G I N G  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M S
 • Risk vs. opportunity. Housing ﬁnance systems that promote high LTV loans 
without adequate underlying state or private safety nets clearly carry higher 
levels of risk, while widening access. Other things being equal there is an inverse 
relationship between access and aﬀordability because higher LTV loans will be 
larger. Moreover, households are more vulnerable to loss of equity if house prices 
fall which may lead to their losing the ability to sell the property. In the ﬁrst 
instance the risk is borne by borrowers who risk losing their homes in the event 
of default. In the second instance there is a risk to the stability of the ﬁnancial 
system, as loan default tends to be non-random (e.g., during a recession, which 
is also more likely to coincide with falls in house prices). The Nordic banking 
and housing market crisis of the 1990s provides some salutary lessons.7
 • Opportunity vs. stability. Linked to the risk-opportunity trade-oﬀ, there is a link 
between levels of gearing and housing market instability. The relationship is not 
simple, and other factors, notably supply responsiveness are of key importance. 
But the extent to which instability is linked to the speculative element in housing 
demand, liberalized mortgage lending systems play a role in facilitating instabil-
ity. This has been a concern of the UK government (HM Treasury 2003).
 • Cohesion-opportunity relationships. Widening access to home-ownership is 
sometimes promoted as a means of spreading wealth and giving people a “stake” 
in society, itself a non-housing objective related to political stability. There are 
also questions of the “exclusion” of those who cannot access the system and of 
related concerns of tenure polarization.
Such trade-oﬀs present policies with important choices when devising policies to 
shape the nature of the housing system, and show why housing ﬁnance cannot be treated 
as simply a technical exercise.
6. HOUSING FINANCE, THE HOUSING SYSTEM, 
 AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
One frequent observation is that “home ownership” and housing markets in many 
transition economies are not really comparable to the West where they are characterized 
by generally much higher levels of transactions and where housing is more obviously 
a store of wealth, and that wealth is relatively liquid. (The reference here is to the poor 
condition of some privatized housing, especially in depressed regions, which may have 
a very low value.) Presumably, one consequence of the development of housing ﬁnance 
systems is that housing markets in transition economies will become more like those 
in the West. Moreover, as transition economies become more closely integrated into 
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wider regional or global economies the relationship between the housing system and 
economic objectives will become clearer.
Microeconomic Objectives
The more open economies become, generally the more pressure is placed on internal 
factors of production in the adjustment mechanism (Eichengreen 1997). Such pressures 
may be greatest for those economies that are formally part of the European Union, and 
will become more pressing for those that join the European single currency. 
The importance of labor ﬂexibility becomes more important as countries’ econo-
mies become more open. The question that has to be faced in the housing system is the 
ﬂexibility of the housing system in relation to changing labor market needs, which will 
relate to trading up and down as well as geographical mobility. 
The present situation of sclerotic housing markets in many countries is far from 
ideal in this regard. The development of housing ﬁnance should help increase ﬂexibility 
in the housing system (and in this regard transaction taxes need to be kept low), but 
there is also a need for easy-access rental sector, especially for younger and more mobile 
households.
Macroeconomic Objectives
The importance of housing liquidity has become more important in some western coun-
tries in recent years. The ability to translate currently held housing wealth into income 
via remortgaging (equity withdrawal) has become important in some parts of western 
Europe (parts of Scandinavia and the UK) while remaining relatively rare elsewhere.
The report of the High Level Group chaired by former Dutch Prime Minister Wim 
Kok is relevant in this regard. Following the EU’s “Lisbon strategy” for growth and em-
ployment, this report calls for “reducing restrictions to more ﬂexible mortgage ﬁnancing 
in a number of Member States” (Kok 2004: 26).8 It argues that “reducing restrictions 
on reﬁnancing mortgage debt and oﬀering improved possibilities to ﬁnance a larger 
proportion of the purchase price of property via more generous and cheaper mortgage 
loans could extend home ownership and also boost consumption” (ibid.: 26). Meanwhile 
the European Commission has published a report searching for ways to encourage the 
greater integration of EU mortgage markets (Mortgage Credit Forum Group 2004). 
These non-housing objectives may not be of pressing concern in most transition 
economies at present, but as systems are devised that will greatly inﬂuence their evolution 
over many decades, the future demands that systems will face is also of relevance.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has attempted to outline the relationships between housing policy and the 
development of housing ﬁnance systems. It has emphasized that while large welfare gains 
can be expected by the development of housing ﬁnance systems, housing ﬁnance systems 
alone cannot be expected to meet the housing needs of signiﬁcant proportions of the 
population. Other mechanisms, including subsidies, microﬁnance, and the development 
of other tenures need to be considered. Moreover, the development of housing ﬁnance 
systems is not purely a technical exercise. It relates to what have been termed “second-
tier” objectives, such as the control of risk in the system, and to economic objectives 
such as labor market ﬂexibility and macroeconomic management. These considerations 
are likely to become more important as economies become more integrated into the 
wider European and world economy.
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ENDNOTES
1 Or at least housing ﬁnance can be developed independently of housing policy. This can be a 
consequence of the respective role of housing departments and ﬁnance ministries.
2 While the scope of the objective—the achievement of access and aﬀordability  may be narrow the 
scale of the aspiration remains ambitious.
3 For example, Lowe writes, “The orthodox idea of it [housing under communism] as a grey, state- 
managed and built system is only partly accurate, for there were also whole sections of society who 
stood outside this formal ‘Stalin model’ of housing” (2003: xv).
4 See Polverini (2004) for an assessment of the potential use of private insurance to protect lenders from 
losses on high LTV loans. He suggests that the facilitation of higher LTV loans is a more eﬀective 
means of improving housing aﬀordability than other instruments such as government subsidies.
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5 See Diamond in this volume.
6 See Jaﬀee and Renaud (1996).
7 “The proximate cause of the crisis was … the collapse of asset values, but the crisis also revealed 
more fundamental weaknesses in banks’ credit assessment and in banking supervision” (Latter 1997: 
42). See Stephens (1995) for an overview of housing market instability following mortgage market 
deregulation.
8 I am grateful to Daniela Grabmüllerová for bringing this to my attention in her presentation at the 
OECD Workshop on Housing Finance, 14–15 December 2004.
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 Home Purchase Affordability 
 and Mortgage Finance
 Raymond J. Struyk 
 ABSTRACT 
 This paper discusses three principal aspects of home purchase afford-
ability, with an emphasis on the situation in Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. It discusses: (1) the factors that 
determine affordability in a country at a point in time; (2) several widely 
used indicators of home purchase affordability in a country, the role of 
mortgage finance in these measures, and some their limitations; and, 
(3) the possible role of “housing microfinance,” i.e., small loans without 
formal mortgage collateral to support incremental housing development, 
which might be used to help low-income households in the region occupy 
good quality housing that they own.
  A principal finding is that the standard affordability indices have the 
virtue of simplicity, but that this simplicity carries a high price:  it masks the 
roles of the multiple factors that determine both household purchasing 
power and dwelling unit prices; the indices are generally point estimates, 
i.e., report on the situation for the “typical household,” and therefore 
provide little information on the situation for those at other points in the 
income distribution; and, there is inconsistency in the results across indi-
ces for particular cities and countries. Given these facts, the results from 
the more data-intensive mortgage underwriting accounting models are 
strongly preferred for analyzing a country’s or region’s housing afford-
ability.
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Home Purchase Aﬀordability 
and Mortgage Finance
Raymond J. Struyk
1. INTRODUCTION
“Housing aﬀordability” is perhaps the most commonly cited housing problem around 
the world, and the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) are no exception. The term is used in many contexts and 
carries a host of possible deﬁnitions. In this paper, the focus is exclusively on the ability 
of households to purchase a home. We deﬁne aﬀordability as the ability to purchase a 
dwelling of the appropriate size and minimum physical and sanitary standards and still 
have suﬃcient income to enjoy at least the minimum consumption of other essential 
goods and services.
Home purchase aﬀordability is typically thought of as a problem for ﬁrst-time home 
buyers. But existing homeowners with growing families may also need to purchase a 
larger unit and some have problems doing so.
Two key questions are associated with the aﬀordability issue. The ﬁrst, often ar-
ticulated, is: what share of renters and newly forming households can aﬀord to become 
owners of homes, providing the minimum necessary housing services? The second 
question, only infrequently asked and even more infrequently answered is: how does 
the share of those who can aﬀord to purchase a unit compare with the target of public 
policy? The reality is that homeownership target levels are almost never speciﬁed by 
governments or legislatures. Rather there is a vague idea that a higher share of households 
who can aﬀord to purchase is better.1
This paper discusses three principal aspects of home purchase aﬀordability, with an 
emphasis on the situation in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. The next section examines the factors that determine aﬀordability in a country 
at a point in time. Following this, we present several widely used indicators of home 
purchase aﬀordability, discuss the role of mortgage ﬁnance in these measures, and 
identify some limitations of the measures. Section 4 discusses how “housing microﬁ-
nance”—small loans without formal mortgage collateral to support incremental housing 
development—might be used in the region to help low income households occupy good 
quality housing that they own. The paper closes with a few conclusions.
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2. DETERMINANTS OF AFFORDABILITY
Measures of aﬀordability condense a wide range of factors into a single ﬁgure. Aﬀord-
ability measures are ratios of housing costs or prices to a measure of household income. 
But there are several elements at work in determining the values of both the numerator 
and the denominator.
 Household income—Eﬀective demand is usually represented by household income. 
In fact, eﬀective home purchase demand depends on both the mean level of household 
income and its distribution, on household savings, and on the availability and price 
of mortgage ﬁnance. At a given mean income level, the greater the degree of income 
inequality, the fewer the families who are likely to have suﬃcient income to succeed in 
purchasing a home. 
Mortgage ﬁnance permits purchasers to leverage their income and savings to become 
purchasers prior to saving the full amount needed for the purchase. In many countries, 
the constraining resource in purchasing a unit with a mortgage is the down payment. 
In other words, where maximum loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) are 70–80 percent, many 
would-be purchasers could make the monthly mortgage payments; but they cannot 
assemble the 20–30 percent down payment plus closing costs.
The extent of leveraging permitted by taking a mortgage depends critically on the 
mortgage interest rate, i.e., the price of funds. This interest rate is determined by ﬁve 
factors. First, macroeconomic conditions set the environment. Where the economy is 
instable, interest rates are relatively high. Russia’s high interest rates during the 1990s 
reﬂected such conditions, for example. Second, the legal environment is critical, particu-
larly for controlling credit risk. The greater the uncertainty banks have about foreclosing 
on a loan-in-default and taking possession of the mortgaged unit, the higher price they 
charge. Third is the extent of bank exposure to other risks. Such risks, as discussed in 
the paper on managing the risks of mortgage lending in this volume, include prepay-
ment risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk. A fourth factor is the general eﬃciency 
and competitiveness of the ﬁnancial sector. Certainly, in the CIS countries, interest 
rates are kept high by comparative poor performance in this area. Finally, central bank 
regulations on risk capital and reserve requirements have a powerful and immediate 
eﬀect on bank interest rates.
 Cost factors—Two broad elements can be distinguished, the price of units available 
for purchase and the cost of production. Each of these in turn has several determi-
nants.
 Unit prices. Ultimately, the price of housing units in the market is determined by 
basic demand and supply factors. Many countries restrict the supply of new housing 
coming on the market through various government regulations and controls. Under the 
Soviet model, the local chief architect determined where new housing would be built, 
its density, and building types. This procedure, or variations on it, remains in place in 
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many countries. The result is that this oﬃce has the ability to control the pace of new 
construction—and it often does, restricting the issuance of permits until side-payments 
are made. The problem is compounded by the requirements for further permits from 
providers of communal services. Therefore, the supply of housing does not keep pace 
with expanding demand. Hence, constant quality dwelling prices rise more rapidly than 
household income.
 Production costs. Where supply is not artiﬁcially constrained so that prices are 
raised above normal levels, cost factors can be important price determinants. Building 
standards drive costs. Many developing countries have unrealistically high standards for 
dwelling units, lot sizes, streets, and communal services, which together place “formal 
housing” beyond the economic reach of the majority of households. Squatter commu-
nities ﬂourish. This problem is not so severe in this region, but there are segments of 
the population who cannot aﬀord housing fully meeting the oﬃcial standards without 
explicit or implicit subsidies. 
A second key cost factor is the eﬃciency of the housing development process. There 
are two aspects here. The more obvious is builders’ technical eﬃciency, i.e., whether 
labor-saving technology and the most eﬃcient mix of capital and labor are employed 
on the job. The less obvious are the ineﬃciencies—in the form of stop-and-go construc-
tion—that result when reliable construction-period ﬁnance is absent. In many countries, 
such ﬁnance is available to only the most established builders, if at all. More typically, 
construction is ﬁnanced through equity, both investors’ and the up-front down pay-
ments, often large, of future occupant-owners. 
The resulting ratio—The interaction of the demand and supply factors is complex 
and this makes interpretation of aﬀordability measures challenging. A high ratio of house 
prices to household incomes often leads to a call for increasing the eﬀective demand 
of households through government subsidies to augment demand. In fact, the culprit 
could be the restrictive practices of local planning agencies that are limiting housing 
supply. At much lower cost and to the beneﬁt of all households, improvements could 
be made in the building permitting process to address the problem.
3. MEASURING AFFORDABILITY 
The measurement of housing aﬀordability has received a good deal of attention in 
scholarship.2 This section reviews some of the more commonly used measures and then 
discusses their relation to mortgage ﬁnance and their limitations.
 Common measures3—This section initially discusses the most widely used measures 
that apply to both owners and renters. The discussion then shifts to better indicators 
for home purchasers. 
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The most general measures. The typical (and simple) approach to housing aﬀordability 
is to deﬁne a threshold percentage of the household income that is the maximum a 
household “should” dedicate to housing costs. Housing is unaﬀordable if a household 
spends more than that percentage of its income. The rationale behind this approach 
is that aﬀordable housing is an important factor in the well-being of individuals and 
families. High housing costs relative to income are often associated with severe ﬁnancial 
diﬃculty, especially among low income households, and can leave such households with 
insuﬃcient income to meet other basic needs such as food, clothing, transport, medical 
care, and education.
This indicator compares current housing expenditures with households’ income. It 
can be measured for both renters and owner-occupiers. In countries with a large private 
rental sector the rent-to-income indicator is used, in countries with a low private rental 
sector the housing costs include user charges. The key question is how the expenditures 
are deﬁned. There have been two main approaches to measuring housing aﬀordability: 
(1) a proportional measure, wherein aﬀordable housing costs are set as a ﬁxed propor-
tion of income, and (2) a residual measure, wherein aﬀordable housing costs are set as 
a ﬁxed amount that does not vary with income level. The proportional measures are 
more generally used because of their simplicity. Examples follow.
 • The New Zealand Social Reports use household expenditure of more than 30 
percent of its income on housing as a key indicator. Twenty-four percent of 
households were in this group in 2001. In the lowest ﬁfth of the household 
income distribution, 42 percent spent more than 30 percent of their income 
on housing.
 • The Australian National Housing Strategy (NHS) deﬁned housing aﬀordabil-
ity as “an income to meet other basic needs such as food, clothing, transport, 
medical care and education” (NHS 1991). Households paying more than 25 
to 30 percent of their incomes in rent or mortgage payments were considered 
to be experiencing aﬀordability problems. The NHS deﬁned households in the 
lowest 40 percent of the income range who pay more than 25 percent of income 
in housing costs as being in “housing stress.” This benchmark—and the more 
conservative benchmark of 30 percent—has subsequently been widely used as 
an overall measure of housing-related hardship in Australia (AIHW 1997).
 • In the US, the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (October 2000) ranks 
states in terms of the hourly wage needed in a 40 hour work week to be able 
to aﬀord a two-bedroom apartment at fair market rent, where aﬀordability is 
deﬁned by the national housing agency in terms of paying no more than 30 
percent of household income on housing costs.
Measures for home purchasers—The most commonly used measures are focused on 
the ability of ﬁrst-time home purchasers to buy. In one way or another they ask how 
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the purchasing power of a typical household compares with the price of the typical 
dwelling on oﬀer in the market. The simplest measures compare a speciﬁc income level, 
usually median income, to a speciﬁc house price, usually the median sales price. The 
advantage of using house prices rather than a more sophisticated measure of the costs 
of home purchases that would include the terms of a mortgage loan is that the data 
are more likely to be available and the concept is straightforward. The disadvantage is 
that the comparison hides the complexity of the housing market and may not reveal 
the true picture.
Housing Aﬀordability Index (HAI)—One solution used in several countries—for 
example, in Australia by the Housing Industry Association and Commonwealth Bank, 
and the National Association of Realtors in the US—is the housing aﬀordability index 
(HAI). This index, comparing a representative income to a representative house price, cal-
culates aﬀordability based on mortgage qualiﬁcation rules. Two versions are possible. 
 1. Aﬀordability is measured by the relationship between the income needed to 
aﬀord a representative house and a representative income. The higher the per-
centage is, the greater the housing aﬀordability is. 
 2. The second approach compares the house price that a target income can aﬀord 
with a target house price. The greater the percentage is, the more aﬀordable the 
market is.
Housing aﬀordability in Australia is measured by the ratio of average household 
disposable income to the (“qualifying”) income required to meet payments on a typical 
dwelling (expressed as an index). In calculating qualifying income a deposit of 20 percent 
with repayments equivalent to 30 percent of income is assumed using a conventional 
25-year loan. Income measures are based on national account estimates of household 
disposable income. An increase in the index represents an improvement in aﬀordability, 
and a decline in the index a decrease in aﬀordability. A value of less than 100 indicates 
that a household with an average annual income would have less than the income re-
quired to service an average mortgage. The median dwelling price is obtained from a 
census of dwellings ﬁnanced by Commonwealth Bank loan approvals. An estimate of the 
median price of existing dwellings of ﬁrst-time homebuyers is used in the aﬀordability 
index. According to the Commonwealth Bank (2002), the HAI was 170 in September 
2001 and decreased to 137 by September 2002.
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) measures the ability of the median 
income family (or ﬁrst-time homebuyer) to qualify for a mortgage on the median-priced 
home (or a starter home). It measures whether or not a typical family could qualify for 
a mortgage loan on a typical home. A typical home is deﬁned as the national median-
priced, existing single-family home as calculated by NAR. The typical family is deﬁned 
as one earning the median family income as reported by the US Census Bureau. The 
prevailing mortgage interest rate is the eﬀective rate on loans closed on existing homes 
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from the Federal Housing Finance Board. These components are used to determine 
if the median income family can qualify for a mortgage on a typical home. An index 
value of 100 means that a family with the median income has exactly enough income 
to qualify for a mortgage on a median-priced home. An index above 100 signiﬁes 
that family earning the median income has more than enough income to qualify for a 
mortgage loan on a median-priced home, assuming a 20 percent down payment, with 
the monthly payment or loan principal and interest not exceeding 25 percent of the 
median family monthly income. For example, a composite HAI of 120.0 means a family 
earning the median family income has 120 percent of the income necessary to qualify 
for a conventional loan covering 80 percent of a median-priced existing single-family 
home. An increase in the HAI, then, shows that this family is more able to aﬀord the 
median-priced home. 
Housing Opportunity Index (HOI) 4—The Housing Opportunity Index (HOI) 
measures the share of homes within a speciﬁc market that a typical household (family 
earning the median income) can aﬀord to buy. In the United States, this index is cal-
culated quarterly by the National Association of Home Builders and it compares the 
median income in a locality with the median home price. Housing Opportunity Index 
is based on the median family income, interest rates, and price distributions of homes 
sold in 180 metropolitan markets in a particular quarter of a year. The price of homes 
sold is collected from actual court records by First American Real Estate Solutions, a 
marketing company. The median family income for each market is calculated by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
An HOI of 70 percent means that families in a region earning the median household 
income could aﬀord to buy 70 percent of homes sold in the region. This technique 
requires a distribution of all house prices and median income of the target household 
(e.g., ﬁrst-time homebuyers, all households, certain occupations). NAHB purchased 
such a data set, which shows the prices of all homes that have changed hands in a 
particular market. Because the address is given, the data can also be segmented into 
metropolitan areas and further into central city and suburbs. In 2001 (4Q) the HOI 
was 64.1 for the US, and ranged from 76.1 for Springﬁeld, MA, to 8.0 for the San 
Francisco Bay Area.5
The HOI is distinguished by its data demands. Calculating the index requires the 
distribution of dwelling prices, not just the median price. For this reason it is not often 
employed.
Indices compared 6—Table 3.1 reports the three indicators of housing aﬀordability 
described above for two cities in the Eastern European region—Moscow and Budapest. 
As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the two cities diﬀer strongly in their income and house 
price distributions, with incomes being more evenly distributed in Budapest and house 
prices more evenly distributed in Moscow. These diﬀerences have a signiﬁcant impact 
on the three aﬀordability indicators described above.
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Table 3.1 
Aﬀordability indices for Budapest and Moscow, 2003 
(measured with median values and with average values)
Indexes based on 
average values
Indexes based on 
median values
Comparison
Budapest Moscow Budapest Moscow US
House price/income ratio 7.7 3.2 6.6 5.8 2.8
Housing Affordability Index 57% 77% 67% 42% 136%
Housing Opportunity Index 17% 15% 11% 4% 65%
Figure 3.1 
Income distributions for Budapest and Moscow 
Figure 3.2
House-price distributions in Budapest and Moscow 
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Relative aﬀordability between the two markets varies with the indicator selected 
and on whether average or median values for house prices and household income are 
employed. The sensitivity of the results to the particular indicator used should be a 
cause of concern in analyses that compare aﬀordability across regions or countries us-
ing a single indicator.
Aﬀordability and mortgage ﬁnance—All of the measures just reviewed assume the 
availability of mortgage ﬁnance. Stated alternatively, they assume that a household would 
not be able to purchase a dwelling in the absence of mortgage ﬁnance. And, indeed, 
today few families in Western Europe, Japan, and North America do. In the countries 
of Eastern Europe and the CIS, however, the majority of households still acquire their 
ﬁrst dwelling without a mortgage. They do so with family support. Either they inherit a 
dwelling, which they either occupy or they sell to obtain the ﬁnance to purchase another 
unit, or they obtain gifts or cheap loans from family members to supplement their own 
savings to make the purchase. This means that, while the standard aﬀordability indicators 
are useful in making cross-country comparisons, they are less reliable for indicating the 
true conditions in countries of the region. One needs to supplement the indicators with 
information on mortgage lending volumes as a share of GDP or similar measures.
There are, of course, a range of subsidies employed by governments to help address 
the aﬀordability issue. Some of these operate in conjunction with mortgage loans. See the 
essay by Douglas Diamond in this volume for a thorough discussion of these vehicles.
Limitations and extensions—While the commonly used measures of home purchase 
aﬀordability prove useful for several purposes, it is important to keep their limitations in 
mind. Two types of limitation are prominent: (1) the failure to go beyond simple point 
estimates for typical households and examine the distribution of aﬀordability across 
households in diﬀerent circumstances, and (2) the failure to take a more comprehensive 
approach to accounting for the costs and returns of owner-occupancy.
Beyond point estimates—As Calhoun and Stark (1996) point out, there are two 
broad approaches to the analysis of aﬀordability using micro data sets. One tries to 
determine the direct impact of mortgage qualiﬁcation requirements on the likelihood 
of homeownership in the context of constrained optimization models.7 The optimal 
home purchase price absent constraints is computed for each household using econo-
metric techniques and then it is compared with what the household can actually aﬀord 
based on its income and assets. The other, more common, approach is synthetic loan 
underwriting simulations, i.e., accounting models. In this case, the analysts examines 
whether each household qualiﬁes for a particular mortgage, given the associated under-
writing standards including down payment requirements. The premium here is on the 
comprehensive measurement of the costs to purchase a dwelling at a certain point in 
the dwelling price distribution and the household’s income, assets, and debts.8 
Because both approaches employ micro data sets, they produce results that can be 
disaggregated in a wide variety of ways, including household characteristics such as in-
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come level, asset level, current tenure, number of children, age of household head, and 
location, e.g., capital, major cities, etc. They also permit one to analyze the eﬀectiveness 
of diﬀering underwriting standards, loan products, and subsidy policies in assisting dif-
ferent types of households to purchase a dwelling.
More comprehensive measures—Limitations of this type are of two kinds. One is 
the focus on the household’s ability to make the necessary payments at the moment 
of purchase, rather than taking a longer perspective. A major shortcoming is the use 
of current income in these measures. Many would-be dwelling purchasers are young 
families. Young workers can reasonably expect their real earnings to increase over time. 
Home purchase is clearly a portfolio allocation decision based on a long time perspective. 
Hence, the failure to take future earnings’ power into account produces a misleading 
picture about the ultimate ability of young families to purchase a dwelling.
The second limitation is that the measures reviewed ignore several factors that 
reduce the cost of homeownership. Three are very important. Capital gains on the 
housing asset reduce the net cost of ownership. In many countries, the ability of owners 
to deduct at least some portion of the interest payments on their mortgage from their 
income tax liability also results in signiﬁcant ownership cost reductions. Finally, the 
burden of monthly mortgage payments under ﬁxed rate mortgages declines over time 
with growth in household income; where inﬂation is moderate to high, these reductions 
can be very large.
In short, the “entry aﬀordability indexes” geared to ﬁrst-time home purchasers are 
poor indicators of the true costs of homeownership. A more comprehensive approach, 
which takes factors like capital gains and favorable tax treatment into account, is the 
“user cost of capital” employed by economists.9 In simple form, the annual user cost of 
a unit of housing capital is the real (i.e., inﬂation adjusted) interest rate, i. The value of 
a year’s ﬂow of housing services, R, is related to the value of the home, V, by
R = iV
One can think of housing “rent” (R) as the opportunity cost of using housing capital 
for one period. Stated alternatively, the capitalized value of rent, R/I, is related to the 
value of the home or a residential building, V. This applies equally to owner-occupied 
and rental housing properties.
One can make the formulation more realistic by adding other factors explicitly 
expressed in annual terms as a share of the value of the property: depreciation and 
maintenance expenditures, at rate d; property taxes, at rate pt; and capital gains, at rate, 
cg. For homeowners this gives:
R = (i + pt + d – cg) V
Property taxes and depreciation increase the user cost, while capital gains reduce it. 
For those who own a property, the eﬀect of capital gains is unambiguously to reduce the 
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user cost of capital. But for would-be property purchasers, higher capital gains mean a 
higher asset price and a greater aﬀordability problem.
Taxes other than the property tax complicate the costs and aﬀordability of owner-
occupied housing. In some countries, property taxes and/or mortgage interest payments 
are wholly or partially deductible from the personal income taxes. At the same time, 
capital gains on owner-occupied housing are frequently untaxed. This combination 
reduces the user cost of capital, often substantially.
General inﬂation aﬀects the user cost of capital through nominal interest payments 
and nominal housing prices. A higher inﬂation rate means a higher interest rate (for 
current owners with adjustable rate mortgages and those purchasing a property) and 
greater capital gains. To see the eﬀects for homeowners, one can add the inﬂation rate, 
a, to the previous equation and multiply the cost that are deductible from the personal 
income tax by 1.0 minus the marginal tax rate, MT:
R = [(i + a) (1 – MT) + pt (1 – MT) + d – (cg + a)] V.
When these various factors are taken into account in determining the cost of home-
ownership, analysts often ﬁnd that the true costs are declining at the same time that the 
media carries sensational stories of homeownership being unaﬀordable.10
4. HOUSING MICROFINANCE
Another approach to increasing home purchase possibilities for lower income households 
is housing microﬁnance. According to Ferguson (2004), housing microﬁnance lies at 
the intersection of mortgage lending and microﬁnance, i.e., lending to micro businesses. 
The blending of the two types of lending is clear from the entries on loan characteristics 
of the three types of lending shown in Table 3.2. 
The basic idea is that borrowers with low incomes and suspect ability to repay loans 
take small loans to develop or improve their housing incrementally. Usually, borrowers 
can receive larger loans after they have repaid smaller ones. The loan amounts are insuf-
ﬁcient to purchase a normal sized unit with quality ﬁnishings. The more likely pattern 
is to purchase a land plot with an initial loan and then construct the unit with a series 
of future loans. The model will have greater applicability in small towns and rural areas 
than big cities.
This approach is relatively widely used in Latin America and certain Asian countries. 
It has not caught on in Eastern Europe or CIS. One could imagine that contract savings 
schemes that have proven popular in some countries could add multiple, small loans to 
a single borrower as a product. Banks making SME loans could also enter the market. 
In Armenia, such banks are beginning to make regular mortgage loans and could easily 
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address this market as well. But the traditional micro-lenders have been NGOs, micro-
banks, credit unions, and other organizations.
Table 3.2
Characteristics of housing microﬁnance, mortgage, and microenterprise ﬁnance loans
Mortgage Loans Microenterprise Loans Housing Microfinance Loans
Borrower
Middle- and upper-income 
households
Low- and middle-income 
households
Low- and middle-income 
households
Originator
Banks, savings and loans Credit unions, NGOs, 
cooperatives, micro banks, 
regulated and non-regulated 
microfinancial institutions
Credit unions, regulated and 
non-regulated microfinance 
institutions, some savings and 
loans, developers, building 
suppliers
Savings requirements and importance
Typically 10 to 30% of a unit’s 
value; sometimes contract 
savings
Often, savings are required in 
order to qualify for a loan
Often, savings are required to 
qualify for a loan
Underwriting
Evaluation of individual 
household income, and of 
property title and value. Strict 
payment-to-income limits
Evaluation of individual credit-
worthiness, family’s net worth, 
and household income
Evaluation of individual’s 
income and creditworthiness. 
Strict payment-to-income 
limits
Amount
One-time loan of USD 10,000 
and above
A series of USD 50 to 
USD 500 loans
From one to three credits 
of USD 250 to USD 7,000 
(average of USD 1,000–2,500)
Interest rate
~Inflation plus a margin of 
8 to 15% per year
~Inflation plus a margin of 
15% to 45%; average of 36% 
per year
~Inflation plus a margin of 
15% to 45%; average of 36% 
per year
Term
 15–30 years Less than 1 year 1–8 years, average of 2 to 3 
years 
Collateral
Property through a mortgage Personal guarantees, goods, 
co-signers
Personal guarantees, goods, 
co-signers
Source: Ferguson (2004).
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5. CONCLUSION
The paper has demonstrated that the standard aﬀordability indices have the virtue of 
simplicity, but that this simplicity carries a high price. For one thing, it masks the roles 
of the multiple factors that determine both household housing purchasing power and 
dwelling unit prices. A second problem is that the indices are generally point estimates, 
i.e., report on the situation for the “typical household,” and therefore provide little in-
formation on the situation for those at other points in the income distribution. Third, 
there is inconsistency in the results across indices for particular cities and countries. 
Given these facts, the results from the more data-intensive mortgage underwriting 
accounting models are strongly preferred for analyzing a country’s or region’s housing 
aﬀordability. 
Based on generally poorly deﬁned “aﬀordability problems,” East European and 
CIS countries have enacted an array of housing subsidy schemes to lower the cost of 
homeownership, as described in Diamond’s essay in this volume. Many of the schemes 
enacted are quite ineﬃcient—both in permitting households to become ﬁrst-time own-
ers and in targeting the beneﬁts to moderate-income families.  Housing microﬁnance 
appears to hold promise for helping lower income households, especially outside big 
cities, to development their own homes incrementally over time.
In short, the policy consideration of home purchase aﬀordability in the region has 
been weak. Measurement of the actual situation has been casual and analysis of the 
probable eﬀectiveness of alternative policies largely missing.
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ENDNOTES
1 In several Eastern European countries where housing privatization has resulted in homeownership 
rates of over 90%, this “higher is better” idea is being challenged. For a discussion, see the essays in 
Lowe and Tsenkova (2003).
2 See Hancock (1991), Howenstine (1993), Malpass (1993), Bourassa (1996), AIHW (1997), and the 
National Association of Home Builders at www.nahb.org. 
3 This section draws heavily on Hegedüs et al (2004).
4 See www.nahb.org.
5 National Association of Homebuilders.
6 The data in this section is from Hegedüs et al (2004).
7 See, for example, Linneman and Wachter (1989).
8 A good example of this type of analysis for the US is Listokin et al (2002); for Eastern Europe, 
Hegedüs et al (2004).
9 See, for example, Dougherty and van Order (1984), Quigley (2000), and Quigley and Raphael 
(2004).
10 A parallel formulation can be made for the user cost of rental housing. For rental property owners, 
the interest and property tax expenses are fully deductible from taxable income but capital gains are 
taxable.
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 Thinking about Subsidies to Housing Finance
 Douglas B. Diamond
 ABSTRACT
 Despite the huge amounts of resources often devoted to subsidizing 
housing and housing finance, there is relatively little effort to carefully 
consider the rationales for such subsidy in general and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the specific set of subsidies being adopted.  The first half 
of this chapter collects together the arguable rationales and the general 
typology for such subsidies and proposes a process for choosing the most 
appropriate subsidies. Based on this analysis, the second half evaluates the 
subsidies and policy formulation processes employed in Central and Eastern 
Europe since 1995. There appears to be a very productive opportunity 
for more critical and comprehensive analysis of housing finance subsidies 
(and subsequent reform) as the region moves into a second decade of 
such subsidies.
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Thinking about Subsidies to Housing Finance
Douglas B. Diamond1
Marja Hoek-Smit of the Wharton School and the author have been reviewing the 
theory and practice of subsidies to housing ﬁnance by way of preparing a report for 
the Housing Finance Group at the World Bank. We have been drawing mostly upon 
our direct experiences in working with policymakers in dozens of countries, including 
many transition, developing, and developed countries. The full report will be avail-
able on the website of the International Housing Finance Program at Wharton (ihfp.
wharton.upenn.edu).
This paper summarizes some of the general points we make in the report and looks 
at examples from transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from that 
perspective.
WHY SUBSIDIZE HOUSING FINANCE?
To many people working in the business of housing ﬁnance—as well as to its users—it 
may seem obvious why it should be subsidized. In a modern urban economy, hous-
ing ﬁnance is key to developing a built environment closer to the level of quality and 
quantity to which society as a whole, or individual consumers, might aspire. To those 
who have always lived with ready access to housing ﬁnance, the purchase of housing 
without reliance on long-term credit seems hard to imagine. In the case of the former 
socialist economies, it could also be expected that easy access to housing ﬁnance would 
be critical to the successful shift of citizens from looking to the state to provide housing 
towards self-suﬃciency. 
For all of these reasons, intervention by the state to promote and even share the cost 
of housing ﬁnance may seem very appropriate. However, leaving the argument at such 
a general level opens the door to ineﬃcient forms of intervention. In fact, many coun-
tries settle for vague rationalizations, which are transmuted by the political system into 
programs with political appeal but very little relevance to identiﬁable social goals.
The contrary argument can also be made. Exactly what is it about housing that 
merits the taxation of all citizens in order to subsidize the consumption of housing, 
either by all or, more commonly, by just a special segment of society? Other necessities 
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such as food and water are often not subsidized, at least to the middle class and above. 
A parallel issue arises if assistance is targeted only on the poorest. Why assist with 
housing and not income in general?
To help clarify thinking about such subsidies, we identify ﬁve speciﬁc policy justi-
ﬁcations for subsidies to housing and/or housing ﬁnance. These are:
 1. Improving public health
  In poor countries, the foremost reason to subsidize housing is to make sure that 
housing conditions, including the quality of water and sanitation, and conditions 
of the residential and social environment, will not cause outbreaks of disease or 
pose physical or social hazards to the population. While it is possible that public 
health can be an issue in the poorest of the transition countries, even those with 
the greatest amount of overcrowding do not face a major crisis in this regard. 
More common is a general feeling that housing standards, especially space per 
person, is lower than in other “similar” countries.2
 2. Improving fairness and justice in a society
  This basically refers to redistributing income within the society, based on 
ideas of fairness—leveling the playing ﬁeld between people with diﬀerent 
starting points in life or providing a minimally acceptable level of housing 
consumption.3 But why address this through housing, instead of cash or edu-
cation? It seems likely that the focus on housing is due to housing’s visibility. 
Highly visible poor quality housing can be taken as a sign of poor overall 
consumption, either calling forth compassion or concern about the blight 
on the visual environment. In either case, the general view seems to be that 
promoting higher quality housing has greater social beneﬁts (for the higher—
“giving”—income taxpayers as well as the recipients) than assisting with other 
aspects of the consumption bundle.
 3. Inﬂuencing economic and political stability
  This rationale is commonly used to support subsidies to homeownership, based 
on the claim that homeowners have a greater stake in the economic and politi-
cal stability of a country. Perhaps it is also believed that people who grow up 
and live in relatively more pleasant personal surroundings will be less likely to 
practice anti-social behavior.
 4. Overcoming ineﬃciencies in the housing or mortgage market that cannot be 
solved through regulations 
  In many countries, it can be argued that there are failings in the eﬃcient operation 
of the ﬁnancial system in general or the housing ﬁnance system in particular. In 
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most cases, these failings could be addressed through reform of various aspects 
of the legal, regulatory, or ownership structure of the sector. However, either this 
may not be the case, or such reforms may be harder to achieve than introducing 
subsidies that will counter these failings. This is often the basis for supporting 
institutional interventions into the operation of the housing ﬁnance system that 
carry implicit subsidies (e.g., mortgage insurance, secondary markets).
 5. Stimulating economic growth
  This rationale is often used to support various kinds of supposedly countercyclical 
assistance to the housing construction sector. In our view, it is generally over-
stated, since other sorts of public investment, in physical or social infrastructure, 
can have as much or more economic impact as additional housing, and often 
have better eﬃciency and redistribution eﬀects. Although such a rationale may 
be valid under certain circumstances, such programs usually have more appeal 
to politically powerful special interests than to economic analysts.
There is an additional rationale that may be convincing to many observers but which 
we do not accept—the claim that society is better oﬀ when everyone has more housing. 
Housing can be considered a “merit good”—a good that society as a whole values more 
highly than individuals alone; i.e., there are some positive social externalities so that the 
optimal level is aﬀorded only through subsidy.4 
In our view, there is no evidence that this is the case for housing. The question is 
open to debate, however. Perhaps it is the case that most people in a society feel better 
about their social conditions when they see that their fellow citizens are housed in more 
space and comfort than would be the case without subsidy.5 
It is notable that many countries do tend to subsidize housing very broadly. One 
competing explanation is that this reﬂects catering to certain interest groups, such as 
the construction sector. Another explanation that is especially relevant to transition 
countries is that it reﬂects also a basic disconnect between the public and social policy. 
It may take a long time for the public to realize that government money is actually their 
money. Until then, politicians promising that some of that money comes back in the 
form of housing subsidies to the middle and upper-middle income groups are popular. 
This is especially the case when the ultimate costs of those subsidies are well hidden 
from view, as will be discussed below.
A further alternative view is that the middle class has to receive some visible beneﬁts 
if it is going to accept being taxed heavily. There may also be some truth to that.
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CATEGORIES AND TYPES OF SUBSIDY
Next, we identify two general approaches to subsidizing housing ﬁnance and several 
variants within each category.
 1. Interventions into the housing ﬁnance system that change the system in some 
way:
  a. state housing banks (lending institutions with majority ownership by the 
state and a special mandate to lend for housing; usually with access to fund-
ing at below-market rates, as well as state-supplied equity capital)
  b. drawing on state-sponsored funding (the state may provide state and private 
lenders with funding at below-market rates, often from state-sponsored 
pension funds or other oﬀ-budget pools of capital)
  c. state-sponsored insurance or guarantees for credit risk (usually state-owned 
mortgage insurance schemes)
  d. state-sponsored insurance or guarantees for funding-related risk (the state 
sets up institutions or oﬀers guarantees that shift some of the funding 
risks—liquidity risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk—to the state)
  e. subsidies to ﬁnance rental housing (some countries set up parallel rental 
housing supply systems—usually called social housing—using varying 
degrees of state funding, control, and risk-bearing).
 2. Subsidies to households themselves (even if channeled through the housing 
ﬁnance system):
  a. up-front cash subsidies and housing allowances (schemes whereby select 
households receive assistance with the cash portion of the purchase price 
of owner-occupied housing or with the monthly repayment on loans for 
such)
  b. subsidies linked to housing-related savings schemes (these include rewards 
such as greater access to other subsidies in return for greater savings eﬀort 
and contract savings schemes such as the bausparkassen)
  c. direct subsidies of interest rates (schemes whereby the state pays a portion 
of the interest due on loans taken from private lenders)
  d. Tax subsidies to mortgage loans (deductions from taxable income or taxes 
due based on mortgage interest or repayments).
In Hoek-Smit and Diamond (2005), the rationales, advantages, and disadvantages 
of each sort of subsidy are examined and then illustrated with examples of such schemes 
from 3 or more countries in each case. We reach a variety of conclusions about what 
are the best general approaches to subsidizing housing ﬁnance and what is the policy 
formulation process that is most likely to produce sensible subsidies. These are discussed 
below.
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We also conclude, based on the many subsidy schemes that we examine, that most 
subsidy schemes are not part of a well-thought-out policy structure. They tend to be 
highly political and ad hoc. This is not news to anyone who has been involved in or has 
studied subsidy policy. But it is a point that needs to be stated clearly so the issue may 
be dealt with in a constructive manner. We attempt to do that within our suggested 
policy formulation process.
A SUGGESTED PROCESS FOR FORMULATING SUBSIDY POLICY
Before looking at what subsidy schemes might be generally most useful in Central 
and Eastern Europe, it may be worthwhile to suggest how such an analysis should be 
conducted, i.e., what sort of logical process will lead to relatively eﬃcient and eﬀective 
subsidy recommendations.
1. Determining the Housing Issues or Goals to be Addressed
Unfortunately, this step is rarely taken, at least publicly. It is often politically preferable 
not to say exactly what the goal of the subsidy is. To do so may make it too clear that 
only a relatively few are beneﬁting from the largesse of the many. Or it may be that it 
will then become too clear that the subsidy proposed has little to do with the purpose 
claimed, instead catering to certain special interests. In most countries the prevailing 
attitude is that the less said about the precise goal of the scheme, the less debate and 
scrutiny the proposal will engender, and, conveniently, the less ex post criticism will 
ensue.6 It is felt to be better that each observer read into the scheme what they prefer 
to see rather than prioritizing explicitly the real needs of the society. 
This is especially the case when, as is unfortunately very common, the subsidy 
proposals are originated by political personages with little input from policy analysts. 
They usually have little ability to judge whether a “nice sounding” subsidy idea (that also 
sounds nice to their political supporters) will actually have much eﬀect on any speciﬁc 
social goal. Their criterion is often the “nice sound” of the idea, and not the long-term 
eﬀect. From this perspective, there is little incentive to be precise about the goal.
On the other hand, our criteria for judging success are the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness 
of a subsidy scheme. From that very diﬀerent perspective, there is no choice but to start 
by asking: What exactly is wrong with the housing or mortgage ﬁnance situation? Is 
this a reason to use public monies? What might be done to solve that problem relatively 
eﬃciently? Stating that the goal is to provide better housing is not enough. Why do they 
need better houses instead of other things that might be done with their own money? 
Who exactly needs the better housing? Does everyone or just a small group? 
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This approach brings one back to the discussion of rationales for housing ﬁnance 
subsidies. However, even if the real goals, such as rewarding special interests or building 
support for the re-election of  the incumbents, are not on the list above, the subsidy 
design process will beneﬁt from explicit statement of these goals (albeit not in public), 
so that the rest of the process (seeking the most eﬃcient and eﬀective tools) can be 
pursued. Even creating “feel-good” programs can be done in better or worse ways.
2. Regulatory or Policy Reform Instead of Subsidy? 
Once the reasons for the constraints in the housing system are understood, the analysis 
should address the question of whether the constraints can be corrected through regu-
latory or policy reform (e.g., excessive costs of registering or enforcing a lien, or other 
market or legal imperfections causing excessive spreads on loans), or maybe only solved 
at the macroeconomic level (e.g., high inﬂation causing high interest rates). To the extent 
that they cannot (e.g., it is politically unpopular to strengthen foreclosure or reduce 
inﬂation), second-best but still relatively eﬃcient subsidies can be designed.
3. Which Subsidy? 
After establishing the need for a subsidy for speciﬁc segments of the market and its 
goals, one can move on to outlining relevant sub-sets of subsidy options and select the 
best implementation agents based on accepted design principles. As noted above, the 
choice is very large, just going on what has been used around the world up to now. 
It should also be noted that, although much can be learned from experience in other 
countries, there are almost always special circumstances within each country calling for 
customization of any solution to that speciﬁc environment.
4. Costing and Budgeting 
Once the goal is identiﬁed, and subsidy measures that actually address that goal are 
being contemplated, it is critical that the costing out and design of the subsidies be 
done properly, taking into account both the current and future costs, both direct and 
indirect, and comparing these to individual and social beneﬁts, equity considerations, 
and alternative ways to make the subsidy transparent. 
Costing the subsidy is particularly important. If the total real future costs are not 
calculated, the political system will give much more weight to short-term impacts on 
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the budget than long-term eﬀects. The result will be a subsidy scheme that is either 
unsustainable or, at least, much more expensive than expected. This is one reason why 
lump-sum subsidies are  favored by many policy analysts and tax and interest rate sub-
sidies are favored by politicians.
In costing out the subsidy, common-sense economics needs to be brought to bear. 
For example, most housing ﬁnance subsidies, if successful, will cause a rise in the total 
amount borrowed. This increase needs to be factored in when forecasting the costs.
Under some circumstances, this increase can be extreme. For example, if the net 
cost of mortgage loans is reduced to less than the return on bank deposits, the increase 
in borrowing can be much larger, maybe even 10 times larger, than, for example, reduc-
ing the eﬀective rate by 2-4 percent but still leaving it above the rate on bank accounts. 
Similarly, a 20 percent bausparkasse premium may have 3 times the eﬀect of a 10 percent 
premium on the amounts saved, and therefore 6 times the cost, because if the return 
on savings in a bausparkasse are much higher than in a bank, many people will simply 
shift their savings to bausparkassen, increasing the cost of the subsidy above what might 
be expected. Complex models can be used for this, but simply asking oneself and one’s 
neighbors what they would do in reaction to a subsidy scheme is often enough to sug-
gest the order of magnitude of the response.
5. Implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation
Even the best designed subsidy, properly budgeted for, can fail to be eﬃcient and eﬀec-
tive if it is not implemented properly. Finally, and unfortunately very rarely, existing 
subsidies should be quantitatively monitored and evaluated over time for eﬀectiveness, 
eﬃciency, and needed reﬁnements. 
There is evidence that this last step is the key to moving gradually to a rationalized 
subsidy policy, since even rudimentary analysis can make it (embarrassingly) clear that 
some schemes have little net eﬀect relative to their cost or are badly targeted, while 
others are eﬀective and should be expanded.
To do this, there should be government support for ongoing independent analysis of 
such subsidies. This analysis could be done by a staﬀ of internal experts with appropri-
ate skills in economics and ﬁnance, or through contracting with external academics or 
research institutions to assess performance. This process has been relatively successful 
in a number of advanced countries in moving subsidy policies towards far more eﬀec-
tive and eﬃcient formats (and simply reductions in subsidies because eﬀects of most 
schemes were found to be so poor).
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SUBSIDY POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Rationales
Although it has been 15 years since most of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe 
started their transition to market economies and democratic governance, the evolution 
of housing ﬁnance subsidy policy is still early in some, if not most, of them. This is 
primarily due to the fact that the housing ﬁnance sector itself has taken time to sprout 
and mature. Severe economic circumstances have also often prevented forays into any 
signiﬁcant level of subsidy to the sector. These same circumstances created lending terms 
that were unattractive without unusually deep subsidies. 
However, several countries have had signiﬁcant experience in the area. The longest 
experience has been seen in the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia). Interesting contrasts can be drawn between that experience and the experi-
ence in the Baltic states, where subsidies and other interventions were far more muted.
What issues have they tried to address? What sorts of subsidies to housing ﬁnance 
have they used and with what success?
As noted above, public health issues are not generally pressing in such countries. 
But renovations of crumbling panel buildings (or older inner-city structures), including 
energy conservation measures, have been a high priority in some. To this end, various 
schemes to reduce the eﬀective rate on loans to condominium associations have been 
adopted in some cases, but the extent and exact terms are not known.
Fairness has been an issue in all of these countries, although not necessarily in the 
expected manner. The main aspect has been helping younger families, who did not beneﬁt 
from the privatization of state rental and co-op housing in the 1990s. It is the younger 
generation that must deal most directly with the end of state provision of housing.
This has generated special programs directed at ﬁrst-time homebuyers in most of 
the countries. The support usually takes the form of interest rate subsidies, usually paid 
to the lender, and/or a lump-sum grant. In Lithuania, it also included subsidized access 
to mortgage insurance.
Only a few countries addressed another aspect of the fairness question, that the 
housing bundle of citizens varied enormously at the time that the existing stock was 
privatized, and this largely determined the housing (and asset wealth) of the individual 
household. Some countries provided interest rate subsidies based on the space per person 
currently occupied by the beneﬁciary. Most countries, however, seemed to adopt the 
view that the allocation of housing wealth was reasonably in keeping with the implicit 
eﬀective distribution of wealth (although nominally uniform) under the socialist system. 
Managers and scientists got good ﬂats and villas and factory workers got poor ﬂats, and 
it was up to market forces what would happen subsequently.
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The assistance to younger non-owner families could also be categorized as subsidies 
designed to boost homeownership as a method of improving social stability. However, 
most of these countries had such high levels of formal or informal (i.e., right to oc-
cupancy at a nominal rent) ownership that it is diﬃcult to accept the existence of 
signiﬁcant concern about a large number of (true) renters not feeling a commitment 
to civic progress.
The last two rationales for subsidies, overcoming ineﬃciencies and stimulating 
economic growth, played major roles in the formulation of subsidy policy. In several 
countries, the idea was promoted that subsidies were needed to bring lenders and bor-
rowers into the market or otherwise the mortgage ﬁnance sector would not develop 
properly. In Hungary, this view took on the added element of concern that the former 
state savings bank, OTP, would deter development of housing ﬁnance through its near-
monopoly on retail savings deposits. 
All countries were anxious to see sustainable economic growth after the depression 
conditions of the early 1990s, and residential construction was seen to be an impor-
tant part of that. This rationale was often hooked together with the goal of developing 
vibrant mortgage markets to achieve support for broad scale subsidy schemes, such as 
large grants, deep interest rate subsidies and tax subsidies, and, in the case of Hungary 
and Latvia, the founding of a state-owned mortgage bank.
The Visegrád countries also all passed bausparkassen (BS) legislation based on these 
latter two rationales. The BS were seen as sources of longer-term capital for buying 
mortgage bonds (part of conventional wisdom, but not really a pressing issue in coun-
tries where interest rates were so high that there was little demand for long-term loans). 
In addition, it was claimed that the low-rate loans eventually emanating from the BS 
would boost economic activity (that in theory might generate taxes covering the cost 
of the subsidies).
Results
Generally, these subsidy schemes were borne more of political expediency than of ana-
lytical insight.7 Not surprisingly, they succeeded more politically than economically.
The one scheme pursued by all Visegrád countries, the bausparkassen, is an extreme 
example. 
The prevalence of the BS was not a coincidence, nor a decision independently for-
mulated by the various governments. The German and Austrian bauspar interests lobbied 
strongly to create new markets “next door” for their capital and ﬁnancial technology and 
they found a receptive audience among the parliamentarians in each country. There was 
little analysis and ready acceptance that the impact on growth would be signiﬁcant.
Unfortunately, this overlooked the fact that the subsidies to BS take 4–6 years to 
become available to borrowers. Even after that point was reached, there is little evidence 
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that they have aﬀected the housing markets in these countries, particularly relative to 
the large amounts of subsidy involved. In Slovakia, ﬁnance from the BS has signiﬁcantly 
substituted for ﬁnance from conventional mortgage lenders, but with little apparent 
eﬀect on the housing market. In the Czech Republic, they have become seen as more 
of a subsidized form of savings than a source of housing credit.8 In general, the schemes 
were poorly suited to the circumstances in these countries,9 and are now arguably su-
perﬂuous, but have become politically diﬃcult to cut back or rationalize.
All of the Visegrád countries adopted various schemes targeted to those who would 
build new housing. The problems with all such schemes is that of “buying out the base,” 
the process whereby the subsidy goes to those who would have bought or built a new 
home anyway, as well as those enticed into doing so by the subsidy. Another problem 
is that the program can become “too successful” and generate unexpectedly high costs. 
Both of these were major problems when, in 1994, Hungary greatly expanded a program 
that provided large grants for new housing. The use of the subsidy was much greater 
than expected yet the number of extra units was fewer than half of those who received 
the subsidy. The result was that the scheme had to be signiﬁcantly cut back after just 
seven months, but the revision process allowed so many to claim it in the future (the 
public had a month’s notice to get a building permit before the subsidy window door 
was closed) that the cost burden remained signiﬁcant for several years.10
The best part of the 1994 scheme was that it involved a single lump-sum grant, and 
the cost was clear already 7 months later. Hungary’s next attempt at a major economic 
(and political) stimulus came in the run up to the 2002 elections.11 Instead of a lump-
sum grant, homebuyers became eligible for such deep interest rate subsidies that the net 
cost of borrowing was distinctly lower than the rate of return available on savings. This 
led to a huge increase in borrowing (previously, 80–90 percent of home purchases did 
not involve a loan, now up to 80–90 percent of purchases did involve a loan, thereby 
substituting for personal savings or intra-family transfers) but only a small increase in 
actual construction. In other words, almost all of the subsidy went to “buy out the 
base,” with an even worse beneﬁt-cost ratio than the earlier grant scheme. In this case, 
moreover, the costs of the subsidy scheme will be a burden on the budget for the next 
20 years. Because of the low visibility of the subsidy in the immediate budget, it has 
been politically diﬃcult for the new government to cut back on the scheme.
All of the Visegrád countries have also adopted some sort of tax subsidy for mortgage 
loans. This appears partly based on a belief that such subsidies are standard in richer 
Western countries (mostly true, but against the advice of most policy analysts), partly 
that it would entice more “black income” to be reported, and partly to appeal to mid-
dle class voters without making the tax-regressive aspect of it transparent.12 Hungary 
also has the most extreme version of such a subsidy, whereby a percent of the total loan 
repayment (principal and interest) goes towards reducing taxes. This, combined with 
other interest rate reductions, implies that for many borrowers, the eﬀective interest rate 
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is negative, i.e., the state is paying them to take out the loan. There is also no evidence 
that this subsidy has had any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the housing sector.13
Hungary also took steps supposedly designed to create a fuller and more active 
housing ﬁnance market. Much of the deep subsidies noted above were directed at sup-
porting the growth of a mortgage bank system. The need for such a system was never 
demonstrated, but political forces led ﬁrst to the creation of a state-owned mortgage 
bank and then to the creation of subsidies just for that bank when it became clear that 
it would fail without them. Ironically, one of the arguments for the bank was to coun-
terbalance the near-monopoly position of OTP. Once OTP gained access to the same 
subsidies, it took as large a share of the mortgage bank market as of the commercial 
bank market.
The Czech version of the interest rate subsidy is notable for one very desirable feature. 
Although initially stated as a ﬂat 4 percent reduction in the mortgage on eligible loans, 
it was modiﬁed in 2000 to phase down as market interest rates fell. Thus, as economic 
stability brought lower rates after 2000, the subsidy rate on new loans declined and even-
tually went to zero. The scheme still suﬀers, however, from the main problem with such 
subsidies, that the future costs of the interest rate buy-down (the bulk of the real cost) 
is not reﬂected on the current year’s budget (as well as largely buying out the base).
Poland avoided most of the weakest aspects of these other subsidies. It neither com-
mitted to large ongoing subsidies, to a bausparkassen system, nor adopted a long-term 
interest rate buy-down. Instead, a tax subsidy on mortgage interest was adopted. A dif-
ferent sort of subsidy was used in the 1990s to encourage economic growth, whereby 
individuals could deduct, up to a relatively high limit, the cost of constructing a new 
house. This subsidy was notable in that it did not require taking out a loan, did not 
involve long-term future commitments of additional subsidy, and was a clear incentive 
to build more housing. Its main weakness was the high cost of buying out the base. By 
1998, it was costing more than 2 percent of the state budget (but as a tax subsidy, it 
was an oﬀ-budget item). 
The Baltic states are a notable contrast to the Visegrád countries. They generally 
avoided the deep subsidy expenditures, yet beneﬁted from a ﬂowering of active mortgage 
markets largely based on market-rate lending. For Estonia, this reﬂects their general 
adherence to more strongly market-oriented policies as well as close ties to Finland and 
other Scandinavian countries. This drew in strong foreign ownership of local banks. 
Given conservative economic policies and a commitment to a ﬁxed exchange rate with 
the euro, loans were being made in euros at low rates. This reduced the pressure for 
subsidies and encouraged narrower spreads in mortgage lending (not coincidentally, 
Hungary has the largest subsidies and the largest spreads as well).
Lithuania has also experienced foreign ownership of its banks and the ﬂowering of 
market-rate lending. Some notable subsidies were used, however. From 1992–1997, 
oﬀ-budget funds derived from privatization were used to ﬁnance completion of co-op 
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buildings that had been committed to earlier. This was mostly an economic stimulus 
goal. 
This program was modiﬁed after 1997 to address fairness, with younger, non-own-
ing households being eligible for an interest rate buy-down. From 1998 to 2001, the 
buy-down was similar to that in the Czech Republic, bringing the rate down to a certain 
level (usually 5 percent). From 2001–2003, the low rate environment caused a switch 
back to a ﬁxed amount of buy-down, but with the goal of keeping the net rate above 
0 percent (even so, the net rate was now below the rate on savings, encouraging those 
who did not really need a loan to apply as well). 
The scheme had two additional desirable features. The buy-down was set to end after 
half of the period of the loan, on the proposition that the household income would then 
have risen, and, after 2000, the state would pay for the cost of any mortgage insurance 
needed to borrow more than 80 percent of the cost of the house. This last subsidy was 
also designed to support a market-rate mortgage insurance scheme that had been set 
up by the government in 2000.
This overall scheme was a reasonable way to promote fairness. The amount of the 
total subsidy per beneﬁciary was limited, so the percentage value was lower for higher 
income households. The life of the subsidy was limited to a reasonable period. The net 
rate was kept above 0 percent (but still perhaps so low as to encourage unnecessary bor-
rowing). There were also limitations on the number of such subsidies granted in any 
given year, in order to protect the budget. And provisions existed for high LTV loans for 
those who could not participate otherwise. However, it was not clear what share of the 
beneﬁciaries were “incremental,” especially in an economy where many of the younger 
households were already beneﬁting from the higher incomes available to professionals 
in a market economy and could probably have bought a house anyway.
Notably, the program was terminated in 2003 and an unlimited mortgage interest 
tax deduction granted as a substitute. It is not clear whether this was in response to 
pressure by the broad middle class to gain access to subsidies or simply a perception that 
such tax subsidies were conventional in advanced economies but could not be aﬀorded 
without ending the interest rate subsidy scheme. In any case, a targeted program with 
a clearly stated goal was replaced by an untargeted one without any likely eﬀect. It was 
also notable that, as is often the case, the decision was made at the highest (political) 
levels without analysis at the policy level.
WHAT SUBSIDIES WORK BEST IN THESE SORTS OF COUNTRIES?
Based on the experience in CEE countries, and other countries discussed in Hoek-Smit 
and Diamond (2004), what might be the most sensible subsidies to housing ﬁnance? 
The best single choice in all cases depends greatly on the speciﬁc circumstances in any 
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given country, including the past history of subsidies, the nature of the political discus-
sion about them, and the apparent rationales for them. These also partly determine the 
degree that the subsidies can be targeted and designed to minimize “buying out the 
base” and maximize the impact on actual behavior relative to cost.
Having said that, as a generalization, well targeted lump-sum subsidies are tradition-
ally considered the best for meeting most of the goals noted above, including fairness 
and justice and also social stability. This is because the cost is transparent, the beneﬁt is 
clear to the beneﬁciary, and it is going mostly for actual housing and not for the lender 
margin. Beneﬁciaries do not even need to be creditworthy to receive it.
In transition countries, if most of the older population has received their housing 
unit at a nominal charge, such a subsidy should be targeted to ﬁrst-time buyers as well as 
by income. Moreover, to minimize buying out the base, the subsidy should be designed 
to phase out as income or house-size or cost exceeds some standard (more typically, 
subsidies to ﬁrst time buyers in CEE have been limited based on a maximum size for 
either house or loan—wise given the prevalence of undocumented income—but the 
subsidy was not usually reduced as loan or house-size exceeded the cap).
In order to calibrate the impact on the budget, such subsidies can be limited in a 
given year and rationed by some transparent system. It should be noted that time on a 
waiting list, by itself, is not always highly correlated with any measure of social need.
However, there is a signiﬁcant reason not to emphasize lump-sum grants in transition 
countries. Given that a large share of the population has been given their home debt-
free, that the population is usually stable or declining (and thus most young families 
are potential beneﬁciaries of bequests of such equity from parents or grandparents), and 
that intra-family aid with home purchase is very common, it is more likely than in other 
countries that a lump-sum grant is not really needed by many potential beneﬁciaries 
in order to buy a home. In other words, even with signiﬁcant targeting, there is still a 
large element of buying out the base.
What may work better in such circumstances is a relatively shallow interest rate 
subsidy (as in the Czech Republic), possibly combined with some system for subsidizing 
the availability of high LTV loans (somewhat like what Lithuania had from 2000-2003). 
If the interest rate net of subsidy is equal to or above the rate available on personal sav-
ings, even subsidized loans have some net cost over using personal cash and will not 
substitute when buyers’ savings plus intra-family transfers are already suﬃcient (which 
is clearly often the case given that, in the absence of deep subsidies, the great majority 
of home buyers in the Visegrád and Baltic states do not use any signiﬁcant amount of 
credit for home purchases).
Users do not have an incentive to draw on the subsidy if they do not need any ad-
ditional funding. If they do need such funding, it will probably cost them very little in 
inﬂation-adjusted terms (if the mortgage rate net of subsidy is only a little more than 
expected inﬂation). The problem of non-creditworthiness of the target population (a 
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big problem in developing countries) is not as prominent in most transition countries. 
If beneﬁciaries are very short of cash, a high LTV loan may be able to help bridge 
that gap.
The critical weakness of such mortgage interest subsidies is that most government 
budgeting systems do not recognize the outstanding amounts of future budget commit-
ments that are being taken on. In the absence of such budgeting, the political process 
will tend to overextend such subsidies, looking towards short-term popularity over 
long-term burden. This has been a serious problem in all of the Visegrád countries, 
where the balance of power is so narrow that elections are always close.
If there is a political need to support housing ﬁnance for middle-class households as 
well, the best option may be small interventions in the housing ﬁnance system, involving 
controlled and relatively small subsidies that address potential “failures” in the hous-
ing ﬁnance market. These can include support for managing credit risk, say mortgage 
insurance, or for capital market access, say subsidies for issuing mortgage bonds. These 
interventions help give private market participants the full range of options in organ-
izing the sector and managing the risks. 
Such interventions, though, should be carefully calibrated. The  mortgage bonds 
given as subsidies in Hungary were hugely excessive, explainable only as a subsidy to 
support the state-owned mortgage bank. In the process, they have signiﬁcantly distorted 
the capital market. The tax-exemption of mortgage bonds in the Czech Republic is a 
more measured approach. The state-owned mortgage insurance company in Lithuania 
is also a measured approach to expanding access to high LTV loans, since the state 
has explicitly excluded any open-ended guarantee and the premiums are set based on 
independent actuarial calculations.14
It is not easy to ﬁnd evidence in favor of using subsidies simply to give a boost to 
the mortgage industry. Countries with small or no subsidies, such as Poland, Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Ukraine, have developed active and competitive mortgage markets when 
the macroeconomic and banking conditions are ready for it. Similarly, the argument 
that bausparkassen are needed to ensure that the market for smaller loans for renovations 
develops is thoroughly undermined by the fact that such markets have developed for 
good business reasons in other countries with level playing ﬁelds for such loans.
In addition to subsidies to homeowner mortgage ﬁnance, there may be a role for 
subsidies to expand access to private or non-proﬁt rental housing options.15 Most of the 
CEE transition countries have, or are working on, schemes for promoting “social rental 
housing.” Unfortunately, in some cases this has meant simply giving funds to munici-
palities or state entities to build more government-owned rental housing, despite the 
extensive experience under socialism with the problems that this involves. The topic of 
ﬁnancing social rental housing is too complex to explore here, but a good summary by 
Claude Taﬃn, head of research at the Union of Social Housing Companies in France, 
is included in Hoek-Smit and Diamond (2004).
95
T H I N K I N G  A B O U T  S U B S I D I E S  T O  H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E
The Role of Policy Analysis
The last two sections indicate that the author believes that there is room for signiﬁcant 
improvement in the sorts of housing ﬁnance subsidies used by CEE transition countries. 
There is some experience that suggests that these countries will gradually move towards 
better subsidies. In some cases, this will be because the current subsidies are building up 
unsustainable levels of future budget commitments. In other cases, it will be because of 
analysis of the cumulative experience with past and current subsidies.
This latter factor has had a signiﬁcant impact on policy formulation in many of the 
richer OECD countries.16 Analysis of the impacts of subsidy programs can never be 
precise, but even study of crude data is often enough, when combined with observations 
from participants, to conclude that a program may be having very little impact relative 
to its costs. Usually even simple analysis of actual data (if the data exists) and program 
operations will point to major improvements that can be made within the scope of an 
existing scheme to reduce waste or increase eﬀectiveness. But going so far as to label 
a program valueless (as many probably are) may be more diﬃcult to publicly state or 
utilize, because of the entrenched interests that usually build up around subsidies (not 
to mention the embarrassment of the program’s original promoters).17
On the other hand, some transition countries are starting to move up along the 
learning curve. Two good examples are the Czech Republic and Lithuania. The Czech 
Republic has internal staﬀ at the Ministry for Regional Development that monitors 
and analyzes the many housing subsidy programs. It has also commissioned analyses of 
the scheme by independent academic experts. 
In 2002, Lithuania used World Bank funding to conduct an independent review by 
domestic and foreign experts of most of the major existing and proposed components 
of its housing policies. This created a strong base of data and analyses that will be useful 
for several years in framing housing policy there.18 
Academic analyses by non-political observers will not usually dominate the public 
discussion among political players about subsidy schemes. The politics of subsidies has 
a life of its own, often very divergent from careful and explicit analysis. But in many 
countries, the preparation of objective data and commentary, especially on the logic 
and eﬀects of current schemes, has narrowed the range of “plausibility” in the claims 
that political discussion can make about the advantages of a speciﬁc scheme. It is also 
true that many schemes actually operate very diﬀerently from the public perception, 
even by its political advocates, and documentation of actual experience can correct these 
misperceptions and prompt revisions.
Admittedly, such research will never channel political or public discussion into 
the dry, impersonal frameworks favored for such analysis. But it seems to this observer 
that the preparation of such analyses is a necessary, if insuﬃcient, condition to evolve 
public policy towards more eﬀectiveness. With 10 or more years of experience in the 
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advanced transition countries, it would be doubly useful for their subsidy schemes to 
be critiqued, both for their own beneﬁt and as a cautionary warning to the countries 
that enter transition later against blindly following in their footsteps.
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ENDNOTES
1 This paper is partially based on a report written with Marja Hoek-Smit for the World Bank entitled 
“An Illustrated Guide to Housing Finance Subsidies.” However, the views expressed here are those of 
the author and not necessarily those of Professor Hoek-Smit or the World Bank.
2 There may be issues of thermal control, earthquake resistance, and other related health and safety 
issues. These may be especially relevant in the context of subsidizing credit taken by condominium 
associations.
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3 This is the rationale emphasized by Christian Donner in his massive study of housing policies in EU 
countries. He claims that the aim of housing policy “is to assure every household access to housing 
adequate in size and in quality and at reasonable expenditure eﬀort” (2000: 38). Because these norms 
are not absolute, but instead relative to consumption and expenditure levels for higher income 
groups, this translates into an argument for redistribution towards supporting housing consumption 
among lower-income households. 
4 Education is often considered a merit good; see Musgrave (1957) for more on this concept.
5 Sweden may be a good example of this. It is notable for very broad subsidies to housing, as well as its 
serious pursuit of “social” objectives. See Christian Donner (2000: 423).
6 The advantages of vagueness about policy goals has been strongly illustrated by the experience in the 
US and UK in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq.
7 This perspective is echoed in Struyk’s study of housing ﬁnance policies in Visegrád countries, in 
Struyk (2000).
8 See Dübel (2003) for more details on the bausparkassen systems in these countries. 
9 Diamond (1999a, 1999b, 2002) examines these schemes in detail and their apparent costs and 
eﬀects. Based on some of the initial experience in the other Visegrád countries, Poland repealed their 
BS scheme without ever implementing it.
10 There were also problems with abuse and unintended consequences, not surprising when such a 
large subsidy (up to 60% of the cost of a new house in rural areas) is oﬀered. There were stories about 
paying contractors to inﬂate construction costs and people “demolishing” their old house. In fact, one of 
the poorest counties in Hungary with only 5 percent of the population received 25 percent of the subsidy 
payments in 1996. The increase in the number of demolitions there was almost equal to the increase in 
construction. 
11 See Hegedüs and Somogyi (2004).
12 Unless carefully designed, such tax subsidies do not respond to any of the rationales noted above, 
including that of promoting homeownership, but could reﬂect the idea that general levels of housing 
consumption should be above the “market-determined” levels.
13 Neither housing production nor housing prices in Hungary have responded strongly to what has 
been a truly massive outpouring of subsidy since 2001. Lending has grown by a factor of 10, and 
lenders are reporting huge proﬁts.
14 It should be noted that, just because the US and Canada have both state-owned and private mortgage 
insurance, in other countries, including Lithuania, banks can choose to oﬀer higher LTV loans for 
a higher interest rate. If the state wishes to subsidize this, it can do so directly through the banks. At 
LTV ratios up to 90% (suﬃcient in most transition countries), it is not obvious that the risk needs to 
be shifted to specialized mortgage insurance companies.
15 There may also be social equity, market imperfection, and even public safety arguments for some 
subsidies to condominium organizations for renovations to common areas. These are beyond the 
space of this paper.
16 Many of these countries have used comprehensive reviews of housing policy or speciﬁc programs to 
signiﬁcantly rationalize their subsidy structures.
17 Making even small changes can be very diﬃcult, as evidenced by the great resistance to reducing the 
seemingly self-evident ineﬃciencies associated with the bausparkassen subsidy in the Czech Republic 
or the mortgage bond subsidy in Hungary, or, for that matter, the almost unrestricted tax subsidy to 
mortgages in the US.
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18 The products of that review can be found at the World Bank’s website. It was notable that the 
presence of the review did not prevent the political process to instigate a major change in housing 
ﬁnance subsidy policy, a tax deduction for mortgage interest, without consulting the reviewers or 
other policy analysts. It is not known how the review has aﬀected policy development since 2002.
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 Risk Management and Mortgage Portfolios: 
 Some Applications for Emerging Markets
 Robert Van Order
 ABSTRACT
 This paper is about controlling the risks that come from holding a portfolio 
of mortgages. An important underlying notion, which is a basic principle 
of financial management, is that risk is fundamentally a portfolio concept. 
For a bank or other financial institution it is not the risk of individual assets 
that matters; rather it is the way in which they are combined to affect the 
risk of the overall portfolio that is most important.
  The focus of this chapter is on credit risk: how it can be analyzed and 
priced, how it fits into portfolios of investors, and how it can be allocated. 
However, credit risk is not the only important risk. A major risk, especially 
for long-term mortgages, is interest rate risk, in particular, the risk from 
funding long-term mortgages with short-term deposits. Balancing these 
two risks is a major portfolio management problem, in part because the 
two interact: things that help manage interest rate risk, such as securitiza-
tion, can make management of credit risk more difficult. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about controlling the risks that come from holding a portfolio of mortgages. 
The focus is on credit risk: how it can be analyzed and priced, how it ﬁts into portfolios 
of investors, and how it can be allocated. However, credit risk is not the only important 
risk. A major risk, especially for long-term mortgages, is interest rate risk, in particular, 
the risk from funding long-term mortgages with short-term deposits.2 Balancing these 
two risks is a major portfolio management problem, in part because the two interact: 
things that help manage interest rate risk, such as securitization, can make management 
of credit risk more diﬃcult. 
An important underlying notion, which is a basic principle of ﬁnancial management, 
is that risk is fundamentally a portfolio concept. For a bank or other ﬁnancial institution 
it is not the risk of individual assets that matters; rather it is the way in which they are 
combined to aﬀect the risk of the overall portfolio that is most important. This risk can 
be measured either by the volatility of the value of the ﬁnancial institution or by the prob-
ability of the ﬁnancial institution not being able to meet its obligations (insolvency). 
There are three central themes regarding credit risk:
 1. The use of a house as collateral and the ability to foreclose and evict borrowers 
are important tools in managing and pricing credit risk.
 2. Geographic diversiﬁcation is an important tool for managing the credit risk of 
a portfolio of mortgages, and there are several ways of obtaining this, e.g., loan 
sales, risk-sharing arrangements and lending through branches of international 
institutions.
 3. Information is a scarce resource, particularly in emerging markets. Asymmetric 
information is a byproduct of this, which makes reallocation of risk more diﬃcult 
and enhances the importance of collateral as a device for controlling risk.
Interest rate risk is managed diﬀerently from credit risk. Because interest rates are 
highly correlated, geographic diversiﬁcation is of little help. Managers of mortgage 
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portfolios have to look at ways of matching the funding of assets and liabilities. Major 
ways of doing this are: 
 1. funding adjustable rate or short-term mortgages with short-term deposits
 2. funding long-term mortgages with long-term debt
 3. selling mortgages (primarily by securitization).3
The analysis below suggests that there are enough degrees of freedom that mortgages 
can be funded without signiﬁcant interest rate risk, but that getting the beneﬁts of geo-
graphic diversiﬁcation requires much work and concern about asymmetric information 
and whether the right parties are taking the right part of the risk. 
The paper begins by analyzing credit risk, focusing on its determinants and on how 
it can be priced. The focus is on the role of collateral in controlling risk, as well as in 
pricing it. It then moves on to portfolio problems and handling both credit and interest 
rate risk. The analysis uses data and analogies from US mortgage experience.
2. CREDIT RISK
Credit risk in a broad sense refers to uncertainty about the costs from borrowers not 
making their payments as scheduled. A short run element of this is delinquency risk, the 
risk of late payments, which even if there is not a foreclosure can cost the lender money. 
That risk is ignored here, and the focus is on the risk that the borrower cannot make up 
late payments and the lender will have to foreclose on the property. For convenience 
this is referred to as default risk.4 The purpose of this section is to present an overview 
of what we know about the determinants of default and pricing default risk. 
Default Models
It is by now generally recognized that a wide range of contracts can be modeled as analogous 
to ﬁnancial contracts with (embedded) options. This approach is applicable to mortgages.5 
Mortgages have termination options: early payment (prepayment) is a call option (i.e., an 
option to buy back or call the mortgage at par), and default is a put option (i.e., an option 
to sell or put the house to the lender at a price equal to the value of the mortgage).6 The ap-
plication of formal stock and bond option-pricing methodol ogy, following Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1973) has been the centerpiece of most mortgage pricing research.
The essence of the option approach is that while it is not possible to predict who 
will default very accurately, it is possible to analyze default, understand its determinants 
and attach probabilities to it, so that it can be priced and to some extent controlled. For 
instance, we can understand how a decline in property value can be a factor in causing 
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default even if we cannot predict which properties will decline in value, and we can 
estimate probabilities of property value decline. We can, then, view the problem in 
probabilistic terms; that is, we can estimate the probability of default and use estimated 
probabilities to estimate expected costs of default.
Understanding the Determinants of Default: Option-based Models
Formal option models analyze models of “strategic” default, that is, where borrowers 
compare the value of their property and the value of their mortgage debt and default 
when the former exceeds the latter. This is a strategy that maximizes the borrower’s wealth. 
These are elegant and not entirely realistic models for mortgage markets.7 The option-
based approach is broader, more ﬂexible, and less elegant; it focuses on the relationship 
between homeowner equity and default cost, which comes from two notions: 
 1. Borrowers are unlikely to default if they have equity in their property. They will 
do what they can to raise money to protect their investment, and they will sell 
the property and keep the equity rather than turn it over to the lender. 
 2. Even if they do default with positive equity, the lender is likely to recover cost 
after selling the property.
Hence, focusing on negative equity and thinking of default behavior as akin to ex-
ercising an option is a good way to begin, because it is only in states of the world where 
the option is in the money (states where a “rational” borrower might choose to exercise 
the option), i.e., states with negative equity, that default is a serious problem to the 
lender. Of course, there is more to default than just negative equity. Most analysts and 
researchers believe that a good ﬁrst approximation to default behavior is that default 
comes from the intersection of three events:
 1. negative equity
 2. a “trigger event” such as illness or job loss
 3. lack of resources to get over the trigger event. 
Detailed analysis of how these interact (e.g., there are probably occasions where equity 
is so far negative that borrowers default without a trigger event and/or they choose not 
to survive a trigger event even if they have the resources) is generally not possible with 
most data sets. So analysts generally must be satisﬁed with proxies for these factors and 
ad hoc empirical models.
Recent research suggests that a reasonable proxy for the likelihood of trigger events 
is the borrower’s credit history. It appears to be the case from this research that credit 
history and equity are both very strong predictors of the probability of default, but there 
is still no good way of predicting which borrowers will default.
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A Simple Option-based Model
It is clear that mortgage borrowers do not exercise their options in the same “ruthless” 
way that owners of ﬁnancial options exercise their options. In part this is because the 
exercise of the option, defaulting on the loan, has extra costs for mortgage borrowers. It 
usually involves moving out of the house and ﬁnding a new one, and it aﬀects borrowers' 
credit ratings. What the option-based approach does suggest is that borrower equity is 
important and that its aﬀect is asymmetric: when borrowers have a lot of equity they 
only do what they’re supposed to do, make their payments, but when equity is nega-
tive they tend to default. While we can say that out-of-the-money options will not be 
exercised, we cannot say very precisely when an in-the-money option will be exercised 
because of the problem of not being able to observe the detailed calculations that bor-
rowers make about the beneﬁts and costs of default. 
A simple version of the model described above is that the probability of default 
is the probability of negative equity times the probability of a trigger event times the 
probability of not having suﬃcient resources to fall back on.8 It says that equity should 
matter and should be included as a key explanatory variable in every model, but it is 
also consistent with a wide variety of other factors, if they are plausible proxies for the 
trigger events. 
Formally, we can estimate
 (1) d = E • f(x,t)
where d is the probability (over some time period) that the loan will default, E indi-
cates whether (and/or the extent to which) the borrower has negative equity (e.g., the 
researcher’s estimate of the probability of negative equity), f(x) is a function of a wide 
range of trigger event variables (e.g., credit history) and variables representing the abil-
ity to withstand a trigger event (e.g., borrower’s liquid wealth or the ratio of mortgage 
payment to income), and t is the time expired since origination.9 Most research uses 
historical data to ﬁt equations of this form.10
A Framework
We begin with the initial value of the property and the loan balance, which for simplicity’s 
sake is taken to be constant over time (rather than amortizing). The ratio of the initial 
loan balance to the initial value is called the Loan-to-Value Ratio or LTV. It is related 
to the down-payment ratio, DP, by
(2) DP = 1 – LTV
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It is common to speak in terms of LTV rather than DP, but both ratios can be used 
to convey the same information, how much equity the borrower has in the house at 
the time the loan is originated.
A simple depiction of the process of property value’s evolution over time is contained 
in the follow diagram. The assumption is that prices go either up or down with some 
known or estimated probability.                            
Figure 5.1 
The ups and downs of property prices  
       
The solid arrows are modest moves, and the dashed ones represent strong moves. 
The lender needs to know the steepness of the arrows and the probabilities of increases 
or decreases. These will vary by location. For instance, in the US it is generally the case 
that California has stronger moves both up and down than does Arizona, but in Cali-
fornia the probability of an increase has generally been higher.
We begin by assuming that prices are as likely to increase as decrease. In neither of the 
upward sloping arrow cases in the diagram were default losses likely because house prices 
increased in both cases. It is the downward sloping arrows that raise problems. The less steep 
of the two areas is less likely to be associated with default because while value (or price) 
did fall it did not fall be enough to make equity negative. In the steep arrow case default 
is more likely. Trend also matters. If, for instance, increases happen 60 percent of the time, 
then the frequency with which negative equity situations occur will be smaller.
Given the trend (in this case ﬂat) the more volatile are price moves (the steeper are 
the arrows) the more likely is default.
Next consider a more formal model that includes both default behavior and pricing 
over time. We continue with the simple model of prices being as likely to move up as 
down, but we extend it over several periods. We start out with house prices equal to 
100, and then trace possible levels and their probabilities over three periods. Figure 5.2 
depicts movements in house prices.
Mortgage Balance
Possible default
No default
Time
Price
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 Figure 5.2
 House prices over time 
110(½ chance)
100
90(½ chance)
House prices start at 100.
then after one year
120 (¼ chance)
110
100
After two Years
100 (½ chance)
80 (¼ chance)
Price
Time
80
90
100
100
110
120
130 (1/8 chance)
321
110 (3/8 chance)
90 (3/8 chance)
70 (1/8 chance)
And after  three years
We now add assumptions about the mortgage and about borrower behavior:
  1. The mortgage is for three periods. For the ﬁrst two periods only interest is to 
be paid, and in the last period interest is paid and the principal is to be paid 
back. The interest rate is 10 percent and is constant.
 2. Borrowers never default when they have positive equity. Equity is the value 
of the property minus the market value of the loan, rather than the book value 
(outstanding balance). Market value is assumed to be the present value of the 
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remaining payments. In this model, with no amortization and the coupon and 
market rates ﬁxed at 10 percent, book, and market values are the same and 
constant at 100.11
 3. When equity is negative borrowers default 25 percent of the time and losses 
per loan are negative equity + 10 (for selling costs).
Now let us consider default losses and pricing for the simple mortgage. Assume the 
down payment is 5 percent, so that LTV=0.95 and the loan balance is 95. 
Figure 5.3 shows the amount of equity the borrower has over time as house prices 
change. 
Figure 5.3 
Equity levels over time
Equity
Time
(–15)
(–5) (–5)
5
5
1515
25
35
321
(–25)
By assumption defaults only occur when equity is negative, which occurs in the 
four nodes in parenthesis. In the other nodes the borrower makes the payments, and 
there are no losses. At the nodes where equity is negative losses occur 25 percent of the 
time. Expected losses at a node are the probability of reaching the node (there may have 
been a default earlier, which would prevent reaching the node) times 0.25 (the prob-
ability of default given negative equity) times the losses if there is a default (negative 
equity plus 10). 
Figure 5.4 depicts expected losses over time. For instance, at the ﬁrst node where 
equity is negative (in the second period with house prices at 90) the (unconditional) 
probability of a loss at that node is 0.5 (the probability of price falling to 90 after one 
period) times 0.25 (the probability of default given negative equity) or 0.125, and 
expected level of loss is 0.125 times 15 (the loss given default) or 1.875. Expected loss 
at the next node with negative equity (in the second period where price has fallen to 
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80) is more complicated. The probability of default is 0.25 (the probability of price 
falling to 80 after two periods) times 0.75 (the probability of there not being a default 
in the previous period (when equity was also negative), which is the probability of the 
mortgage surviving the ﬁrst period) times 0.25 or 0.047, and expected loss at that node 
is 0.047 times 25 or 1.17. The ﬁgure gives probabilities and loss given default for all the 
nodes where default is possible.
Figure 5.4 
Expected losses over time
25(0.25x0.75x0.25=1.17
15(0.25x0.5)=1.875 25(0.75x0.75x0.25x0.375)=1.32
0
00
0
0
35(0.75x0.75x0.25x0.125)=0.62
(Probility of default at that node is in parenthesis)
From this we can calculate the probability of ever defaulting and expected losses. To 
the lender the measure of losses is the expected losses discounted back to the present. It is 
assumed that this discount rate is also the same as the rate on the mortgage, 10 percent. 
Then we can calculate expected (average) present value of losses over time.
In this case 
 • The probability of ever defaulting is (from the numbers in parenthesis) 
0.125+0.046+0.053+0.018 = 0.242.
 • Expected present value of loss is
  15x0.125/1.10 + 25x0.05/1.102+ 25x.05/1.103 + 35x.01/1.103 = 4.28.12
 • Both would be smaller if:
  – Lower LTV
  – Smaller dispersion of prices
  – Upward trend in prices 
The asymmetry of the option-based model is captured in the diagrams. Strong 
property value increases do not help lenders much (borrowers just continue making 
payments), but strong decreases hurt because they are a factor in default. The probability 
(0.25 in this case) of defaulting during the period, given negative equity, is typically 
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estimated from historical data, and where data permit will vary with measurable vari-
ables such as credit history, income, etc.
This is a very simple model, which for instance does not explicitly allow for strategic 
default. For a discussion of models which include strategic default see the survey papers 
by Kau et al. and Hendershott and Van Order. Both the option-base model and the 
more strategic ones have much the same implication: that negative equity plays a major 
role in default.13 The model also looks too easy in the sense that it takes for granted 
the 0.25 parameter for default conditional on negative equity. This should be derived 
from a large and rich set of historical data, data which most emerging markets do not 
have. Rather most emerging market analysis will have to begin with best guesses (US 
or European parameters are insuﬃcient) and update as data emerge.
Summary of Default Factors
The model suggests ﬁve important factors in predicting default:
 1. the initial LTV
 2. price volatility
 3. price trend
 4. vulnerability to a shock
 5. ability to withstand a shock 
Traditional mortgage underwriting guidelines can be interpreted as non-quantitative 
ways of incorporating these factors into lending decisions. 
A Sample Model
Here we consider a simple, illustrative empirical model,14 using Freddie Mac data on 
750,000 ﬁxed rate mortgages originated from 1976 through 1983. The model focuses 
on LTV and the state of the economy as factors in default in a formal empirical model. It 
estimates the probability of defaulting per year as a function of time expired since origina-
tion, original loan to value ratio (LTV) and the year of origination, which is a simple proxy 
for the state of the economy (1976 was a very good year, but 1981 was a recession year). 
The framework (see footnote 9) is a proportional hazard model. It takes the form:
(3) d = a(t)ebx
 
where x is a vector of explanatory variables including equity measures and origination 
year. It is essentially the same as (1) above, but with an explicitly exponential formula-
110
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I I  • •  F R A M E W O R K  E L E M E N T S  O F  E M E R G I N G  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M S
tion. The data are used to estimate the b coeﬃcients. Results for b’s are not shown here. 
Instead the b’s, which are all statistically signiﬁcant, are used to calculate “multipliers” 
relative to a “baseline” mortgage, which in this case is loan with an LTV of 80 or below, 
originated in 1979 (about an average year during the sample).15 Details of the statistical 
model are in the article cited.
Results are shown in Table 5.1. The model shows how default moves with both LTV 
and economic conditions, as proxied by origination year. To get a feeling for the extent to 
which various origination years were likely to be good or bad the average rate of growth 
of house prices nationwide in the two years after origination is reported in parenthesis 
after the origination year.16 For instance, holding origination year constant, loans with 
an LTV at 0.95 defaulted about 8 times as often as those with an LTV at 0.80 or below. 
Loans that were originated in 1980 or 1981 (recession years with low (–0.4 percent and 
1.4 percent respectively) house-price growth, holding LTV constant, defaulted 1.9 to 
2.5 times more frequently than loans originated in 1979 (0.4 percent growth) and 25 
times more frequently than ones originated in 1976 (12 percent growth).17
Table 5.1 
Eﬀects of LTV and origination year (the economy) on annual default rates 
(subsequent two-years average house-price growth in parenthesis)18
LTV class Effect (multiplier)
≤80 1.0
81–90 3.9
91–94 5.7
≥ 95 8.1
Origination year
1976 (12%) 0.1
1977 (10%) 0.2
1978 (4%) 0.5
1979 (0.6%) 1.0
1980 (–0.4%) 1.9
1981 (1.4%) 2.5
1982 (2.5%) 2.1
1983 (4%) 1.4
Hence, the evidence here and in other analyses19 suggests that default does indeed 
vary strongly with LTV and economic conditions. Because the data set used in Van Order 
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(1990) does not include things like credit history of the borrowers their model cannot 
tell us much about how default rates vary across diﬀerent borrower types. However, this 
is likely to be the sort of data (at best) that an emerging market is likely to have, and so 
the “bare bones” model with little more than LTV and the movement of the economy 
is likely to be the most applicable. 
Pricing and Analysis
Models like the above can be used for estimating default probabilities and pricing, as 
well as for analyzing “what if ” situations, such as what would happen in a particularly 
severe downturn (high LTV loans originated in a year like 1981 will have much higher 
default costs than low LTV loans originated in a good year like 1976). 
The main pricing tool is “Monte Carlo” pricing models. These models work in much 
the same way as the simple pricing model above. That model began with a probability 
distribution of price changes (e.g., 50–50 chance of up or down for “stagnant” regions 
and perhaps 60–40 for growing ones) and then generated defaults and loan losses, which 
in turn generated the expected present value of losses. The Monte Carlo models do the 
same thing, calculate expected present value from an underlying probability distribu-
tion, but they are more complicated because they involve more complicated probability 
distributions than the simple binomial distribution in the example and they can include 
many explanatory variables. 
For instance, more complicated distributions of house prices can be estimated, and 
we can then draw randomly from the estimated distributions over time to get sample 
time paths of the relevant variables. Going back to the simple pricing model, instead 
of the binomial model it might be appropriate to estimate a normal distribution of 
house-price changes over time. The distributions need not be constant; e.g., the short 
run mean (or standard error) might have a time trend or a tendency to revert back 
to some long run mean, and the models can consider several other variables, such as 
unemployment, divorce rates, credit history and interest rates as well as house prices, 
which can also have distribution functions. 
Once the distribution function has been estimated, random draws are made from 
it in order to generate a time path (in the case of the model above, three periods) of, 
in this case, house prices during the term of the mortgage. The time path of prices will 
induce default losses, which are calculated using the model (e.g., a 25 percent probability 
of defaulting if equity is negative). The losses are then discounted back to the present, 
giving the expected present value of losses along that path. Repeated draws are made, 
generating repeated paths of defaults and expected present values. The average of these 
is the estimate of expected present value of losses. Because the model uses simulation 
techniques it is quite ﬂexible and easily accommodates consideration of other variables 
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as well as house prices (e.g., by estimating the eﬀect of unemployment on default and 
estimating distribution functions for future unemployment).
Estimating the probabilities is of course not easy, but sometimes there are enough 
historical data to get a ﬁrst approximation. For instance, given the data in Table 5.1, we 
could assume that each of the eight origination years is equally likely and use that as a 
basis for generating expected present value estimates. That, of course, is, a very simple 
assumption, but absent a full data set (which is likely to be the case in many emerging 
markets) perhaps the best that can be done. At this stage in the analysis the analyst’s 
judgment will be important in deciding how seriously to take recent history.
The estimate of expected present value can then be used to calculate an “up front” 
premium (that might be charged by a mortgage insurer) that would cover cost, or it 
can be converted into an annual payment that yields the same expected present value, 
i.e., the credit risk premium in the mortgage rate. 
The main tool for “what if ” analysis is stress tests, which analyze what happens 
to a portfolio of mortgages under changes in interest rates and credit conditions. An 
advantage of stress tests is that they can be used to analyze risk of portfolios without 
requiring a long history of data.20 
Risk Control at the Level of Individual Loans
The option-based model focuses on the role of equity as a primary determinant of credit 
risk on individual loans. The analysis suggests the following as devices for controlling 
risk at the individual loan level:
Legal structure—Strong foreclosure laws, which limit loss per default, have been 
essential to the development of all successful mortgage markets. The ability to treat 
houses and mortgages almost like commodities and default almost like a ﬁnancial op-
tion is a major factor in the success of mortgage markets. Expected default costs then 
depend primarily on the initial loan to value ratio, which is known to everyone, and on 
the probability of house value falling by enough to trigger default, which can generally 
be estimated, and on other factors. Absent strong foreclosure laws it is very diﬃcult to 
evaluate credit risk, and lending is likely to become limited to those with demonstrably 
low risks, a small part of the population. If you want people to have good housing you have 
to be able to take it away from them.
Information and credit history—It has become increasingly the case in the US that 
use is made of information about borrower credit history, and incorporated into statisti-
cal underwriting models that focus on down payment as a major factor in determining 
credit history.21 For most emerging markets data on credit history are limited, and the 
focus for the time being will likely be on down payment. But as information becomes 
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more available lenders will be able to estimate statistical models of mortgage default 
with both credit history and equity as explanatory variables. An important element of 
developing a mortgage market can be collecting data on loan performance and sharing 
it (e.g., through credit reporting agencies).
Macroeconomic stability—Because volatility is an important factor in default cost 
and because macroeconomic instability is diﬃcult to diversify away, macro stability 
is an important factor in controlling risk. The most desirable scenario for mortgage 
lenders is a slow but steady increase in house prices. High inﬂation has limited beneﬁts 
to lenders, but the costs from controlling inﬂation after it has become a problem (high 
unemployment and house-price declines) can be very high.
Managing the Risks of a Mortgage Portfolio 
The above discussed the risks and pricing of individual mortgages. This is not the same 
as the risk facing a mortgage lender with a portfolio of mortgages. In particular, the risk 
to a lender refers to the risk of the lender’s overall portfolio, not of the individual loans 
in it. A portfolio of assets that are individually risky but uncorrelated with one another 
could be quite safe if the portfolio is large. That is, a diversiﬁed portfolio of mortgages 
might have quite diﬀerent behavior from that of individual loans or a pool of loans that 
are highly correlated (e.g., concentrated in a particular region).
To illustrate this point consider Figure 5.5, which presents results from loans 
purchased by Freddie Mac from 1985 through 1995 and followed for their ﬁrst ﬁve 
years. The horizontal axis depicts cumulative house-price changes over the ﬁve years 
after origination and the vertical axis depicts cumulative foreclosure rates.22 The loans 
had original loan-to-value ratios of 0.79 to 0.81. The light colored diamonds represent 
experience of a particular state-origination year. For instance, the AK diamond represents 
the experience of loans originated in Alaska in 1986 over the nest ﬁve years. During that 
period average house-prices in Alaska fell slightly (meaning over half of them fell) and 
the cumulative default rate was over 20 percent. On the other hand loans originated 
in Washington, D.C. (the D.C. diamond) in 1995 had a default rate of only 2 percent 
and experienced house-price growth of more than 50 percent (Figure 5.5).
The scatter looks as we would expect from the option-based model. States with 
rapid property appreciation had low foreclosure rates, and those with price declines had 
high rates. The main thing to note is the large diﬀerences in experience across states. 
The US experience in general has been one of relatively small national recessions but 
occasionally large regional recessions. The solid boxes represent the same measures but 
for a nationally diversiﬁed portfolio of mortgages, i.e., the entire sample of Freddie Mac 
loans in a particular year with the same (79 to 81) LTVs.
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Figure 5.5 
Default probability vs. house-price appreciation
Source: Freddie Mac.
The picture tells a story. The diversiﬁed portfolio has a much smaller dispersion and 
much less risk. For emerging markets this is an important point: diversiﬁcation is an 
important vehicle for controlling risk. For small lenders and/or small countries it can be dif-
ﬁcult to attain, and geographically concentrated lenders run the risk of bankruptcy. That 
is, they run the risk that the value of mortgage portfolio will fall suﬃciently below the 
value of liabilities funding that the lender will not be able to pay oﬀ its obligations. 
Major ways of managing risk from geographic concentration are:
 1. Avoid risk in the ﬁrst place. That is, one can keep credit risk with borrowers by 
requiring large down payments and only lending to borrowers with the best 
credit histories. However, this is not always possible or desirable; the business of 
ﬁnancial institutions is to take on risk, and a large part of the borrowing public 
cannot aﬀord large down payments. 
 2. Sell it oﬀ. Lenders can sell oﬀ some or all of their loans (and in return buy loans 
from other regions).
 3. Share it or insure it. Lenders can agree to share the risk with other lenders 
or investors. Insurance requires the development of a mortgage insurance 
industry.
 4. Lend through large diversiﬁed institutions. An example is large banks and cross 
border lending.
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 5. Hold a lot of capital. That is, fund purchases more with equity, which does not 
have to pay a dividend, than with debt so that they are more likely to meet 
their obligations even if income, after foreclosure costs, from mortgages falls. 
In emerging markets, however, capital is generally both scarce and expensive. 
For new or emerging institutions with not much access to insurance or capital and who 
do not want to be too conservative about lending the second and third strategies are the likely 
choices. However, they present important management and adverse selection problems, the 
solution to which can be complicated by the other major risk of mortgage portfolios.
 
Interest Rate Risk
The second and in some ways more important risk associated with funding mortgages is 
interest rate risk. That is, traditional lenders, banks or specialized mortgage banks (savings 
and loans in the US) have sometimes funded longer term mortgages with short-term 
deposits. The use of short-term deposits to fund mortgages poses two potential problems 
for bank (depository) type lenders. First, deposits have liquidity risk. That is, while most 
of the time banks enjoy a stable source of core deposits, there are times when deposits 
ﬂow out of banks (or do not grow fast enough to keep up with the mortgage market) 
and they do not have an elastic source of funds with which to replace them. Second, 
deposits’ short maturities, combined with holdings of long-term ﬁxed rate mortgages, 
can lead to a duration mismatch that is risky. In the late 1970s and early 1980s when 
interest rates increased rapidly many US savings institutions had large losses and became 
insolvent on a market-to-market basis. It is clear, in retrospect, that interest rate risk was 
the beginning of the collapse of the thrift industry in the 1980s. 
Hence, there are at least two important dimensions to the risk of holding mort-
gages. Borrowers like longer term mortgages with ﬁxed rates, and experience suggests 
these have lower credit risk, but funding them in the traditional way through banks 
and other depositories raises interest rate risk problems. Lending with adjustable rates 
pushes interest rate risk back to borrowers with the potential to increase credit risk when 
borrowers’ rates increase. 
Managing both credit and interest rate risk suggests the desirability of both having 
a long-term source of funds, and being able to sell oﬀ or in some way control concen-
tration risk.
The ability to do either or both of these depends on the institutional structure avail-
able to lenders. This in turn will be linked to methods available for funding mortgages. 
So we turn next to diﬀerent models for funding mortgages.
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Funding Mortgages
There are two archetypal models (with many variants) for funding mortgages. In the 
ﬁrst, the “bank” or “depository” model, lenders fund mortgages with their own liabilities, 
typically deposits. In the second, the securitization model, the originator (possibility a 
bank) sells the loans to an entity that then turns them into securities and raises money 
in the bond market. Both approaches are similar in that they raise money and allocate 
credit risk, but the division of labor and the division of risk can be quite diﬀerent.
The bank approach is rather straightforward. The bank performs all of the basic 
elements of making the market work. In particular, it raises funds and accepts the risk 
of holding mortgages. The securities market is newer and trades on the ability of securi-
ties markets to raise money faster and cheaper than the traditional bank/deposit model. 
However, securitization raises new issues in risk management.
Alternative Structures for Funding Mortgages: 
Implications for Risk Management
Depositories: Specialized Institutions and Commercial Banks
The two classic examples of specialized institutions are European mortgage banks and 
US saving and loans (building societies in the U.K. were in some ways similar to savings 
and loans). These institutions were especially created to focus on mortgage lending. The 
key diﬀerence among these is that European mortgage banks have tended to be match-
funded, funding long-term mortgages with long-term bonds, whereas savings and loans 
were often (especially before 1990) mismatched (building societies were match-funded 
with adjustable-rate mortgages funded with deposits). These institutions focus primarily 
on housing, which might be considered a plus, but they are not well diversiﬁed across 
product line (though they may be well diversiﬁed geographically).
Commercial banks have not been major mortgage lenders in many countries, but 
their share has been increasing.23 An advantage they have is that they have some (non-
geographic) diversiﬁcation beneﬁts by not concentrating on mortgages, and deposits are 
a low cost (albeit not always elastic) source of funds. They also can exploit their general 
expertise in managing credit risks and cross selling products (e.g., induce borrowers to 
be depositors and/or to take out types of loans). A weakness is that to the extent they 
are conﬁned to deposit funding they have diﬃculty doing ﬁxed rate mortgages without 
taking interest rate risk, and/or running the risk of deposit outﬂows.
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Securitization and Secondary Markets
Deﬁnitions—I deﬁne mortgage securitization as the bundling of mortgages into pools 
(mortgage-backed securities or MBSs) for sale into capital markets. Secondary markets 
are the place where mortgages and mortgage-backed securities are traded after they are 
originated. Secondary market institutions (SMIs) are institutions (e.g., banks and/or other 
ﬁnancial institutions) that facilitate this process. They do this by creating mortgage-
backed securities and/or by buying mortgages from originators in the primary market 
and holding the mortgages in their own portfolio and funding the purchases with debt 
and other capital market instruments. It is important to note the diﬀerences among 
these and the ability to choose among them; e.g., securitization and the creation of a 
secondary market are not the same as creating an SMI.
Functions—In the case of either MBS or debt funding, the SMIs perform the function 
of connecting the mortgage market with bond markets. This function is advantageous: 
It provides a broader, more reliable and more elastic source of funds (from investors 
in capital markets, both domestic and international) than does the traditional deposit-
based model, and it provides a longer term source of funds, which makes it easier for 
borrowers to have longer term, ﬁxed rate funding without lenders taking on interest 
rate risk from maturity imbalance or taking on liquidity risk.
Current practice—Securitization removes mortgages from the originator’s balance sheet 
because it involves a sale of assets by the originator into a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), 
which holds the assets, thereby assuring that owners of mortgages are not aﬀected by the 
status of the seller (bankruptcy remoteness). Shares in the pool of mortgages in the SPV 
are then sold to investors. These sales can be pro rata (investors all receive proportional 
shares in the pools experience), or they can be divided in various ways. For instance, the 
pool can be broken into two classes: a subordinated class that takes the credit risk until 
losses reach some maximum amount (e.g., 10 percent of the pool), and a senior class that 
take the rest of the losses. The idea of this is to give the holders of the senior class, who 
are not likely to be mortgage specialists, some conﬁdence that losses to them will be will 
be small and/or to get a strong, AA or AAA, rating. A way of enhancing this conﬁdence 
is for the originator to take some or all of the subordinated class.
Unbundling
A major change in US mortgage markets, one which will undoubtedly take place in 
any secondary market system, has been the “unbundling” of the four major aspects of 
mortgage-lending: origination, servicing, funding, and accepting credit risk. This is 
most evident on the investment side. Investors in mortgage-backed securities need not 
be involved in originating, servicing, or taking on credit risk. They do have to manage 
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the interest rate risk that comes with holding long-term ﬁxed rate mortgages, but that 
is a function that bond market investors are supposed to take on.
Tradeoffs
Gaining access to bond markets, whether through mortgage-backed securities or bonds 
can give lenders a way of avoiding interest rate risk, accessing a low cost and highly elastic 
long-term source of funds and, if the risk is sold along with the mortgage, of obtaining 
diversiﬁcation, but it comes with a cost because security market operations can have 
high management costs. The unbundling that has come with secondary markets has 
enhanced eﬃciency by promoting division of labor, but it has increased the dependence 
of the various participants in the market upon one another, which in turn raises the 
question of whether groups on whom one is counting can, in fact, be counted on. For 
instance, SMIs and investors in MBSs have to worry about the quality of loans sold by 
originators, who might know more about the loans than they do and can select against 
them. Similarly, loan servicers may not have incentives to service the loans as well as 
investors would like. That is, information is a scarce resource, and some have better ac-
cess to it than others. As a result there is a problem of asymmetric information between 
traders, which raises important management problems.
Agency Problems and Agency Costs
The information asymmetry that comes from the unbundling, raises principal/agent prob-
lems, or agency costs, which must be balanced against the generally lower costs and ease of 
raising money in capital markets vs. deposit markets. Agency problems, or principle-agent 
problems, refer to problems that arise when one party (e.g., an investor), the principal, 
uses another party, the agent (e.g., a securities dealer) to perform services for it or is in 
some way dependent on its actions. A problem arises if the agent has better information 
than the principal (the dealer may know more about the quality of securities) and does 
not have incentives to act in the interest of the principal (e.g., the dealer might sell the 
bad loans and keep the good ones). Controlling this is expensive and imperfect, and as 
a result there are agency costs, which come from monitoring and other costs as well as 
premiums required by investors who know they are being selected against. 
Managing agency costs has been the major management problem for the secondary 
market in the US.24 When risks are unbundled to the extent they are, e.g., in the US 
secondary market, it is quite important that it be clear who is taking the risks and that 
the risks be taken by those best able to handle them, rather than passed on to institutions 
that do not have the skills, information or incentives to handle them properly.
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The selection issues that confront securitization are likely to be more formidable 
in emerging markets. In these markets asymmetric information is likely to be a bigger 
problem, because mortgage originators will have better access to local information, but 
publicly available information for investors, such as credit history and historical data, 
will be largely unavailable, so that statistical models that might oﬀset local lenders’ 
advantages will be largely unattainable in the near future. 
Underwriting will be left to originators who will inevitably be able to select the best 
loans for themselves. The problem is worse if foreclosure costs are high (e.g., because 
it takes a long time to foreclose), in which case a house is not good security, and local 
information, which is not easily obtained by a secondary market investor, becomes 
relatively more important. Strong foreclosure laws have been absolutely essential to the 
development of the US secondary market. 
How these agency problems are managed and how they aﬀect portfolio management 
depends on structures available for mortgage originators and investors.
Comparison of Structures
Beneﬁts of long-term funding—Access to long-term funding allows borrowers to get 
long-term mortgages, if they choose to, without lenders taking on much interest rate 
risk. It puts interest rate risk into the bond market, which is best able to manage it (e.g., 
many long-term investors like pension funds and life insurance have long-term liabili-
ties and do not ﬁnd long-term assets risky). Banks, secondary markets and specialized 
institutions can all in principle get access to long-term funds, through securitization 
or bond issuance. 
This expands borrower choice by allowing both adjustable and ﬁxed rate loans. It 
also lowers credit risk because adjustable rate loans push interest rate risk onto borrow-
ers, and the payment shock associated with rate increases makes borrowers more likely 
to default.25 
Methods for raising long-term funds and controlling credit risk—Because of the length 
of their commitment and general inability to unravel it after it is made, long-term in-
vestors are especially concerned with asymmetric information about credit risk agency 
costs and their evolution over time. A way of handling this is to require that risk be held 
by someone with a long-term interest in managing it and/or that the securities have a 
high rating. In any event this requires that at a minimum the investors stand behind 
someone else in the credit risk queue. 
There are ﬁve basic ways of accessing sources of long-term funds from capital markets 
in ways that can produce highly rated securities, given asymmetric information about 
credit risk and a desire by investors to have originators (or other specialists) take at least 
the ﬁrst hit in credit risk:
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 1. Securitizing loans: But in a senior/subordinate structure where the bank (or 
specialist investor) keeps the subordinated part, which takes the ﬁrst hit on 
defaults. The size of the subordination will depend on what is necessary to get 
a good rating on the senior part. 
 2. Over-collateralized (“covered”) bonds: Where a bank, say, puts aside 125,000 in 
mortgages against a loan of 100,000. This is not an asset sale; rather it is an 
arrangement within the banks balance sheet, where certain assets are set aside 
as security for the bonds.
 3. Selling corporate bonds: Backed by all the assets of the bank (and suﬃcient capital 
by the bank). 
 4. Selling loans with recourse back to the lenders: Probably with reserves set aside by 
the lender to guarantee the recourse.
 5. Mortgage Insurance: By a diversiﬁed insurer with suﬃcient expertise to overcome 
the potential of being selected against by loan originators. Insurance can be on 
individual loans or on pools of loans.
All ﬁve diﬀer in important legal ways and have diﬀerent transaction costs.26 Secu-
ritization, for example, involves extra protection (bankruptcy remoteness). Investors in 
collateralized bonds may not be sure of their access to collateral.27
Efficient Risk Bearing
The above suggest the following principles for lenders who want access to longer term 
sources of funds:
Credit risk should stay mostly with the originator (or a specialist like a mortgage insurer). 
Because of agency costs it is very hard for capital market investors to be conﬁdent that 
they know much about the risk they are accepting. Structures that keep most of the 
risk with the originator, who has the best information about the risk, are likely to be 
best at handling agency costs. 
Interest rate risk should be taken by investors. Originators, e.g., banks, are often not in a 
good position to handle interest rate risk. There is no signiﬁcant asymmetric information 
involved in interest rate risk, because interest rate movements tend to be similar for all 
ﬁxed income securities. Thus, it is better handled by investors with long time horizons, 
like pension funds. Furthermore, most originators (banks) have no particular advantage 
at forecasting interest rate movements. That is better done (if done at all) by bond market 
specialists. Funding long-term mortgages with short-term liabilities is very risky.
Government guarantors should be at the end of the credit risk queue. Again, because 
of agency problems, most investors and guarantors have the worst information about 
risk. There is often pressure for the government to provide guarantees as a way of get-
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ting a mortgage system oﬀ the ground. This can be a good policy but only if the risk is 
structured properly. In particular, the government is likely to have the worst information 
about risk and not have the tools (government’s ability to foreclose may be limited by 
policy considerations as might its ability to discriminate among borrowers) to control 
risk. The government can back up the system, but that does not require it to be near 
the front end of the credit or interest rate risk queue. Rather the government should be 
at the end of the queue, after lenders, investors and insurers have taken the bulk of the 
risk, so that its job is simply to supply credibility to an emerging system.
Diversiﬁcation should come either internally (from consolidation, like being a branch 
of a larger bank) or from risk-sharing with specialists like mortgage insurers. Mortgage 
insurance may not appear very quickly, but consolidation and cross border funding are 
possible sources of diversiﬁcation. That is, local banks that are branches of larger banks 
that are diversiﬁed across countries and regions can bring diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. Clearly, 
however, concentration risk can be a serious problem in emerging mortgage markets. 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
There is no single structure that is always best at accomplishing the function of linking 
mortgage markets with long-term ﬁnancial markets. There are, however, two archetypes 
that are worth focusing on:
 1. Banks and bonds. Banks can originate mortgages and hold them, funding them 
by issuing long-term deposits or bonds (or if possible use forward and option 
markets to turn short funding into long-term callable funding). With bonds 
the banks can attract funds by over-collateralizing the bonds. This makes the 
bondholders happy, but it requires the banks to raise the excess collateral either 
in capital or in deposit markets. Alternately, the bonds can simply be general 
liabilities of the banks. 
 2. SPVs and securities. In this case the bank or other lender can set up a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) into which loans are sold (and taken oﬀ the banks bal-
ance sheet). The bank can set up as a senior/subordinated structure, with the 
bank retaining the subordinated part, which acts like the excess collateral above, 
with the bond market buying the senior part. 
Both structures have the advantage that the loan originator is on the hook for the 
ﬁrst (and largest) part of the credit risk, so that they put investors and/or government at 
the end of the queue. Then in either case the adverse selection problem is mitigated by 
having originators at the head of the queue, and investors’ role is more in taking interest 
rate and systemic risk or (especially in the case of government support) promoting the 
creditability of the underlying legal structure.
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To a large extent the success of particular structures depends on regulatory and 
tax issues, which vary across countries. The banks and bonds option has some appeal 
in emerging markets because it is less likely to require new laws, institutions etc, and 
because banks are more likely to be the best at managing credit risk; that is, they can 
manage the principle/agent problem better (at ﬁrst) than a secondary market institution 
can, and it is easier to make bonds homogeneous (especially in early stages) than it is 
to make mortgage-backed securities homogeneous. The oﬀset is the sometimes reluc-
tance of banks to move very rapidly into the mortgage business and the possible lack 
of a legal structure that allows eﬀective over-collateralization (bankruptcy remoteness). 
Securitization has the advantage of being more likely to guarantee investors bankruptcy 
remoteness, so that they are more certain of their access to the underlying mortgages.
Credit risk in emerging markets can be managed, but that requires the protection 
of good access to collateral. Absent this, it will be managed like that of risky personal 
loans. With good collateral variants of the option (equity)-based models can be used to 
price, analyze and maybe control credit risk.
Credit risk and interest rate risk are related. Many ways of avoiding interest rate 
risk aﬀect the manner in which credit risk is managed, by raising agency problems due 
to the asymmetric information between lender and investor. It is clear from the above 
that taking interest rate risk is not necessary, but under some institutional arrangements, 
in particular the standard bank model, it is diﬃcult to avoid interest rate risk and still 
provide borrowers with ﬁxed rate loans.
That is why developing access to the capital markets in form of bonds or loan 
sales is important. The conﬂict is that on the one hand they can allow lenders some 
diversiﬁcation, by laying oﬀ some of the credit risk, but on the on the other hand they 
raise agency problems with investors because of adverse selection. Hence, setting up a 
senior/subordinated structure or an over-collateralization (or covered bonds) structure 
is a good idea for investors because it keeps the bulk of the risk with originator, assur-
ing investors that they are less likely to be selected against. However, this does not help 
with geographical diversiﬁcation.
Diversiﬁcation then requires a supplement. One is in the form of insurance, by 
diversiﬁed insurers who specialize in handling mortgage risk and are less likely to be 
selected against, or by lending coming through branches of (e.g., Europe-wide) banks 
that are well diversiﬁed to begin with and can manage the risk involved in keeping the 
subordinated part of a senior/sub-structure or the extra collateral in an over-collateral-
ized bond issues. They also have the potential to interest investors in unsecured bonds 
because of their size and perhaps strong capital position. 
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ENDNOTES
1 Much of the analysis and research for this paper was done while I was chief economist for Freddie 
Mac, which is not responsible for any of the ideas expressed. I have received helpful comments from 
Ray Struyk and a referee.
2 Another risk, which has become especially important in the US market, is prepayment risk—risk that 
when rates fall borrowers will reﬁnance and lenders or investors will have to reinvest at a lower rate. 
For reasons of space and relative unimportance, so far, in emerging markets, this is touched on only 
brieﬂy here. Surveys by Hendershott and Van Order (1987) and Kau et al (1995) discuss this in some 
detail. 
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3 A fourth technique, which is not discussed here because it does not appear to be applicable to most 
emerging markets, is using derivatives like futures and options contracts to hedge risk.
4 This is not exactly right because as a legal matter delinquency is typically deﬁned as a form of default. 
However, in much of the research and popular scholarship default is usually what is deﬁned as it is 
here.
5 See Hendershott and Van Order (1987) and Kau and Keenan (1995) for surveys.
6 Delinquency risk can also be viewed as an option: the option to borrow money short-term at a rate 
equal to the mortgage rate plus penalty. A way of viewing the default process is that it begins with the 
exercise of the delinquency option and only ends up as a default (foreclosure) if equity is negative.
7 Strategic default is not, however, unheard of. There is anecdotal evidence from the US in Texas in the 
1980s, after oil prices had fallen and house prices crashed, that borrowers who had not experienced a 
“trigger event” such as unemployment, walked away from their high value mortgages and low value 
houses. One can argue that the wealth maximization approach is correct for mortgage markets, but 
that because transactions and other costs it is not easy to measure wealth and that is why ad hoc 
proxies are used in modeling default.
8 This is not quite right because it assumes that the three events are independent, but in general they 
are not. Places where house prices fall and diminish equity are likely to be places with trigger events 
(e.g., unemployment). From a statistical point of view this makes separating the role of equity as 
measuring whether or not the options the money form equity as a measure economic stress diﬃcult. 
It needn’t aﬀect the ability of a particular default model to predict the probability of future default.
9 The model described above suggests that f(x) should be multiplicative in the variables that represent 
trigger events and those that represent capacity to survive trigger events. The hazard model discussed 
in the next footnote is automatically multiplicative. 
10 A particular variant which is commonly used is the “hazard” model which takes the form: 
d = a(t)exp(bx), where a(t) is a baseline time trend, x is a vector of explanatory variables including the 
probability of negative equity, and b is the vector of coeﬃcients giving the eﬀects of x. The function 
is already nonlinear, but it can be made more so by transforming x.
11 Allowing interest rates to change adds some interesting complications to the model. In particular, if 
interest rates increase, borrowers are less likely to default on a ﬁxed rate mortgage because the value 
of the mortgage decreases (they now have a valuable below market rate mortgage). Note that with 
an adjustable rate mortgage that is not the case, so there is reason to expect adjustable rate loans to 
default more when rates go up, beyond the “payment shock” or cash ﬂow problem. Note also that the 
result is not reversed on the downside if borrowers can reﬁnance when rates fall. So we should expect 
expected defaults to be higher for adjustable rate loans.
12 Intuitively, the probability of ever defaulting is just over 0.2 and the average loss is about 0.2 times 
loan balance, so, taking account of discounting, average loss is about 0.04 or $4 per $100 loan. 
13 The strategic models are diﬀerent in some subtle ways. For instance, the strategic models emphasize 
that it is the market value of the mortgage (not the outstanding balance) that counts as equity. The 
complication in the strategic models is that market value explicitly includes the value of the option 
to default later, which is not counted as part of equity in the option-based model (see Kau et al 
1995). As a result market value is not exactly the same as the present value of remaining payments 
discounted at the same (10%) rate. In particular, as the option gets further into the money the 
value of the mortgage falls (the discount rate increases), so that the borrower will tend to defer 
defaulting now because of the enhanced value of the default option. This makes equity calculations 
much more complicated because it means considering all future possibilities at each node, which 
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greatly complicates computations. The models also derive the present value formulation for price, 
from zero arbitrage conditions, rather than assume it, as has been done here. Note that in both 
models borrowers will be less likely to default when interested rates increase because their (ﬁxed rate) 
mortgage now has a below market rate (alternately it has a smaller market value).
14 See Van Order (1990).
15 Because the data are categorical, that is the x’s represent whether a variable is within a certain range 
(e.g., LTV between 90 and 94) the multipliers are simply ebxi where xi is one if the variable is in the 
ith category and zero otherwise. 
16 Data are from the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). They are average 
growth rates from the ﬁrst quarter after the origination through the ﬁrst quarter two years later. For 
data see  ofheo.gov/media/pdf/3q04_hpi_reg.txt.
17 The model assumes that the multipliers are independent, so that a 95 LTV originated in 1981 is about 
72 times more likely to default than is a below 80 in 1976, but that assumption may not be accurate 
for big diﬀerences.
18 See Van Order (1990).
19 See Quercia and Stegman (1992) for a survey.
20 See Buckley et al (2001).
21 See Straka (2000).
22 Foreclosure in this case means Freddie Mac taking possession of the property.
23 See Lea 2001.
24 This is discussed in Van Order (2001).
25 Alternately, a beneﬁt of a ﬁxed-rate loan is that when rates go up the borrower suddenly has a below 
market rate loan, which will make default less likely.
26 The ﬁve are not mutually exclusive. For instance, a lender might sell loans to a securitizer with 
recourse back to the lender, and the securitizer might then hold the subordinated part of the pool, 
essentially covering losses above what the recourse will cover. An insurer might require that the 
originator share in the ﬁrst loss on mortgages.
27 Accounting beneﬁts of sale vs. being oﬀ balance sheet have not been discussed. A reason for wanting 
to get an asset oﬀ balance sheet is so as not to have to hold capital against it. This can be a beneﬁt if 
banks are constrained in their ability to raise capital, as opposed to debt or deposits. Sometimes there 
are tax consequences to funding with more or less capital. Many of these beneﬁts evaporate if a good 
risk-based capital model is applied.
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 Housing Finance in Transition Countries: 
 Finding Bills on the Street
 Robert M. Buckley and Robert Van Order
 ABSTRACT
 The paper seeks to address questions about the appropriate public role in 
emerging mortgage markets, particularly the extent to which policymakers 
can or should identify  innovations that may be, as Miller (1986) suggests, 
“sand in the oyster,” i.e., innovations that go on to become the pearls of 
a well-functioning ﬁnancial system.  The perspective is an application of 
the much-celebrated irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller, which 
says that under a certain set of assumptions (e.g., perfect markets and 
symmetric information), the liability structure (and institutional struc-
ture that supports it) of the ﬁrm does not matter, in the sense that the 
sum of the values of the ﬁrm’s liabilities will be invariant to changes in 
composition, always adding up to the same value, which is determined 
by the value of the ﬁrm’s assets. The theorem suggests that particular 
institutional structures and policies are absent subsidy, unimportant, and 
probably futile. Our analysis focuses on the role of various violations of 
the model’s assumptions (e.g., symmetric information) in making some 
institutional structures better than others and in suggesting efﬁcient types 
of government intervention.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the role of market-based housing ﬁnance has become increasingly impor-
tant. For years it has played a signiﬁcant role in the ﬁnancial systems of many countries, 
and as a result the outstanding stock of mortgages in these countries has become quite 
large, e.g., relative to the size of their economy, as measured by GDP. For instance, the 
US has more than USD 7 trillion in mortgage debt outstanding, a number which is 
equal to about 70% of its GDP, and as Table 6.1 shows, there are similarly large ratios 
in the UK and Denmark. The table also shows that housing ﬁnance has achieved high 
levels of development in many other developed economies. For the past decade mortgage 
debt in Europe has been growing at more than 8 percent per year, more than double 
the rate of growth of GDP.2 
The table also shows that housing ﬁnance in transition countries is at a much 
lower level relative to GDP. Of course, this result is not surprising given the absence 
of market-based ﬁnance in pre-reform countries, as well as the depth of the transition 
shock experienced by many of them. But more important than the low current levels is 
what might happen in the future. If the recent experience of Western Europe is taken 
as a benchmark, housing ﬁnance in transition countries could grow very rapidly for a 
substantial period of time. Not only are these countries now liberalizing their ﬁnancial 
systems as much of Western Europe did a decade ago, but in addition, inﬂation in the 
region has been largely tamed, the rule of law and enforceable contracts embraced, and 
respectable, even rapid, rates of economic growth have been achieved. In such a context, 
growth rates for mortgage credit of 20 percent per year for a decade or more would not 
be surprising.3 This has the possibility of being a boon to these economies or, if done 
poorly, disruptive force. Whatever the growth rate will be, ﬁnancial innovation will 
certainly play a large role as foreign ﬁnancial structures continue to be imported and 
modiﬁed to suit local conditions and demands.
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Table 6.1
Outstanding mortgage debt in selected countries
Country Mortgage Debt 
as a percentage of GDP
Country Mortgage Debt 
as a percentage of GDP
US 86 Croatia 8
UK 70 Czech Republic 6
Germany 53 Hungary 8
Sweden 47 Poland 3.8
Japan 50 Romania 4
Denmark 87 Russia 0.5
France 23 Slovenia 3.3
Source: For left hand column Judith Hardt (2004). For right hand column, Dübel (2004) and 
Woollett (2004).  
The questions this paper seeks to address are: 
 • First, what is the appropriate public role in this emerging sector? That is, how 
can the public sector prudently manage rapidly growing housing ﬁnance sys-
tems? Recent history suggests that this question has some importance given the 
problems that have arisen in Western European economies, such as Sweden, 
Finland, and Germany as they deregulated their housing ﬁnance systems.4 
 • Second, can (or should) policy makers identify those innovations that may be, 
as Miller (1986) suggests “sand in the oyster,” that go on to become the pearls 
of a well-functioning ﬁnancial system. As he documents, this identiﬁcation is 
important because many of the innovations that take place are meretricious 
reforms designed largely to circumvent regulations or taxes.
These questions are important for a number of reasons. 
 • First, in market economies the public role in housing ﬁnance is substantial. Every 
country that has a substantial housing ﬁnance system has an extensive, often 
complex and usually non-transparent public role. In addition, the opposite is 
also often the case: countries with less mortgage credit have generally followed 
policies which prevented mortgage market development. A number of stud-
ies have shown the important role that policy has played in mortgage market 
outcomes.5 Thus, the sort of policy environment adopted can be expected to 
play a signiﬁcant role not only managing growth, but also in determining how 
rapidly mortgage ﬁnance develops. 
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 • Second, in many cases the current public role in housing ﬁnance in OECD 
economies is the result of government “ﬁnancial innovation,” primarily deregu-
lation, following an economic shock.6 These public policy changes were then 
typically followed by a series of private sector actions that might be viewed as 
a form of tinkering with the system put in place by the public sector. In other 
words, as Calomiris (2001) has shown, for many years after World War 2, the 
ﬁnancial systems of OECD countries simply did not innovate. The systems 
were highly regulated and non-competitive, characterized by interest rate and 
quantitative lending controls. Indeed, Zinjales and Rajun (2003) argue that the 
systems not only did not develop, they were less developed in 1980 than they 
were in 1913. These systems were, in short, overregulated and path depend-
ent until the mid-1980s. Then, they began to deregulate, adapt, and grow, as 
is also shown in Figure 6.1. In every case shown except Italy’s, mortgage debt 
outstanding in the last year far exceeded the level of 20 years earlier (relative to 
GDP). In contrast, during the earlier path-dependent period there was little 
overall growth; some systems increased and the others declined.
 • Third, public sector innovation is not just about deregulation; it is also about 
oﬀsetting “market failures” that come about from information asymmetries 
and moral hazard that are sometimes important in ﬁnancial markets. Private 
innovators in this sector have not always been the “life blood” of the ﬁnancial 
system, as Miller (1986) describes it. Indeed, many of the government ﬁnancial 
innovations in housing ﬁnance were designed to oﬀset or reallocate some of 
the risks or moral hazards that arose due to private sector innovations in the 
sector. In other words, rather than relying on the private sector to spontane-
ously innovate and eﬀectively “show the way,” most public innovations were 
designed to do the opposite: control private actions or stimulate them within 
well-deﬁned parameters. Snowden (1990), for example, reviews the problems 
that arose with private sector development of mortgage securitization in 19th 
century America as an example of the sorts of moral hazard aﬀecting private 
innovations. 
More generally, a theoretical case can be made for some sorts of public interven-
tion. For instance, in a recent review of ﬁnancial innovations White (2003) suggests 
that one of the explanations for less ﬁnancial innovation is that due to the information 
externalities associated with innovations that ultimately do become “pearls,” innovators 
are unable to appropriate all the returns from innovation. As a result, they invest less 
in doing so. Similarly, in considering the sorts of ﬁnancial systems Eastern European 
emerging democracies should establish, Stiglitz says “there is no presumption in favor 
of unfettered markets” (1993: 15). Consequently, both history and theory suggest 
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providing incentives that make innovations that have positive eﬀects on the rest of the 
economy more rewarding to individual entrepreneurs. 
Figure 6.1 
Size of housing ﬁnance systems in high-income countries7
In sum, as shown by Miller (1986), over recent years ﬁnancial innovations have 
played an extremely important role in the broader beneﬁts provided by the US ﬁnancial 
system. Given the situation in transition countries, it is reasonable to expect mortgage 
ﬁnance innovations to have similarly beneﬁcial eﬀects. However, as he also shows, it will 
be diﬃcult to say what will work. What, in fact, is the sort of innovation that suits the 
particular environment in such a way that it will be broadly diﬀused? This suggests pro-
viding incentives (at a minimum a well-functioning legal and institutional background, 
perhaps supplemented by subsidies or guarantees) rather than picking winners. 
This sort of question has long been raised about the role of ﬁnancial policy in 
fostering economic growth. Gerschenkron (1962), for example, has famously argued 
that in some countries, such as Russia at the end of the 19th century, institutions were 
insuﬃciently developed for banks to play their crucial role in development. In such 
countries, he argued that new institutional arrangements could jump start ﬁnancial and 
economic development. Is the same true of housing ﬁnance in transition economies? 
Can policy-makers in these countries jump start the development of their frequently 
underdeveloped housing ﬁnance systems? Can, for instance, the development of the 
securitization of mortgages or the establishment of a secondary mortgage market ac-
celerate the development of housing ﬁnance? Or should the attention of policy makers 
be more modestly focused on establishing the legal underpinnings and infrastructure 
of simple, enforceable, and prudent mortgage contracts? 
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Before trying to answer these questions we must ﬁrst brieﬂy provide a perspective on 
how to look at the issues involved in integrating housing ﬁnance systems into broader 
ﬁnancial systems. The perspective is an application of the much celebrated “irrelevance 
theorem” of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958). This theorem says that under a 
certain set of assumptions, which mainly involve perfect markets and costless default, 
the liability structure of the ﬁrm doesn’t matter, in the sense that the sum of the values 
of the ﬁrm’s liabilities (e.g., debt vs. equity, long term vs. short term debt, callable vs. 
non-callable debt, secured vs. unsecured debt) will be invariant to changes in composi-
tion, always adding up to the value of the ﬁrm’s assets. Because our analysis is concerned 
with trying to identify the forms of ﬁnancial innovation that are likely to have the op-
posite eﬀect—that is, be relevant—we are, in eﬀect, maintaining the hypothesis that, 
in contrast to the irrelevance theorem, the form of ﬁnance does indeed matter. For this 
result to occur, however, requires that the assumptions of the theorem be violated. So, 
after brieﬂy reviewing the theorem, each of the next two sections focuses on ways that 
the assumptions underlying an irrelevance theorem for mortgage ﬁnance are indeed 
violated. 
In both sections our analysis is largely heuristic and based on broad statistical trends 
in more advanced economies. We take this approach for two reasons. 
 • First, there is a multiplicity and complexity of details of the diﬀerent systems. 
This institutional richness makes a more detailed quantitative analysis diﬃcult 
if not impossible as highlighted by the range of qualiﬁcations Buckley et al’s 
(2005) place on their analysis of comparative credit policies in EU countries. 
 • Second, the large number of transition countries involved, 18, and the rapid 
rate of change in their policies makes any detailed analysis of their current policy 
stance out of date rather quickly. As a consequence, while we occasionally refer 
to the policies undertaken in various transition countries these references are 
more in passing than comprehensive. 
The irrelevance theorem—Modigliani and Miller’s basic argument is similar to the 
joke about two economists walking down the street. One says to the other “I just found 
a $20 bill.” The other replies “No you didn’t.” To which the ﬁrst says “Why do you say 
that?” To be told “If a $20 bill were lying on the street someone would have already 
picked it up.” The theorem’s similarity to the joke arises because under their theorem 
changing the way the ﬁrm ﬁnances its assets will not aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm or the 
“all-in” (weighted average) cost of funds. Diﬀerent ﬁnancing strategies will all already 
have been priced so that none of them has an overall advantage. If a diﬀerent strategy 
were to have a remaining advantage, in perfect markets it would have already been 
exploited just as the $20 bill would have already been picked up.
From this perspective, ﬁnancing strategies are simply diﬀerent ways of rearranging 
the cash ﬂows received from the management of the assets, and if investors are well-in-
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formed none of the strategies hides the fundamental risks of the assets; they just reallocate 
them. Traders will tend to price the risks correctly, as long as they can measure them. 
In such a context, the traditional distinction between depository-oriented and bond 
market-oriented systems is also largely irrelevant. 
The “M&M” theorem is one of those ideas that is obvious, but, of course, wrong—
markets aren’t perfect; even if they are often rather good. Information asymmetries and 
default costs, among other things, can invalidate the theorem. 
In this respect, the theorem helps us ask the right questions, such as: why should we 
expect one institutional setup, which simply funds mortgages by using diﬀerent ﬁnancing 
techniques, to parcel out the same cash ﬂows, be expected to be better than another? And 
if markets do try to price risks properly, why don’t prices make us indiﬀerent to diﬀerent 
structures? What, for instance, might make deposit-based, as opposed to bond-based 
ﬁnancing more attractive as a way to fund mortgages? More speciﬁcally, what role do 
information asymmetries and transaction costs play in explaining why there has been 
a preference for one type of system, like banks, which fund largely with deposits and 
equity, over, say, markets, which fund with bonds, equity and pass-through securities? 
So the question is how important are violations of the theorem’s assumptions, and 
can they give us insights into what types of ﬁnancial institutions will dominate? 
2. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND THE STRUCTURE 
 OF MORTGAGE FINANCE  
The mortgage lender’s perspective on asymmetric information—It is critical for transi-
tion countries to ask what type of housing ﬁnance system or housing ﬁnance institutions 
are likely to do the best job in helping to mobilize and allocate savings. The perspective 
we take in answering this question is that a system’s eﬃcacy has to be considered within 
a broader ﬁnancial sector context, and not merely as a means of funding housing invest-
ments or housing low-income households. A reason for our perspective as to what is 
likely to be an eﬀective housing ﬁnance system is based on the accumulating evidence 
that ﬁnancial liberalization makes a signiﬁcant contribution to overall economic growth.8 
If this is the case, then a more liberalized ﬁnancial system will not only produce more 
mortgage credit, it will also contribute to a higher “growth dividend.” Hence, our broader 
perspective on what constitutes an eﬀective housing ﬁnance system is how this system 
contributes to ﬁnancial sector strength and resilience. 
However, as Allen and Gale (2001) show this perspective does not tell us whether 
deposit-oriented or bond-oriented ﬁnance is preferable. In fact, their answer, as well as 
the ﬁndings of subsequent and more generalized bank research is that either approach can 
be eﬀective. The issue is one of circumstances. Figure 6.2 provides some perspective on 
what circumstances have implied for bond market development in a number of countries. 
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It shows that in the last decade bond market development has advanced in almost all of 
the countries for which we have data—it declined in only 2 out of 15 countries. But, it 
also shows that by 1998 total bond ﬁnance in Europe, not just mortgage bond ﬁnance, 
was generally smaller relative to GDP than was mortgage ﬁnance, as described in Table 
6.1. While bond market funding has continued to increase in recent years, it neverthe-
less accounted for only 20 percent of mortgage ﬁnance in Europe in 1998 (see below), 
with deposit-based lenders being the dominant means of ﬁnance. Only in Denmark 
and the US was the bond market signiﬁcantly larger than the mortgage market. Hence, 
ﬁnance in most countries remains relationship- or deposit-based. 
Figure 6.2 
Private bond capitalization (developed countries) 
Source: Database of Financial Development and Structure, World Bank.
What, if any role does asymmetric information play in explaining this sort of 
structure? Perhaps the most basic insight it suggests is that information is expensive 
and some institutions or institutional arrangements are better at getting or processing 
it than are others. If that is the case, then the “all-in” cost of funds will not be invariant 
to structure; some structures will have lower information costs and some traders will 
demand premiums because they fear they will be “selected against” by those with better 
information, raising the costs of funds. In such cases diﬀerent liability types will not be 
equally transparent and may well require compensation beyond what is justiﬁed by their 
cash ﬂows. Lenders will develop relationship lending to minimize “agency costs,” which 
come from monitoring and other costs as well as premiums required by investors who 
know they are being selected against. Indeed, minimizing these agency costs is typically 
cited as the economic rationale for the existence of banks and intermediaries.9
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The funding structure depicted in Figure 6.3 suggests that in 1998, roughly 15 years 
after ﬁnancial liberalization had begun in Western Europe—about the same amount of 
time since liberalization began in transition countries—bond ﬁnance only accounted for 
20 percent of mortgage funding, and most of that was accounted for by the more than 
100 year-old mortgage bond systems of Germany and Denmark. Thus, deposit-based 
lending remained the unambiguously preferred funding method.
Figure 6.3 
Funding Europe’s mortgage loans
  
Thus, as long as there are signiﬁcant agency costs in intermediating between bor-
rowers and lenders, it is not surprising that the lender is a bank-like institution which 
monitors the assets it originates and has diﬃculty assuring other investors as to the 
quality and homogeneity of the assets it has originated. The immediate result is that the 
mortgages are more valuable to the originator than they are to the investors. The ultimate 
result is that the bank-like institutions hold most of the mortgages they originate. 
That, of course is not all there is to it. M&M also assume no transaction costs, but 
diﬀerent liabilities often have very diﬀerent transaction cost structures. For instance, 
depositories raise money in deposit markets, which often require branches and tellers 
and other costly ways of raising money from depositors that are more expensive than 
raising money in stock or bond markets, which may have scale economies. Certainly, 
as shown by LaCour-Little (2000), technological improvements and cost saving in-
novations in underwriting practices suggest that in the long run agency costs for bond 
market investors will fall and depositories will be under increased competitive pressures 
from bond-based methods of ﬁnance. 
Similarly, the long-term successes of both the German and Danish systems of bond 
ﬁnance, not to mention the largely bond-based US system, suggests that there can be 
a splitting up of origination and investment functions to allow for the advantages of 
Universal/commercial banks
Savings banks
Mortgage banks/mortgage 
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and pension funds
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specialization and economies of scale, which lower transaction costs. However, such 
specialization, in return, puts pressure on the system in the sense that parts of the system 
depend on other parts, thereby raising agency costs. For instance, investors depend on 
originators and servicers to act in their interest when the servicers might not have the 
incentives to do so. This system of “unbundling” the mortgage asset taps a low transac-
tion cost source of funds (the bond market); and it allows a range of choice (ﬁxed and 
variable rate mortgages) to borrowers and specialization among players, but there is a 
tradeoﬀ due to the agency costs. Hence, bond markets may have an advantage from 
lower transaction costs that can oﬀset the asymmetric information disadvantage.
Another reason that an M&M focus may be helpful in thinking about ﬁnancial 
structures is the issue of the maturity balance of assets and liabilities and risk allocation 
between borrower and lender. That is, the liability structure of a lender may aﬀect the 
nature of the assets supplied. For instance, a structure that relies on short term liabilities, 
like deposits, may also, for regulatory reasons (and without good markets in which to 
hedge interest rate risk), require that the assets it funds also be short term, e.g., so as to 
control interest rate risk. Hence, a bank-oriented system may aﬀect resource allocation 
by forcing variable rate mortgages on borrowers. If, as seems to be the case in most 
situations, borrowers are not in a good position to accept some of the accompanying 
interest rate risk, there will be a smaller mortgage market, more credit risk, and a less 
eﬃcient allocation of capital, suggested by the recent Miles report (2004) for the UK 
housing ﬁnance system. 
The optimal structure, then, will do the best job of balancing the agency costs and 
transaction costs and provide a range of choice to borrowers among mortgage instru-
ment types (e.g., long term vs. short term) so as to allocate risk well. Structures that 
manage these problems the same way are likely to be about equally desirable and will 
aﬀect resource allocation and growth in more or less the same way. 
The optimal institutional arrangement depends on a number of factors. If the key 
design issue is the ability to monitor agency problems, then the simplest way this can 
be done is if the institution performs all of the above-mentioned functions itself. This 
result occurs because the agents are likely to be driven by the objective of maximizing 
the proﬁts of the institution, and when the recourse of one institution against the poor 
performance of another is diﬃcult to accomplish, the incentive to move all activities 
within one institution and control the whole package increases. 
In other words, as a ﬁrm’s decision to buy or produce a particular input for the 
production of a product it sells will be based upon the costs of the two options, in 
transition countries where housing ﬁnance systems are just beginning to emerge, agency 
costs are likely to be much greater where the diﬀerent functions are performed by dif-
ferent specialized institutions. In a new system each agent’s attempts to maximize the 
proﬁts of the institution it serves has the potential to create diﬃculties for the ﬁrms 
with which it interacts.
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Consider, for instance, the relationship between a mortgage originator and an 
investor in a newly-emerging housing ﬁnance system. The investor needs assurance 
that the originator is using acceptable underwriting criteria in the origination process; 
otherwise, the investor could be stuck with poorly performing loans. The easier it is to 
obtain such assurance, the more likely the functions will be separated and vice versa. 
In the early days of their development, the systems now in place in developed countries 
were based in large part upon a single institution that performed all the intermediation 
functions. 
Alternatively, in countries such as Denmark, where bonds rather than deposits 
are used for funding, a speciﬁc event—the 1795 ﬁre in Copenhagen—created a need 
for mobilizing resources rapidly so that the city could be rebuilt. The method cho-
sen making all the mortgagors in each bond issue jointly and severally liable for the 
default by other mortgagors, provided investors assurances that the risk of repayment 
would be minimized. More than 150 years later this system remains the basic ﬁnanc-
ing channel used in Denmark today, suggesting that the somewhat extreme liability 
structure was suﬃcient to solve the agency problem. Similarly, both the US system 
and more recently a number of European ones, e.g., Spain, have made the transition 
from a system dominated by a single investor-originator institution type to one in which 
the functions are delivered by a wide variety of specialized institutions. 
In this new kind of system, agency problems are addressed by a variety of policies 
that have been developed as speciﬁc problems have arisen. A major factor is the ability 
to foreclose in the event of default, so that borrower equity, which can generally be 
observed by the lender, acts as a major disincentive to default. Beyond this, investors or 
intermediaries often dictate underwriting criteria; investors can require equity participa-
tion by mortgage originators, have recourse to the assets of the originator or borrower 
in case of default, and have the technical capabilities to monitor the activities of the 
originators. These sorts of evolving policies, coupled with major advances in computer 
technology and the increasing credibility of the relationships between the institutions 
involved, have allowed these systems to un-bundle the various housing ﬁnance services 
and increase competition along each of these diﬀerent margins—exploiting the eﬃcien-
cies of the bond (as opposed to deposit) market. 
But, the evolution has hardly been linear. For example, in the UK, although a sec-
ondary market and functional specialization have been introduced, housing ﬁnance is 
still dominated largely by depository institutions, although the share accounted for by 
building societies has contracted sharply. Agency problems between lenders and insurers 
have eroded the market share of centralized lenders, and mortgage insurers suﬀered losses 
on loans with high loan-to-value ratios in the late 1980s. The insurers were subsequently 
downgraded by the ratings agencies, resulting in a higher cost of credit enhancement for 
mortgage security issuers.10 Nevertheless, the UK’s increasingly bank-based, as opposed 
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to building-society-based, system is certainly better able to rely upon the bond market 
as well as the deposit market to fund mortgages. 
When legal and regulatory structures are weak and agency costs are high, the kind 
of system that emerges in most developing countries is likely to be considerably less 
specialized than the US or European systems. Until people become more comfortable 
with the “ﬁnancial rules of the game,” and until improvements in information technol-
ogy are more widespread, the legal consequences of various actions better known, and 
the economic returns to investments better-documented and understood, the transition 
to a more liberalized housing ﬁnance system is likely to begin with less emphasis on 
specialization—such as secondary markets—and more emphasis on allowing market 
incentives to shape both the institutional forms used and the speed of liberalization. 
Thus, an important conclusion of applying the M&M perspective is the realiza-
tion that there is no single optimal housing ﬁnance structure that can be applied to all 
countries at all times. Systems will evolve.11 The optimal form depends upon a variety of 
factors including the nature of the agency problems, relative transactions costs of various 
sources of funds, input prices, the technology of mortgage production and servicing, 
and even the nature of legal recourse in the event of default. But until the technologi-
cal and legal systems are in place to monitor and control principal agent relationships, 
it is quite diﬃcult to create successful specialized institutions of the sort established in 
Russia and Slovenia, which concentrate on only one or two functions. 
Instead, the most productive eﬀorts are likely to be focused on the development of 
the economic and legal environment needed to perform the basic functions of a market-
oriented housing ﬁnance system. Of course both the bank- and bond-based systems of 
Western Europe are increasingly present in transition countries through their ﬁnancial 
sector investments in these countries. Certainly over time many of these countries will 
no doubt be integrated into a pan-European ﬁnancial system. Our conclusion does not 
argue against such a result. Rather, it suggests the sorts of steps for the domestic markets 
of transition countries that would be most welcoming of this integration. Moreover, we 
think that this result is likely to hold until the asymmetric information problem that 
constrains the demand for mortgage ﬁnance is addressed. 
The borrower’s perspective on asymmetric information—Principal-agent problems 
also aﬀect the incentives faced by the other side of the mortgage transaction in transi-
tion economies. They arise largely because of the way housing was privatized and the 
characteristics of the housing stock itself. Most of the housing stock in the transition 
economies is made up of multi-apartment buildings which in the case of the former 
Soviet Union (fSU) countries were constructed without reference to either underlying 
land values, or to economically-viable employment. For example, in a review of the data 
for seven transition countries Vecvagare (2004) shows that the share of the multi-apart-
ment stock ranged from 46 to over 90 percent of the stock, ﬁgures that are three to six 
times higher than the 15 percent of the multi-apartment stock of the US.
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This characteristic of the housing stock is important because if this share of the stock 
was built by private investors, as is largely the case in market economies, the density 
and location of the housing services provided would reﬂect market incentives. Under 
such circumstances, it would not matter whether a landlord owned the entire building 
or just a limited number of units. Rents would reﬂect the response of cost-minimizing 
suppliers. In contrast, when such multi-apartment buildings were built in locations 
decided upon by the public sector with perverse land/structure input ratios—i.e., low 
rise buildings built upon high value central city land and high rise buildings built on 
low value land on the outskirts of the city—rents reﬂect the choices of planners rather 
than the market.
Once property rights to these buildings are properly established economic incen-
tives should lead to a process of creative destruction of the non-viable structures and 
redevelopment. However, in most of the region, and particularly in the fSU, few of these 
buildings have ownership rights to the buildings that have been clearly established, much 
less consolidated. In almost all transition countries, the government privatized individual 
apartment units under essentially giveaway terms, but the ownership of the fabric of 
the buildings—the roofs, elevators, and general energy eﬃciency—remain unmanaged. 
Analysis of the problems involved with this ownership structure has led to the discovery 
of one of the ﬁrst new forms of market failure observed in the past 50 years. 
This new market failure was identiﬁed by Heller (1998) in an analysis of the fac-
tors that constrained the privatization of real estate in Moscow. He argues that the way 
transition governments transferred property rights—by not endowing anyone with a 
bundle of rights representing full ownership—prevented eﬀective resource usage. In 
other words, he argues that transition in Russia produced a contractual situation that 
in many ways is the opposite of the traditional “commons problem” in which no one 
has clear ownership rights to a shared good. In the Russian case, too many were given 
some form of claim on a particular piece of property. Just as too little control leads 
to over-usage of a resource in the commons situation, too much control in an anti-
commons situation leads to under-usage and under-maintenance. Heller’s work was 
subsequently formalized in an economic model by Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and 
applied to other industries. 
Certainly if one looks at the continuing problems with maintenance, much less 
upgrading, of the estimated USD 1 trillion dollars of residential real estate that was under-
taken in the transition countries during the 1990s, anti-commons seems to be very much 
the problem.12 Congested and ambiguous ownership rights to common property areas 
and severely under-priced maintenance fees continue to constrain the emergence of eﬀec-
tive property management throughout the region, creating the sorts of principal-agent 
problems Basu and Emerson (2003) shows characterize many rent control regimes. 
In such an environment, the demand for mortgage credit will necessarily be more 
limited. Besides the constraints principle-agent problems pose for mortgage lenders in 
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transition countries, they also create diﬃculties for the demand for mortgage credit. 
Until the excessively fragmented ownership structure of residential property is addressed 
there will be reduced incentives to invest in upgrading and redeveloping the existing 
housing stock as well as a reluctance of lenders to make loans against such ambiguous 
collateral. This will not only lower the level of ﬁnance it will impede the restructuring 
of previously socialist cities. 
3. THE COSTS OF DEFAULT AND THE FORM 
 OF MORTGAGE FINANCE
The structure of mortgage ﬁnance will also be aﬀected by public policy and by how 
default costs aﬀect the behavior of lenders and borrowers.
The lender’s perspective—another premise of M&M’s conclusion is that default 
has no “transaction” costs, the only cost to the lender being the diﬀerence between the 
loan balance and the value of the collateral backing the loan, and that the probability 
distribution of these losses is equally well known to all traders. However, asymmetric 
information problems aﬀect this premise as well. Because lenders are often unable to 
discriminate between borrowers who are likely to repay and those who are not, and 
because borrowers know a lot about their own property value and propensity to default, 
lenders ration mortgage credit in order to prevent being selected against. They do this 
mainly in two ways: ﬁrst, they either limit access to credit only to those demonstrably 
able pay, e.g., those who can aﬀord to make signiﬁcant down payments or those able 
to pay less than a speciﬁc share of their income for repayments. This rationing may 
make mortgage lending more prudent, but at the same time it reduces the welfare 
of those who are rationed out of the market by non-price means. 
Such rationing characterizes mortgage lending in most countries. Indeed, down 
payments of 40 percent or more of initial house value are common in many economies, 
generating a variety of subsidy and insurance schemes to help mitigate the costs posed 
by the rationing, particularly for ﬁrst-time homebuyers. In general two types of public 
policy solutions have been developed. One provides subsidies for households so that 
they are able to save enough in a second mortgage to “top up” the low loan-to-value 
ratio loan they can get from banks.13 The other is the provision of default insurance 
whereby borrowers pay an insurance fee to be able to borrow loans with larger loan to 
value ratios. Neither of these approaches is costless, so the question we address is: how 
do they compare as ways to address the non-price rationing that characterizes mortgage 
lending?14 
In addition to their eﬀects on costs, these approaches can also be important because 
of the indirect eﬀects they can have on the development of a country’s ﬁnancial sector. 
For example, these policies can aﬀect lenders’ ability to exploit geographic diversiﬁcation 
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possibilities. For many of the transition countries this sort of diversiﬁcation is important 
due to their smaller geographical size and correspondingly more limited geographical 
diversiﬁcation possibilities. Can these smaller markets create a regulatory environment 
that is both prudent yet still welcoming of greater risk-bearing by more geographically 
diversiﬁed institutions? 
As shown by Buckley et al (2005) the EU countries are not yet able to exploit 
geographical diversiﬁcation possibilities. For full geographical diversiﬁcation gains to 
be realized in EU countries, mortgage insurance prices in some countries—such as the 
Netherlands and Sweden—will have to be increased (or cross border lending or branch-
ing will have to grow, e.g., in the form of Europe-wide banks).15 They argue that in 
other EU countries which provide subsidies rather than insurance as a way to reduce 
rationing, such as Germany, France, and Austria, or cross default guarantees by other 
borrowers, as in Denmark, it will be diﬃcult for private insurers to compete. Thus, 
given the current policies in the EU countries, it is unlikely that private insurers will to 
be willing to exploit the possibilities potentially available through EU-wide geographi-
cal diversiﬁcation. When their larger, more ﬁnancially developed EU neighbors cannot 
fully exploit geographical diversiﬁcation it is unlikely that transition countries will be 
able to either, unless they rely on Europe-wide lending. 
Nevertheless, when correctly structured with minimal risk exposure to the govern-
ment, mortgage insurance programs can lead to more complete markets without the 
use of subsidies. As such, they can more eﬃcient than are schemes that rely on subsidies 
to address market incompleteness. However, poorly constructed programs with large 
guarantees from the government can be quite costly. Hence, while prudently-structured 
public default insurance can be more cost eﬀective and eﬃciency-enhancing than are 
the frequently used bausparkassen subsidy schemes, there is still a danger of excessive 
risk-taking from poorly designed guarantees. Of course the development of insurance 
programs in such geographically limited countries will impose higher costs on borrowers 
than would be broadly diversiﬁed programs. 
The borrower’s perspective—purchasing a house is both a consumption and invest-
ment decision. As an investment decision, the choice of buying a home is framed as an 
asset allocation choice and, as a number of studies have shown, housing generally ac-
counts for most of the wealth of most of the households in most economies. Goetzmann 
(1993), for example, examined how single family homes ﬁt in an investment portfolio 
and found that in developed systems it functions as an excellent source of hedging risk 
because housing prices are negatively correlated to the stock market. But owner-occupied 
housing’s attractiveness as an investment is vulnerable to local house price changes, and 
this vulnerability is heightened by the ability to leverage housing purchases through the 
use of debt. In eﬀect, access to mortgage debt permits households “to plunge” in their 
portfolio strategy by taking a long position in housing. Indeed, as Kaplan et al show, 
most households in the US are signiﬁcantly under-diversiﬁed, by holding too much of 
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their own housing.16 This risk is compounded when the mortgage loans are issued not 
only with recourse to the house-value but also to the borrower’s future earnings, as is 
the case in many Western European countries.17 In sum, encouraging homeownership 
for poor and moderate income families through highly leveraged mortgage credit may 
well subject those with the least ability to bear macroeconomic risks to have to assume 
more of such risks than they are able to aﬀord. Moreover, in many cases they do this 
without fully understanding what they have done until it is too late.
4. COMMENTS
 
When the way a good is ﬁnanced can aﬀect savings, generate externalities, and has gener-
ally been extensively controlled by government, public policy concerns will naturally arise, 
particularly as transition countries move toward more liberalized ﬁnancial systems and more 
accessible housing ﬁnance. The objective of this paper has been to give some perspective on 
the kinds of policies that are likely to be supportive of the development of housing ﬁnance in 
transition economies. This support is warranted for both positive and negative reasons. 
With regard to the former, an eﬀective housing ﬁnance system can have desirable 
spillover eﬀects on the ﬁnancial system generally. In particular, housing is potentially 
good collateral, and because it is long term it can be important in developing long term 
bond markets as well as being a laboratory of sorts for diﬀerent ﬁnancing techniques. For 
instance, as shown by Miller (1986), housing ﬁnance in the US began the move toward 
securitization and was instrumental in developing some ﬁnancial derivative markets; 
for instance, the ﬁrst long-term futures market was in mortgage-backed securities, and 
mortgages are often used in the creation of synthetic ﬁnancial assets. 
But, the eﬀects of ineﬀective policy are also important to note, particularly when 
some of the “policy mistakes” in this area are considered, such as the USD 150 billion 
savings and loan crisis in the US. The collapse of these lenders in the late 1980s, as the 
US system liberalized, was the largest ever contingent liability ever realized by the US 
government. While this event is perhaps the best-known case it was by no means an 
isolated incident, as noted earlier. Many other developed economies—Sweden, the UK, 
Germany, and Finland, to name a few—experienced pronounced public sector diﬃcul-
ties and costs in the transition to more liberalized housing ﬁnance systems. Thus, while 
history suggests that the public sector has a large role to play in this sector it also suggests 
that less may indeed be more in the case of the public role in housing ﬁnance.
For instance, while working on encouraging transactions between ﬁnancial interme-
diaries—a form of secondary market trading—as has been done in Croatia and Hungary, 
for example, is a good idea, it is even more important to get what might be termed 
the “front end” (origination) right. That is, it is even more important to have proper 
registration, foreclosure, and eviction procedures in place prior to setting up secondary 
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markets because of the potentially severe selection problems discussed in section II. If 
that is done, then many of the concerns about asymmetric information will diminish, 
enhancing the range of market institutions (bank and bond) that can work. M&M will 
be a good point of departure.
As was brought out by the US Savings and Loan crisis, keeping the system solvent 
(safe and sound) is important, and the provision of guarantees, whether explicit (like 
deposit insurance or the provision of insurance on mortgages) or implicit (as is the 
case with most European banks) can be very costly. Controlling safety and soundness 
requires serious consideration of risk-based capital, not old accounting-based capital 
ratios, but really risk-based standards that make companies hold more capital if they 
do things that increase risk to the company (or taxpayer stakeholders). As shown by 
Buckley, Klepikova, and Van Order (2001), the old Basle model does not do this. The 
stress-test-based standards currently being used by the US secondary market ﬁrms, 
“Freddie Mac” and “Fannie Mae,” as well as the internal-models approach being used to 
analyze capital requirements of banks, are major improvements. The encouragement of 
their use by lenders who are growing rapidly would provide a much better understand-
ing of the risk exposures implied by various strategies. It is, in short, important to stay 
away from simple accounting ratios and arbitrary balance sheet distinctions. Finally, 
frequent audits and prompt response are also important. It is also important to limit 
the government’s role in risk-taking, if there is to be a role at all, to the “back end” of 
the process, so as to have most risk accepted by the private sector and limit the ability 
to select against government guarantees.
In the end, sand for the pearls in the oyster are hard to identify. M&M theorists 
would worry about the likelihood of ﬁnding a 20-dollar bill on the street. But for the 
emerging housing ﬁnance systems in transition countries it is almost certainly the case 
that such currency is not only on the street, it is waiting to be picked up. The ﬁnancial 
systems of these countries are not perfect markets in which everything has been priced; 
asymmetric information and potentially high default costs characterize many of the 
mortgage transactions involved. It follows that the structure of ﬁnance is probably not 
only relevant, it matters very much. 
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ENDNOTES
1 Buckley is at the World Bank. Van Order is at the University of Pennsylvania. The views expressed in 
this paper do not represent those of the World Bank. We are grateful to Jozsef Hegedüs, Raymond 
Struyk, Michael Lea, and Loic Chiquier, to the participants in the 2004 workshop on housing 
aﬀordability in Budapest for discussion and comments on earlier versions of this work, and to Kate 
Owens and Jerry Kalarickal for research assistance.
2 European Mortgage Federation. 2003, the period is 1992–2002.
3 To place this forecast into context Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland all grew at more than 15 
percent per year over the 1992–2002 period, according to Suarez and Vassallo (2004), and conditions 
conducive to mortgage lending have improved much more rapidly in transition countries. For 
instance, from 1998 to 2003, the average growth rate of the 18 European transition countries was 
more than double the EU rate. In addition, since 1998 the median inﬂation rate fell from more 
than 10 percent per year to less than 5 percent, with 6 countries having a less than 1 percent rate in 
2003. Finally, EBRD reports that by 2003 three of the 18 countries had “well functioning ﬁnancial 
systems” and four others had almost achieved this status. All of the countries, except Russia, had 
signiﬁcantly improved their ﬁnancial system. According to the EBRD, they had made substantial 
progress on bank recapitalization, auditing, and supervision, with a signiﬁcant presence of private 
banks and little to no preferential credit. A decade ago the “average situation,” in the same countries, 
again according to EBRD, was one of interest rates signiﬁcantly inﬂuencing the allocation of credit, 
little conﬁdence in the systems, and little private sector involvement. 
4  See Englund on Sweden and other citations in his paper for Finland and Germany. 
5 See, for example, Suarez and Vassallo (2004).
6  For example, what we will describe as the bond-based or arm’s length system of mortgage ﬁnance, 
observed in the US, Germany, Denmark, and France were all developed by government actions in 
response to a perceived shortage in the supply of funds. The US system was established in response to 
the Great Depression with an extension of the role of bond-based ﬁnance following the savings and 
loan crisis; the German system, according to Goedecke, Karl, and Scholz (1998) arose in 1769 out of 
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the pressing need for credit, especially in Silesia following the Seven Years’ War. The Danish system 
was established following a large ﬁre in Copenhagen in 1795; and the French system, upon which 
the German mortgage banks were modeled, developed in 1852 in the Credit Foncier de France as a 
way to fund Baron Haussman’s rebuilding of Paris. 
7 The 1965 data are from Goldsmith (1985). The data for France and Germany in the ﬁrst period are 
from 1960 and for Italy is from 1963. The 1983 data are from Dübel, Lea, and Welter (1997). The 
2002 data for European countries are from the European Mortgage Federation and for the US is 
from the Federal Reserve.
8 See Levine (2001) among others.
9 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), among others. 
10 See Follain, Lea, and Mikelsons (1993)  
11 See Stephens (in this volume).
12 This estimate of the size of the transfer is from World Bank (2001).
13 See Buckley, Karaguishiyeva, Vecvagare, and Van Order (2005) for a description of these subsidies 
and some of the literature on them. The most frequently used homeownership subsidy scheme 
to subsidize second mortgages is the bausparkassen savings scheme used in Germany, Austria, and 
France. This scheme takes a number of forms but generally ﬁrst provides subsidies to young families 
to save for a number of years, and then provides them with a subsidized loan to top up their ﬁrst 
mortgage loan. This subsidized loan is for a multiple of the amount saved. The objective is to use 
subsidies to encourage savings for larger down payments so there is less need for a second loan, and 
then to subsidize the higher costs of the second loan.
14 This question has some currency for transition economies as well, because at least six of them have 
recently adopted the subsidy approach while ﬁve have opted for public provision of default insurance. 
Bausparkassen subsidy schemes have been introduced in Croatia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Public default insurance operates in Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Kazakhstan.
15 Insurance is still vulnerable to adverse selection, but large insurance companies may be better able 
than banks to invest resources in improving information to minimize asymmetry.
16 A lot of this depends on how long the owner expects to stay in the house and the source of price 
changes. For instance, if the owner expects to stay a long time, then the purchase of a house can be 
regarded as diminishing risk by locking in the services of the house at a ﬁxed cost, and the mortgage 
can be regarded as diminishing risk by limiting the owner’s wealth at risk. If, however, the quality of 
the house’s services changes over time, then the owner is accepting risk that will be reﬂected in price 
changes. 
17 As shown by Buckley, Karagushevia, Van Order, and Vecvagare (2005).
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 Development of a Commercial-bank-based 
 Housing Finance System in Poland
 Jacek Łaszek
 ABSTRACT
 The Polish housing finance market has been growing since 1994; however, the 
market is still small in scale as compared to the advanced EU countries. Major 
factors of successful development are economic stabilization, decreasing inflation 
and interest rates, growing optimism of consumers, privatization of the banking 
sector, the market base housing policy and international programs provided by the 
World Bank and USAID. Today the market is characterized by strong competition. 
Practically all banks offer mortgage loans, but the major players are the biggest 
universal banks. The sources of recourses for loans are short-term deposits. In 
Poland there is no contractual savings scheme, and specialized mortgage banks 
have a marginal share on the market. The market started with dual index loans, 
while today the biggest share in portfolios are foreign currency loans. Strong 
competition has caused a decline in  margins and an increase in affordability of 
the loans, but so far the market offers only loans with adjustable rates. Future 
challenges, which will be the result of rapid growth of portfolios, are better su-
pervision and risk management as well as more access to the capital market. So 
far housing policy stands away from mortgage market, but in the future it must 
address affordability issues using market tools.
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1. OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET 
After 14 years of transition, the real estate ﬁnancing system now covers residential prop-
erty, building plots, and commercial property. Financing is available at the investment 
stage or for the purchase of an existing object. From the very beginning of transition, 
commercial property has been ﬁnanced according to market principles. In the last 14 
years the residential property ﬁnance system has evolved considerably; from a highly 
subsidized system based on a single, state-owned bank (PKO) to a commercial and 
highly competitive system. 
The market of commercial loans for house purchase is, along with the residential 
property market, the best-developed market segment of the Polish housing sector. Pri-
marily universal banks compete, oﬀering mortgage and mortgage-construction loans to 
individuals and construction loans to developers. Despite its still relatively low volume in 
relation to the total amount of market transactions, commercial banks compete ﬁercely 
in this market. It manifests in a high growth of portfolios and oﬀered credit conditions 
(Figure 7.1). The subsidized part of system consists in old cooperative loans—initiatives 
that do not exceed 10 percent of the market share.
A fast growth in portfolios results in an increase in the importance of housing 
loans in the sector. Although basic sector indicators and macroeconomic ratios diﬀer 
considerably in this area from the levels prevailing in countries with a developed market 
economy, they already constitute a signiﬁcant element of the sector and rapidly become 
more important (Table 7.1).
The following facts prove the scale and pace of growth of this market. In 1994 
the World Bank and related organizations negotiated with large commercial banks in 
Poland to deﬁne participation in a mortgage loan project under development. Most 
banks thought mortgage loans would not be accepted in Poland due to the high risk 
for banks and lack of potential customers. Most of the negotiation participants saw the 
future of the construction industry in the continuation of the system from the socialist 
period, i.e., highly subsidized loans granted by PKO BP, a state bank. 
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Figure 7.1 
Housing loan portfolio in Poland, 1994–2004 
(nominal and real prices)
A USAID survey conducted at the beginning of 1997 showed that there were 
two groups of banks emerging in the sector but adopting diﬀerent strategies (Łaszek 
1997). 
The ﬁrst group consisted of banks that wanted to specialize in this kind of activity. 
As a rule, they took a more complex approach to the intended area of activity—in-
troducing or intending to introduce a package of products to the secondary market, 
as well as ﬁnance construction of single-family and multi-family houses under various 
organizational forms—establishing separate units at the head oﬃce level and specializa-
tion at the branch oﬃce level. 
The second group included banks for whom this kind of activity was of second-
ary importance. Their motivation to operate in the sector varied. Generally, it was the 
question of following competitors and market demand, as well as exploring new op-
portunities. They were not fully convinced that the development of the market would 
be successful, but they didn’t want to lose out. They chose the simplest products without 
creating specialized structures. 
A professionalism survey conducted at that time on a representative sample of ten 
banks which entered the sector, concerning their advancement level in comparison to 
experienced banks present in the sector (PKO BP, PBG), resulted in an assessment at 
the level of 30 out of 100. 
By the end of 1998, after less than two years, the level was estimated at 40–50 
points. By then, not a single bank was avoiding the mortgage market or considered it 
a dead end (Łaszek 1997).
0
[PLN million]
10,000
15,000
25,000
30,000
40,000
35,000
20,000
5,000
Ja
n.
 9
4
M
ay
 9
4
Se
p.
 9
4
Ja
n.
 9
5
M
ay
 9
5
Se
p.
 9
5
Ja
n.
 9
6
M
ay
 9
6
Se
p.
 9
6
Ja
n.
 9
7
M
ay
 9
7
Se
p.
 9
7
Ja
n.
 9
8
M
ay
 9
8
Se
p.
 9
8
Ja
n.
 9
9
M
ay
 9
9
Se
p.
 9
9
Ja
n.
 0
0
M
ay
 0
0
Se
p.
 0
0
Ja
n.
 0
1
M
ay
 0
1
Se
p.
 0
1
Ja
n.
 0
2
M
ay
 0
2
Se
p.
 0
2
Ja
n.
 0
3
M
ay
 0
3
Se
p.
 0
3
Ja
n.
 0
4
M
ay
 0
4
Se
p.
 0
4
[Time]
155
D E V E LO P M E N T  O F  A  C O M M E R C I A L- B A N K- B A S E D  H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M  I N  P O L A N D
Ta
bl
e 7
.1
 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 h
ou
sin
g 
lo
an
s v
s. 
ba
sic
 se
ct
or
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 a
nd
 m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 ra
tio
s 
Tu
rn
o
ve
r 
an
d
 it
s 
fi
n
an
ci
n
g
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
H
ou
sin
g 
lo
an
s o
ut
sta
nd
in
g 
ba
la
nc
e,
 fo
r 
lo
an
s e
xt
en
de
d 
by
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
, 
as
 a
 %
 o
f G
D
P
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
9
1.
3
1.
8
2.
6
3.
6
Sh
ar
e 
of
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 h
ou
sin
g 
lo
an
s i
n 
ba
nk
in
g 
se
ct
or
 a
ss
et
s, 
%
0.
2
0.
4
 0
.5
0.
7
0.
9
1.
6
2.
2
3.
0
4.
3
6.
0
H
ou
sin
g 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
pe
r 
1,
00
0 
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
2.
0
1.
7
 1
.6
1.
9
2.
1
2.
1
2.
3
2.
7
2.
6
 2
.6
*
%
 o
ut
la
y 
on
 h
ou
sin
g 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
fin
an
ce
d 
w
ith
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 lo
an
s 
9.
5
9.
4
 9
.7
8.
0
9.
0
15
.0
16
.0
21
.0
26
.0
36
.4
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ho
us
in
g 
m
ar
ke
t p
er
 1
,0
00
 in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
2.
9
3.
1
3.
9
3.
1
3.
6
2.
9
2.
8
2.
8
—
2.
9
%
 tu
rn
ov
er
 o
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ho
us
in
g 
m
ar
ke
t f
in
an
ce
d 
w
ith
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 lo
an
s.
1.
98
 
2.
42
 
2.
67
 
3.
83
 
6.
89
 
9.
46
 
10
.2
4 
13
.7
9 
—
27
.6
H
ou
sin
g 
lo
an
s o
ut
sta
nd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
to
ta
l 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
ho
us
in
g 
sto
ck
 in
 %
0.
05
 
0.
06
 
0.
08
 
0.
10
 
0.
17
 
0.
24
 
0.
30
 
0.
42
 
—
0.
87
N
ot
e: 
* 
  W
ith
ou
t “
pa
pe
r c
on
str
uc
tio
n”
—
th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
la
w
s.
So
ur
ce
: 
Au
th
or
’s 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
da
te
 fr
om
 IG
M
, G
U
S,
 a
nd
 N
BP
.
156
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I I I  • •  C A S E  S T U D I E S — T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
Currently we are witnessing full professionalism in the sector which includes large 
commercial banks as well as specialized structures. Mortgage loans are generally con-
sidered the best items in a portfolio.
The competition in the sector, particularly since 2000, has been rapidly increasing. 
This is reﬂected in falling bank margins in relation to the WIBOR 3M rate, the most 
frequently used benchmark, despite the risk remaining at a constant level. While in 
1999–1996 banks’ margins still reached the level of 7–9 percent, in 1999 they fell to 
3.5–4.5 percent, reaching 2–2.5 percent in 2002. In subsequent years a level of 1–1.5 
percent is expected. A certain decrease in requirements concerning the assessment of 
creditworthiness, in particular the assessment of stability of income (other sources of 
income, not only those related to a permanent employment contract are taken into 
account), and extension of repayment periods (initially 10–15 years, at present even 
35) constitute another manifestation of competition.
2. DEVELOPMENT FACTORS AND THE REGULATION SYSTEM
Mortgage loans have never been a central housing policy objective for the government. 
Until the end of the 1990s mortgage loans were seen as rather marginal, something 
for the rich. The opinion prevailed that whoever could aﬀord a mortgage loan could 
also aﬀord to build a house without it. That system was purposefully and consistently 
developed in the years 1990–1994. The fact that a developed system of mortgage lend-
ing, besides an eﬃcient market of building sites, is the foundation of a market-oriented, 
eﬃcient housing sector was ignored. 
The mortgage loan system is risk sensitive regarding political, macroeconomic, and 
microeconomic changes. The dominant opinion, justiﬁed by many years of experience, 
is that certain minimum conditions have to be met to make the system function. Among 
those conditions, the following are usually mentioned:1
 • macroeconomic stabilization and low nominal and real interest rates as a require-
ment for broad availability of loans
 • real interest rates on deposits as a condition for accumulation of savings in the 
banking system
 • competition among banks forcing them to extend the supply oﬀer by mortgage 
loans
 • an eﬃcient system of legal registration of real property and pledges on real 
property—supported by an eﬃcient system of geodesic registration of real 
property—as a requirement for security of turnover and creditors
 • an eﬃcient system of debt collection (and eviction) as a foundation of security 
for the creditor.
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At the beginning of the transition in Poland, none of the above conditions were 
met. After eight years of transition, two were essentially fulﬁlled—real interest rates on 
deposits and competition among commercial banks. After fourteen years a degree of 
macroeconomic stability and progress in the system of registration of real property was 
achieved. Despite that, the mortgage lending system is developing successfully. 
The following factors determine the success of development of the mortgage loan 
system:
 • rapid commercialization of the banking sector and intense competition among 
banks
 • the experience of PKO
 • expiration of cooperative housing loans in 1996
 • participation by foreign institutions
 • little interest on the part of the authorities in the mortgage loan system and 
consequently no experiments and subsidies
 • perceptible, progressive stabilization and consumer optimism in larger cities 
during most of the period analyzed.
It is diﬃcult to assess the weight of particular factors. Experience shows that many 
were relevant, so a clear synergy eﬀect occurred. One should stress here the signiﬁcance 
of long-term, active involvement by foreign institutions such as the World Bank, 
USAID, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Polish-
American Enterprise Fund. Those institutions, in particular the World Bank and USAID, 
launched large, multi-year programs supporting the development of the market. These 
programs—involving developers and banks—were implemented in sequence (ﬁrst the 
World Bank, followed by the EBRD, and ﬁnally USAID), assuring induction and support 
for the reform process until 2000. Programs also impacted subsequent governments. In 
consequence, a massive ﬂow of know-how took place, which laid solid foundations for 
future development, without the usual experimental mishaps typically experienced in 
such circumstances. Generally, the knowledge concerned three areas:
 • Credit instruments operating under conditions of high inﬂation allowed the 
launch of mortgage loans already in mid-90s.
 • Standard documents and procedures connected with mortgage lending created 
the basis for future development.
 • Experience related to the housing policy was adequate.
 Assistance to the banking sector was essential in the sense that despite privatization 
of the largest banks and their takeover by renowned, global banking groups, the impart 
of knowledge in this area was rather small. 
PKO, a bank traditionally specialized in this sector, also received such assistance. 
Even though in the process of the adaptation of the World Bank experience, according 
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to the bank’s own concept, major failures could not be avoided (the Alicja loan, based 
on a DIM2-type loan), a product was created. It was able to function on the market 
under conditions of high inﬂation and a lack of macroeconomic stabilization. PKO’s 
signiﬁcant success on this market demonstrated to other commercial banks that it was 
a prospective market, which was worth the eﬀort.
Further development of the mortgage loan market was only possible after expira-
tion of the old, subsidized loans from PKO, the legacy of socialism. A considerable 
success of the foreign institutions, primarily the World Bank, was the abandonment of 
the subsidized loan program. USAID, on the other hand, has to be given credit for its 
large contribution to the prevention of the development of a contractual credit system 
based on German patterns (bausparkassen). The examples of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia show how this can block the mortgage market through a mass introduction 
of contractual saving schemes.
Another important factor was the relatively quick privatization of the banking sec-
tor, accompanied by a rapid growth in competition. It forced banks to enter the retail 
banking sector and search for new, unexploited areas.
Since mortgage loan programs were operated by foreign organizations, which inten-
tionally separated themselves from budgetary subsidies, this area hasn’t been included 
in the oﬃcial housing policy, especially after 1995. Thus, fortunately, experiments and 
changes in policies typical for cabinet changes, as well as idle promises, were avoided. 
At the same time, thanks to a fully commercial character of the market, favorable eﬀects 
of competitive pressure, such as a richer product oﬀering, a reduction in banks’ margins 
and an improved service quality, were seen.
Another decisive factor, along with the involvement of foreign institutions, was 
progressive economic stabilization and an increase in consumer income and optimism, 
in particular in larger cities. This had a signiﬁcant impact on banks—convincing them 
of the decreasing risk of mortgage loans—and on consumers—persuading them to invest 
in real estate with the support of mortgage loans.
In consequence, the mortgage loan market got started with high interest rate and 
without an eﬃcient system of registration and debt collection. Banks compensated and 
still compensate their risk with relatively high margins and low average loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio (not more than 70 percent on average). Further development of the market, 
understood as a further decrease in margins and increase in availability of loans, in order 
to be economically reasonable and avoid excessive risk, requires a limit to risk associated 
with registration of property and collection of bank claims, as well as greater macroeco-
nomic stability. A decrease in interest rates has proven to be of crucial importance to 
the increased availability of mortgage loans to the average citizen. 
The Polish system of mortgage banking was created and grew on the basis of universal 
banks and one specialist bank. Other solutions have not gone beyond the experimental 
stage so far. 
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After the possibilities of ﬁnancing with deposits were exhausted in the mid-90s, 
American concepts (securitization, a central mortgage bank) dominated the list of pos-
sible approaches to loan reﬁnancing. In practice, due to the availability of resources and 
their cost, commercial banks and PKO BP ﬁnanced lending with short-term deposits 
from individuals, and this approach prevailed in the banking system. 
The Mortgage Fund Project launched by the World Bank in the mid-90s was based 
on the model of a central mortgage bank that reﬁnanced universal banks with mortgage 
portfolios. Initially the Mortgage Fund was fed from the budget and by international 
organizations – ultimately to issue mortgage bonds. In the initial period these bonds were 
to be backed by the government and the international organizations, so the Mortgage 
Fund watched over the quality of reﬁnanced loans and the standardization of procedures 
very restrictively and successfully.
The whole program including the Mortgage Fund and a technical assistance project 
ﬁnanced by the World Bank, the EBRD, and USAID—despite its large impact both 
on the credit standards and, indirectly, on PKO BP, developers, and ﬁnally, on govern-
ment housing policy—proved to be a ﬁasco in commercial terms. Apart from other 
factors such as excess liquidity in the banking system (especially big banks), still poor 
demand, and a complicated product, the essential factors proved to be the following: 
banks’ reluctance to subordinate themselves to the rigors of standard credit procedures 
and ongoing monitoring of their portfolios, as well as a relatively high (despite hid-
den subsidies) cost of resources compared to deposits. The high cost of resources was 
connected with the existence of the intermediary—the Mortgage Fund. However, the 
psychological aspect was equally important, as banks did not want to share proﬁts with 
an institution that bore neither credit risk nor the cost of building portfolios. 
Due to the program’s poor results, the low demand for mortgage loans, and commer-
cial banks’ lack of interest in the Mortgage Fund, the World Bank practically withdrew 
from active participation in 1996. All of a sudden, however, there was a considerable 
increase in demand for mortgage loans—numbers soared in subsequent years. Despite 
that, negotiations undertaken on a number of occasions by USAID (the only remaining 
foreign sponsor of the Program in 1997–1998) on the privatization of the Mortgage 
Fund, with commercial banks as future owners, indicated a complete lack of interest 
on the part of the latter. The program’s failure shows that the Polish banking system 
was not mentally prepared for an advanced, two-tier mortgage system, regardless of 
whether it was compatible with the concept of securitization or the central mortgage 
bank system. 
In 1996 German mortgage banks and bausparkassen appeared in Poland. They were 
modeled on the solutions functioning in Germany and in several other European coun-
tries. The Act on Mortgage Bonds and Mortgage Banks passed practically without any 
comment from either the community of Polish bankers or the theoreticians of ﬁnancial 
systems. It resulted from the still modest signiﬁcance of mortgage loans in the banking 
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system and a low level of knowledge in this area. The problems the act solved—i.e., 
liquidity and the potential for lower priced funds from the capital market—were of no 
signiﬁcance or did not manifest beneﬁts to the Polish situation. From 1997 to 1999 
the mortgage loan market was subject to a number of changes. The decrease in inﬂation 
and interest rates was accompanied by a considerable increase in demand for mortgage 
loans, and the banks increased their interest in that product. The ﬁrst three mortgage 
banks were established, acting under the Mortgage Act, and actions were undertaken to 
establish three others. However, the act did not meet the expectations connected with 
it, proving to be too restrictive, poorly adapted to the Polish legal system, and poorly 
adapted to the already entrenched practices in the mortgage loan market. The newly 
established mortgage banks could not enter into competition with universal banks, 
due to a considerable limitation in the scope of their activities, a lack of a distribution 
network, and more costly funds coming from the capital market. Two large universal 
banks withdrew from the concept of establishing mortgage banks; a third one stopped 
its actions taken in that direction. Certain concepts of amending the act appeared, 
among others allowing mortgage bonds to be issued by universal banks. In 2002 an 
initiative was undertaken to adapt the Mortgage Act and related regulations to condi-
tions prevailing on the Polish mortgage loan market via some eased prudential ratios 
and extension of the scope of banks’ eligible activities. Despite that, mortgage banks 
still constitute a marginal part of the market.
Beyond mortgage banks, which were subject to strict legal control, the mortgage 
activity of universal banks was subject to banking supervision under general principles. 
This was connected with the number and high quality of housing portfolios, not dif-
fering from international standards (with the share of irregular loans below 3 percent). 
The situation started to change in line with an increase in the share of mortgage assets 
in total banking assets and a decrease in the quality of portfolios. Their quality is still 
good in comparison with other loans, but the share of irregular loans is systematically 
increasing (3.2 percent in 2000; 4.5 percent in 2001; 5.9 percent in 2002). Taking into 
account portfolios’ high growth-rate and the generally 2- to 3-year period when problems 
start to appear, a further increase in irregular loans may be expected, particularly when 
the dynamics of growth fall. Principles of control of mortgage and housing receivables 
were implemented in 2001, and in 2004 the weight of risks on mortgage assets were 
made dependent on the LTV (loan-to-value) ratio.
3. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In the initial period of transition from 1990 to 1994, PKO BP had a monopoly on the 
residential property market. Therefore development was to a large extent dependent 
on breaking that situation. 
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Loans granted to housing cooperatives during the socialist period constituted the 
principal part of PKO BP’s portfolio. Starting from 1994 there were already three enti-
ties on the market: PKO BP, PAMbank, and several other banks grouped around the 
Mortgage Fund program operated by the World Bank, with the PBG Bank in Łódź 
being the largest. PKO BP and PAMbank had two distinct strategies targeted at two 
diﬀerent income groups: PKO B at the mass of customers with a relatively low income 
(PKO BP loans were indexed and subsidized by the state), PAMbank at the elite cus-
tomer with the highest income. The Mortgage Fund was located somewhere between 
those two groups. 
In 1995 the state budget ceased to subsidize PKO BP mortgage loans, and the bank 
reacted by stopping the program entirely. New, indexed, and unsubsidized products 
(double- and single-index) were launched by PKO BP in the last quarter of 1995. Most 
highly subsidized cooperative projects contracted between 1988 and 1990 expired—there 
were no more cooperative ﬂeets with cheap ﬁnancing on the market. The resulting gap 
was ﬁlled up by other banks, who could then enter the market with their own commercial 
products. In subsequent years PKO BP’s monopoly was gradually eroded.
Despite the loss of actual monopoly, PKO BP retained its important position in 
the market. Its huge distribution network and branch oﬃces with experience granting 
housing loans, including indexed ones were essential. Another important factor was the 
received image of PKO BP as a housing bank and its identiﬁcation with preferential 
loans redeemed by the state. 
An important element of PKO BP’s continued success were two loans oﬀered from 
1995 to mid-2000: an indexed and a normative loan. The former was a single-index 
loan with partial indexation; the latter was a classical DIM-type product with a region-
ally determined index of repayment only. It was complicated and diﬃcult for the bank, 
not clearly understood, but taken up in anticipation of a reduction in interest rates. 
The bank had always calculated those loans incurring a considerable risk, counting on 
support from the state. 
PKO BP also had a speciﬁc position given its size, its presence nationwide, and the 
loyalty of its customers. This assured the bank a leading position on the domestic deposit 
market and allowed ﬁnancing of long-term loans, including deferred repayment loans 
ﬁnanced with short term deposits. 
Starting from 1998 PKO BP was under increasing pressure from its competitors, 
who oﬀered denominated loans as a ﬁnancial instrument applied under high interest 
rates. In line with the growth in competition and exhaustion of the best market of rich 
customers, all banks started deepening the market—opening to customers of average 
income, the traditional PKO BP customer. At the same time problems with the quality 
of double-indexed loans led the bank to withdraw from that instrument in 2000 and 
temporarily withdraw from the mortgage loan market. The bank did not oﬀer other, 
competitive—particularly denominated products, which limited promotion to a con-
162
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I I I  • •  C A S E  S T U D I E S — T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
siderable extent. Thus it again lost a large part of the market to competitors. PKO BP’s 
activity did not increase again until 2003.
At present practically all-large and medium-sized banks oﬀer housing loans. From 
the beginning of the 1990s the following banks actively compete with PKO BP: the 
Polish-American Mortgage Bank, GE Capital Bank, Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy 
SA (currently incorporated into PKO SA), the Inicjatyw Społeczno-Ekonomicznych 
SA (BISE), Powszechny Bank Kredytowy S.A., currently merged with the Bank 
Przemysłowo-Handlowy. In the mid-1990s they were joined by: PKO SA, Bank Śląski, 
Creditanstalt SA, LG Petrobank. Other banks entered the market mainly from 1997 
to 1999. 
The structure of the market changed as a result of these processes—PKO BP went 
from monopolist to market leader as the market became highly concentrated (the ﬁve 
largest participants hold about 80 percent of shares).
Rough estimates of market shares and their growth dynamics for the largest market 
participants are presented in Table 7.2 (Łaszek 1997).
Table 7.2 
Largest estimated mortgage loan portfolios 
in the Polish housing sector [%] (as of December 31) 
Bank/Period 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
PKO BP new portfolio 73.6 74.6 71.5 68.7 59.8 50.1 40.7 36.0 35.0
PKO SA 2.0 2.1 4.4 10.3
12.6 13.1
10.0
PBG 3.4 5.7 5.3 4.1
PAMB/GE 14.1 8.7 6.5 4.0 3.2 4.8 7.6 7.9 10.0
WBK 0.2 1.1
4.5 6.3
7.0
Bank Zachodni 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.9
BPH 0.9 0.6 2.3 6.9
11.2 10.2
14.0
PBK 3.7 3.4 3.7 5.9
Kredyt-Bank 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.0 3.4 4.6 5.0
Mortgage banks, 
housing portfolios
0.3 0.5 1.1
Source: Author’s calculations.
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4. PRODUCTS—THEIR PRICES AND CONDITIONS
The quantitative development of the mortgage and housing loan market was accompa-
nied by the development of lending instruments. The variety of products is still rather 
modest compared to developed markets. From the beginning, the Polish market has 
contained a high share of indexed loans. At the beginning of the 1990s double-indexed 
products oﬀered mainly by PKO BP prevailed on the market; at the beginning of 2002 
products indexed with the exchange rate were dominant. While the former provided a 
hedge against high inﬂation, the latter protected against high real interest rates at the 
cost of exposure to FX risk. 
Another characteristic feature is a short repayment period. Despite the considerable 
extension of maturity already mentioned, products with a maturity of 10 to 15 years 
prevail, and such is the real life cycle of the products. Prepayments are still common, 
and the share of loans reﬁnanced in other banks also increases in line with the increase 
in competition.
The third feature is the relatively small size of loans. This is a consequence of low 
incomes, high interest rates, and prudent attitudes among both banks and borrowers 
(see table 7.3).
From 1997 to 2000, the average size of loans granted by PKO BP varied from PLN 
30,000 to 40,000; BPH SA—from PLN 40,000 to 50,000; PKO SA—from PLN 60,000 
to 70,000; and in the case of loans drawn from the Mortgage Fund, from PLN 50,000 
to 60,000. Surveys conducted between 2000 and 2002 by the Polish Bank Association 
indicated that the average loan ranged from PLN 50,000 to 60,000. As for mortgage 
loans, those amounts were relatively small. 
Loans oﬀered within the framework of the Mortgage Fund are typical examples of 
double-indexed loans, where interest is calculated with an index of 13-week treasury 
bills plus the fund’s 1-2 percent margin, plus the margin of the participating bank. 
The GUS average wage index was applied as the repayment index. At present only the 
BISE oﬀers them.
From 1995 to mid-2000 PKO BP oﬀered its own indexed loans: the indexed loan 
and the normative loan. The former one was a single index loan with partial indexa-
tion, the latter was a classic DIM-type product but with regionally varied repayment 
index. From 1995 to 2000, PKO BP loans were based on the interest rate of 12-month 
deposits at the 5 largest banks excluding PKO BP, plus the bank margin amounting to 
5 percent. 
The basic segments of mortgage housing loans in Poland are the loans that serve to 
ﬁnance newly built ﬂats, ﬂats purchased from the existing stock of residential property, 
and repairs and modernizations. 
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Classic mortgage loans—loans for the purchase of existing ﬂats built by a developer 
or purchased from the existing stock—certainly constitute some 50–60 percent of the 
banks’ portfolios. According to the NBP data the portfolio of mortgage loans amounted 
at the end of December 2002 to nearly PLN 11.6 billion; it is not known, however, 
what part of the existing portfolio would receive mortgage collateral. 
The remaining part of banks’ portfolios is composed of housing loans or mortgage 
building loans for individual customers for advance ﬁnancing of the costs of construc-
tion of a ﬂat by a developer or building cooperative. In the case of mortgage building 
loans, collateral appears over a long period of time (following the completion of the 
construction of ﬂats and the establishment of a perpetual book) or does not appear at 
all, where the loan is repaid before the maturity date established in the loan agreement. 
This product was made necessary by the developers’ market, who imposed the advance 
ﬁnancing of newly built ﬂats prior to completion of construction, or where a constructed 
ﬂat is still the property of the developer, and it is not possible to secure the loan with a 
mortgage. At the initial stage, classic mortgage loans are most frequently secured by an 
insurance company, due to the time-consuming process of registering mortgage claims 
at the perpetual book courts or the necessity of establishing a perpetual book. 
According to loan size, maturity, valuation, and collateral, it is possible to distinguish 
between mortgage and housing loans, even though such a distinction does not exist in 
oﬃcial analytical material. 
Housing loans are those not secured with a mortgage. Their maturity ranges up to 
ﬁve years, and they amount to PLN 30,000−50,000. These are usually repair loans, or 
supplementary loans upon the purchase of real estate. Loans that exceed those amounts 
may be qualiﬁed as mortgage loans. As an alternative security to mortgages, PKO BP 
oﬀered loans pledged by shares in the Pioneer investment fund.
Taking into consideration availability, mechanism of repayment, and hedging against 
inﬂation, the market oﬀers loans to be repaid by annuity—so-called averaged repayment 
loans, decreasing installment loans, and denominated loans (foreign currency-indexed 
loans and double-indexed loans). 
In most cases loans oﬀered by banks are classic housing loans with a variable inter-
est rate. In the repayment formulas of loans ﬁnancing the purchase of a ﬂat or a house, 
systems of decreasing repayments or annuity repayments prevail. Only certain banks 
applied an averaged repayment formula. Apart from the Mortgage Fund program, 
PKO BP, and PBK, none of the banks oﬀered loans with double indexation or deferred 
payments. At the beginning most banks based the interest rates of their products on the 
so-called base rates of the bank, which usually included the bank’s costs, risk premium, 
and proﬁt. They varied as a result of changes in costs or market competition. At present, 
most banks, as in countries with a developed lending market, use external indexes such as 
central bank interest rates or cost of money on the interbank market (the most popular 
are WIBOR 3M and 1M). This is a sign of the ongoing civilizing process of the market 
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and an increase in the importance of the money market as a benchmark of alternative 
costs. The capital market, due to its weakness, is not yet considered a benchmark in 
this respect. In 2000 mortgage loans with ﬁxed interest rates appeared on the market 
for the ﬁrst time.
From the very beginning, inﬂation and high interest rates on zloty loans have been 
the principal barriers to the development of the market. In the 1990s, in particular in 
the ﬁrst half of the decade, interest rates on zloty loans were very high, often several 
dozen percent. This was the reason for the dominance of denominated and indexed 
products on the market. In the long-term, however, the level of interest rates on zloty 
loans was steadily decreasing (cf. Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2. 
Interest rates on housing loans in Poland, 1994–2004
The lowest historic level of interest rates on zloty loans was recorded at the end of 
1998, only to increase again in 1999 by 6–7 percent. At that time banks oﬀered housing 
loans for up to 20 years (e.g., the DOM loan of PKO SA) with a variable interest rate 
only, in zloty or convertible currencies: USD, DEM, ATS, or FFR. The lowest inter-
est rates (on zloty loans) were oﬀered by the BPH (16.15 percent) and PKO BP (16.4 
percent p.a.—at the base rate of 11.4 percent). For loans in convertible currencies the 
margin added to the index (LIBOR/FIBOR 6 M or 3 M) amounted to 6–8 percent. 
Commissions varied from 0.5 to 3.5 percent of the loan amount, and only certain banks 
charged for the application processing and fees for administering the loan. The maximum 
amount of the loan varied between 60 and 80 percent of the real property cost/valu-
ation. Mortgage on the credited property was and still is the basic security required; 
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temporarily, since it was established, another security is required (endorsement, pledge, 
guarantee, blockade of funds). The recurrence of inﬂation in 1999 resulted in an increase 
in interest rates on zloty loans up to 24 percent in the case of variable rate loans (the 
fourth quarter of 2000). The fall of inﬂation in 2001 resulted in a decrease in interest 
rates on zloty loans to 13–15 percent (in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002), and a year later even 
up to 7.5–8 percent. Competition also forced a decrease in the margin on denominated 
loans up to 4 percent. Due to the recession and low interest rates, loans denominated 
in euro, Swiss francs, and yen became increasingly popular on the market. 
Declining inﬂation brings falling interest rates, whereas competition on the market 
enforces a gradual decrease in margins, extension of loan repayment periods, and better 
tailoring of loans to the ﬁnancial conditions of the borrower (through the diﬀerentiation 
of the product oﬀering). Amortization periods oﬀered on the market (up to 35 years) 
practically do not diverge from those prevailing in countries with a developed market 
economy, whereas margins and interest rates still remain higher (cf. Table 7.4).
In 2000 mortgage loans with ﬁxed interest rates were launched on the market. The 
most extensive promotion was for a product of Deutsche Bank. The bank proposed 
an interest rate of 15.75 percent, compensating its risk with a 10 percent commission 
(vs. regular 1.5–2 percent). The loan was granted for a period of 5 to 25 years, with 
the ﬁxed interest rate binding for a period of 5 years, after which the interest rate was 
to be changed, or the customer could switch to a variable interest rate. Another oﬀer 
of this type by the BRE-Rheinhip was of a similar nature. Its interest rate was based 
on 52-week treasury bills. The reﬁnancing period amounted to 2, 3, 4, or 5 years, and 
the fee for early repayment equaled 1–2 percent of the prepaid amount. Both products 
were highly speculative and intended to have a marketing eﬀect; therefore they did not 
win customer recognition. In 2002, in connection with the decline in inﬂation and the 
expected decline in real interest rates, products of that type appeared with interest rates 
at the level of 12–13 percent—still speculative. However, starting in 2004 products with 
a ﬁxed interest rate at a level close to market conditions began gaining popularity, but 
with a contractual period of the binding ﬁxed rate limited to one or two years. Therefore 
an increase in the popularity of products with ﬁxed-variable interest rates, common in 
Europe, may be expected.
A product that has already been present on the market to a limited extent, and now 
is increasing in its popularity, is the insurance of the pledge on a loan. In Poland, due to 
high interest rates, an LTV ratio of 75–80 percent was a barrier the borrowers could not 
cross. A decline in interest rates, the introduction of indexed loans, and diﬀerentiation of 
income-levels among the public resulted in a situation where at the end of the 1990s this 
parameter remained a barrier to a small portion of customers. Consequently a product 
insuring loans up to 100 percent was launched by certain insurance companies.
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The most recently introduced products, an innovation on the market, are credit-
line loans. They are patterned after corresponding products oﬀered quite recently in 
the USA and the UK. Just as in those countries, due to their ﬂexibility, they may turn 
out to be a desirable product among customers. 
On the other hand, oﬀering products allowing the capital invested in property to 
be regained without changing its ownership rights is relatively poor. Loans pledged 
by mortgage are oﬀered by most large commercial banks, while no reverse mortgage 
products have been introduced in Poland. 
Another factor limiting the availability of mortgage loans are banks’ prudential 
regulations. Most frequently they include: 
 • A documented regular income stream for a (minimum) period of six months. 
Under higher risk conditions related to a particular customer, banks may require 
an approved income statement for the previous year or even two years. Banks 
usually assume the level of income at 1.5 of the average wage at least, and no 
less than 0.5 of the average wage or the minimum wage per family member 
remaining after the repayment of monthly commitments due (resulting from 
the loan and other ﬁxed liabilities). The TDR ratio accepted as the share of the 
loan repayment in the borrower’s income, safe for a bank, is set at maximum 38 
percent. Some banks do not require a minimum income surplus and calculate 
the TDR ratio at the low level of 25 percent.
 • Occupation or current job: in industries/sectors where no crash is expected. 
 • Age: below 50 years of age for the longest loans (due to the long-term character 
of the loan and a life insurance policy requirement applied at certain banks).
 • Place of residence/location of the ﬁnanced property: due to the short develop-
ment period of the real property market, its low liquidity, and limitations in 
getting sound information on transactions in order to derive value, as well as a 
lack of social acceptance of potential collection of the property, banks generally 
limit their scope of activity to properties located in towns and cities.
 • Proportion of the loan amount to the value of the property: without additional 
collateral, banks usually accept the maximum proportion at the level of 75−80 
percent.
 • Collateral: entry of the mortgage burden on the ﬁnanced property as the ﬁrst 
item, until then—other forms of bank security including credit insurance with 
an insurance company.
 • Valuation: banks apply valuations by experts, either outsourced or internal. 
The analysis of bank policies for the last ﬁve years indicates two trends: attempts 
to formalize and standardize requirements are balanced with attempts to liberalize 
requirements. This grows out of experience allowing for the size of risk to be assessed 
and from competitive pressure. The approach to borrower’s income has been particu-
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larly liberalized and rationalized—at present banks also accept income generated from 
contracts for deed and commissioned jobs. They only require documented long-term 
regular income stream and apply risk ratios. On the other hand the practice of granting 
large housing loans on the basis of analysis of the borrower’s income for the last three 
months was discontinued. While at the beginning banks ﬁnanced 50–60 percent of the 
costs of a property, at present, without additional security they ﬁnance even up to 80 
percent of the property value; sometimes even 100 percent (with the upper 20 percent 
of the value insured at the same bank). At a certain amount of the credit, valuation of 
the property by bank’s or external experts has become a standard. 
Competition forced a departure from the obligatory life insurance with assignment 
to a bank, and lowered the commissions and fees for processing a loan application.
After incurring rather unfavorable experience (up to 30 percent irregularity) banks 
have become much more reluctant to ﬁnance developers’ investments with classical 
building loans. In fact, they are ﬁnanced indirectly by building-mortgage loans, where 
the entire risk is borne by the future buyer of the ﬂat. The model of the development 
sector in Poland is a separate issue still requiring resolution. 
As far as bank security requirements are concerned, mortgages are increasingly acces-
sible. Banks specializing in loans to such households operate on the market. Those banks 
specializing in loans to households with medium incomes do not require a mortgage as 
a precondition to grant a loan and apply a low TDR ratio, with a possible soft condi-
tion of income surplus after repayment of the loan. A low TDR ratio at the level of 25 
percent is unfavorable for high income households, therefore banks specializing in large 
loans for wealthy households apply the ratio at the level of 38 percent and eliminate less 
wealthy customers by using a high ratio of income surplus per member of household. 
It may be expected that an increase in competition and income of the public will lead 
to increasing market penetration. 
Distribution of mortgage products is also increasing. In the 1990s the basic distri-
bution channel consisted in a network of branch oﬃces. The development of insurance 
and pension funds at large banks involved brokers working for those funds in the sale 
of mortgage products. However, their share in total sales has never become dominant, 
similar to the sale of products performed by developers and real property agents. After 
2002 large domestic and foreign companies, acting as an intermediary in the sale of 
consumer credit, also got interested in that market. Their market share shows an increas-
ing tendency. According to surveys, certain retail banks, in particular the smaller ones 
with a lower capital base but with good access to customers, are also interested in the 
intermediation or resale of mortgage loans. 
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5. MORTGAGE LOANS, HOUSING NEEDS, AND AFFORDABILITY
Mortgage loans are important, but just one of the elements determining the develop-
ment of the housing sector. One must also ask to what extent loans will contribute to 
satisfying housing needs and what are the principal barriers of the sector’s development. 
Table 7.5 presents approximate creditworthiness in relation to housing loans divided 
into deciles in 2002. 
Table 7.5 
Average creditworthiness of households in 2002
Deciles Available credit [PLN] Available amount of square meters
1 23,000.47 12.78
2 33,387.77 18.55
3 40,065.33 22.26
4 46,742.88 25.97
5 53,420.44 29.68
6 60,839.94 33.80
7 69,743.35 38.75
8 122,926.37 68.29
9 149,992.72 83.33
10 253,747.08 140.97
Note: Estimates were calculated with the use of prudential criteria commonly applied in Polish banks. 
For lower income groups that do not fulﬁll the prudential criteria the acceptable proportion of 
loan cost to income is 15 percent.
Source: Author’s estimates.
Table 7.6 presents estimations of the global creditworthiness of households in 2000 
and 2002 and predictions for year 2008 in Poland.
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Table 7.6 
Household global creditworthiness
Year 2000 2002 2008
Global creditworthiness [billion PLN] 15.0 43.5 60.0
This data indicates a considerable, nearly threefold increase in creditworthiness of 
households from 2000 to 2002. It explains the reasons for signiﬁcant growth and the scale 
of gain in portfolios. It resulted both from the decline in inﬂation and related decline in 
nominal interest rates on zloty loans, change in the structure of loans towards an increased 
share of cheaper denominated loans, as well as a decrease in interest rates on those loans. 
The most important factor in terms of market development—the decline in inﬂation and 
related decrease in interest rates—explains at least 40 percent of the phenomenon. 
Considering changes in global creditworthiness on the horizon in 2008, such drastic 
changes should not be expected. The increase in creditworthiness of the population 
achieved in 2002, mostly thanks to denominated loans, largely discounted the future 
decrease in interest rates. Consequently, assuming a moderate yearly growth of income 
at 1.5−2.5 percent, a yearly increase in creditworthiness to the level of PLN 55–60 bil-
lion can be expected. A question arises about the relation of this theoretically calculated 
creditworthiness to the housing needs of the population and the sector. 
Table 7.7 presents the current level of demand for mortgage loans, the creditworthi-
ness of the population, and the sector needs.
Table 7.7 
Current demand for mortgage loans, housing needs, 
and sector needs [estimate, PLN billion]
Purpose of loan New mortgage loans issued in 2002 Demand for mortgage connected 
with potential housing needs
(rough estimation)
Housing construction 4.8 7.5
Repairs 0.7 4.2
Secondary market 4.5 13.4
Total 10.0 25.1
Demand was estimated assuming the repair rate increases to 3% yearly (with 50% of 
the value in loans), the annual number of transactions on the housing market increases 
to 5–6 per 1,000 households (with 40% of the value in loans), and housing construction 
increases to 90–100,000 per year (with 60% of the value in loans).
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Comparing consumer creditworthiness (PLN 43.5 billion) against housing and sector 
needs (PLN 25.1 billion) shows no macroeconomic obstacle to the development of the 
sector. It shows that the mortgage loan should become the primary instrument for cover-
ing housing needs in Poland. The basic tool increasing the availability of those loans is 
appropriate macroeconomic policy maintaining low inﬂation and low interest rates. State 
guarantee programs and targeted subsidy programs should become an important element 
of housing policy, allowing housing loans to penetrate the market and reach lower income 
groups who are currently crowded out of the market and left to the social sector. 
6. CONCLUSION
The estimates presented here show that—contrary to prevailing opinion—neither in-
come nor demand are the principal obstacles to the development of the housing sector. 
Changes in consumer preferences towards other kinds of consumption, particularly 
to less capital-consuming ones that do not require long years of sacriﬁces in the form 
of savings and repayment of long-term loans, seem to be equally important. These 
behavioral patterns are strengthened with extended protection of tenants and highly 
subsidized rent in the resources of ﬂats to let, which, particularly in large cities, form 
a large portion of the market. An important factor limiting the demand of households 
is the high risk of losing money due to the model of housing construction based on 
advance payments commonly applied in Poland. 
Problems in the construction plot market combined with excessively time-consum-
ing permission procedures and a lack of information have slowed the construction of 
housing in large cities. This increases risk and exerts a dampening eﬀect on building 
demand and on banks (loans make up 60–70 percent of the value of newly constructed 
units). The involvement of the ﬁnancial sector in the residential property sector has 
been relatively modest so far. The activity of banks has also been prudential, that is 
why the problems aﬀected the banking sector to only a limited extent. This situation is 
subject to rapid changes: mortgage portfolios will soon constitute a signiﬁcant asset, and 
competition enforces a higher risk. It may then be expected that future experience will 
not be as unequivocally positive for banks. In the near future, banks should pay more 
attention to risk assessment and risk management. Both activities must be supervised 
by a government agency.
Consumer protection must also be improved (which is yet to happen even within 
the EU). Although Poland has adopted general rules concerning consumer loans and 
mortgage loans, mortgage agreements, and consumer information are in many cases 
unfavorable for clients.
The ﬁnancial system in Poland is still in a very early stage of development compared 
to developed countries. So far housing policy has created additional risks rather than 
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serving as a stabilizing element. This situation has to be changed. Without a long-term 
and complex housing policy, the sector will be unable to house the population eﬃciently. 
The place of mortgage loans in overall housing policy must also be deﬁned—especially 
as it relates to deepening the market to include lower income groups. Authorities must 
provide guarantees and subsidies for these strata while also developing private or semi-
public rental housing with modest rents.
The challenges facing the mortgage system have been solved in various ways in 
other countries. The Polish system is based on universal banks, household deposits, 
and variable interest rates, but future developments will see an increase in interest-rate 
and liquidity risk, so access to the capital market will be necessary. Existing mortgage 
banks issuing mortgage bonds and loans under the current Mortgage Law are subject 
to a strong supervisory regime and still play a marginal role in the market. For years, 
specialists have been suggesting that universal banks be allowed to issue mortgage bonds. 
Another solution lies in securitization, entering into legal eﬀect this year. However, the 
law is still incomplete and the system even more complex.  
The problem of entering the mortgage market is connected in many cases with a 
required down payment. This problem may be solved by contractual saving system or 
mortgage insurance. So far experiences with German-style contractual savings were 
unsatisfying—politicians and lobbyists introduced these systems to compensate for the 
unfavorable economic environment. Private insurance systems covering diﬀerent risks 
(especially delayed mortgage registration) are developing gradually and successfully, 
perhaps becoming a logical choice for housing policy makers.
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ENDNOTES
1 USAID is of a similar opinion, considering that only a partial realization of those postulates is 
necessary. See USAID (2000).
2 A Dual Index Loan (DIM) is a special mortgage instrument developed for economies with high 
inﬂation. The borrower payment is set up once in the beginning and then adjusted with the income 
index. In the long run this payment should cover real interest rates and principal. The outstanding 
balance is adjusted with the market interest rate. As a consequence, part of the nominal interest is 
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capitalized and mortgage debt rises in nominal terms but should decline in real terms. In practical use 
this is a very complex instrument that creates a lot of problems especially in underdeveloped banking 
systems (characteristic of countries where it tends to be introduced). This tool may fend oﬀ payment 
tilt problem while increasing several new substantial risks.
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 An Evaluation of the Hungarian 
 Mortgage Program
 József Hegedüs and Eszter Somogyi
 ABSTRACT
 The onset of transition from socialism found Hungary’s housing system bankrupt 
due to the long-term, low interest (1–3 percent) state housing loans issued in the 
1980s. According to a World Bank study the total budget and off-budget subsidies 
to the sector amounted to 7.5 percent of the GDP in 1989. The two most important 
items were the interest rate subsidy—30 percent of the total subsidy—and the 
subsidies to the public sector including both direct and indirect subsidies (indirect 
referring to foregone rental income on public housing stock)—44 percent of the 
total. Through the consolidation of the banking sector and “old loans” and by 
privatizing the public rental stock the housing subsidies decreased to 1.2 percent 
of the GDP by 1998.
  Meanwhile, by the middle of the 1990s, a deep crisis could be detected in 
the housing sector. New construction diminished to 20 percent of the level of the 
1980s—around 0.5 percent of the existing stock—the deterioration of the housing 
stock accelerated, housing finance activities essentially vanished, the social rental 
sector decreased to 4 percent of the stock, and several social problems emerged 
in the management of the housing stock (arrears, etc.). Housing loans practically 
disappeared: while outstanding loans were 16–17 percent of the GDP in 1989, 
they were reduced to 1–1.5 percent by the end of the 1990s. 
  In 2000 the right-wing populist government announced a new housing policy, 
which aimed to increase the new investments in the housing sector, creating a 
competitive mortgage market and supporting the revival of the rental sector as 
well. The new subsidies supporting borrowing were introduced in 2000. How-
ever, the government was under constant pressure by lobbying groups, and the 
conditions and eligibility criteria for the subsidies changed step by step. By 2002, 
before the election, the potential fiscal cost of the mortgage system had become 
critical. According to our calculation, the present value subsidy of the loan to be 
issued in 2003 would be equivalent to 2–3 percent of GDP, while the result of the 
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program can be questioned both in terms of efficiency and in terms of the social 
effects. 
  The new left-wing government elected in 2002 promised to keep the subsidies 
unchanged in the housing sector and even promised increases in some elements 
of the subsidy system (e.g., increasing the premiums for the contract savings and 
increase in the upfront down payment subsidy for new construction). The new 
government postponed decisions on modifying the subsidy system for two years, 
but the fiscal burden forced them to introduce changes at the end of 2004. This 
chapter describes the program and evaluates the results versus costs from the 
viewpoint of public policy. 
179
An Evaluation of the Hungarian 
Mortgage Program 2000–2004
József Hegedüs and Eszter Somogyi1
INTRODUCTION
The onset of transition from socialism found Hungary’s housing system bankrupt due 
to the long-term, low interest (1–3 percent) state housing loans issued in the 1980s. 
According to a World Bank study the total budget and oﬀ-budget subsidies to the sector 
amounted to 7.5 percent of the GDP in 1989. The two most important items were the 
interest rate subsidy—30 percent of the total subsidy—and the subsidies to the public 
sector including both direct and indirect subsidies (indirect referring to foregone rental 
income on public housing stock)—44 percent of the total. Through the consolidation 
of the banking sector and “old loans” and by privatizing the public rental stock the 
housing subsidies decreased to 1.2 percent of the GDP by 1998.
 Meanwhile, by the middle of the 1990s, a deep crisis could be detected in the hous-
ing sector. New construction diminished to 20 percent of the level of the 1980s—around 
0.5 percent of the existing stock—the deterioration of the housing stock accelerated, 
housing ﬁnance activities essentially vanished, the social rental sector decreased to 4 
percent of the stock, and several social problems emerged in the management of the 
housing stock (arrears, etc.). Housing loans practically disappeared: while outstanding 
loans were 16–17 percent of the GDP in 1989, they were reduced to 1–1.5 percent by 
the end of the 1990s. 
By the mid-1990s there had been no housing loans in Hungary and the situation 
was similar in other Eastern European countries. It must be pointed out, however, that in 
some countries there had been no loans even before the political changes, unlike Hungary, 
where the loan portfolio in 1990 amounted to 15 percent of the GDP (Hegedüs-Várhegyi 
2000). Early in 2000 an energetic program targeting the establishment of a housing loan 
system was launched in Hungarian housing policy. During the four years of the “mortgage 
subsidy” program the housing loan portfolio grew to 8 or 9 times its previous size; whereas 
at the beginning of 2000 the loan portfolio was only approximately HUF 130 billion, by 
September 2004 it was HUF 1,836 billion. As a result, the loan ratio within the GDP 
increased from 1.5 percent in 2000 to 10 percent at the end of the year 2004. 
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The paper will tell the story of this program and evaluate results versus costs from the 
viewpoint of public policy. There are two key questions in the scholarship on housing 
ﬁnances in transition countries—deﬁning “optimum” housing ﬁnance institutions and 
developing an eﬃcient framework (both legal and institutional) for housing ﬁnance in 
transition economies. Options include mortgage banks, commercial banks, secondary 
mortgage institutions, and contract savings. The second question is about the possible 
role of housing ﬁnance subsidies. The fact is that at the end of the 1990s (8 to 10 years 
into the transition period) housing ﬁnance was in deep crisis in most transition coun-
tries. Several important measures were then taken: formation of new legal frameworks, 
banking reform, privatization of banks, and development and introduction of new 
ﬁnancial institutions and innovative mortgage products. However, no real progress 
had been made in terms of the issued loans, number of households using credit, and 
the credit-to-value ratio, etc. Despite the high level of “need” for housing, the popula-
tion with purchase capacity remained low. Thus it was crucial to see whether a subsidy 
was needed to generate demand and—if yes—what kind of subsidy programs should 
transition countries use.
In the ﬁrst part of the study we describe the macroeconomic and housing policy 
background of the program. One of the interesting points is that the situation before the 
program was similar to other transition countries. The Hungarian program represents 
a response—not necessarily the best one—to this challenge, which is worth studying. 
The second part of the paper describes the program and its changes between 2000 and 
2004. There are a lot of technical details which are impossible to present in the frame-
work of this volume; however it is important to understand the process and motives 
of policy making. In the third part of the paper we try evaluate the program from the 
viewpoint of public policy. 
1. HOUSING POLICY, HOUSING FINANCE, 
 AND SUBSIDIES BEFORE 2000
Housing Policy
After the political changes at the end of the 1980s, three stages in housing policy can be 
outlined. In the ﬁrst period (1989–1994) the government tried to manage the housing 
crises related to economic decline and the “deep subsidy” system of the socialist period. 
The government “moved out from the housing sector,” decreasing subsidies and dimin-
ishing their direct role. Decentralization was part of this process, as local governments 
were asked to manage the housing allowance program partly ﬁnanced from their own 
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resources. The housing policy of this period largely entailed crisis management. The Law 
on the Rental Sector (1993) and the Social Law (1993) made it clear that the government 
does not take responsibility for housing, but leaves it open to future intervention. The 
subsidy system had been changed in order to decrease the burden on the budget, but no 
major changes were realized in the concept of housing policy. Decisions from this period 
made it clear that politicians had not accepted “targeting” as a concept. Nevertheless, 
this idea became more and more important in the “white paper” programs. 
In the second period (1995–2000) new institutions were established and the legal 
basis was improved. Meanwhile, the level of subsidies gradually decreased as a con-
sequence of decreasing housing output. Two basic ﬁnancial institutions were set up: 
contract savings banks and mortgage banks. The law on contract savings banks was 
very controversial as the subsidies for savers made the housing subsidy system regres-
sive, and there was no direct relationship between subsidies and an increase in housing 
investments. Changes in the legal basis of housing ﬁnance were important. Attempts 
to curb inﬂation and changes in the subsidy system had temporary eﬀects on the hous-
ing sector. The housing policy concept declared the need for a reform in the subsidy 
system, but changes mainly served the purpose of reducing the budget burden. From 
1998 on, a new aspect of housing policy was stressed—the need to support middle-in-
come households—but no signiﬁcant moves were made for two years. The third period 
started after 2000, when the government launched an active program backed by positive 
macroeconomic changes. 
Soon after the change of regime, the country undertook structural reforms and 
stabilization measures. By the mid-1990s, as a consequence of deterioration in macro-
economic performance (the government budget deﬁcit), the country responded with a 
second round of deep and far-reaching reforms that included the enterprise, banking, 
and public sectors. Structural reforms were complemented with a strong ﬁscal stabiliza-
tion package (1995–98) and the maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies. Robust 
economic performance followed, with real GDP growth averaging 4.4 percent over the 
1997–2001 period. Unemployment had been on the decrease from the middle of the 
1990s and stabilized at 5–7 percent at the turn of the century. 
Macroeconomic Background, Privatization of the 
Construction Industry, and Housing Investments
Since 2000, economic policy priorities have shifted from structural reforms to rebalanc-
ing living standards and upgrading public infrastructure. Wages, pensions and public 
sector investment have increased. Yet some structural reforms remain pending, notably 
in ﬁnancing the health sector, in sub-national ﬁnance, and capacity building.
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The change in the regime and the following transitional recession had its eﬀect on 
the housing sector (Hegedüs and Várhegyi 2000). The real estate market has been trans-
formed quickly; huge construction companies have been broken up and privatized; the 
sale of construction materials has been liberalized, restrictions on owning property have 
been lifted, and a signiﬁcant portion of state owned housing has been privatized—all 
this has paved the way for a market-oriented housing model. However, there have been 
many signs that the transformation process was not smooth: housing construction rates 
have fallen; the housing stock has further deteriorated; problems maintaining and re-
newing privatized (and non-privatized) housing have emerged, housing expenditures 
have been taking an increasing part in household incomes and housing-related arrears 
have become a social issue. 
Because of economic depression, the housing investment decreased and housing 
output went down as well. Changes in the subsidy system had an eﬀect on the hous-
ing output, but by 1998 the number of new units dropped to an even lower level than 
before. Interestingly enough, macroeconomic changes had not inﬂuenced housing 
investments before 2001.
Figure 8.1
New construction and building permits between 1989 and 2002
 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃce.
The housing situation improved in the 1990s partly because there was no demo-
graphic pressure on the housing sector and the demand for housing had been postponed 
(see Table 8.2). Housing units with 3 or more rooms did not increase, and 15 percent 
of the stock was obsolete and in critical condition.
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Table 8.2 
Basic indicators of housing conditions 
in Hungary, 1960–2000
Units 
[millions]
Persons 
per 100 
inhabited units
Number of 
rooms 
per 100 units
Units with 3 or 
more rooms 
[percent]
Units without 
comfort 
[percent]
1960 2.79 349 147 n.a. n.a.
1970 3.14 327 164 10.8 65.9
1980 3.55 302 199 24.3 37.7
1990 3.86 274 237 40.5 18.7
2000 4.06 274 263 45.9 15.0
Sources: Central Statistics Oﬃce.
Housing Privatization and Housing Subsidies
As a consequence of housing privatization, 15–20 percent of the total housing stock 
moved from state ownership to the owner occupied sector. In the Hungarian housing 
system the state rental sector had a 25 percent share before transition. Its role was decisive 
in the urban areas, where privatization caused a dramatic change in the tenure structure. 
Privatization was basically a giveaway, with prices at around 10–15 percent of market 
value. As a consequence, in 2000 the estimated share of the rental sector was 8 percent, 
of which 4 percent was public (CSO 2003). Thus Hungary’s housing sector came to 
be dominated by owner occupation. Even if privatization was a contradictory process 
from the point of view of housing policy, it had a positive ﬁscal eﬀect in the short run, 
as 2/3 of the revenues of public sector rentals came from state subsidies. 
Now the housing subsidy system has changed. In the 1990s oﬃcially measured 
housing subsidies2 reached 3.7 percent of GDP, and more than 2/3 of total homeowner 
subsidies in 1990 went to subsidizing interest on “old loans” (See Hegedüs, Mark, and 
Tosics 1997). In 1993–94 the subsidies related to borrowing were reduced, and the VAT 
exemption on housing investment was abolished. As a compensation of these austerity 
measures the upfront “housing construction and purchase grant” was increased. The 
increase had a temporary eﬀect on the market and on new construction, but its eﬀect 
was later inﬂated (See Figure 9.1). By the end of the decade the share of the interest rate 
subsidy diminished to 35 percent of total subsidies and made room for new programs 
(see Table 8.6 in the appendix). Beside the “old loan” subsidies, the most important 
subsidy was the housing construction allowance, which was a capital grant subsidy for 
new construction depending on the number of the children in the family. Among the 
housing ﬁnance subsidies the premium for contract savings and housing loan subsidies 
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was important. Total budget and oﬀ-budget subsidies decreased to 0.8 percent of the 
GDP by 1998 from 1.2 percent in 1993. 
Housing Finance: Mortgage Loans, Interest Rates
Housing loans as sources of housing ﬁnance had practically disappeared: while the out-
standing loans were 16–17 percent of the GDP in 1989, they had decreased to 1–1.5 
percent by the end of the 1990s (see Figure 8.2). Paradoxically, while market economy 
institutions including a competitive banking system have been created in Hungary, the 
housing ﬁnance sector has grown diﬀerently than in developed economies, where 60 
to 80 percent of housing investments are ﬁnanced from loans. 
In an earlier paper (Hegedüs-Várhegyi 2000), we gave an explanation of the shrink-
ing of the loan sector. Besides the worsening and unpredictable income situation of 
households, two other factors had major roles: loss of value of property and high real 
interest rates on loans. By 1998 the real loss of the housing value reached 40–50 percent 
of the value of the 1990s, and a turnaround started in 1998–99. 
Figure 8.2 
Outstanding housing loans, 1990–2003
 
 Source: Hungarian National Bank.
Housing prices in the 1990s decreased in real terms by 40 percent, and started to 
increase again from 1998. This was one factor which had a positive eﬀect on household 
housing demands. The facts and expectations of a continuous house price increase made 
the household housing investments proﬁtable. In the next Figure 9.4 the rate of return 
on real housing prices shows positive changes from 1998. However, this trend seems 
to have stopped by 2002, which supports the assumption that in that year we reached 
the peak of a price bubble. 
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The interest rate was around 30 percent between 1991 and 1997, which made the 
expansion of the loan sector basically impossible. Innovative loan products (e.g., Deferred 
Payment Mortgage) were not able to signiﬁcantly change the situation. 
Figure 8.3 
Interest rates on housing loans and CPI, 1988–2002 
Source: Hungarian National Bank.
In the 1990s the combined eﬀects of these two factors could not be oﬀset by the 
housing subsidy system and innovations in the housing ﬁnance system. Until 1998 the 
investment in real estate had a lower “return” than rendering the saving as deposits.
Figure 8.4 
Real return on deposits and housing in Hungary, 1989–2002
Sources: OTB Bank, Hungarian National Bank, MRI, own calculations.
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By 2000 it was not only the macroeconomic situation that had changed, such as 
inﬂation, house prices, unemployment, GDP, etc., but the institutional reform had had 
its eﬀect as well, especially in the banking sector.
The Institutional Structure 
of Residential Housing Lending System in Hungary  
By the end of the 1990s the main institutional and legal changes that initiated a more 
extended, long-term mortgage lending activity had been implemented. As a result of 
the institutional development of the nineties, three main types of ﬁnancial institutions 
participate in housing ﬁnance: commercial banks, mortgage banks, and contract sav-
ings banks. 
The mortgage lending activity started to grow signiﬁcantly when the new housing 
loan subsidy system that gave interest rate subsidy to housing loans was introduced. The 
idea was to establish an interest rate subsidy that makes mortgage loans more available 
for households until the inﬂation decreases to a level that allows for acceptable condi-
tions for long-term mortgages. Therefore, the subsidy scheme was designed so that the 
subsidy declines in parallel with the fall in inﬂation. Two diﬀerent types of interest rate 
subsidies were introduced: an interest rate subsidy to mortgage bonds and an interest 
rate subsidy for loans connected to new construction. The program was launched in 
January 2000, and the mortgage bonds have become the primary resource for mortgage 
loans due to their subsidization. 
Until the late 1990s, the housing lending market was highly concentrated and 
dominated by OTP, the former state bank, and only from 1996 have other commercial 
banks started to enter the housing ﬁnance market. While in the case of retail lending 
the monopoly of OTP had shrunk substantially, in the area of housing loans OTP’s 
share declined only slightly: as late as 1997 OTP still had nearly 90 percent of the mar-
ket. Due to reasons mentioned earlier—low demand, high inﬂation rates, high credit 
risk—commercial banks moved into the housing lending market only later and with 
a very cautious business strategy. They were mostly following OTP’s policy, as a result 
of which there was no genuine competition between banks. The lack of competition 
was also felt in the slow decrease of real interest rates in housing loans. Owing to the 
new subsidy policy introduced in 2000, the number of commercial banks and ﬁnancial 
institutions on the housing lending market has considerably grown in the past three 
years. According to Hungarian Central Statistics Oﬃce (HCSO) data, 16 commercial 
banks, 3 mortgage banks, and 179 savings cooperatives operated in the market in 2002, 
as a result of which the market is now less concentrated. 
Setting up mortgage banks became possible with the enactment of the Act on 
Mortgage Credit Institutions and Mortgage Bonds (1997). Currently there are three 
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mortgage banks in the market: the Land and Mortgage Bank (FHB), the German-owned 
HypoVereinsbank (1999), and the OTP Mortgage Bank (2001). 
The ﬁrst mortgage bank, the state-owned FHB, was set up in 1998. At the outset, 
housing lending was not central in the bank’s strategy: the bank primarily targeted 
the upper segment of the market and did not deal with subsidized loans, which it did 
not consider safe enough. Initially, with the introduction of the new subsidy program 
FHB gained a central role in housing ﬁnance—at the beginning only the FHB was 
entitled to receive the subsidy for mortgage bond issuance. Because the FHB was not 
authorized to issue its own loans, loan origination was organized in cooperation with 
commercial banks and saving cooperatives in the form of reﬁnancing agreements or on 
a commission basis. The reason for such arrangement was to break OTP’s monopoly 
in the market. However, FHB’s monopoly on subsidized bonds was cut back later, and 
other mortgage banks gained the right to issue subsidized mortgage bonds. FHB was 
then permitted to issue its own mortgages as well. As a result of these changes, OTP 
established its own mortgage bank. The recent pattern of mortgage lending is that the 
FHB has reﬁnancing agreements with nine commercial banks and issues its own loans 
through its ﬁve branches, while the OTP Mortgage Bank does not issue its own loans but 
has an exclusive reﬁnancing agreement with OTP commercial bank. With the current 
arrangement OTP regained its leading role in mortgage lending: 2/3 of the mortgage 
loans were issued by the OTP in 2002. 
Although 8 percent of households have contracts with savings banks, these ﬁnancial 
institutions have a marginal role in housing lending. The main reason is that the conditions 
of their loans became less favorable with the introduction of a new interest rate subsidy 
system. However, contract savings banks enjoy high subsidies on the savings side.
2. LOAN SUBSIDY PROGRAM AFTER 2000
Since January 2000 the subsidy system has been changed and two new subsidy pro-
grams have replaced the old system in the area of housing ﬁnance. Housing mortgage 
programs were frequently changed, betraying government impatience. Changes came 
in such rapid succession that there was no time to evaluate the eﬀects of the interven-
tions. Beside the two mortgage subsidies, the modiﬁcation of the PIT advantages had 
an important eﬀect as well.
2000 to Spring 2002
The demand-side mortgage subsidy aimed at increasing aﬀordability for new construc-
tion. According to regulations, the interest subsidy was equal to the yield of government 
bonds less 4 percent provided that the bank charges an interest rate not more than the 
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yield of the government bonds plus 4 percent for a loan with 10 years maturity (see 
Table 8.3). So the borrower paid maximum 8 percent for the whole life of the loan as 
interest and service cost, and the subsidy will decrease if the inﬂation (the yield of the 
government bond) decreases. In the beginning, only “ﬁrst-time buyers” were eligible 
for the subsidized loan (a ﬁrst-time buyer is deﬁned as a household who does not own a 
house at the time of purchase or construction). The government bond rate for one year 
was decreased from 11.2 percent in 2000 to 6.4 percent by 2003 (see Figure 8.5), thus 
the subsidy would have decreased from 6–7 percent to 2–3 percent with the original 
condition.3 The expectation was that this program would have a relatively high initial 
cost, but later its ﬁscal eﬀects would be managed easily. Moreover, the demand-side 
mortgage subsidy was limited by the fact that only households buying (or constructing) 
new units were eligible.
Figure 8.5 
The government bond rate, 1999–2003 
Source: Hungarian National Bank.
Thus the subsidy in the beginning was tied to the government bond interest rate 
with the condition that the interest rate of the loan would have a ceiling. To give an 
example, the subsidy was equal to the government bond interest rate minus 4 percent 
(10 – 4 = 6 percent) and the maximum interest rate was equal to the government bond 
plus 4 percent (10 + 4 = 14 percent). Therefore the household maximum burden was 
8 percent and was independent of the actual interest rate.
The other program was the funding-side mortgage subsidy (support of the mortgage 
bond). In 2000, a 3 percent subsidy was given to support the issue of mortgage bonds 
(special long-term securities) to ﬁnance mortgage loans both for buying and building 
new homes and for buying existing units. The mortgage bank raises the funds with the 
government support required for lending on the capital market and channels them 
to the borrower through its own branch network or its partners (commercial banks,
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savings cooperatives, insurance companies). The subsidy is granted for 5 years, after 5 
years—the law says—with the new issuance the subsidy will change provided that the 
household burden does not change. Initially, this program provided a 3 percent ﬁxed 
interest rate subsidy for the mortgage bonds issued to support housing investment (see 
Table 8.4). It stipulated that the maximum interest rate of the loan from these resources 
could not exceed the mortgage bond interest rate plus 1.5 percent. In January 2000 the 
mortgage bond interest rate was 11 percent, the loan issued from these resources had a 
maximum interest rate 12.5, while the cost of the bank was 8 percent (11–3).4
The third subsidy program was the Personal Income Tax (PIT) mortgage payment 
allowance. From 1994, the maximum amount which could be deducted from the tax 
payment was 20 percent of the mortgage payment (interest and capital), maximum 35 
thousand HUF.5 Its eﬀect was not very inﬂuential, as the ceiling was very low.
Both mortgage subsidy schemes—despite their technical problems mentioned 
before—could be considered eﬃcient in starting the mortgage loan ﬁnance for housing. 
It was clear to the observers that this policy would help the upper middle and middle-
income groups to have access to housing loans with a “shallow” subsidy system. In this 
way it would be possible to target the remaining part of the subsidies to the needy social 
groups. It seemed to be a reasonable price for building up a modern housing ﬁnance system. 
However, the government had been under constant pressure by lobbying groups, and the 
conditions and eligibility criteria for the two schemes had changed step by step. 
The funding-side mortgage subsidy was increased from 3 to 6 percent by June 2001, 
and in October the subsidy was tied to the mortgage bond interest rate. By February 
2002 the interest rate subsidy was equal to the mortgage bond interest rate plus 2 percent 
with a ceiling of 10 percent. As the mortgage bond interest rate was around 9 percent 
in the beginning of 2002, the interest rate subsidy was 10 percent—a huge subsidy.
The conditions were relaxed as well to include not only individuals but local gov-
ernments and developers; not only new construction but also renewals, extensions, etc. 
became eligible.
Although the future cost of the program increased as a consequence of these changes, 
the scheme still had some advantages. As the government bond price decreases, the 
subsidy decreases as well. The household burden (interest and service cost) was maxi-
mized up to 8 percent up to October 2001—6 percent afterwards. The total size of 
the demand-side subsidy was constrained by the quantity of new construction (as only 
loans issued for new construction were eligible), however  this was not true for the other 
mortgage subsidy (the support of the bond issue), which was tied to the transaction of 
existing and new units.
The PIT mortgage allowance was modiﬁed as well. In 2001, the maximum deduction 
was increased to 40 percent—240 thousand HUF/year in the case of the new construc-
tion. Before the election (in the spring of 2002) the personal income tax deduction was 
expanded to loans for buying existing housing units as well. 
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Hesitation: 2002 to June 2003 
The new left-wing government elected in 2002 promised to leave subsidies unchanged 
in the housing sector and even promised increases in some elements of the subsidy 
system (e.g., an increase in premiums for contract savings and in the down payment 
subsidy for new construction). 
By the end of 2002 it had become clear that the volume of housing loans increased 
very fast as a consequence of the subsidies. One of the reasons was that the biggest 
Hungarian Bank (OTP) entered the market and could optimize its position by issuing 
private bonds. Soon it became a leading institution on the mortgage bond market.
Figure 8.6 
Loans issued in 2002 
Source: Monitor Report6 (2003).
However, the ﬁscal eﬀects of the mortgage programs were not projected correctly. 
In October 2002 one of the prominent economic research institutes estimated the fu-
ture cost of the two mortgage subsidy programs at 42 billion HUF for the year 2005, 
while the expectation was 140 billion HUF7 (Molnár-Pichovsky 2002).8 Other research 
institutes (like MRI) evaluated the program as unsustainable, but the government did 
not pay attention to the warning (Hegedüs and Teller 2004).9 
The government—for political reasons—kept postponing the decisions. Moreover, in 
2002 the government increased the subsidy for the contract savings and the housing policy 
allowances to demonstrate that they wanted to support the sector (see Appendix).
After a long political discussion the government changed the conditions of the 
mortgage program in June 2003, but much less radically than was expected. There was 
no change in the mortgage demand subsidy program. In the funding-side mortgage 
subsidy program, diﬀerent formulas were introduced for buying existing units and for 
buying or building new units. The subsidy decreased by 2 percent in the case of new 
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units, and it became equal to the mortgage bond rate; it decreased by 3 percent in the 
case of the existing units. The size of the maximum spread was diﬀerent for new and 
existing units; the subsidy decrease in the case of the new units was less signiﬁcant in 
an eﬀort to support new construction.
Figure 8.7 
Changes in the housing loans of the household sector 
Source: Hungarian National Bank. 
 
Parallel to the modest cuts, the government changed the law on public servants, which 
gave a guarantee to civil servants up to the diﬀerence between the value of the home and 
the loan given according to the underwriting procedures of the bank. This guarantee 
existed from July 1, 2001 with a ceiling deﬁned by “socially accepted housing needs” 
speciﬁed in the law. From July 2003—because of anecdotal evidence that public servants 
used this possibility for investment purposes—some constraints have been introduced. 
Period of 2003 June until 2003 December
Because of the increased government deﬁcit and worsening macroeconomic conditions, 
introducing substantial changes became inevitable by December. The cost of the program 
became evident by the end of 2003. In 2003, the mortgage loan issuance increased, and 
there was no sign that it would decline. The macroeconomic changes aﬀected the ﬁscal 
cost of the program as well. The government bond rate increased above 12 percent, which 
made the mortgage program more expensive. The changes of the subsidy programs were 
inﬂuenced by the “construction lobby” that argued that most of the subsidies went to 
the existing housing market and had not helped the housing investments. 
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Figure 8.8 
The type of housing investment used by the issued loan, 2001–2003
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃce. 
In the case of the mortgage demand subsidy program the size of the subsidy de-
creased, and it was deﬁned as 60 percent of the government bond rate. Before December 
2003, the subsidy was equal to GBR minus 2 percent, thus the subsidy decreased from 
10 percent to 7.2 percent (at a level of 12 percent of the GBR). In the case of the fund-
ing-side mortgage subsidy for existing units a more severe cut was used: the subsidy was 
set at 40 percent of the government bond rate. 
The tax exemptions in PIT for mortgage repayment had been cut severely as well. 
The maximum tax deduction was decreased to 120,000 HUF from 240,000 HUF, and 
the borrowers were eligible for a maximum of 4 years. In the case of buying existing 
units, the maximum deduction was equal to 30 percent of the mortgage payment, while 
in the case of new units it remained 40 percent. 
Back on Track
As a consequence of the cuts in subsidy the issuance of mortgage loans decreased, but 
the total decrease was less than expected, as a new foreign-exchange-dominated mortgage 
loan was introduced. In the last quarter of 2004, 100 billion HUF in new loans were 
issued, 50 percent of which were foreign-exchange-dominated mortgage loans. This 
created a new challenge to ﬁnd ways to manage the EX risks of the new loans. The ﬁscal 
burdens, however, will become smaller, as no subsidy is given to these loans. 
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Housing policy remained in the focus of politics. At the beginning of 2005 the 
government started a new program which will have important eﬀects on the mortgage 
ﬁnance. A government guarantee program was designed to introduce both the subsi-
dized mortgage and the foreign exchange dominated mortgage. The government again 
increased the housing construction subsidy (see appendix) and expanded its use to the 
market of the existing units at 50 percent of the subsidy level. These program elements 
were a reaction to criticism that the mortgage subsidy program has helped the relatively 
rich, as its loan-to-value ratio is around 50–60 percent, leaving households without 
intergenerational transfer and substantial savings out of the program.  
3. OUTCOME OF THE MORTGAGE PROGRAM 
The Macroeconomic Effects: Housing Construction, Loans Issued
The market reacted to the housing subsidy changes, but with a substantial and increas-
ing “lag.” Building permits as well as new construction increased. The present 3.5 built 
units per 1,000 inhabitants is in the lower middle range in Europe, but is one of the 
highest among the transition countries (see Figure 8.1 ). It is a question how much of 
the increase is due to the subsidy program and how much is due to the macroeconomic 
changes (GDP increase, lower inﬂation, etc.). 
The major part of the increase in housing investment was due to professional de-
velopers. The share of “self-built” housing decreased from 52.8 percent to 35.5 percent 
between 1998 and 2003, thus 87 percent of the surplus was generated by professional 
developers. However, the mortgage program seems to have a distorting eﬀect on the 
market in terms of the over-supply of small, low quality units, while in international 
comparison the Hungarian housing market is dominated by “average” housing units. 
This distortion was caused by the fact that the subsidy system provided incentives to 
invest in medium size or small housing, where both developers’ and buyers’ price risks 
are smaller. 
The mortgage program with its 2002 parameters was unsustainable, and political 
discussions on the program had a negative eﬀect on the market. First, households brought 
forward their housing investment decision because they believed the government would 
withdraw subsidies. This fact led to over-demand for new housing for which developers 
were not prepared, and it had a negative eﬀect on the quality and price of the new units. 
Secondly, after the government changed the subsidy scheme, developers ended up with 
unsold units and several bankruptcies are now foreseen among developers. Probably, this 
will not result in a burst of the price bubble, as new investment does not dominate the 
market but could cause other disadvantages such as a low level of transactions, etc.
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The outstanding loan increased very fast, and the share of the loans related to buy-
ing existing units increased much more after 2002. There is a discussion among experts 
and housing politicians over the optimum mix of subsidies to new investments and 
existing units. The argument is that subsidies for existing units lead to rise in prices 
because of the rigidity of the supply. However, the market of the existing units and 
new investment cannot be separated. 56 percent of the buyers enter the market selling 
their previous units. Thus the existing market and new market are strongly inter-
related. According to the housing survey of 2003, 85 percent of buyers of existing units 
renew their homes,10 thus the transaction generates real investments as well. 
In the years of rapid expansion of housing loans household savings decreased sub-
stantially, which contributed to macroeconomic problems at the end of 2003 (Palocz 
2003).
Mortgage Boom in House Prices: 
Expansion without a House-Price Bubble
House prices have been quite volatile in the last 15 years. In the 1990s, real house prices 
decreased by 40–50 percent until 1998, and between 1998 and 2001 a 100 percent real 
increase took place (see Figure 8.4 ).11 The real increase preceded the mortgage program, 
thus it is clear that the house-price increase was not fuelled by the mortgage boom. A 
study in 2000 (Valkovszky 2000) warned housing politicians that a mortgage subsidy 
program would lead to a price bubble. This did not happen, despite the fact that by the 
end of 2003 outstanding mortgage loans had increased by three times compared to the 
1999 amount, and from 2 percent to more than 9 percent of the GDP. No substantial 
price increase could be observed on the market until 2004.
The 1998–2000 house-price increase can be explained by several factors such as 
stock market changes, interest rate decrease and the role of foreign investors (Kiss 
2002). However, house-price trends have to be explained in a longer-term perspective 
(Hegedüs and Várhegyi 2000). In the years of the economic recession of transition house-
holds’ housing demand decreased, and as a consequence of special equity withdrawal12 
housing supply was stabilized in spite of the substantial decrease in the new construc-
tion. The macroeconomic stabilization changed the market parallel with the collapse 
of the stock market. The price increase impacted housing investment, which can be 
demonstrated through permission data (see Figure 8.1), but actual new construction 
did not have a substantial role in slowing down the price increase (new construction 
represents only 20–30 percent of all transactions). The increase in mortgage loans did 
not have a direct inﬂuence on investments, because the majority of the surplus demand 
went to the market of the existing houses not to the new construction. 
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Our explanation is that the Hungarian real estate market had moved into a price 
bubble in the years of 1998–2001, and it was close to “bursting” when an additional 
demand appeared, and this slowed down the price decrease. To put it in another way, 
the price increase of 1998–2000 could be realized only in a certain part of the market 
(that is, increased asking prices; however, the eﬀective demand did not increase, thus 
the number of transactions was limited). After the mortgage boom, the eﬀective de-
mand increased basically at the same price level as the asking price. Thus the number 
of transactions increased (according to our estimates from 3 percent of households to 6 
percent in a year). The mortgage funds “leaked” from the sector through transactions, 
not through direct borrowing. The survey and other indirect information do not support 
the hypothesis that the leakages were directly connected to borrowing. 
Fiscal Effect
The mortgage program had very serious ﬁscal eﬀects on the budget. There was a debate 
among experts about the future ﬁscal cost of the program. The government argued in 
2000 that the ﬁscal burden would be manageable if interest rates went down. The weak 
feature of the interest rate subsidy is the unpredictability of the true cost of subsidy 
in an inﬂationary environment. Moreover, because of the frequent changes in terms, it 
was very diﬃcult to follow the issuance of the diﬀerent type of loans and estimate the 
future costs. Even the comparison from one year to another was impossible, because of 
the lag time between authorization of the loan and actual withdrawal of money.
Figure 8.9 
Subsidies in the chapter of the Ministry of Finance [billion HUF]
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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As a consequence of the mortgage program, the share of housing subsidies in 
GDP increased from 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent between 1998 and 2003 (see Figure 
8.9). However, the problem of the interest rate subsidy is that it means a long-term 
commitment to the budget. After a certain point it shrinks the housing programs’ 
ﬂexibility. It was clear in 2000 that the ﬁscal eﬀect depends on how fast the magnitude 
of the outstanding loans is increasing, and how “deep” the interest rate subsidy is, 
that is, the diﬀerence between the “cost of the money” and the eﬀective interest rate 
paid by households. Commitments could be measured by the present value of the interest 
rate. According to our recent estimates, the present value of the subsidy commitments 
connected to the loans issued in 2002 and 2003 is 3.6 percent of the GDP (Hegedüs 
and Teller 2004).
The other problem is that mortgage subsidies will dominate the housing budget, 
which means that most expenditures will be related to past housing activity. Similar to 
the beginning of the 1990s, the share of “old loans” will have more than 75 percent of 
the housing budget, which gives no room for any new housing programs. 
Affordability
In the last three years prices increased faster than household incomes. However, other 
aﬀordability indicators (e.g., Housing Aﬀordability Index and Housing Opportunity 
Index) improved because the housing loan interest rate decreased substantially—partly 
because of macroeconomic changes, and partly because of the interest subsidy (see Table 
8.5). It is important to emphasize that the price increase preceded the subsidy program. 
Table 8.5 
Aﬀordability indicators13 in Hungary, 1999 and 2003
1999 2003
Price/income ratio (HP/I) 4.1 6.2
Housing opportunity index (HOI) 40% 60%
Housing affordability index (HAI) 15% 30%
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃce.
The Social Effects
The interest rate subsidy was successful in terms of the outstanding loan, and in start-
ing the expansion of the housing loan sector, but it was less successful in initiating new 
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construction. However, the subsidies had a very regressive income eﬀect, and a serious 
ﬁscal eﬀect on the public sector. 
We do not have data related to the income composition of the households who had 
access to interest rate subsidies. However, through Personal Income Tax data we can make 
inferences and conclusions about the social eﬀect of the program. As a consequence of 
changed conditions, the PIT deduction related to mortgage payment increased substan-
tially from 5.6 billion HUF to 17.0 billion HUF. The expected volume was above 30 
billion HUF for 2003, meaning this subsidy represents more than 1/3 of total housing 
loan subsidies (see Figure 8.9).
Figure 8.10 
PIT deduction related to mortgage payment, 1999–2002
Figure 8.11 
Average size of PIT deduction by income 
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Figure 8.12
GINI-curb of subsidy allocation among households according to income groups 
Figure 8.13
Share of households who claim PIT deduction by income 
 
The subsidy is allocated regressively among income groups (see Figures 8.10–8.13). 
As a result of this distribution, the upper 20 percent income bracket claim 60 percent 
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they do not have accumulated capital in the form of a dwelling. Interestingly enough, 
the real situation is far better than indicated by the model. On one hand, our model used 
individual, “separate” households as a basis. In the case of real ﬁrst-time buyers, parental 
assistance is an important factor. As mentioned earlier, the role of intergenerational 
transfers is signiﬁcant in housing ﬁnance. It is known from the CSO housing study 
that somewhat more than 50 percent of parents over 50 had helped their children in 
some way to obtain an apartment. This means that in the case of 50 percent of ﬁrst-time 
buyers savings (and income as well) are complemented by parental assistance. It could 
be an important question as to how housing policy should treat this fact in principle 
and in practice when developing subsidy programs.
4. CONCLUSION: WAS THE MORTGAGE SUBSIDY NECESSARY 
 TO DEVELOP A MORTGAGE MARKET?
One of the key questions related to housing ﬁnance development in the region is whether 
subsidized mortgages are necessary to initiate substantial lending. Scholarship on housing 
policy suggests that the best strategy is to separate subsidies from market ﬁnance. The 
Hungarian case tends to support the view that a subsidy program is needed to launch 
signiﬁcant mortgage lending. Even if this is true, it is not clear how great and in what 
form subsidies must be to provide a real impetus to mortgage lending. 
Even the Hungarian case does not demonstrate clearly the need for subsidization 
instruments. The basic factors were macroeconomic: household income, expectations, 
etc. Some comparative housing indicators (housing investments, transactions, etc.) sug-
gest that the subsidy programs do not have major eﬀects on market “fundamentals.” In 
the evaluation of the outcome it is very important to take into account that households 
were bringing forward their decisions to move, but it is almost impossible to measure 
the real eﬀect.
The ﬁnancial community was very inﬂuential in forming an institutional structure 
for the housing ﬁnance system (two major latent interest groups were the “construction” 
lobby and the “ﬁnancial” lobby). An important factor in Hungary was the competitive-
ness of the market (banking sector reform and privatization). It is true even if the share 
of the OTP Bank, the biggest Hungarian bank, is 66 percent (see Figure 8.6). While still 
high, it has decreased signiﬁcantly (it used to be close to 90 percent). The “leading bank” 
had a huge impact on the formation of housing ﬁnance institutions (the signiﬁcance of 
the bausparkasse system and mortgage banks became evident after OTP stepped in).
However, it is unquestionable that the size of the subsidy was too high. On the basis 
of the household survey, we estimated the demand of the loan among the households 
who indicated the intention to move. The actual ﬁgures were 60–80 percent higher than 
our estimates. This means that households took loans in order to make investments.
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APPENDIX
PRINCIPAL TYPES OF HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN HUNGARY
In the text we already described three subsidies (two mortgage subsidies and tax allow-
ances) which are not included in the summary below.
Expenditure for the “Old” Fixed-rate Loan Stock 
Between 1971 and 1989 housing loans were ﬁxed rate with relatively low interest (3–3.5 
percent). The diﬀerence between the market rate and the low ﬁxed rate was ﬁnanced 
through retail banks by the central budget. In 1991 Parliament raised the interest rate 
of the old loans and oﬀered borrowers two options.
 1. They could choose the current market interest rate for their loan (32 percent 
at that time), and in this case their actual outstanding debt was reduced to half 
the real balance. The forgiven half of the debt was taken over by the central 
budget. In order to cover this amount the budget issued two types of government 
bonds. The capital and interest payment of these bonds was a heavy burden on 
the budget until 1998: the total cost of the bonds was 19 billion HUF. 
 2. Alternatively, borrowers could choose a preferential interest rate (15 percent at 
that time). The outstanding debt remained the same, but the central budget 
was obliged to pay the diﬀerence between the preferential interest rate and the 
market interest rate to housing ﬁnance banks. Expenditure in the central budget 
for this purpose was 4 billion HUF in 1993.
Beside these items local governments inherited “old loans” as well, which were used at 
the end of the 1980s for local programs. The diﬀerence between the ﬁxed rate (approxi-
mately 8 percent) and the market rate was paid by the budget. It was not a large item.
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Table 8.6 
Housing subsidies, 1998–2003
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Direct subsidies
Housing Construction Allowance 20.4 19.9 24.0 19.5 18.9 30.1
VAT allowance 0.2 1.9 5.0 5.9 6.4 9.0
Municipal rental capital grant 0.0 0.0 9.3 23.4 21.4 15.6
Municipal implicit rent program 22.5 22.8 24.6 27.2 27.1 23.4
Special targeted programs 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.6 4.2 1.2
Housing investment grant for the handicapped 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.3 3.1 2.8
Energy saving housing investment 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.5
Military/Police housing 3.2 3.3 4.7 6.0 5.7 5.9
Subtotal 49.6 51.5 71.6 87.2 87.6 88.6
Housing loan subsidies 
Subsidy to old loans 24.1 19.5 14.5 11.7 11.3 9.0
Repayment subsidy 8.0 7.2 6.0 5.4 4.1 1.1
Construction period loan subsidy 3.0 1.8 2.2 2.7 1.8 0.6
Demand-side mortgage subsidy 0.0 0.0 1.3 4.8 15.0 23.5
Funding-side mortgage subsidy 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 6.7 56.3
Contract savings subsidy 3.0 4.5 5.1 6.5 5.7 5.9
Subtotal 38.1 33.0 29.8 31.8 44.5 96.3
Tax expenditures
Housing savings subsidy 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
PIT tax allowance for mortgage payment 1.2 1.6 2.2 5.6 17.0 31.1
Duty tax subsidy 1.0 2.6 5.4 11.4 17.6 26.6
Subtotal 2.4 4.4 7.7 17.1 34.8 57.8
Grant total 90.2 88.9 109.1 136.1 166.8 242.7
As a % of GDP 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.7
Source: Hegedüs-Teller 2004.
Repayment Subsidy
The interest rate subsidy was changed to a subsidy for loan repayment between 1989 
and 1993. The preferential subsidy was available to families building or buying a new 
house or ﬂat and the magnitude of the subsidy depended on the number of the children. 
Since January 1994 the repayment subsidy has been available only in a very limited 
area; borrowers with a “Youth Savings Contract” could get a repayment subsidized loan 
for buying or building a new house. After 1994 the budget paid a subsidy equal to 4 
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percentage interest on credits drawn for construction or purchase of a new home during 
the ﬁrst ﬁve years of repayment, 3 percent during the second ﬁve years, and 1 percent 
during the third three years. To be eligible houses had to meet the same requirement as 
HCA: new units had to be within certain limits on the number of rooms and cost. This 
program was ceased in 2000, and was replaced by mortgage subsidies.
Interest Rate Subsidy for the Construction Period Loan
Preferential schemes were used for housing developers during the construction period. 
In cases where credit was repaid in one year the budget paid 75 percent of the interest, 
50 percent if repaid between 1 and 2 years. This program was replaced by mortgage 
subsidies. 
Value Added Tax Allowances
Until the end of 1994, 60 percent of the VAT paid for housing purposes was reimbursed, 
up to a total 400,000 HUF. The total amount of the VAT could be reimbursed if the 
VAT refund had already begun by the end of 1992.The VAT refund was abolished at 
the beginning of 1995 and reintroduced in 1999 with the same conditions: 60 percent 
of the VAT can be reimbursed up to 400,000 HUF.
Duty Tax Allowance
The rate of the transfer tax on housing sales depends on the purchase price; it is 2 percent 
up to 4 million and 6 percent for the part of the price above 4 million. The transfer tax 
for other real estate was 8 percent and increased to 10 percent. New units have been 
free from tax as of January 1, 2001. Young home buyers (under 35) have a 50 percent 
allowance up to 40,000 HUF buying units with a maximum value of 8 million HUF. 
Premium for Contract Savings 
The Law on Housing Savings Banks was passed in 1996. The government paid a premium 
of 30 percent of the money saved up to 36,000 HUF per year. The ceiling was increased 
in April 2003 to 72,000 HUF/year (moreover, condominiums, and maintenance coop-
eratives had a special ceiling depending on the number of units in a building).
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Housing Construction Allowance
The grant is available when a family constructs or buys a new housing unit; the magnitude 
of the grant depends on the number of children in the household. Families are qualiﬁed 
for subsidies if (1) at the moment of applying for the grant they have no dwelling of 
their own (they do not own and are not renting a state rental unit) and (2) the standard 
of the new home is below the centrally decided standard size and cost limit.
Beginning November 2001 households with 3 or more children have been eligi-
ble for 50 percent of HCA in the case of reconstruction or extension. From February 
2005, young households have become eligible for 50 percent of the HCA in the case 
of buying existing units. 
Table 8.7 
Changes in the magnitude of social policy allowance 
1993 Jan 1994 Nov 1994 Dec 2002 Apr 2004 Feb 2005
For the first child  50  50   200 500 800 900
For the second child 150 250 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,500
For the third child 400 600 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,400
For each additional child  50  50   200 500 800 800
Local Government Subsidies
Local government subsidies were developed based on the special local social subsidies 
which were ﬁrst established as early as 1983. These are interest free loans and grants not 
to be repaid. Local governments use their own free resources to cover the gap between 
the rent and the cost of the municipal housing units. 
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ENDNOTES
1 We are grateful to László Harmati for his comments on the paper.
2 Housing subsidies were not measured “systematically.” They contained budget subsidies and certain 
types of oﬀ-budget subsidies dictated by the interests of the policy regime. The calculation never 
included tax allowances in the PIT, or the implicit rent subsidies. 
3 There was a diﬀerence between the ﬁxed and variable rate of loans. In the case of the variable rate, 
the one-year government bond was the reference rate, in the case of the ﬁxed rate the ﬁve-year 
government bond was the reference rate.
4 The two programs can be combined. It means that subsidized resources through mortgage bonds 
can be used for the loan supporting new construction or purchase of newly built houses/ﬂats. As a 
consequence, the real interest rate could be negative. 
5 This is equal to 180 USD/year.
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6 DEM Oﬃce of Information and Economic Research LTD.
7 Projection made by the Ministry of Finance in October 2004.
8 After 1998 housing became a hot political issue. The leading political parties got into a “game” 
promising more and more support to the housing sector without understanding the ﬁscal and social 
consequences of the proposed programs. Thinktanks often supported by diﬀerent interest groups 
were indirectly interested in justifying the programs (they are typically “captured”—the culture of 
independent thinktank policy research is still immature). Probably this phenomenon is related to the 
“immature” public policy culture in these countries. It is partly related to the fact that the government 
does not have the capacity to predict the possible eﬀects of their policy, but the lack of a real interest 
in monitoring eﬀectiveness may even be more important. 
9  A report by the Hungarian National Bank in 2004 judged changes in the mortgage subsidy program 
in the spring of 2002 to be unsustainable, but this was not indicated in the Financial Report of 2002, 
which had a section on the role of housing. 
10 40% made major renewal (extension, refurbishing, upgrading comfort level, etc.), 46% basic 
maintenance (painting, etc.).
11 The decrease in real prices was a consequence of diminishing real household income and a shift in 
household portfolio decisions (Hegedüs-Várhegyi 2001). Housing privatization and the consolidation 
of old loans (which could be paid back at discount rates) could be other factors explaining the 
trends. 
12 The end of the 1980s saw an overinvestment in housing in the East European housing systems 
compared to the GDP (Hegedüs, Mayo and Tosics 1999). In Hungary, as a part of the structural 
adjustment, households used their equity to maintain their consumption in terms of direct downward 
moves in the housing market and in terms of postponing housing investments. Housing privatization 
itself did not play a determining role in this process; however, it made equity withdrawal easier. 
13 House price/income ratio (HP/I): The house price/income ratio is the most frequently applied 
indicator comparing the price (average or median) of a given ﬂat with the annual income of a given 
household (average or median). Housing aﬀordability index (HAI): The aﬀordable house price/
average house price ratio indicates what percentage of the value of an average home is the value of the 
home aﬀordable by way of a loan for which one with average income is eligible. The index compares 
the average household’s income to an “ideal income level,” which is high enough to purchase an 
average home. Typical loan criteria include 20% cash, 30% debt service/income ratio 25-year term. 
Housing opportunity index (HOI): The housing opportunity index indicates what percentage of the 
homes in a given market the average household is able to pay for. The values of the indicator are based 
on household survey data.
14 Aﬀordability indicators assumed an 80% LTV.
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 Housing Finance in Slovenia: 
 The Key Role of the National Housing Fund
 Andreja Cirman
 ABSTRACT
 The transition to a market economy has brought dramatic changes to the 
system of housing finance in Slovenia. In this period the National Housing 
Fund emerged as the most proactive institution in housing policy. Until 
recently the Fund has had a dominant position in the provision of hous-
ing loans for individuals and non-profit housing associations. With the 
structurally inhibited supply, this has resulted in a persistent increase in 
housing prices. 
  The development of mortgage financing and introduction of the Na-
tional Housing Savings Scheme made it possible for the Fund to withdraw 
from lending to individuals and concentrate on the supply side. Although 
the Scheme was not flexible enough for the dynamic transitional environ-
ment, its introduction seemed relatively reasonable in 1999, and had an 
important role in transforming the way the housing policy intervened on 
the housing market. However, its terms in the current time only distort the 
market. Therefore, no new tender for the Scheme took place since 2003 
and the provision of housing finance is now in the hands of the banking 
sector. Today, the Fund operates as a provider of financial resources mainly 
for the non-profit sector and as an investor in housing—in order to boost 
housing construction. 
  In the future the government should restrict its position in allowing 
mortgage interest rate deduction or the subsidization of specific groups 
of potential homeowners, and support the secondary market with relevant 
legislation and necessary instruments. The Fund could find its role as an 
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important player on the as yet undeveloped secondary mortgage market 
and in the provision of non-profit housing. It should also withdraw from 
construction and establish itself as a promoter of quality and sustainable 
housing construction.
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Housing Finance in Slovenia: 
The Key Role of the National Housing Fund
Andreja Cirman
INTRODUCTION
The transition to a market economy has brought dramatic changes to the system of 
housing ﬁnance in Slovenia. The swift turn from an approach to housing based on 
providing to an approach based on enabling resulted in a total withdrawal of the state 
from the system of housing ﬁnance in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. In the absence of a 
well-deﬁned housing policy and with a slowly developing system of mortgage ﬁnancing, 
the Housing Fund of the Republic of Slovenia (known as the National Housing Fund) 
emerged as the most proactive institution in Slovenian housing policy. In this article 
we shall deal with the development of housing ﬁnance in Slovenia with an emphasis 
on the role of the National Housing Fund. 
1. THE SLOVENIAN HOUSING MARKET 
Slovenia has a population of 1.964 million, with 684,847 households and 777,772 dwell-
ings—of which only 665,111 are occupied (Census Data 2002). The introduction of a 
market economy in the housing sector meant the introduction of extensive reforms in 
housing policy. In the process of privatizing socially owned dwellings in the early 90s some 
66,000 social housing units were sold and with this sale the rental tenure was reduced from 
31 percent in 1991 to 11 percent in 1993 (Hribar 1994; Žnidaršič and Hribar 1995). By 
2002, the rental sector was reduced to 10 percent (7 percent of social rental tenure and 3 
percent of private rental tenure). The proceeds from privatization were distributed as such: 
10 percent to the Restitution Fund, 20 percent to the Housing Fund and 70 percent to 
previous owners of the social housing stock (ﬁrms and municipalities). 
Reforms have also led to the disappearance of some mechanisms previously contrib-
uting to the maintenance of a relatively stable housing supply. In the past new dwellings 
were almost of exclusively of two types. Apartment blocks in urban areas were ﬁnanced 
by earmarked payroll taxation and distributed partly by local government and partly by 
employers (enterprises and other institutions) to their employees, who became tenants in 
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those dwellings.  Some units were also sold on the market by construction companies. 
The purchase of those units was predominantly ﬁnanced by loans that were distributed 
by employees and usually carried a negative interest rate. The second type of construc-
tion comprised privately ﬁnanced individual houses. This was also partly ﬁnanced by 
favorable company loans, together with private savings, commercial loans, and through 
self-construction (Lavrač and Verlič-Christensen 1996). 
New housing construction almost came to a halt after 1991 due to new regulations 
that abolished the system of ﬁnancing of new public housing in the form of ﬁnancial 
contributions from the salaries of employees and enterprise proﬁts. Lack of ﬁnancing 
accompanied with high nominal interest rates due to high inﬂation accompanied with 
high real interest rate in the banking sector, lack of building land due to restitution, 
and long and complicated building procedures have aﬀected construction activity most 
severely. However, the rate of housing built by individual families and households has 
more or less retained its pre-transition level, since such housing has always been pre-
dominantly constructed on individual family initiatives (Sendi 1999). 
Figure 9.1 
Dwellings completed in the 1975–2000 period
Source: Statistical Oﬃce of the Republic of Slovenia, 2003.
On the other hand, the demand for housing was stimulated by macroeconomic sta-
bilization with decreasing inﬂation and interest rates, a growing number of households, 
loan disbursements by the National Housing Fund and development in the banking 
sector. This resulted in a strong increase in housing prices. Prices in the capital city of 
Ljubljana (denominated in EUR) grew on average by 4 to 7 percent per year in the 
1996–2003 period; however some halt in growth occurred after the introduction of 
the National Housing Savings Scheme (ﬁrst release occurred in July 1999, followed by 
regular annual releases), because over the 2000–2003 period the favorable terms of the 
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scheme kept the money out of the housing market. The situation in the market could 
also be illustrated by the fact that every time a tender for favorable interest rate housing 
loans at the National Housing Fund was successfully completed, the inﬂow of money 
caused an evident increase in housing prices. In comparison to other transition countries, 
Slovenia has one of the highest cost-to-income levels for newly constructed dwellings in 
Europe. The median house-price-to-income ratio is 7.0 (Pichler-Milanovič, 2001).
Figure 9.2 
House prices in Ljubljana, 1995–2004
Source: Slonep 2004.1
2. THE NATIONAL HOUSING FUND BEFORE 2002
The Slovenian Housing Fund was founded by the government in 1991 on the basis of 
the Housing Act. Its initial sphere of activity was to support the construction, renovation, 
and maintenance of housing by oﬀering long-term housing loans on favorable terms 
to households and to non-proﬁt housing organizations. With a capital of 60.9 billion 
tolars (EUR 264.5 million) in 2002, the fund is one of the biggest ﬁnancial institutions 
and the most important housing institution in Slovenia.
According to the Housing Act, the fund is entitled to receive 20 percent of the rev-
enue from the sale of the socially rented dwellings. Although the state is legally obliged 
to ﬁnancially support the National Housing Fund (NHF), the ﬁrst transfer of funds 
from the central government budget was received as late as in 1995. From 1995 to 1999 
the state annually strengthened the NHF capital base in the range between EUR 5 to 10 
million. Since these funds were not suﬃcient for exercising all the activities, the manage-
ment of the NHF decided to raise some additional funds by issuing debentures. 
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In 1995, the NHF issued the ﬁrst series of housing fund debentures. The main 
characteristic of this ﬁrst issue was that the securities were given to individuals instead 
of housing loans to be used as a means of payment for housing. Construction com-
panies were supposed to receive these securities instead of cash when selling housing. 
The second and third series of debentures followed in 1998 and 2001. They were sold 
to the public and the income generated was entirely designated for disbursing loans to 
individuals. 
With its lending activity in the nineties the fund contributed to the demand as 
well as supply side of the housing market. On the demand side it used the funds to 
disburse low interest rate loans to households. In 1995, the interest rate in real terms for 
those loans was 3 percent, in comparison with the average banking interest rate of 12.8 
percent. The last tenders were carried out in 2001 and 2002, with a real interest rate of 
1.75 to 2.25 percent and a maturity of 10 to 20 years. The amount received depended 
on the size of the household and income. Special groups, such as young households and 
disabled people were treated preferentially.2 
Similar to banking practices, the loan could be insured by a mortgage, guarantors, 
or an insurance company. The loans were granted by public tenders that were usually 
heavily oversubscribed. Therefore, a proportional reduction of requested amounts was 
necessary. The use of loan proceeds was limited to housing with no limitation to the 
size or price. However, each tender was limited to a certain use of the loan proceeds, 
for example renovation, construction, and purchase. Before 2002 the NHF managed 
to carry out 24 tenders for low interest rate loans to households in an amount totaling 
almost EUR 300 million. 
The National Housing Fund also tried to stimulate the supply of non-proﬁt rental 
housing. After privatization, the Slovenian housing market suﬀered a severe shortage 
of aﬀordable rental housing. The tenure structure reveals a high homeownership rate, 
with only 7 percent of households in the socially rented sector and 3 percent in privately 
rented accommodation, concentrated mostly in larger towns (Statistical Oﬃce 2003). 
However, due to the institutional arrangement of non-proﬁt rental housing provision 
with low rents that were highly regulated and the poor capital base of housing associa-
tions, the demand for NHF’s loans by non-proﬁt housing associations is relatively low. 
In the period from 1991 to 2002 the fund carried out eight tenders and distributed 
EUR 55.6 million in loans. By the end of nineties the loans carried a real interest rate 
of 1.95 to 2.25 percent, with a maturity of 25 years.
In this period the fund was also active in the reconstruction after the Posočje earth-
quake. It distributed 1381 loans on favorable terms to households and started to build 
rental units suitable for the elderly.
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3. HOUSING LOANS OFFERED BY THE BANKING SECTOR
In the past as well as at the present, there has been no speciﬁc banking institution in 
Slovenia that has specialized in housing ﬁnance, though most of them oﬀer housing loans 
as one of their ﬁnancial products. Mortgage lending, in the sense of house-purchase loans 
secured on the dwellings themselves, was introduced in Slovenia only in 1997. Prior 
to that, housing loans were secured by guarantors or insured by insurance companies. 
Housing loans in Slovenia amounted to some EUR 950 million in 2001. Commercial 
and savings banks and the National Housing Fund shared the market in a relation of 
approximately 2:1. 
Unfortunately, mortgage loans at the end of the nineties played a smaller role in housing 
ﬁnance than they did in more developed ﬁnancial systems. Banks mostly preferred insur-
ance policies as collateral, since possession in the case of borrower default was a lengthy 
and diﬃcult procedure (it still takes a minimum of two years). This results in high up-front 
costs with loan closing costs up to 5% of the loan amount. Loans secured on insurance 
are limited to ten years, because insurers do not issue insurance for longer periods. 
The typical mortgage in Slovenia in the nineties was a ten-year repayment mortgage. 
The short mortgage term was the result of the relatively high nominal interest rate, which 
made long-term mortgages relatively unattractive. Most mortgages were oﬀered with 
interest rates that were ﬁxed above the level of inﬂation. The typical LTV ratio was quite 
conservative, at 50 percent, and the income criteria applied by lenders limited mortgage 
repayments to no more than 1/3 of the borrower’s disposable income. Because of the 
country’s high housing prices and the loan-to-income ratio, borrowers were rarely in a 
position to borrow even as much as 50 percent of the purchase price. 
The situation today is similar, except that the reduction in the rate of inﬂation and 
in interest rates has prolonged the average loan maturity to some 15 years and the LTV 
ratio is now 60 to 70 percent. With foreign, mainly Austrian banks entering the Slov-
enian market, the competition has somehow increased, although their market shares in 
the nineties and in early years of the new millennium were still small.
4. CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The housing situation—with low aﬀordability of housing due to rising housing pric-
es—called for changes in housing policy at the end of the nineties. The challenges for 
the Housing Fund were how to assure further access to aﬀordable lending and how to 
stimulate supply and assure aﬀordable housing. In order to achieve this, two new instru-
ments were introduced. In 1999 the National Housing Savings Scheme was introduced, 
and in 2001 the National Housing Fund was transformed to a real estate fund, enabling 
it to invest in the provision of housing. 
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In March 1999 the Slovenian government adopted the National Housing Sav-
ings Scheme as a tool for promoting long-term saving, including premium granting, 
and with the purpose of increasing the supply of aﬀordable long-term housing loans. 
The Scheme was modeled on the Austrian bausparkassen system. It consisted of 5- and 
10-year savings contracts with a selected commercial bank. The interest rate for the 
5-year contract is TOM3 + 1.65% and TOM + 3% for the second type of contract. With the 
5-year contract, every 12 months the government grants a “13th month amount premium,” 
meaning an 8.33 percent annual savings. The 10-year contract entitles the saver to a pre-
mium of 10.42 percent of annual savings. After the period of contractual saving the savers 
participating in this scheme can obtain a favorable housing loan. The banks are obliged to 
provide savers with a loan which must be at least double the sum they have managed to save. 
With the 10-year contract the saver can obtain a 20-year loan with a pre-ﬁxed interest rate of 
TOM+3.8 percent. The 5-year contract gives the saver the right to the 10-year loan and the 
interest rate is 2.45 percent per annum. For NHSS loans, banks are not allowed to charge 
additional costs for granting the loan and for its administration. The right to a housing loan 
is transferable not only to spouses or partners, but also to children and grandchildren. The 
loan proceeds must be spent on housing in a period of one year after the savings period is 
over. However, the use of proceeds from savings is not limited to housing.
Contracts on savings within the NHSS began on July 1, 1999. With the limited 
amount of subsidy the number of available contracts was limited. The ﬁrst issue of NSVS 
with almost 23,000 contracts was “sold out” in a week.  By the end of 2003, 82,644 
contracts had been concluded, the majority of them for a period of ﬁve years. 
The NHSS instrument was introduced in order to force banks towards a more 
competitive approach to housing ﬁnance. According to the survey, conducted in 
1999 for the Ministry of Finance, foreign consultants highlighted several speciﬁcs of 
the Slovenian mortgage banking system. They noted that there was actually no true 
system of mortgage ﬁnance in Slovenia, since only a low proportion of housing 
loans was secured by mortgages. High real interest rates of around 6 percent 
in 1999 enabled banks to charge relatively high interest margins. The closing 
costs amounted to 3 to 5 percent of the loan amount. For the funding of housing 
loans, which typically have maturities between 10 and 20 years, Slovenian lenders rely 
primarily on savings deposits of up to 1-year maturity. With this structure of funding 
the interest rate risk for Slovenian lenders is relatively high. 
At the time of introduction the NHSS was a very competitive product. While the 
eﬀective interest rate (interest rate earned after the premium) was comparable to the 
interest rates of other banking products, the interest rate on loans was less than half of 
the interest rates charged by banks for their loans (see Table 9.1). Therefore it came as 
no surprise that 22,800 people entered into the ﬁrst scheme, and since the government 
maximized the yearly grants, the available amount of savings contracts at each subscrip-
tion was reached within a few weeks. 
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Table 9.1 
The National Housing Savings Scheme vs. bank loans
Banks NHF4
Interest rate 5.8% 2.45%
Funding up to 1 year maturity with NHSS 5–10 year deposits
Interest rate margin approx. 2–3% 0.8%
Closing costs Yes No
Maturity 10–20 10–20
Loan insurance same instruments
Due to its attractive features, a high amount of money started to pour into the NHSS. 
According to surveys conducted by the NHF over 80 percent of savers that entered the 
contracts in 1999 expressed the intention of taking out a loan after the saving period. 
This was expected to activate around 100 billion tolars (about EUR 420 million) in a 
period of one year, which is 10 to 20 times the amount of the loans disbursed by the 
NHF on the basis of an average tender. Therefore, there was a reasonable fear that this 
amount of money would lead to a housing market bubble in 2004 and probably result 
in a liquidity shock within banks. Consequently, the government was forced to take 
serious measures on the supply side of the market, otherwise all of the eﬀect of subsidies 
would diminish and end in proﬁts on the supply side of the market. 
The government reacted with two sets of measures. On the one hand it ﬁnally 
implemented long neglected reforms in spatial planning and real estate market regula-
tion in order to speed up new construction. On the other hand the government, as 
the owner of the National Housing Fund, transformed the institution to a real estate 
fund. With the introduction of the NHSS, the fund was also able to withdraw from 
lending activities to households. This enabled the NHF to free some of its capital for 
other purposes. This capital, and the status of the real estate fund, made it possible for 
the fund to enter the housing market as an investor and ﬁnance new construction, in 
order to build up a new supply of housing with aﬀordable prices.
In 2001, the fund entered into 41 joint construction projects with 36 municipalities. 
This resulted in over 500 new non-proﬁt rental units, while an additional 100 units were 
sold on the market. The second round of joint projects with municipalities that took 
place in 2004 is expected to result in an additional 650 rental units and 200 units for 
sale. By buying large quantities of newly constructed dwellings the fund also managed 
to attain favorable prices, and in 2003 sold 429 apartments in the expensive capital city 
and coastal area. The prices were in the range of EUR 1,100 to EUR 1,300 per square 
meter, some 20 percent below the prevalent market price. Through the acquisition of 
218
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I I I  • •  C A S E  S T U D I E S — T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
land the fund also ﬁnanced new construction that resulted in 852 dwellings, with the 
same price range that came to the market in Ljubljana and the coastal area this year. 
The Housing Fund has also bought larger quantities of land and plans for an additional 
5,000 apartments to enter the market by 2007.
On the other hand, the macroeconomic situation also meant that no major liquid-
ity shock took place. Ongoing macroeconomic stabilization, the intention of entering 
European Monetary Union by 2007 and, above all, decreasing interest rate trends on 
worldwide ﬁnancial markets, have resulted in the fact that by 2004 the housing loans 
oﬀered by the banking sector5 are competitive enough to keep reducing the number of 
savers that are actually exercising the right of low interest rate loans. 
Figure 9.3 
Average banking interest rate on housing loans and 1-year deposits
Source: Bank of Slovenia Bulletin 2004. 
5. CONCLUSION
The ﬁrst privatization that took place in Slovenia was the privatization of social housing in 
1991. But after that the government put housing on the backburner for almost a decade. 
In this period the Housing Fund emerged as the only real actor in the housing sector. 
With strong leadership, it acted proactively most of the time. Until recently the fund has 
had a dominant position in the provision of housing loans for individuals and non-proﬁt 
housing associations. With a structurally inhibited supply, this has resulted in a persistent 
increase in housing prices. The development of mortgage ﬁnancing in Slovenia made it 
possible for the fund to withdraw from lending to individuals and step over to the supply 
side. Today it operates as a provider of ﬁnancial resources mainly for the non-proﬁt sector 
and as an investor in housing—in order to boost housing construction. 
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This switch was very much facilitated by the introduction of the National Housing 
Savings Scheme. Upon its introduction the design of the scheme seemed very shortsighted. 
The terms of the scheme attracted many people to enter contracts and a resulting price bub-
ble and liquidity crisis in 2004 seemed highly probable. However, it brought the necessary 
pressure to force the government to rethink its lack of policy with only minor measures 
that as a rule boosted the demand side of the market and resulted in higher prices. A new 
legislative framework improved functioning of the land market,6 shortened bureaucratic 
procedures, and further developed mortgage ﬁnancing that were also beneﬁcial to the 
construction industry. With favorable macroeconomic trends the outcome in terms of 
housing prices is probably not much diﬀerent to what would have happened if the lack 
of policy had been maintained.7 But there is an important diﬀerence—infrastructure has 
improved and the Housing Fund has emerged as a strong player on the supply side of 
the market—therefore improving the outlook for future development.
The changed macroeconomic environment also changed the features of the scheme. 
Once attractive due to its favorable interest rates on loans, it attracted people who wanted 
to spend proceeds on housing. In 2004 the terms are no longer so advantageous on the 
borrowing side, while the savings interest rate has become extremely appealing for inves-
tors. Since the use of savings proceeds is not restricted to housing, the government could 
end up in the position that it no longer subsidizes housing but all sorts of other invest-
ments. Therefore, no tender for the National Housing Savings Scheme has taken place 
since 2003. 
The most probable future scenario is that the instrument will gradually fade away. 
The banking sector is already quite competitive and by entering the European Monetary 
Union in 2007 the banking system will face even stronger competition and probably 
become the prevalent provider of housing ﬁnance products. Although the National 
Housing Saving Scheme seemed reasonable, at the turn of the millennium and had an 
important role in transforming the way the housing policy intervened on the housing 
market, its terms in recent times only distort the market. With the banking sector of-
fering housing loans with maturity up to 30 years, it seems unreasonable to promote 
ex-ante saving (through subsidization in the savings period) instead of  increasing the 
aﬀordability and enabling earlier transition to homeownership by ex-post saving through 
competitive housing loans oﬀered by banks.
In the future it would be reasonable for the government to restrict its position 
to allowing mortgage interest rate deduction or subsidize speciﬁc groups of potential 
homeowners and support secondary market with relevant legislation and necessary 
instruments. However, for a more eﬃcient mortgage market the government will have 
to speed up foreclosure procedures in order to allow full development of the mortgage 
ﬁnance market.  While for the fund, one of the possible scenarios is that it will operate 
as an important player on the not-yet developed secondary mortgage market and in 
the provision of non-proﬁt housing. It should deﬁnitely withdraw from its activities as 
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an investor on the homeownership part of the market. On one hand, the present high 
homeownership rate does not support strong subsidization of this sector, while on the 
other hand, NHF investment activities (NHF being a part of the public sector) seriously 
distort the market for new construction. In its new strategy the fund should also aim 
to establish itself as an important promoter of quality and environmentally sustainable 
solutions in housing construction.
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ENDNOTES
1 On the Slovenian real estate web page, Slonep gathers information on asked prices from newspaper 
and web advertisements and provides data on average prices per quarter.
2 Criteria for loan distribution were set by the National Housing Fund.
3 TOM is an interest rate used as a proxy for inﬂation. It is set by the Bank of Slovenia on the basis of 
average inﬂation in the preceeding three months.
4 Conditions for the prevalent 5-year contract. 
5 Especially loans in euros and based on EURIBOR oﬀered by foreign banks were very competitive 
due to the low EURIBOR.
6 However, one of the most important instruments for eﬃcient land policy—the introduction of 
property taxation—was postponed until 2007. 
7 Figure 8.2 shows a high increase in asked prices in the last year. Still, according to real estate brokers, 
this also reﬂects increased expectations on the sellers’ side, fuelled by the NHSS. As a rule those 
expectations are rarely realized. 
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 The Long-lasting Impacts of Earlier Housing Policies 
 on Housing Finance in Romania 
 Ileana Budisteanu
 ABSTRACT
 Through mass-privatization in the early 90s Romania became a super-homeowner-
ship country with over 97% of the stock in owner-occupancy. Government policies 
and programs of the 1990s were dominated by a strong bias toward owner-
occupancy, laissez-faire in the existing stock, and neglect of the development of 
a proper rental sector. Dissatisfaction with the quality of the existing housing and 
changing housing consumption models built up demand in the housing sector. 
But affordability and access to housing were constrained both by macroeconomic 
volatility and by restricted options and immobility in the existing stock.
  The positive economic development that started in 2000 energized a rapidly 
developing credit infrastructure. Recent development shows a promising mixture 
of specialized institutions and instruments co-existing and competing in a process 
of evolution. The expanding mortgage market still needs more legal and organi-
zational measures to become supportive of a well-functioning housing finance 
sector.
   The contention of this chapter is that the late start of the mortgage market 
in Romania can be retraced to the housing policies of the early 1990s, which had 
long-lasting impacts on the whole housing system.
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The Long-lasting Impacts of Earlier Housing 
Policies on Housing Finance in Romania
Ileana Budisteanu
INTRODUCTION
In response to Mark Stephen’s previous essay on housing ﬁnance, this section examines 
the relationship between housing policy and housing ﬁnance in the evolution of the 
housing system over the last ﬁfteen years in Romania. Speciﬁcally, we will look at the 
ways in which the housing policies in 1990s Romania succeeded or failed to develop a 
housing ﬁnance supportive of a well-functioning housing sector. 
The ﬁrst part of the paper outlines the wide and long-lasting consequences of priva-
tization. The second part is a review of government policies and programs in the 1990s 
which aimed at improving the aﬀordability of housing. The last part is devoted to the 
recent development of mortgage ﬁnance and its expected impact on the housing sec-
tor. The conclusions of the paper emphasize the role early policies have had in the slow 
development of a housing ﬁnance market. We conclude that the right mix of policies, 
their timeliness, and their degree of coherence exert a long-term inﬂuence on the entire 
housing system, which cannot be corrected in the short-term.
1. PRIVATIZATION IN THE 1990s AND THE EMERGENCE 
 OF A HOUSING MARKET
The words “housing crisis” were heard in Romania repeatedly over the past decade. As 
a result of wide-scale privatization, Romania became a nation of homeowners with 97 
percent of the existing stock in owner-occupation. Divestment in new production and 
rehabilitation, high utility costs, and lack of aﬀordability induced the overall perception 
of a housing crisis.
The two phenomena that dominated the housing sector over the last decade were:
 • massive privatization followed by accelerated decay of the privatized housing 
stock
 • aﬀordability for “young households”—the main target of government policies 
and programs.
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Government policies and programs were contradictory: a generally laissez-faire 
attitude toward existing housing stock amidst strongly ownership-oriented, govern-
ment-supported programs.
The housing system inherited by Romania in 1989 from the former socialist regime 
had many common features with other Eastern European housing systems. However, 
soon after 1990 Romania’s housing sector gained a particular feature through rapid 
privatization—the homeownership rate jumped to over 90 percent, reaching 97 percent 
by 2000. Though this ﬁgure also includes the not fully accounted for private rental in 
owner-occupied stock (estimated at 3–4 percent), it situates Romania among “super-
homeownership” countries.1
With a population of 21.69 million inhabitants, Romania has a sizeable housing 
stock of about 8.11 million units. In the strictly numerical sense, the existing stock would 
seem adequate. As indicated by the last census—of March 2002—the number of dwell-
ings exceeded by 9 percent the number of households (though a large part of the so-called 
vacancies represent secondary dwellings mostly for recreational purposes). Meanwhile, 
the quantitative indicators of the stock improved slowly but steadily over the decade.
Far from jumping to the conclusion that the existing stock is satisfactory, a closer 
look at its tenure structure, the physical condition of the dwellings, and the evolution 
of households leads to a gloomier picture. Though multifamily structures account for 
only 39 percent of the whole stock, in urban areas apartments in blocks of ﬂats represent 
71 percent of all dwellings. Poor initial construction and long deferred maintenance 
and repair have led to the early and rapid aging of the buildings, visible both outside 
(on façades) and inside (poor thermal insulation, obsolete technical equipment, leak-
ing roofs, etc.). Obviously, these blocks of ﬂats are in urgent need of major repair and 
rehabilitation. A great concern is also the consolidation of some hundred pre-war 
high-rise buildings in Bucharest, which were damaged by three major earthquakes in 
the last three decades.
Wholesale privatization induced a misleading perception, which pervaded all housing 
issues during the ﬁrst phase of transition, that access to homeownership should be the 
prevailing type of tenure (if possible in a quasi-free way such as privatization). Despite 
its initial beneﬁts, drawbacks soon surfaced. Fifteen years later, both home-owning 
families and authorities are looking for ways to cope with the consequences of mass 
privatization. The almost total transfer of the public stock to private ownership resulted 
in more than one distortion in the housing system.
First, most owner-occupiers cannot meet the maintenance and refurbishment costs 
of their deteriorating dwellings, costs which are compounded by soaring utility fees. 
New housing consumption models and the upward ﬁltering of high-income owner-
occupiers further contribute to the deterioration of the existing stock. For those left 
behind the burden of maintaining and up-grading their housing became even further 
beyond their means.
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Second, authorities were left with a negligible residual public stock; they cannot 
cope with the most urgent social needs or provide alternative permanent housing in 
cases of eviction or natural disasters. Third, development of a proper rental sector was 
neglected. Those in need have to turn to private rentals that have developed in the 
owner-occupied sector and pay, more often than not, a speculative price (which runs 
from USD 250–300 and up for a standard two-room unit). Moreover, privatization 
also proved counter-productive to the economic objectives of the government2 for labor 
mobility: there was no elasticity in housing options, with over 90 percent of households 
captive in their privatized units; those ﬁnding a job in another city could not move out 
of their unit and ﬁnd aﬀordable housing there. After 15 years, ownership of privatized 
dwellings still continues to distort consumption decisions in the direction of consumer 
goods and immobility. 
It is obvious that a large part of the existing stock built in the last forty years in 
multifamily structures but also most of the traditional buildings in central urban areas 
could not be written oﬀ overnight. The rapidly depreciating asset value of this stock is still 
unaccounted for. 
Intervention in the existing stock would imply a combination of approaches—from 
refurbishment to rehabilitation, demolition, and recycling—all of which need appropri-
ate legal and institutional backing. Rehabilitation would not only increase supply in the 
existing stock, but would also avoid social tensions that are already building up.
One of the main beneﬁts of privatization was the rapid development of a hous-
ing market in the early 90s, the emergence of a ﬂuid real estate market, mainly in 
the existing stock. Over the whole decade, prices for existing units hovered around 
USD10,000–15,000 for typical standard 2-room units.
The advent of the Euro in 2000 and the improvement of the economic environment 
were followed by four years of steep price increases:3 house prices reached unprecedented 
levels in 2003 and the trend continued in 2004. By early 2005 prices have trebled (due 
also to the overvaluation of units in order to obtain larger housing loans).
In terms of housing need there is neither demographic pressure nor a severe over-
crowding problem in the existing stock. On one hand, demographic projections indicate 
that Romania’s population will shrink considerably over the next decades. Family size is 
also expected to diminish due to population aging and changes in social patterns.  On 
the other hand, housing consumption has slowly but steadily increased during the past 
decade. However, housing need is certainly driven by the need to replace and upgrade 
existing units, especially in some urban areas, especially large residential areas with 
multifamily structures and in the old city centers. 
Potential demand reﬂects the changing housing consumption models but is mostly 
fueled by dissatisfaction with the quality of the existing stock, especially as it is degrading 
steadily due to the long deferred upgrading and modernization. 
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As concerns young adults’ diﬃculties to accede to the market—theirs is the ﬁrst 
generation confronted with a market, not having beneﬁted from the windfalls of pri-
vatization. They ﬁnd it hard to come to terms with a situation where the only viable 
option is to buy.
Eﬀective demand includes a variety of strategies based on size and quality criteria: 
trade-ups, extensions, refurbishments. For most the 1990s demand was restricted both by 
income-related factors—low wages, no access to housing ﬁnance, and high and volatile 
interest rates—and non-income-related factors—preferences for other consumer goods 
(cars, household appliances, etc.). 
Prices and Affordability
The macro-economic environment and the lack of housing ﬁnance were the main culprits 
rightly incriminated for aﬀordability problems during the 1990s. Declining wages and 
the reluctance of banking institutions to issue long-term loans contributed to aﬀord-
ability problems and to the late start of an active housing ﬁnance sector.
As construction costs went up just as steeply as the prices of existing units after year 
2000, preferences shifted more and more to single family houses whose price equals 
that of a centrally located apartment. Increase in demand for land and the scarcity of it 
in urban areas pushed prices higher. 
It is common practice to hoard agricultural land at the outskirts of cities for a few 
cents/m2, hold it while it gains urban status, then sell it after servicing for speculative 
prices of up to USD 150–350/m2. A speculative land market is also developing in rela-
tion to construction of shopping malls and major infrastructure (pushing the price of 
land up by 50–100 percent).
Generally the current price structure reﬂects market conditions, i.e., large varia-
tions in location and quality. In Bucharest, prices currently range from USD1,200/m2 
in fashionable areas to USD 350/m2 and up if building through the National Housing 
Agency (NHA). An old pre-WWII townhouse fetches USD 100,000–150,000 and a 
centrally located modest “villa” goes for USD 800,000. Units in multifamily standard 
structures sell for USD 25,000–30,0004 (for a studio) up to USD 30,000–45,000 (for 
a 2-room apartment). 
The up-scale market, the most active sections, for both new construction and refur-
bishments, caters mainly for top executives, investors (for resale), multinationals, and a 
relatively small number of upper-middle income families. Construction of new housing 
is currently aﬀordable for families with an annual income of over USD 150,000. Analysts 
say that if demand would quickly absorb the existing supply, developers would build 
expensive housing. The next medium- and long-term goal is “building for the middle 
class,” targeting up-and-coming families with an income of USD 80,000–150,000.
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With inﬂation falling (to14.1 percent in 2003 and 9 percent in 2004) and banks 
lowering the spread between deposit-rates and lending-rates (currently hovering around 
10–15 percent), aﬀordability is enlarging. However, households with median income 
can generally aﬀord only smaller rehabilitation loans. Buying existing standard units is 
aﬀordable to households with an annual income of over USD 10,000.
Predictions as to the evolution of prices are contradictory. In some analysts’ view, 
the market has come to saturation; prices are expected to fall by 2006, when housing 
sold in 1996 to sitting tenants through restitution come on the market.5 Others think 
prices will continue to increase due to the scarcity of land in urban areas.
2. HOUSING POLICIES 
Considering housing policies in light of tenure structure and access to housing, we 
refer to policies of early transition which advocated for a free market in the housing 
sector, where supply and demand would adjust freely to meet various needs without 
the intervention of  authorities and institutions. Due to general hardships during the 
early years of transition, with (statistically) everybody housed, housing policies stayed 
on the backburner for most of the 1990s.
Throughout the 1990s the main aim of government policies and programs at 
the national level was to reduce the gap between market house prices and family 
incomes, especially by granting access to home-ownership for young individuals 
and families. Programs were dominated by two major issues: complete the unﬁnished 
stock from the 1980s6 and build new housing for young individuals and households. 
A number of small-size programs were devised to this end. Young households 
(under 35) were oﬀered ﬁxed-rate loans to purchase their ﬁrst dwelling from among 
unﬁnished units. The loans were disbursed by the State Savings and Deposit Bank and 
a state subsidy covered the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed rate and the adjustable market-
rate charged by the bank. The minimum down-payment of 30 percent was also 
covered by a budget grant. The program was operational between 1997 and 1999. 
It had to be stopped in 1999 when public expenditures soared. Other programs 
included: settling-grants for white collar employees moving to rural areas, granting 
free plots of land in villages, etc.
As by law housing provision is the responsibility of local governments and a con-
siderable share of local budgets is dedicated to “housing-related” expenditure. The term 
designates expenditures which include winter subsidies for utility payment as well as 
construction of general infrastructure—paving roads, building basic infrastructure and 
public utilities in rural areas, implementing land registration, etc. 
Direct housing support was ﬁnanced or co-ﬁnanced from the state budget, e.g., 
housing loan interest subsidies (see above), subsidies for a very small number of social 
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housing units, for the unﬁnished buildings, and for consolidating properties damaged 
by previous earthquakes.
Direct investment in public rental and social housing has been kept at a negligible 
level up to now. This was due both to the scarcity of funds and to the received wisdom 
that there was no actual need for more “social housing”—a term that came to (pejora-
tively) signify the entire multifamily stock built in the last 40 years (though in fact this 
stock contains a rather wide diversity of quality and location). Nonetheless, the issue 
of public (social) housing became topical in recent years due to the growing number of 
evictions (for large utility payment arrears, but also due to the repossession of dwellings 
by former owners) and the prospects of emergency situations (earthquakes, ﬂoods).
The major government program of the last decade was the creation of the National 
Housing Agency (NHA) in 1999 with the aim to re-launch new housing construction 
and grant access to ﬁrst-time buyers, especially young households. The NHA’s scheme 
started on the basis of an international credit granted to the government and transferred 
to the agency as a budget allocation. The agency managed to keep prices lower through 
subsidies that came in the form of up-front budget allocation and the contribution of 
local governments with serviced plots of land free of charge. 
The agency acts both as a developer and a funding institution.7 Beneﬁciaries are 
households selected according to a number of criteria (among which being under 35 
and able to repay the debt rank the highest).
Another line of activity of the agency is that of a creditor for selected applicants. 
Legislation adopted in 1999 enabled the agency to grant mortgage loans from its own 
resources to investors (individuals and legal entities) and to general contractors
The program is basically a “government-run, build-and-sell program”—dwelling 
prices are set by the NHA at a lower level due to land leased free of charge for the life 
of the construction. However, the NHA was the ﬁrst institution to promote housing 
mortgage ﬁnance through selected banks that originate mortgage-loans and retain the 
administration of the mortgages.
Over the last couple of years the NHA embarked on a more diverse set of programs, 
which also include the construction of rental and social housing.8 It even envisages a 
“phasing out” of its current program of build-and-sell, by selling out its portfolio and 
reshuﬄing to building-for-rental at moderate rents and social housing.
The activity of the NHA met with mixed feelings both from specialists and the 
general population. With its strong focus on access to home-ownership and its initial 
success the NHA program further strengthened the perception that owner-occupancy 
should be the main way to accede to a dwelling. Early success in delivering on its objec-
tives reinforced the tendency to believe that such an agency working through market 
mechanisms is the only way to address housing problems. Yet, in mid-term, the agency 
failed to reach down to its main target-group, i.e., middle-income young households 
in need of a dwelling.
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On the other hand, some critics8 saw in the program the risk of channeling 
substantial public funds from municipalities to the construction of housing-related 
infrastructure. With growing demand and restricted supply of serviced land, costs and 
prices are expected to increase. The NHA housing construction program succeeded in 
avoiding these problems so far, only because the subsidy takes the form of free access 
to land for development. Furthermore, the beneﬁts accruing to the agency represent a 
great advantage over other developers, with whom it should have competed freely on 
the market (UNECE 2001).
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 
During the 1990s Romania’s economy had a sinuous evolution, with periods of 
deep recession and high inﬂation (1990–92 and 1997–1999) alternating with short 
periods of growth (1993–96). The unbalance culminated in 1997, when inﬂation 
rocketed to 151 percent. The decline came to a halt in 1999, and 2000 was the ﬁrst 
year of economic growth, a trend which is still continuing. Five years of growing 
GDP secured a leading position for Romania among EU candidate countries over the 
last period. In the opinion of analysts and international organizations the country is 
ﬁnally on a sustainable economic track (Ernst and Young 2003). Incomes still lag well 
behind certain other countries in the region, though here also a positive trend is clearly 
visible.9
Over the last decade, housing ﬁnance has been severely constrained by negative 
economic growth, low real wages, high, volatile interest rates, and extremely large gaps 
between banks’ lending rates and deposit rates.
As of 2000, domestic consumption expanded rapidly, stimulated by increase in real 
incomes, consolidated trend of disinﬂation, and the aggressive stance of banks. With 
economic conditions improving and related legislation in place, a more active housing 
ﬁnance sector is rapidly developing, and households turn eagerly and hopefully to the 
newly developed mortgage market.
The restructuring process of the banking sector is almost complete, with a number 
of privatizations, consolidations, mergers, and foreign investments. Presently, there 
are 30 commercial banks10 and 8 branches of foreign banks in Romania. Of these, 5 
major banks hold almost 2/3 of total assets and total deposits. The major Romanian 
bank—Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR)—will complete its privatization in 2005. 
The only fully state-owned and state guaranteed bank—the Savings and Deposits Bank 
(CEC) is currently in pre-privatization as well. 
The dynamic development of the banking sector is supported mainly by non-govern-
ment credits, which almost doubled in 2003 (48.5 percent in real terms) as compared to 
2002, of which credits to the population is the most dynamic segment. The growth-rate 
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of this segment exceeds that of corporate credits by far: in 2003 credits to the population 
grew by 214.6 percent as against 24.6 percent in the corporate sector (NBR 2003).
The Size of the Mortgage Market
Under the new conditions, the banking sector developed new crediting infrastructure 
for medium- and long-term loans. After a late start, the mortgage market developed very 
rapidly over the last 5 years. All major banks and a number of smaller ones and other 
ﬁnancial institutions oﬀer a wide array of housing ﬁnance products under various con-
ditions. At the outset their portfolios were small and their share in the banks’ portfolio 
of loans was very low. However, the rate of increase was considerable: four times in real 
terms (though sinuously) over the period June 31, 2000 to December 31, 2002.
Table 10.1
Size of the mortgage market, 2001–200211
Time 
[t]
Mortgage 
as % of 
total loans
% quarterly growth rate 
of mortgage loans (t/t–1)
% growth rate of 
mortgage loans as of 
June 30, 2000 (t/1)
% 
arrears
June 30, 2001 0.49 99.29 116.61 0.43
December 31, 2001 1.24 254.27 296.51 0.21
June 30, 2002 0.95 86.64 256.91 0.41
December 31, 2002 1.54 157.21 403.88 0.19
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2003.
With all its rapid evolution the mortgage market is still underdeveloped. By the 
end of 2002 the total mortgage loan portfolio of the banks was of about USD90–100 
million i.e., 1.95 percent of the total non-government credit (0.22 percent of GDP); it 
increased in 2003 to USD 500 million and attained USD 700 million by mid-2004.12 
Estimates for 2006 expect it to reach USD1.2 billion i.e., 2.2 percent of GDP.
In the ﬁrst couple of years after 2000, two-thirds of the mortgage loans were issued 
in national currency (ROL), and then the proportion reversed in favor of the Euro. Pres-
ently, the national currency is being favored, after two consecutive years of appreciation. 
Banks improved their procedures and started competing for customers by providing 
more ﬂexible loans to meet customers’ needs under current conditions.
The types and number of crediting institutions is growing. With the adoption of a 
special law on “collective saving and crediting for housing” in 2004, Raiﬀeisen Group 
(Austria) and Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall (Germany) created the Raiﬀeisen Housing 
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Bank oﬀering savings-schemes for buying and building housing—the ﬁrst bausparkasse-
type institution in Romania. Two specialized mortgage credit institutions Domania 
Credit and Imoﬁnance attract customers with rapidly approved credits. As the percep-
tion of Romania’s economic situation is improving, investment funds seem interested 
in the Romanian real-estate market—expecting a higher return (14–15 percent) than 
in other countries in the region (8–10 percent).13
Typical housing ﬁnance has adjustable interest rates, L/V 75–80 percent, with 
property and/or life insurance and the eligibility income base often including all family 
members (sometimes income from dividends, and independent activities too). 
Table 10.2
Main types of housing ﬁnance
Type of loan/Bank Term 
[years]
LTV
[%]
Interest rate Currency Paying 
capacity 
coefficient
Maximum 
amount
Mortgage loan
BCR
20 75 8–10% 
in Euro
adjustable 
quarterly
ROL
Euro 
USD
35% 500,000 
Euro
Housing loan
BCR
10–15 85 
(with warrants)
75 
(no warrants)
8–10% 
in Euro
adjustable 
quarterly
ROL
Euro 
USD
35% 100,000 
Euro
NHA 25 
(young 
h.hs)
75 7% 
(y.h.hs)
9% other
ROL 35% 50,000 
Euro 
average
Contract Savings 
Raiffeisen Housing 
Bank
Savings 
period
2.5–7
50 3% 
for saving*
4–7%
average 6%
172 mill. 
ROL 
average
Note: * plus a 30% bonus on savings.
Despite increased demand for mortgage lending, banks are still reluctant to lower 
interest rates, though the central bank reduced the reference rate three times (from 21.5 
percent to 17 percent) during 2004. Loans are still very expensive: there is a signiﬁcant 
gap between the general interest rate of the national bank and that charged on mortgages 
and the costs are very high.
Housing loans are currently funded from short-term deposits. The expansion of 
mortgage credits created the conditions for alternative funding, namely the issuance of 
mortgage bonds and the development of a secondary mortgage market.  Presently related 
legislation is in preparation and is expected to be in place in 2005.
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The explosion of consumer credit in 2003 prompted the National Bank of Roma-
nia (NBR) to adopt more restrictive regulations for mortgage credit in February 2004, 
limiting the monthly repayment burden to a maximum 35 percent of net income. 
A credit bureau started its activity in fall 2004.
As a reaction, banks turned to housing loans (which fall under the incidence of 
the Civil Code where the eligible income base includes all family members).14 They 
extended the term of housing loans to 20 years (against the former 10–15 years period 
of reimbursement) and in some cases eliminated the hard currency risk (which used to 
lower the amount of the loan granted by 10 percent). Though housing loans becomes 
more expensive (as banks might require life insurance for all family members) they are 
more aﬀordable to families with a monthly income of around USD 800.
Mortgage Lending Risks
Despite the lending boom of the last years, the rate of defaults was very low and dwin-
dling. Though there is no overall overview available, the percentage of arrears hovers 
around under 1 percent of all housing loans.15 Yet, credit risk persists, as there is no 
alternative funding and no underwriting.
Interest-rate risk persists in both the national currency and hard currency. Though 
the anti-inﬂation policy bore fruit in the form of diminishing interest-rate risk in national 
currency, banks are still over-cautious to reduce interest rates. On the other hand, loans 
in hard currency could aﬀect households through ﬂuctuating exchange rates.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Reform of the housing system proved more lengthy and diﬃcult than expected. Romania 
has come a long way since 1989. The years of transition were strongly marked by the 
legacies of the former socialist system, of which the most important for our argument 
is the precarious state of large parts of the existing housing stock, lack of elasticity in 
supply, and restricted housing options. 
Could the late start of the mortgage market be retraced to the early housing poli-
cies of the 1990’s?
Government policies and programs of the 1990s were dominated by mass-priva-
tization, a strong bias toward owner-occupancy, and laissez-faire toward the existing 
stock—leaving everything else to the market. All of this had marked eﬀects on the 
evolution of the entire housing system over the 1990s.
The early interest-rate subsidy programs proved to be unsustainable. The activity 
of the National Housing Agency produced mixed results. On one hand, the NHA was 
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the ﬁrst institution to promote housing mortgage ﬁnance and address aﬀordability con-
straints of a number of young ﬁrst-time buyers. On the other hand, it did not meet the 
expectations of those most in need of housing, but rather catered to a category which 
could have accessed the market by its own means. The heavily subsidized construction 
programs of the NHA and the margin squeeze induced anti-competitive features on 
the housing market.
Aﬀordability problems pervaded the whole housing sector, as access to housing 
was constrained by low incomes, high house prices, and lack of housing ﬁnance. Due 
to high inﬂation, banks were reluctant and households couldn’t aﬀord to embark on 
long-term investment. Options were restricted to buying or building which together 
with the poor targeting of scarce public funding, further increased access and aﬀord-
ability problems. 
Mass-privatization prevented the government from achieving its economic objec-
tives. The large owner-occupied sector still displays a high level of immobility, impacting 
negatively on labor mobility in a restructuring labor-market. The supply side was 
neglected, hampering the development of a more functional rental sector (both in the 
existing stock and through new construction).
Meanwhile, the chronic neglect of the existing stock made homeownership unsus-
tainable for most households. On the emerging housing market, existing units keep 
losing their asset-value as reﬂected in the decreasing number of transactions on the 
secondary market, thus restricting supply in the existing stock and lowering housing 
mobility. 
Privatization has had also perverse eﬀects on the behavior and mindset of owner-
occupants, inducing the overall perception that buying is a unique option, distorting 
their consumption decisions and diverting them from saving.
The late start of the mortgage market coincides with macroeconomic stabilization 
and steep lowering of inﬂation. With economic growth set for the ﬁfth consecutive year 
on a positive and sustainable track, the need for housing ﬁnance is rapidly growing. The 
aggressive stance of banks and ﬁnancial institutions signiﬁes that ﬁnancial institutions 
will invest in housing in a sounder ﬁnancial environment. Though there seems to be no 
optimal housing ﬁnance structure,16 the recent development of housing ﬁnance shows a 
promising mixture of specialized institutions and instruments co-existing and compet-
ing in a process of evolution. The rapidly expanding mortgage market still needs more 
active work to improve the legal and organizational basis for a mortgage-risk insurance 
system. Though the quality of credit has improved, the registering of a mortgage is still 
lengthy and costly; legislation to promote mortgage bonds and develop a secondary 
mortgage market is still ahead; foreclosure is largely untested. In order to reduce market 
risk, anti-inﬂation policy should continue.
Housing policies of the past decade years worked in the direction of restricted op-
tions and immobility. The improvement of macro-economic conditions lifted some 
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aﬀordability constraints (with housing ﬁnance helping as well) but it would take some 
time to balance options and supply and to develop a more ﬂexible market.
The lessons of the past ﬁfteen years in Romania clearly point to the need for a co-
herent mix of policies, which would include further public support for managing the 
rapidly growing housing ﬁnance system and to safe-guard whatever is possible of the 
existing stock.
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ENDNOTES
1 See Stephens in this volume.
2 See Stephens in this volume.
3 References to the US dollar and the DM in Transylvania switched to the euro overnight.
4 Early 2005.
5 According to SGA Romania, real-estate consultants.
6 Romania entered the 1990s with a sizeable stock of about 100,000 unﬁnished housing units, in 
various phases of completion.
7 As a developer the agency approves contractors, supervises construction, and ﬁnally sells units to 
eligible households. The NHA selects contractors through tender. They have to provide their own 
design and ﬁnancial packages. The construction cost limits and the proﬁt margin (of max. 5%) are 
also set by the agency.
8 Its large project of a “new urban village” north of Bucharest includes 3,200 housing units in various 
options (single, multifamily, ownership, rental, social).
9 From USD131 in 2000 to USD240 in 2002—(National Institute for Statistics).
10 Of which: state-capital 1, mixed-capital 2, private-capital 6, and foreign-capital 21.
11 Banks included in the survey: BCR, BRD, Banc Post, Banca Transilvania, Banca Romaneasca, 
Citybank Romania.
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12 Estimates of various analysts, as no actual survey is available.
13 Presently real-estate divisions of large ﬁnancial groups—Europolis, CA Immo, Heitman, etc.—are 
active on the real-estate market in a number of major cities of Romania (including Timişoara, Cluj, 
Constanta) in land acquisition, oﬃce-space building, and to a lesser extent up-scale residential 
units. 
14 In the sense of the Civil Code a family includes all relatives having a common household.
15 In 2003 it was 0.6% of all non-government loans; the NHA reports less than 1%
16 See Buckley and Van Order in this volume.
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 Residential Mortgage Lending, Risk Management, 
 and Affordable Housing Market Development 
 in Russia
 Elena Klepikova and Natalia Rogozhina
 ABSTRACT
 Housing finance has a key role to play in addressing Russia’s still-significant hous-
ing problems. The role of mortgage finance in home purchase was still limited 
in 2004 in part because of high interest rates (rates were in the 11–15 percent 
range on dollar denominated loans). A major reason for the high rates is that 
banks are just learning how to manage the various risks associated with making 
these long-term loans.
  This paper outlines a series of recent actions taken by both legislators and 
banks to manage these risks and thereby improve housing affordability. In 2004, 
the Duma enacted a series of amendments to the Mortgage Law that strengthen 
banks’ standing in case mortgage foreclosure is necessary. Additional legislation is 
in process that will enable the creation of credit bureaus and the sale of mortgage 
default insurance. 
  Banks take significant interest rate risk with the fixed rate mortgages they 
originate. This risk as well as liquidity risk are currently managed to a significant 
degree by loan-originating banks selling mortgages to financial actors better able 
to manage these risks. Primary among these is the Agency for Housing Mortgage 
Lending (AHML), a state-owned entity that purchases conforming loans from banks 
outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. AHML sells government-backed bonds to 
finance its purchases. Lenders in the two major cities are selling loans to major 
international banks that fund them with internal funds. Still, it is probable that 
the majority of mortgages will remain bank-owned assets. All investors in home 
mortgages are presently exposed to prepayment risk.
  As mortgage lending in Russia expanded sharply only about 2000, and as the 
economy has been strong over the whole period, the evolving risk management 
systems have yet to be properly tested.
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1. THE MOVE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MARKET 
 THROUGH MORTGAGE LENDING RISK REDUCTION 
Developing an Affordable Housing Market
Risk management in residential mortgage lending has become crucial to the develop-
ment of an aﬀordable housing market in Russia. The successful growth of a mortgage 
lending industry is the only way to provide citizens with greater opportunities to live 
in better housing. Lower mortgage risks will lead to lower lending interest rates and 
increased housing ﬁnance aﬀordability, thereby improving Russians’ ability to satisfy 
their housing needs. 
Housing in Russia remains a social problem of critical importance. According to 
a recent household survey,1 at the end of 2003, only 39 percent of households were 
satisﬁed with their living conditions. 
It is important to stimulate households’ active participation in own home purchase. 
Household savings form an additional resource for housing investments, simultane-
ously increasing eﬀective housing demand and leading to a greater volume of housing 
construction. Growing eﬀective demand for housing supported with proper bank credit 
facilities can become a strong driver for overall economic growth. 
The Housing Aﬀordability Index (HAI) calculates a ratio of the average market 
price of a standard dwelling (54 m2 total space in Russia) to average household income 
(a household of three). In 2004, the ﬁgure was 4.35, normal for a mature economy. 
However, while evaluating housing aﬀordability, ﬁnancing deserves special attention. 
Prior to closing a deal, home purchase typically requires a signiﬁcant saving period and 
an available mortgage loan. With this in mind, Russia diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the 
developed world.  
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Currently, only a very limited group of high-income citizens can aﬀord a suitable 
dwelling. According to the survey mentioned above, only 12.4 percent of households can 
ﬁnance a home purchase out of their savings or with borrowed funds. So, the objective 
to stimulate an increase in the number of solvent purchasers is directly connected with 
the task to develop and expand the long-term residential mortgage lending industry. 
The household survey has demonstrated that 19.2 percent of households see no ways 
to improve their living conditions. Another 7.1 percent would like to obtain a better 
dwelling in the social housing sector free of charge, by registering on a waiting list or 
through resettlement to shared multifamily dwellings. This means that 26.3 percent of 
households can solve their housing problems only with government assistance. Even 
with partial governmental assistance (in the form of down payment or interest rate 
subsidies) 9 percent will wait for social housing. 
This may be attributed to a variety of factors:
 • High housing prices that are inconsistent with household income level result 
in low eﬀective demand (disparity between household incomes and desired 
housing prices).
 • Not only are household incomes low, but motivation to save is low due to 
limited access to residential loans and low conﬁdence in banks.
 • High interest rates on residential loans (10–15 percent per annum in USD) 
caused by banks’ high exposure to certain risks. 
This problem was inherited from the socialist era, when the government was expected 
to provide free housing as part of national policy. This policy resulted in endless waiting 
lists and shared multifamily apartments. 
The period of economic reforms in Russia brought changes to the system of hous-
ing ﬁnance. The time of dominant government support for the housing sector and the 
practice of government subsidized 25–50 year loans for individual or cooperative housing 
construction at token interest rates (0.5–2 percent per annum) has passed. 
For the most part, oﬀ-budget ﬁnance sources have taken the place of the centralized 
system of housing distribution, with households’ savings at the core. However, the low 
level of these savings deprives households of the chance to have better housing, requiring 
special eﬀorts to mobilize other resources for housing ﬁnance. Bank resources such as 
long-term residential mortgage loans are best able to aﬀect this situation positively. 
The Banking Sector: Residential Mortgage Product Profiles 
Before the August, 1998 ﬁnancial crisis, retail residential lending was oﬀered by no more 
than 20 Russian banks. After the crisis several banks suspended this type of operation. 
But with economic recovery other banks stepped in, gradually extending their mort-
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gage programs. This process was driven by banks’ interest in energizing the market and 
regional authorities’ mortgage programs. The RF Central Bank analysis on the Russian 
mortgage market in 2001–2002 has revealed that in 2001 residential mortgage services 
were provided by 8.5 percent of operating lending institutions (112 banks and lending 
agencies) and in 2002—by 11.2 percent (149), while the share of residential mortgage 
loans in the total consumer lending portfolio during this period did not exceed even 
0.5 percent of the total amount of loans to households. 
So far, long-term residential mortgage lending is yet to become an important ﬁeld 
of business for Russian commercial banks. There are still only a few active mortgage 
lenders; these include Sberbank of Russia, DeltaCredit, Raiﬀeisenbank, Vneshtorgbank, 
the National Mortgage Company, Investsberbank, Fora-Bank, International Industrial 
Bank, United Industrial, and Commercial Bank. Although it is possible to note other 
positive trends in recent years, the major favorable change has been in mortgage lending 
terms oﬀered by banks (Table 11.1).
Table 11.1
Residential mortgage loan products oﬀered by major primary lenders in Russia 
(as of December 2004)
Bank Loan term
[years]
Loan amount Interest rate
Per annum
Loan 
currency
[LTV] [thou USD]
Sberbank of Russia 15 up to 90% from 3 18% RUR
Sberbank of Russia 15 up to 90% from 3 11% USD
Raiffeisenbank 10 70% 25–400 12% USD
DeltaCredit 10 70–85% 10–500 from 10% (fixed) USD
DeltaCredit 15 70–85% 20–500 from 10% (variable) USD
Vneshtorgbank 20 80–85% 10–500 10.5–11.5% USD
National Mortgage Company 10–15 60–95% 15-450 9.9–18% USD
AKB Fora-Bank 10 85–70% 10–200 15% USD
Investsberbank 5 80% 10 14% USD
International Industrial Bank 10 70–80% 17–200 15% USD
OPT Bank 10 70-80% 15–200 15% USD
First Mutual Loan Association 15 80–70% 10–450 15% USD
Moscow Bank 10 70% 3–150 11% USD
The loan period has increased from 1–3 years to 5–15 or even 20–27 years under 
certain regional programs. The weighted average life of loans is 10 years. 
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Second, interest rates on mortgage loans have shrunk from 30 to 10–15 percent 
per annum for hard currency loans, and from 42 to 15–18 percent for ruble loans. The 
Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending and several regional programs oﬀer ruble loans 
at 8–15 percent per annum. The weighted average interest rate for ruble loans in 2002 
was 14.3 percent. 
Role of Risk Reduction
Despite the current downward trend in interest rates, mortgage loans remain aﬀordable 
only for households with above-average incomes. High lending rates reﬂect high credit risks, 
the rate of inﬂation, cost of ﬁnance, and operational risks present in Russia. High interest 
rates remain the main reasons households are unwilling to buy housing using mortgage 
loan. As a consequence, the level of mortgaging in general remains insigniﬁcant. 
In setting ﬁnal interest rates the banks ﬁrst try to evaluate major risks associated with 
the mortgage product they are going to oﬀer to clients. Thus the risk management system 
is one of the important components of the bank’s policy aimed at risk reduction. 
Mortgage risk management consists of at least two major blocks:
 • creation of the legal environment favorable for mortgage risk reduction and risk 
management opportunities enhancement for mortgage market players 
 • eﬃcient mortgage risk management by mortgage market players.
2. DEVELOPING HOUSING LEGISLATION DEVELOPMENT 
 AND REDUCING RISK IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING 
The Role of Legislation in Mortgage-lending Risk Management 
2003–2004 was a period of active improvement in legislation intended to build an af-
fordable housing market. Legislative initiatives included: RF Housing Code, changes 
to the Federal Mortgage Law, amendments to laws regulating housing and mortgage 
market taxation, the Federal Law on Credit Histories, and several others. 
Aﬀordable housing is not necessarily cheap housing. Housing aﬀordability is a 
qualitative factor. It reﬂects the existence of certain conditions that enable the popula-
tion groups with average income to purchase decent housing without subsidies. This 
can be achieved through implementation of actions aimed at stimulating housing 
construction and housing lending development. The aim of housing policy is to allow 
citizens to improve their housing conditions using market tools rather than waiting for 
free social housing. 
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According to the household survey, 34.7 percent of households are ready to improve 
their housing conditions through buying or building a house using personal savings 
and/or taking a residential mortgage. Housing becomes aﬀordable when and if mortgage 
loans are easily aﬀordable. The proposed program for an aﬀordable housing market calls 
for reducing the level of income a household should have to qualify for a mortgage. 
Social housing will remain central only for low income groups.
Approval of the proposed package of laws will help make housing and home loans 
more aﬀordable as a result of:
 • reduced lending risks followed by reduced interest rates on mortgages
 • reduced housing construction costs.
Five legislative initiatives to reduce mortgage risks:
1. Improving foreclosure procedures in case of default
Legislative initiatives introducing eﬀective foreclosure procedures are expected to re-
duce the risk in mortgage lending and protect lender’s rights in case of default. In this 
respect serious changes to the Mortgage Law and the Civil Procedure Code of the Rus-
sian Federation were suggested approval. The proposed amendment to the Mortgage 
Law foresees that foreclosure on the mortgaged property and its subsequent sale gives 
legal rights for eviction of the debtor and other persons occupying the property in case 
it (the house or an apartment) was pledged under a mortgage agreement or by act of 
law as security for a loan from a bank, other lending institution, or legal person for 
the purchase, construction, capital repair, or other improvement of this property, or to 
reﬁnance such a loan. 
Proposed amendments to the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) are aimed to ensure rights 
to foreclose on any residential property if it is used as a security for a housing loan. 
Under the currently eﬀective law, foreclosure can take place only if residential 
property is bought with the loan proceeds and the borrower has more than one 
dwelling to live in. According to CPC (Art. 446, It. 1) it is impossible to enforce a 
writ of execution against the property (or parts of it) if it is the only dwelling the 
debtor and his/her family has for permanent residence. The same is applicable to 
land plots occupied by such property or land plots purchased for non-commercial 
purposes. 
The proposed legislative initiatives will reduce banks’ exposure to residential mortgage 
lending risks by introducing eﬀective foreclosure procedures. Housing loan aﬀordability 
is determined by borrowers’ paying capacities, modest housing prices, and the availability 
of low interest rates. Lack of protection for lenders’ in case of default and diﬃculties 
with foreclosure (or sometimes even failure) force banks to include expected costs of 
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these risks in the interest rate charged to borrowers. As a consequence, interest rates go 
up and loan aﬀordability goes down. 
2. Changes to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation terminating
 an owner’s and his/her family’s right to use property (a house, apartment, 
 or other residential unit) if ownership is transferred to another
Currently the soviet-era law is still eﬀective—typical for communities with a lack of 
real ownership rights. There is no market for housing, and housing rights prevail over 
ownership rights. This situation adversely aﬀects development of the mortgage lending 
industry because it makes mortgaged property sale very diﬃcult. As a result, banks refuse 
to provide loans against residential units encumbered by rights of third parties unless 
this encumbrance ceases with the sale of the mortgaged property. No one will agree to 
buy a unit encumbered with third party rights (unless at a price insuﬃcient to cover the 
lender’s claim). The proposed amendment will help protect housing ownership rights, 
create a more favorable housing market, and reduce the risks of mortgage lending. 
This will also facilitate the sale of mortgaged property by saving time and costs and 
enhancing property liquidity. This will also have a downward eﬀect on interest rates 
on mortgage loans. 
The proposed amendment will regulate relations between homeowners, persons 
recognized as homeowner’s family members (this status provides the right to use the 
homeowner’s property) and buyers. 
This amendment will provide additional legal grounds for termination of the use of 
property by homeowner’s family members. Speciﬁcally, the property title transfer from 
the former owner to a new one will be considered such legal grounds. Pursuant to this 
provision a new owner will have the right to claim the eviction of the former owner’s 
family from the property and will have an opportunity to buy the property free from 
any encumbrances. 
It is also proposed to extend and include this provision in the Housing Code of the 
Russian Federation as one of the rules regulating the use of the property by a homeowner 
and his/her family members. This amendment will then bring to an end the ludicrous 
practice that permits family members of former homeowners to stay in sold property. 
3. Changing child welfare authorities’ role in real estate transactions
The proposed amendments to the RF Civil Code and Mortgage Law repudiate the 
current obligation of the seller to obtain the approval for property sale and mortgage 
transactions from the child welfare authorities if this property is used as a place of resi-
dence by a minor or by a disabled or legally incapable person. It is proposed to limit this 
obligation only to cases where residential units are inhabited by persons that are under 
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guaradianship or lacking parental custody. All other persons will have no need to apply 
to the child welfare authority for approval of their real estate transactions. 
The purpose of the proposed amendments is to prevent unreasonable interference 
of the authorities in sales and mortgage lending transactions. Functions exercised now 
by these authorities signiﬁcantly limit homeowner’s rights. 
Child welfare authorities should step in when interests of minors without parental 
custody are in danger as a result of a real estate transaction. In all other cases children’s 
interests and future are protected by their parents. Child welfare authorities’ interference 
only causes diﬃculties for parents in their attempts to improve housing conditions for 
their children. Currently, these authorities use the vagueness of the legislation to dictate 
their own, rather biased, terms to families. 
4. Developing mortgage insurance 
Such a momentum should expand the mortgage market, increase the share of borrowed 
funds in the cost of purchased housing, enable households that meet mortgage lending 
standards but do not have personal savings to pay a large down payment to enter the 
mortgage market, and contribute to overall housing aﬀordability. 
Provisions for the introduction of a mortgage (credit risk) insurance system are 
stipulated in Item 4, Article 31 of the Draft Law Amending the Federal Mortgage Law, 
according to which the borrower under a residential mortgage contract may insure his 
risk for non-fulﬁllment (or improper fulﬁllment) of his obligations to repay the loan. 
Under such insurance policy the insured amount should not exceed 20 percent of the 
pledged property value. 
The insurance policy covers the case when a lender brings a claim to a borrower 
to repay the balance of a defaulted loan that remains uncovered after the sale of the 
mortgaged property and proper disposal of respective proceeds in accordance with 
Russian mortgage law. 
Insurance indemnity will be paid to a lender if the lender is unable to recover the 
outstanding amount of the principal and other associated costs after the foreclosure has 
been ﬁnalized on a defaulted loan. 
5. Credit bureau development 
The introduction of credit bureaus will contribute signiﬁcantly to development of the 
housing mortgage market. As the retail mortgage market in Russia is growing, there is 
a growing need for information on applicants’ payment discipline and history of their 
interaction with other lenders. Analysis of prospective borrowers’ credit histories should 
become a standard underwriting procedure for banks. This may be accomplished only 
if the necessary legislative, administrative, and economic incentives are provided for 
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the formation of a credit bureau. Information on borrowers’ credit histories will help 
banks make more reasonable credit decisions and reduce underwriting costs, which in 
turn will have a favorable downward eﬀect on loan interest rates. 
3. BANKING PRACTICES IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Banks play a key role in development of an advanced mortgage lending system in 
Russia. Today banks are the only professional players on the mortgage market. By 
following comprehensive regulatory and procedural instructions set by their regula-
tor, the Central Bank, banks can ensure a rather high level of mortgage transparency. 
Only now can they aﬀord to use new information technologies crucial to implement-
ing mortgage programs of a substantial scale. Moreover, only banks appear to be able 
to carry out eﬃcient ﬁnance management in the emerging competitive environ-
ment. Being well aware of mortgage lending risks, they attempt to manage them 
professionally, ﬁrst of all, by collecting primary statistical information on every 
mortgage lending phase and loan portfolio dynamic. In the long run this should 
help redistribute risks within the market system, shifting them to those who can man-
age them most professionally. New banks’ entrance into this market sector may help 
diversify risks in order to prevent a situation where all risks are assumed by one player, 
for example, by governmental structures, which ultimately means taxpayers in the case 
of systemic problems. 
For now, only banks appear capable of mobilizing signiﬁcant resources to ﬁnance 
residential mortgage loans, and according to legislation, only they are eligible to work 
with currency resources that provide additional opportunities both to attract new sources 
of long-term funds and oﬀer a wider range of loan products to mortgage market (by 
oﬀering hard currency loans).
The current unique role of banks in mortgage lending development can be ex-
plained by the speciﬁc structure of the Russian banking sector, which consists entirely 
of universal banks. This may have a diﬀerent impact on the speciﬁc conﬁguration of an 
emerging mortgage lending system. On one hand, during the startup period universal 
banks may help expand mortgage lending. Due to inﬂow of additional revenues from 
other operations their universal nature allows these banks to operate as primary lenders, 
bearing the considerable initial costs of launching mortgage programs and originating 
initial mortgage loan portfolios, with little or no loss in proﬁts. Universal banks become 
portfolio lenders performing all three basic functions of the mortgage lending system. 
They are responsible for loan origination and servicing originated loans; meanwhile they 
hold the loans as investments. This means they bear all risks associated with residential 
mortgage lending. On the other hand, at the startup period of the emerging mortgage 
market banks have no other alternative but to become portfolio lenders.
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Recently, the Russian mortgage market has witnessed certain changes in its insti-
tutional structure: new players entering the market started to position themselves as 
specialized mortgage banks. However, in Russia there are no laws allowing existence and 
regulating operations of specialized structures in the in the ﬁeld of mortgage lending. 
Called mortgage banks, these new players are in fact universal banks which deliberately 
keep their banking license but limit their operations to residential mortgage lending. 
Moreover, these ﬁrst specialization steps on the Russian primary mortgage market 
failed to change the way the three basic functions of the mortgage system are organized. 
Due to a preclusion of economies of scale, this may slow the eﬃciency and the rate of 
progress in the sector. 
Another important aspect of primary market specialization problem is availability 
of eﬃcient mechanisms to transfer ownership rights to mortgages and rights to service 
loan portfolios. Unfortunately, the existing mortgage market infrastructure in Russia 
(registries, notaries, mortgage insurance, and bank regulations) is characterized by high 
risks and costs that make the retail mortgage business, considering its negligible size, 
highly ineﬃcient. 
Factors preventing mortgage lending development in the banks (according to a 
bank’s survey2) are described in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2
Factors preventing the development of mortgage lending in banks
Problems Percentage
Absence of effective foreclosure and eviction procedures 89
Lack of long term financial resources 85
“Shadow” income of borrowers 85
Complicated and time consuming procedures for property rights and deal registration 55
High notary fee and cost of registration 64
High cost of mortgage deals 55
Absence of a bureau 49
Lack of interest from realty agents 35
Lack of experienced and trained staff 33
Banking system not customer oriented 33
It is evident from an analysis of these limiting factors that bankers consider mort-
gage lending risks to be very high. Of particular concern are risks caused by external 
factors and current mortgage legislation. Russian banks should focus on eﬀective risk 
management in developing residential mortgage lending. 
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Credit Risk—Risk of Loan Default
This risk is caused by legal and judicial diﬃculties the lender may face in implement-
ing foreclosure, eviction, and sale procedures in case of default; it results in overrating 
mortgage loans. 
To make this type of lending more secure a number of banks have successfully ap-
plied the model of three-party sale and mortgage contracts concluded between sellers, 
buyers-borrowers, and lenders. With this model it is possible to register the title to 
the property purchased with borrowed funds with the lender’s lien securing the loan 
repayment. This substantially reduces the banking risks and shortens the transactions’ 
registration time. Banks in Moscow and St. Petersburg pioneered this model, and their 
example is now followed in several other regions. 
Successful dissemination of loan origination and servicing standard procedures based 
on advanced experience from other parts of the world is another positive movement in 
the residential mortgage lending development in Russia. 
Being concerned with underwriting quality, banks try to maintain in-house bor-
rowers’ credit histories by collecting information on their consumer loan payments and 
repayment discipline. The banking sector initiated establishment of credit bureaus out-
pacing lawmakers in this ﬁeld. The anticipated approval of the Law on Credit Histories 
will create a necessary legal environment for the collection of databases on borrowers’ 
payment discipline allowing banks to reduce underwriting costs. 
Interest rate risk
Mortgage loans are usually provided at ruble or dollar denominated ﬁxed interest rates. 
Regions throughout Russia mostly provide ruble loans, and Moscow and St. Petersburg 
markets operate mostly with dollar loans. 
Operating in the secondary mortgage market, the Agency for Housing Mortgage 
Lending (AHML) focuses its activity on regional markets through setting ruble ﬁxed-
interest loan standards and buying ruble ﬁxed-interest loans meeting AHMLs’ standards 
that originate outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. AHML’s main concern now is to adjust 
its interest rate policy to the market situation in anticipation of future pre-payment risk, 
causing the need to reinvest prepaid capital on the ﬁnancial market. 
Currently, most outstanding residential mortgages in Russia are in hard currency 
at ﬁxed rates. This results in high debt service payments for borrowers. Hard currency 
ﬁxed interest loans may have a greater credit risk because most borrowers earning ruble 
income fear “payment shock” when their ruble incomes may become insuﬃcient to 
repay currency loans. 
Fixed-rate loans also carry higher market risks both for lenders and investors. In a 
high and volatile inﬂationary environment, interest-rate risk management becomes of 
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particular importance for banks as well as AHML. Realizing this, they have shifted their 
attention to variable interest rates testing new lending programs with variable interest 
rate loan products. As a consequence, the market range of credit products has recently 
become wider including new products such as variable interest rate loans with capped 
payments permitting more reasonable interest rate risk distribution between lenders and 
borrowers. Strong interest exists to develop credit products with interest-only payments 
and the principal due at the end of the loan term. 
Liquidity Risk
The lack of long-term and comparatively cheap credit resources is another serious limi-
tation of the mortgage lending development. This factor was mentioned by 85 percent 
of respondent banks (Table 2). Currently banks are mostly ﬁnancing mortgages with 
short-term resources, and signiﬁcant number of long-term loans may result in a serious 
mismatch of assets and liabilities, reducing compliance with the Central Bank liquidity 
requirements. 
This problem can be overcome by the development of a secondary mortgage market 
and improvement of reﬁnancing mechanisms for mortgages. One way to achieve this 
involves improved performance by AHML, where the government guarantees AHML 
securities, thus making them more attractive to investors. Currently, AHML has con-
cluded an agreement on reﬁnancing mortgage loans in 81 regions. As of June 30, 2005 
the amount of reﬁnanced mortgage loans was 280 million dollars. 
The bank sale of a pool of mortgage loans is another way to ensure the liquidity of 
mortgage loans. Speciﬁcally, this strategy is used by City Mortgage Bank, which issues 
mortgage loans and forms pools of those mortgage loans in order to foster their further 
sale. Indeed, in spring of 2005, City Mortgage Bank sold a pool of mortgage loans for 
the amount of 5 million dollars to International Moscow Bank. 
Another eﬃcient mechanism in resolving banks’ liquidity problems is providing 
banks with right to issue mortgage-backed securities, simultaneously strengthening 
the investment quality of such securities. Now banks are looking forward to legal 
regulations governing the rules for issuing mortgage-backed securities, which will help 
them attract long-term investors’ resources as do insurance companies and pension 
funds. 
4. Prepayment Risk 
The importance of this risk management grows simultaneously with the growth of the 
mortgage securities market. Mortgage loan prepayments may cause serious diﬃculties 
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in protecting the interests of investors that put their money into mortgage-backed 
securities. Banks that do not issue mortgage-backed securities may also meet serious 
prepayment problems. The question is how to reinvest and guarantee a comparable rate 
of returns on prepaid proceeds. Currently, banks often use the following instruments 
in managing prepayment risk:
 • Establish a 3–6 months period during which advanced repayment of a loan is 
prohibited.
 • Stipulate a requirement in the loan contract to pay a prepayment penalty that 
may be valid for the whole loan term, or a period speciﬁed by the bank.
 • Apply the above two remedies together: ﬁrst a ban, then a penalty.
 • Fix the minimum sum of a loan that may be repaid ahead of schedule.
Despite recent positive changes in the development of a mortgage market banks 
continue to face serious problems providing long-term residential mortgages. 
In the context of current legislation, residential mortgage lending is considered a 
very risky and low proﬁt business. 
4. RISK MANAGEMENT UNDER REGIONAL HOUSING FINANCE 
 PROGRAMS
Several cities and regions (Moscow, Moscow Region, Orenburg Region, Samara Region, 
Saratov Region, Nizhniy Novgorod Region, Irkutsk Region, Ryazan Region, and other 
regions along with Udmurtia and Bashkortostan Republics) are now making strong 
eﬀorts to implement their own housing programs. 
Main Characteristics of the Regional Housing Programs
Funds allocated by regional and local governments under these programs are used to provide 
home purchase and construction loans and ﬁnancial aid for housing improvements. 
Budget subsidies for home purchase may be made in the following forms:
 • interest rate subsidies on mortgage loans originated by authorized banks—
budgetary funds are used to cover the diﬀerence between the current market 
interest rate on similar loans and the concessionary interest rate
 • subsidies partially covering the purchased dwelling cost (down payment subsidy);
 • providing funds to banks to be used in making loans.
Regions tend to support households’ housing purchases by providing budgetary 
funds for subsidizing home loans. Typically they use non-transparent schemes and do 
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not calculate the eﬃciency of budget expenditures and the full cost of housing programs 
into the budget. 
Interest-rate subsidies appear to be particularly ineﬀective. Interest rates are deter-
mined by the market (the cost of loan ﬁnance for banks, the risks of particular banking 
operations, e.g., mortgages). In case of interest rate subsidies, the budget compensates 
the diﬀerence between the market (ﬁxed according to bank’s evaluation criteria) and 
concessionary interest rates. However, considering the rather long life of mortgages and 
the very volatile money market situation in an unstable economy like Russia’s, interest 
rates may increase and generate a subsequent growth in the government’s burden as 
well. Governments may lack the funds to fulﬁll their obligations, thus exposing banks 
to additional risk. It is diﬃcult to estimate in advance the amount of funding the gov-
ernment ultimately needs to ﬁnance an interest rate subsidy program, as interest rates 
are to a large extent governed by ﬁnancial market trends. 
Targeted down payment subsidies to households appear to be more eﬃcient. This 
type of subsidy increases the paying capacity of households without changing their 
income level by reducing the size of a loan and, accordingly, the size of monthly pay-
ments. This is a purpose-speciﬁc and means-tested subsidy, the design of which allows 
clear monitoring of the use of budget funds. It also gives households a chance to select 
a dwelling by type and quality. This type of subsidy helps establish a demarcation line 
and links between public and market sectors of the economy. 
The analysis of regional approaches to the housing problem suggests that despite 
formal diﬀerences, Russian regions share a universal will to support regional housing 
programs with local budgetary resources. Typically such programs are small-scale due 
to limited budgetary capacities. 
In conclusion, regional housing programs undeniably help households purchase 
better housing by providing them “low-cost” budgetary loans, but at the same time there 
is a lack of eﬃciency controls on such programs to calculate the cost versus results. Such 
programs are unpopular among investors and banks because they make risk analysis 
and evaluation more diﬃcult. 
Main Disadvantages of Regional Housing Programs
Apart from the improvement of housing conditions for many households, regional 
programs have certain disadvantages, most serious of which are:
 • Misappropriation of budgetary resources (resources are allocated via extra-
budgetary funds and are not always used in accordance with the purpose and 
target group they were assigned for).
 • Concessionary loans and interest rate subsidies place a burden on regional and 
local budgets and often fail to reach the target groups that really need them.
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 • Commercial banks, insurance, real estate, and appraisal companies participate 
in regional housing programs as authorized agents and responsible for loan 
origination and servicing rather than as real market players.
 • Understated interest rates serve as a strong disincentive for institutional and 
private investors and thus limit the scope of regional housing programs.
 • Commercial banks tend to “wait and see,” unwilling to invest ﬁnancial resources 
in residential mortgage lending and inclining to shift the possible risks of such 
lending onto budget-supported regional mortgage agencies. 
Still, it is worth noting that the growing market and demand for mortgage 
loans stimulates regions’ transition to market-driven forms of ﬁnance. For example, 
Samara, Orenburg, and several other regions have plans to develop the mortgage 
market by introducing market mechanisms and creating secondary mortgage market 
facilities. 
Risk Distribution between Participants in Regional Housing Programs  
Generally regional housing programs use one of the three models of budget resource 
spending: interest rate subsidies, down payment subsidies, and providing capital to 
banks. The distribution of program risks among participants depends on the type of 
spending model chosen. 
In the case of interest rate subsidies, risk is fully carried by regional governments, 
which might fail to ﬁnance the growing diﬀerence between the market and program 
interest rates as a result of sizable upward movements on ﬁnancial markets, inﬂation, 
etc. Ultimately this risk will become a banking problem, as banks will have to carry and 
manage liquidity and credit risks. 
Down payment subsidies set regional governments free from all risks. All mortgage 
lending risks (interest rate, liquidity, credit, and prepayment risks) will be carried by 
banks.
If ﬁnancial resources from the budget are provided to a bank for residential mortgage 
loan originations, the government will have to manage its liquidity risk, and the bank 
itself will carry the credit, interest rate, and prepayment risks. However, these risks are 
much less hazardous to banks as compared to risks they meet when implementing their 
own mortgage programs, because budgetary resources are long-term and at no or little 
cost to banks. 
Still, there may be situations when the liquidity risk becomes a serious problem 
for banks. For example, a regional administration gives a 4-year interest-free loan to a 
bank, and the bank extends concessionary loans to households with a payment period of 
10–15 and 20 years. After four years pass, a new administration may come in and after 
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revising its housing policy, demand that banks pay back the loan, which immediately 
exposes the bank to risks of liquidity. This scenario demonstrates the strong political 
dependence of regional housing programs.
The program launched by AHML deserves comment. It is based on the idea of 
developing relations with regional administrations and regional operators on the sec-
ondary mortgage market (regional mortgage agencies, housing funds, etc.). AHML 
suggests a model when primary lenders, i.e., banks, are assigned to government agencies 
acting as regional operators; the regional operators buy loans from the assigned lenders 
who originated the mortgages; the operator pools them, then sells them to AHML. 
The operator retains the servicing function on the mortgages sold in the pool. In this 
scenario every intermediate agency (regional operator) has an income interest, which 
works against interest rate reduction. Most risks are carried by regional operators in 
this program:
 • Credit risk—is mostly carried by regional operators, because they are obliged 
to buy back the mortgage in case of default. This obligation is supported with 
additional regional government guarantees; moreover, possible losses incurred 
after the sale of pledged property should be equally shared between AHML and 
regional operators. 
 • Liquidity risk—is minimized due to AHML-reﬁnanced loans originating 
in banks via regional operators; in this situation the main task is to increase 
AHML’s resource raising opportunities—its ability to attract long-term inves-
tors’ capital. 
 • Interest rate risk—is mostly carried by AHML and partially by investors as a 
result of government guaranteed securities.
 • Prepayment risk is carried completely by AHML, which manages it by establish-
ing a 6 month moratorium on loan prepayments. 
This approach to developing a mortgage lending system is rather discouraging for 
banks, because their participation in the AHML program is limited to originating loans. 
However, considering banks’ attitude toward this program, AHML is now devising and 
testing models for establishing direct relations with banks. 
5. RISK MANAGEMENT PROSPECTS
Finally, there are a few further prerogatives to reduce mortgage risk in Russia that should 
be stressed:
 • Diversify lending instruments which employ variable repayment schedules and 
interest rates, meanwhile developing a market for mortgage securities issued by 
banks on redemption terms similar to a loan schedule.
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 • Manage risk of liquidity by developing a secondary market for long-term mort-
gage reﬁnancing, attracting long-term resources from institutions (insurance 
companies, pension funds).
 • Manage credit risk by developing a credit risk insurance system and system of 
credit bureaus supplying banks with information on prospective borrowers. 
 
ENDNOTES
1 The survey was carried out by the IC RAM (Investigation Center of the Russian Association of 
Marketing) in December 2003–January 2004 as part of the project “Evaluation of the Scale 
of Dynamics of Changes in Eﬀective Housing Demand and Housing Construction in Russia” 
implemented at the request of the Foreign Trade Bank (OAO Vneshtorgbank). Apart from the mass 
survey based on the representative sample of Russian households a series of additional surveys was 
conducted in 9 cities: Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Krasnodar, Samara, Vladivostok, 
Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, and the Moscow Region. Personal interviews with household heads 
responsible for making housing decisions were used as a survey instrument. 3,000 respondents were 
interviewed across Russia and 400 more were interviewed in each of the nine selected cities and the 
Moscow region. 
2 The research was carried out by the IC RAM (see footnote 1). The market research used a sample of 
100 banks including 3 banks from each of the 9 project regions and the Moscow region. Sampling 
was performed by experts who gave preference to banks actively operating or starting operations in 
residential mortgage, consumer lending, and residential construction lending markets. 
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 Mortgage Lending and Risk Management 
 in Kazakhstan
 Dr. Friedemann Roy, Aset Mananbaev, and Murat Yuldasev
 ABSTRACT
 Kazakhstan, like other former Soviet republics, entered the transition pe-
riod with no tradition of mortgage lending. The objective of this article 
is to describe and analyze developments in mortgage lending and risk 
management in Kazakhstan. First, it discusses the main indicators of the 
economy. Second, the mortgage lending market and the government 
strategy in housing is presented. The final part tackles the structure and 
the role of the Kazakhstan Mortgage Company (KMC) within the develop-
ment of capital markets. This analysis also includes a risk assessment of 
KMC’s operations. 
  In order to stimulate long-term funding for mortgage lending, the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) established KMC. KMC operates as 
a sales-of-asset liquidity facility. KMC has made a considerable contribu-
tion to mortgage market development. The total volume of outstanding 
mortgage loans has reached KZT 24 billion. Interest rates on mortgage 
loans have decreased to 13.6 percent in 2004. Loan terms have risen to 
20 years.
  KMC’s operations are subject to an array of risks (credit risk, interest 
rate risk, liquidity risk, exchange rate risk, prepayment risk). The once 
sound approach has been recently put into question due to a revamp 
of the government’s strategy in developing the mortgage market. As a 
result, KMC has been converted from a low risk entity into a high risk 
entity which may require a state guarantee to remain viable.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The broad availability of mortgage ﬁnance accelerates the pace at which households 
improve their housing conditions by permitting them to leverage their current income 
and savings. While there were a few long-term housing loans in the former Soviet Union, 
such loans were really little more than an element of centrally allocated credit.1 Thus, 
Kazakhstan, like the other former Soviet republics, entered the transition period with 
no tradition of mortgage lending. The development of such lending has been hampered 
by the immaturity of the banking sector and macroeconomic setbacks.
Kazakhstan has enjoyed stability and impressive growth rates in recent years. Under 
these circumstances, the demand for housing has expanded and can be expected to 
continue to grow. The government has been responded to this development by intro-
ducing a broad strategy to support mortgage lending. One component of this strategy 
is the establishment of the Kazakhstan Mortgage Company (KMC) in order to improve 
long-term funding of mortgage loans obtained from capital markets. 
The objective of this article is, then, to describe and analyze the activities of KMC in 
the context of Kazakhstan’s economy. The article is organized so that the main indicators 
of the economy are discussed ﬁrst, including the banking and housing sector. Second, 
the mortgage lending market and government strategy in housing are presented. The 
ﬁnal part of tackles KMC’s structure and role within the development of capital markets 
in Kazakhstan. This analysis also includes a risk assessment of KMC’s operations. 
Kazakhstan is located along the Caspian Sea and neighbored by Russia to the north, 
China to the east, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to the south. Around 
15 million people enjoy a great deal of space. With 2.7 million square kilometers in 
size, the country is ﬁve times the size of France (with a population of about 56 million). 
Recently, the country has gained considerable attraction by foreign investors because 
of its large oil and gas reserves. 
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The high demand for oil from the Caspian Sea is also the main driver of economic 
growth. According to the table below, GDP rose from 2.7 percent in 1999 to 9.4 percent 
in 2004. For 2005, growth will be slightly lower (8 percent). GDP per capital has also 
risen but still lacks behind neighboring countries like Russia where it amounted to 
USD 3,041 (in 2003).
Table 12.1 
Basic economic indicators (1999–2005)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 (P) 2005 (E)
GDP growth 
[% to previous year]
2.7 9.6 13.5 9.8 9.2 9.4 8.0
GDP per capita [USD] 1,133 1,234 1,492 4,657 1,990 3,699 3,072
Inflation rate [%] 17.8 9.8 8.4 5.9 6.4 6.7 7.6
Unemployment rate [%] 13.5 12.2 10.2 9.3 8.7 8.4 8.2
Avarage salary [USD] 91 117 142 157 194 274 n.a.
Note: P = projected    E = estimates
Source: IMF, F.A.Z.-Institute, National Bank of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstani State Agency of Statistics. The 
unemployment rate is calculated as a percent of the economically active population. 
Rising macroeconomic stability is reﬂected by steadily declining inﬂation rates. 
From 1999 to 2003, they have decreased from 17.8 to 6.4 percent. In 2004, a slight 
upward trend shows as a result of considerable foreign currency inﬂows and rising prices 
in the agricultural and industrial sector. This trend is likely to continue in 2005 albeit 
to a limited extent. 
The National Bank of Kazakhstan’s (NBK) monetary policy is aimed at a band 
of 4.9–6.5 percent for average inﬂation for the year. This objective could be diluted 
through recent increases in government spending on social beneﬁts and pensions as well 
as changes in the exchange rate. In view of the large diﬀerentials between government 
and private sector salaries, the government is expected to raise salaries for public sector 
employees. Such pay increases could intensify inﬂationary pressures, especially if they 
lead to an acceleration in private sector wages.2
The recent appreciation of the tenge—Kazakhstan’s currency—is of concern for na-
tional authorities, as it could hamper the competitiveness of the economy. Since envisaged 
government spending increases imply a further rise in the real exchange rate, it is possible 
that authorities prefer higher inﬂation to a (nominal) appreciation of the tenge.3
The labor market has beneﬁted from the economic upswing. The unemployment rate 
has also fallen, amounting to 8.4 percent in 2004. The positive economic development 
has lead to rising wages, too. With an average salary of USD 194 (as of 2003), Kazakhstan 
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records the highest average wage in central Asia. However, it lags behind Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries where average wages amount to USD 472.4 The highest 
salaries are paid in the ﬁnancial sector and in mining, where employees earn an average of 
USD 377.28 and USD 304.71 respectively. Due to favorable oil prices and implemented 
tax reductions, a further increase in average wages and employment is expected.
2. THE BANKING SECTOR IN KAZAKHSTAN
Since 2002, the banking sector has grown rapidly, led by strong economic growth. 
Coupled with that, ﬁnancial depth and intermediation have steadily increased. Factors 
responsible for ﬁnancial deepening are faster and more transparent judicial procedures, 
more sophisticated legislation on banks, as well as stronger supervision. The National Bank 
of Kazakhstan (NBK) envisages achieving EU-standards in the banking sector by 2007.5 
Growing conﬁdence in the banking system has been facilitated by a deposit insurance 
system introduced in 1999 (compulsory in 2004) and the Bank Secrecy Law of 2000. 
Figure 12.1 
Transition economies: credit/GDP ration and ﬁnancial sector reform
Source: International Financial Statistics, EBRD Transition Report 2003, IMF, author’s calculations
Credit to the private sector in relation to GDP and broad money to GDP are used 
as indicators of ﬁnancial depth and intermediation. Since 1998, bank lending to the 
private sector has increased, due to better credit assessments, underpinned by strong 
real growth.6 The bulk of loans has gone to the industry and trade sectors. The share 
of lending to households is small but rising rapidly, with mortgage lending rising by a 
factor of four in 2003.
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The graph above shows that Kazakhstan’s credit-to-GDP ratio is below the aver-
age range of more advanced countries like the Czech Republic (38 percent) or Poland 
(30 percent) and above average for transition countries with similar institutional 
quality in the ﬁnancial sector (like Romania with 11.3 percent). With 23.4 percent 
private sector credit to GDP, Kazakhstan is slightly above Russia (22.5 percent). Loans 
are mainly ﬁnanced by deposits, which constitute almost 70 percent of banks’ total 
liabilities. Around 55.5 percent of credit and 47 percent of deposits are denominated 
in foreign currency (mainly USD). Albeit decreasing, the prevalence of foreign 
currency in the banking sector still reﬂects the weak conﬁdence in the national currency, 
which has been also in part driven by the constant deprecation of the tenge against 
the dollar in the recent years. However, the increasing share of KZT deposits reﬂects 
enhanced stability of the banking sector. 
The level of ﬁnancial intermediation in Kazakhstan is lower in comparison to other 
transition CEE countries. Broad money in relation to GDP amounts to 11.6 percent 
in Kazakhstan whereas in Russia it is 26.2 percent and in Hungary 47.2 percent.7 In 
this context, administrative measures to control interest rates (for instance, the ceiling 
on deposit rates introduced by the Deposit Insurance Fund and tax incentives) only 
distort ﬁnancial intermediation. 
On the other hand, shrinking spreads will support intermediation. Lending interest 
rates, for both local currency as well as foreign currency credits, have declined markedly 
over the past half decade, reﬂecting increased competition, and, for KZT loans, lower 
inﬂation. Averaging 10 percent, they still remain high. Interest rates on loans (in KZT) 
vary from 15–11 percent. For term deposits, banks currently pay about 9 percent (in USD 
6 percent). Especially improved availability of creditor information has been beneﬁcial to 
lower spreads. Despite shrinking spreads, banks have managed to remain proﬁtable. This 
achievement has been due to a reduction in personnel expenses and in the number of 
branches, a better enforcement of debts, and a slow entering into non-banking activities, 
like insurance, securities, and the real estate business8 (See Figure 12.2).
Competition appears to be ﬁerce among similar-sized banks, but not necessarily 
across size categories. Moreover, banks are competitive in and around big cities, but 
only a few banks cater to smaller towns. In 2002, banks recorded a combined proﬁt of 
USD 132.2 million.
At present, banks are proﬁtable, well capitalized, and have ample liquidity. As of 
2004, the average risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio was 16 percent, signiﬁcantly 
above the required minimum of 12 percent. Banks’ return on equity (ROE) ranged 
from 8 to 14 percent. However, banks’ loan portfolios are relatively young and, for the 
most part, have not yet been tested by sharp changes in macroeconomic conditions or a 
severe asset price downturn. Slightly worrying signs are a deteriorating quality of banks’ 
loan portfolios in 2004. Loan losses increased in relation to total loans outstanding from 
2 percent in 2003 to 3 percent in 2004 despite the rapid increase of outstanding loans. 
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Figure 12.2 
Changes in interest rates, 2000–2004 
Source: Kazakhstani authorities, IFS 
Interest rates are shown in local currency and for individuals.9
On the whole, the banking sector is fairly concentrated. The three largest banks 
(Kazkommertsbank, Bank TuranAlem, and Halyk Bank) have a combined market share 
of about 60 percent. In 2003, they hold together 61 percent of the assets and 66 percent 
of the loans. Moreover, they hold 69 percent of personal deposits. At the end of 2004, 
35 banks operated in the country, of which 16 were foreign owned.
3. THE HOUSING SECTOR IN KAZAKHSTAN
The positive macroeconomic environment has stimulated demand in the housing sector. 
This growth is underpinned by rising incomes, lower interest rates, and a better supply of 
mortgage loans. From 2002 to 2003, new construction rose by 16.9 percent. However, 
the building industry cannot meet current demand, which exceeds supply by two to 
three times. Almaty and Astana face an especially severe lack of dwellings as a result of 
the ongoing migration of citizens in search of employment in these cities. 
Currently, house prices are driven by the construction of the new capital of Astana 
and the rising demand for better housing conditions coming from foreign companies 
operating in Kazakhstan. The recent price increases have induced a higher turnover in 
the secondary market as people buy now fearing future price increases or in order to 
rent. Experts fear that this rise in construction (and mortgage lending) may also provoke 
a real estate bubble. The real estate markets in the large population centers are already 
beginning to show signs of over-heating (IMF 2004a).
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In general, the state has withdrawn from providing funds for housing, creating a 
clear need to develop private housing ﬁnance. The previously state-owned dwellings have 
been privatized. As a result, 97 percent of the housing stock is in private ownership.
The current situation in the housing sector has induced the government to inaugurate 
the national housing development program of Kazakhstan for 2005–2007. This program 
is aimed at providing aﬀordable housing to citizens. It focuses on the creation of a fully 
balanced housing market and an increase in mortgage loans and housing construction 
savings in order to ﬁnance new construction and renovation or modernization of the 
existing housing stock.10 Through this program, housing supply should be particularly 
increased in the major cities in order to damp prices rises. 
4. THE MORTGAGE LENDING MARKET
The increasing economic stability as well as better regulations on property enforcement 
and an increase in the overall eﬀectiveness of the judicial system has supported banks 
entering in mortgage lending. For example, a regulation on credit register was adopted 
by NBK in 1998 in order to disseminate creditor information to banks. Under this 
scheme, commercial banks are required to report to the regulatory authority if a single 
entity or an individual borrows in excess of KZT 3 million (or KZT 1 million). In 
addition, a new automated subsystem is being developed whereby banks can access 
current and periodic creditor data. A law on credit bureaus has been submitted for the 
government’s approval, which will also help reduce credit risk for banks.
Mortgage lending has steadily grown and is now accelerating rapidly. From July 
2003 to January 2004, the total volume of mortgage loans soared by 208 percent (from 
KZT 14.1 billion to KZT 29.5 billion i.e., about USD 197 million).11 As per September 
2004, the volume of mortgage loans totaled KZT 68.8 billion. 
In addition, a growing numbers of bank have recently appeared on the market. For 
instance, Kazkommertsbank only entered into retail banking in 2000. In 2002, the 
bank has started to develop its own lending program for housing purposes. Halyk Bank 
started its mortgage-lending program in April 2004. Activities are mainly concentrated 
in Almaty and Astana which record are share of 63 percent of all mortgage loans granted. 
This concentration corresponds to the economical structure of the country. Equivalent 
to other lending practices, the majority of loans are granted in USD (63 percent as of 
January 2004). Loans in KZT are usually indexed to the inﬂation rate. Interest rates 
on loans (in KZT) range from 13.5 to 15.7 percent. A further reduction is expected in 
the next years. The table below gives an overview about the mortgage lending programs 
of selected banks lenders: 
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Kazkommertsbank is the only bank oﬀering a savings program connected to its 
lending program. Customers who participate in the savings program beneﬁt from more 
favorable loan conditions (lower interest rates). With a maximum of 20 percent, the 
down payment requirement seems to be very low. Loan terms in KZT are short and 
may therefore restrict aﬀordability. 
The mortgage lending market is segmented: it can be broadly divided into the group 
of medium-sized banks participating in the new lending program of the Kazakhstan 
Mortgage Company (KMC) that securitizes mortgage loans of these banks, and the 
largest banks having their own mortgage lending program. The most important lend-
ers are Kazkommertsbank, BTA-Ipoteka, and Centercredit.12 KMC mainly operates 
around the big cities. With a wider network and higher operational costs, the largest 
banks engage in mortgage lending in less urban regions, but are free to choose their 
interest margins. The newly licensed state-owned Zhilstroi Bank is a third player in the 
mortgage market, but solely caters to low-income groups.
5. THE GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGY 
 TO DEVELOP MORTGAGE LENDING
The government has pursued a systematic approach to develop the mortgage lending 
market in Kazakhstan. The main components of the concepts are laid down in the 
graph below:
Figure 12.3 
Institutional infrastructure of the mortgage market 
Source: Roy (2004)
Market players:
Primary market: Bank, financial institutions, brokers
Secondary market: Kazakhstan Mortgage Company
Fund suppliers:
Pension funds 
Insurance Companies 
Supervision:
National Bank of Kazakhstan
State Agency of Financial Control
Risk management instruments:
Credit Bureau
Mortgage Guarantee Fund
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Supervision of the market is executed by NBK and the State Agency of Financial 
Control (SAFC): whereas NBK monitors the liquidity position of the banks, SAFC 
is responsible for regulating and supervising banks and ﬁnancial institutions. In addi-
tion, SAFC awards licenses to the banks. Originally, SAFC was a department of NBK 
but was set up as a separate entity in January 2004. With the separation of SAFC, the 
government aimed to ensure its independence. The licensing process should be discon-
nected from monetary policy. 
In order to reduce risk in mortgage lending, the government established a credit 
bureau (August 2004).13 It is owned by the banks. The government has no stake in it. 
The data collected is available to all lenders. All banks are obliged to report to the credit 
bureau, even if they are not shareholders of the credit bureau.
In January 2004, NBK founded the Kazakhstan Mortgage Guarantee Fund (KMGF), 
which provides mortgage default insurance to lenders. Its activities are aimed at reducing 
the down-payment to 10 percent and the interest rate to 9–10 percent and increasing 
loans terms.
Long-terms funds to reﬁnance mortgage loans are provided by pension funds and 
insurance companies. Their funds are channeled through KMC to the banks in the 
secondary market or they buy bonds that the banks directly issue. The ﬁrst issuer of 
mortgage bonds was KMC. BTA Mortgage Company ﬁrst issued mortgage bonds in 
2003. The total volume of bond issues from 2001 to 2003 amounted to KTZ 656 
million. In 2004, Bank Center Credit issued bonds worth KZT 500 million (OECD 
2004: 9).14
In the primary markets, loans are sold through banks’ branch networks, brokers, 
or realtors. Typically, brokers are self-employed but receive special training from banks 
with which they cooperate. Some insurers oﬀer life insurance and property insurance. 
Often, these risks are re-insured on the international market.15
6. DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL MARKETS
In order to stimulate long-term funding for mortgage lending, obtained from capital 
markets, NBK established the Kazakhstan Mortgage Company (KMC) on December 
29, 2000. The objective of KMC is to reﬁnance banks’ mortgage loan portfolios: KMC 
purchases mortgage loans from participating banks and then issues securities to investors 
backed by the acquired mortgage debt. KMC beneﬁts from an implied government 
backing through its complete NBK ownership.
The government considers KMC a part of its wider strategy to develop the housing 
ﬁnance market in Kazakhstan. Its activities are aimed at providing long-term mortgage 
loans at reasonable costs thereby organizing the market and fostering competition 
among banks. 
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KMC started operations in 2001. The company has developed into an important 
market player in housing ﬁnance. It has a market share of 28 percent. As of May 2004, it 
records an authorized capital of KZT 2.5 billion (about USD 17.9 million—now USD 
70 million). Assets amount to KZT 14.8 billion (about USD 105.7 million). 
Figure 12.4 
Model of KMC facility
Source: Roy (2004)
KMC operates as a sales-of-asset liquidity facility. KMC signs an agreement with 
commercial banks or non-banking organizations (later called partner banks), which 
intend to securitize their mortgage loans. The banks grant mortgage loans to their 
customers who in turn provide the lending bank with a pledge on the dwelling. Then, 
partner banks sell their mortgage loans to KMC which in turn acquires a right on the 
mortgage housing loans. In case the housing loans do not comply with KMC require-
ments and standards, banks are obliged either to retract the loans and provide the 
corresponding value of the loan or provide KMC with further enhancements. Thus, 
credit risk remains with the partner banks. In this way, KMC organizes the market, 
further enhancing stability in mortgage lending.
KMC bundles the loans and issues securities in the capital markets, which are 
bought by investors (typically pension funds or insurance companies). For every bond 
issue, there is one separate cover pool. The cover pools are entered in the state register. 
Entries in the register can be modiﬁed if necessary. By law, the cover pools are removed 
by bankruptcy. KMC uses the funds received from the investors to pay banks the cor-
responding value of their mortgage loans.
PartnerbanksKMC
Investors Borrower
Securities Mortgage loan Collateral
Cash
Mortgage loans
Cash
Dwelling
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The administration of loans remains the responsibility of partner banks. However, 
they are obliged to transfer redemption payments to KMC so KMC can meet its obli-
gations against bondholders.
7. STANDARDS AND LOAN REQUIREMENTS OF KMC
Table 12.3. 
KMC lending program
Currency of loan KZT
Loan amount Up to KZT 23m
Terms of loans 3 to 20 years
Required LTV ratio 70–85%
Debt ratios
 – payments/income
 – total payments/income
35–45%
40–50%
Required insurance Property and life insurance
Prepayment Penalty of 2% of redemption payment,
minimum amount KZT 184,000
Source: KMC (2004)
In principle, KMC only purchases loans made to citizens of Kazakhstan. In a loan 
agreement with a partner bank, the borrower commits himself to use the borrowed 
amount for housing purposes and to provide the partner bank with collateral.16 Before 
a loan agreement is signed, the partner bank requires an independent appraisal of the 
market value of the pledged property. As a further precondition, the partner bank re-
quires property and life insurance.
The typical mortgage loan is granted in KZT and indexed to inﬂation.17 Loans 
are annuity loans with monthly payments. With the inauguration of the Kazakhstan 
Mortgage Guarantee Fund (KMGF), LTV ratios are likely to rise from 70 to 85 percent. 
The down payment may be even lowered to 10 percent in case the borrower has con-
cluded a mortgage default insurance with KMGF. Prepayments are subject to a penalty, 
which amounts to 2 percent of the payment. The minimum amount for prepayments 
is KZT 184,000. In addition, the customer has to wait six months before prepayment 
is executed.
As soon as the partner banks sell their mortgage loans to KMC, they transfer the 
rights on the mortgage to KMC. The transfer of collateral will be noted in the land 
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registry. A trustee nominated by NBK scrutinizes and controls the value of the pledged 
mortgages. In a report, he will inform KMC about the value of the collateralized debt. 
KMC bundles the loans with the same maturity and terms and sells them as securities 
to investors like insurance companies or pension funds. Typically, KMC issues ﬂoat-
ing rate notes. The interest rate is adjusted twice a year. The maximum adjustment is 
limited to 4.5 percentage points (OECD 2004: 10). The maturity of the bond is up to 
15 years. Bonds are sold by auction.18
8. ACHIEVEMENTS OF KMC’S ACTIVITIES
Since its inauguration in 2001, KMC has made a considerable contribution to the 
mortgage market development in Kazakhstan. As shown in the graph below, KMC’s 
mortgage portfolio has experienced constant growth. As of October 2004, the total 
volume of outstanding mortgage loans has reached KZT 24 billion. In 2001, KMC 
cooperated with 4 partner banks. This number has risen to 14 banks, thus increasing 
mortgage loan supply to the population. 
Interest rates on mortgage loans have decreased from 28 percent in 2001 to 13.6 per-
cent in 2004. Some partner banks oﬀer mortgage loans at a rate of 12.6 percent. In 
2001, loan terms amounted to a maximum of 3 years. Today, borrowers can be granted 
loans with terms up to 20 years. As of August 2004, the total volume of mortgage loans 
outstanding was KZT 95,156 billion. The market share of KMC is about 28 percent.
Figure 12.5 
Growth of KMC mortgage portfolio [million KZT], 2001–May 2004
Source: KMC (2004).
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KMC mortgage bonds have also gained a nation-wide acceptance among institutional 
investors. As of October 2004, the total volume of issued mortgage bonds amounts 
to KZT 21 billion. With a share of 56 percent, pension funds are the most important 
bondholders, followed by banks with 38 percent.19 KMC bondholders enjoy certain 
privileges: income on bonds is exempt from taxation. Banks have to hold only 20 percent 
of their risk-weighted capital against KMC bonds. However, there are special limits for 
insurance and pension funds. The share of KMC bonds may not be higher than 10 and 
15 percent of their assets, respectively.
9. RISK ANALYSIS OF KMC’S SECONDARY MARKET MODEL 
KMC’s main role is to stimulate long-term funding, obtained from capital markets. As 
such its operations are subject to an array of risks. This section examines these risks and 
other factors to assess the eﬀectiveness of KMC’s activities. 
The following criteria will be applied:
 • Likely eﬀectiveness of system in addressing ﬁnancial risks: The risk analysis 
outlines to which risks KMC is subject to are:
  – credit risk
  – interest rate risk
  – liquidity risk
  – exchange rate risk
  – prepayment risk.
 • Cost to consumers: What costs are imposed on the consumer when he takes 
up a mortgage loan securitized by KMC? Costs usually consist of the interest 
rate and further fees, including notary and cadastre fees, credit report, and an 
application fee if the lender requires one.
 • Cost to partner banks: What costs do the lenders bear when selling assets to 
KMC?
 • Cost to the government: What cost has the government incurred for the in-
troduction of KMC into the market, especially in light of the ﬁscal support 
granted to KMC or its bondholders (whatever type that might be)? 
 • Long-term sustainability of KMC’s activities and the whole mortgage lending 
system: To what degree will the ﬁnancial system remain robust against macr-
oeconomic shocks now and in the next 3–5 years? What could happen if the 
number of mortgages originated per year is modest, i.e., sustained issuances of 
KMC are not feasible?
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Likely Effectiveness of the System in Addressing Financial Risks
 • Credit risk: Credit risk to KMC is low because it purchases loans with full 
recourse to banks. In addition, KMC improves credit risk management of 
partner banks since loans eligible for purchase by KMC have to comply with 
the following credit ratios:
  – Payment-to-income: this ratio comprises redemption payments (interest 
and principal) as well as payments for life and property insurance. The ac-
ceptable range is 35 percent to 60 percent of monthly income.
  – Total redemption payments to income: this ratio takes into consideration all 
redemption payments for all loans the borrower has taken up. The maximum 
acceptable ratio is 45 percent of monthly income. 
  – The LTV-ratio should not be higher than 70 percent. If loans exceed this 
ratio, additional collateral is required. 
  – Since partner banks typically grant variably rated mortgages (VRMs) credit 
risk rises in the case that inﬂation surges ahead of salary increases. As a con-
sequence, the stipulated credit ratios by KMC may be diluted and require 
borrowers to provide for additional securities.20
  – Since KMGF partially insures losses that arise from defaulted mortgage 
loans,21 they could be induced to assume higher risks, as they would do 
without this insurance scheme provided by KMGF. Currently, banks’ expo-
sure to mortgage loans is increasing rapidly, making them more vulnerable 
to falling house prices (or other macroeconomic shocks which deteriorate 
households’ creditworthiness). 
   However, credit risk to partner banks remains of concern to KMC. Before 
concluding an agreement with a bank, therefore, it thoroughly analyses the 
creditworthiness of the bank. In addition, KMC does regular reviews on the 
ﬁnancial stability of partner banks.
 • Interest-rate risk: This risk was substantially reduced through the issuance 
of ﬂoating rate notes, which were indexed to inﬂation. In this case, the bor-
rower bears the interest-rate risk since partner banks granted VRMs.  
 Recently, this policy changed. The president decided to strengthen his 
popularity by setting up a large-scale mortgage scheme. In order to deliver on 
this scheme, he utilized KMC, which now oﬀers ﬁxed-rated mortgage loans 
at an interest rate of 10 percent.22 In order to ﬁnance possible interest rate 
subsidies, the government made a capital injection of USD 40 million and 
envisages increasing the capital of KMC up to USD 200 million in the next 
two years. Instead of paying out dividends to the government, they should be 
used to cover eventual interest for KMC in case interest rates rise again.  
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As a result, KMC oﬀers ﬁxed-rate loans that are reﬁnanced through ﬁxed-rate 
bonds, exposing it to considerable interest rate risk, especially when interest 
rates surge. If KMC fails, the government has to step in. 
 • Liquidity risk: Since partner banks sell their mortgages, they are no longer 
concerned about liquidity risk. However, it is of concern to investors. KMC 
addresses this risk to a signiﬁcant degree through oﬀering bond issues with 
diﬀering maturities. Furthermore, this approach has also produced a lower 
average interest rate on KMC bonds. In this context, a major advantage of 
KMC compared to the individual partner bank is that its bond issuances will 
be greater in volume, thereby giving it greater ﬂexibility in structuring them.
 • Exchange rate risk: since KMC only purchases loans denominated in KZT and 
issues bonds in KZT, exchange rate risk does not exist.
 • Prepayment risk: KMC mitigates prepayment risk through the issuance of bonds 
with ﬂoating rates with varying maturity.23 In addition, customers of the partner 
banks can execute prepayment only with a time lag (six months). However, an 
increase in prepayment activities is likely due to the falling interest rates, which 
provide a strong incentive for borrowers to reduce the payment burden.24 
Cost to Consumer 
As mentioned above, the establishment of KMC has lead to lower funding costs for 
banks and the supply of longer maturities for mortgage loans. A major advantage 
to borrowers has been the increase in loan terms made possible by the sale of assets 
and the consequent reduction in monthly payments. With ongoing macroeconomic 
stabilization, a further reduction in interest rates and an increase in loan terms (up to 
25–30 years) are likely.
Cost to Partner Banks 
Medium-sized banks have beneﬁted especially from KMC, as they have been able to 
introduce their own mortgage lending programs. Since KMC sets the standards for 
mortgage lending, partner banks have experienced higher origination and servicing 
cost in order to meet the standards required for the sale of loans to KMC. In addition, 
partner banks have to pay a fee to KMC for the securitization and management of 
their mortgage portfolios. However, partner banks have lowered their funding costs 
and have been able to oﬀer longer loan terms to their customers, which allowed them 
to gain in market share. 
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Cost to the Government 
Currently, the sole owner of KMC is NBK, which has also been the main driver for 
developing the mortgage market in Kazakhstan. As a state-owned entity, KMC may 
be more subject to political manipulation and may have a tendency to grow with or 
without being eﬃcient or eﬀective. The dual role of NBK as an owner and supervisor, 
thus likely resulting in conﬂicting interests, is slightly diluted due to the establishment 
of SAFC. However, the government plans to divest KMC’s ownership into the private 
market, which may solve this inherent conﬂict.
Since KMC is considered an instrument of the state to foster mortgage lending,25 
investors in KMC bonds may perceive this concept as a form of an implicit government 
guarantee to KMC. They would expect the government to step in if KMC faced serious 
troubles. This perception may therefore mean a potentially signiﬁcant liability to the 
state budget. It is now reinforced through the capital injections by the government and 
the imposed interest rate policy on KMC. 
An initial capital injection by the government aimed at develop long-term funding 
is understood to be an appropriate approach (Chiquier et al 2004). In essentially all 
countries in which a liquidity facility has been initiated, governments have provided at 
least limited assistance. The government’s recent policy has contradicted such a reason-
able strategy, putting an unforeseen burden on the budget. 
Long-term sustainability of KMC’s activities and the entire mortgage lending 
system:
The introduction of KMC has been embedded in a wider state strategy to develop 
the mortgage market. Activities of KMC have been reinforced through the establish-
ment of credit bureaus and MGF. By having assisted in organizing the market, KMC 
has set standards for mortgage lending which have led to better aﬀordability of housing 
loans. Moreover, KMC’s bonds have also been an attractive and secure investment for 
pension funds and insurance companies. 
However, it is unclear, to what extent investment decisions are driven by implied 
government backing (because of the still existing full NBK ownership of KMC). The 
perception that KMC’s bonds are backed by the full faith of NBK may lead to overcon-
ﬁdence in the market. The planned divesture could alter this assessment. Hence the legal 
foundations for the enforceability of the mortgage pledge and the quality of the protec-
tion provided by the mortgage pledge pool to back the securities would be important 
to clarify for KMC’s sustainability before NBK divests its holdings in KMC. 
Moreover, the resilience of the market has not been tested against macroeconomic 
shocks. Kazakhstan’s economy is largely dependent on the energy sector. Spillover eﬀects 
into the housing sector in case of a fall in oil prices or an unexpected sharp drop of the 
dollar cannot be ruled out completely. A further test on stability would be set in a pos-
sible real estate bubble since the market already shows signs of over-heating. In case of 
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its bursting, a high number of defaulted loans would be taken on which may also result 
in a considerable burden on the budget in case of a government bail-out.
10. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Inside the Commonwealth of Independent States,26 Kazakhstan was the ﬁrst country to 
supported long-term funding of mortgage loans through the issuance of mortgage-backed 
securities (covered bonds). KMC as the institution responsible for the organization of 
these transactions clearly contributed to the establishment of a stable and viable mort-
gage lending market in Kazakhstan. By lowering interest rates and increasing loan terms 
through reducing banks’ lending risks, access to aﬀordable housing loans has risen. As 
a result of KMC’s activities, competition among banks has advanced.
In order to further stimulate the market, KMC envisages the introduction of ﬁxed-
rate instruments and the improvement of bonds’ issuing procedures. KMC also intends 
to extend loan terms up to 30 years and increase its market share up to 20–25 percent 
in the next years.
The positive market perception of KMC indicates that there is suﬃcient business 
for it. Sustainability depends mostly on how attractive the funding it oﬀers is relative 
to other sorts of funding i.e., how low the rate is on its bond issuances. In this context, 
KMC’s role could be strengthened by extending its activities outside the major cities since 
there is only a limited network for mortgage origination, as large banks with wide branch 
networks are not members of KMC program. Such an involvement may be helpful, as 
the quality of housing stock and the supporting communal service infrastructure in these 
areas is still largely in need of upgrading. Public funding of infrastructure upgrades and 
new utilities are important elements in supporting housing market development. 
In Kazakhstan, KMC operating as a sale-of-assets liquidity facility proved a simple 
and robust model to mobilize funds to insure liquidity access to more mortgage lenders. 
It has been structured to realize economies of scale. It has been compatible with the 
multiple lenders in the Kazakhstani market. For lenders, it was a rating enhancement 
due to its ability to disconnect the exposure to some risks associated with their mortgage 
loan portfolios. However, the externalization of credit risk implies an agency risk and 
cost for monitoring the underwriting and servicing of loans.27 In the long run, a viable 
secondary mortgage market in Kazakhstan depends on a working primary market with 
adequate supply of originated mortgages, appropriately documented, and classiﬁed. 
Coupled with that, the government previously laid the foundations for fully function-
ing and competitive primary mortgage market. This has included actuarially sound and 
increasingly automated mortgage underwriting, credit enhancements, mortgage default 
insurance, and a well-developed investment-banking sector. However, the government 
recently abandoned this sound strategy, converting KMC from a low-risk, entity that 
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could be privatized into a high risk entity which cannot be privatized and requires a 
state guarantee.
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ENDNOTES
1 See Kosareva and Struyk (1996).
2 Increased government spending is likely to raise inﬂation by about 0.25–0.5% in 2005. 
See IMF (2005a: 13).
3 See IMF (2005a: 15).
4  However, there are large diﬀerences among the countries: in Bulgaria, the average wage is USD 187.05. In 
Russia, it amounts to USD 255. In Poland and the Czech Republic, salaries have risen to about USD 683.7. 
With USD 1,394.5 on average, Slovenes earn the highest average salaries (data as per 2003). 
5 See Zhusupova (2003) and Herrmann and Wildenhain (2003). For example, legislation on banks 
stipulates that banks have to apply IAS accounting standards. In their credit business, loans to one 
borrower may not exceed 25% of the bank’s capital. Participation exceeding 10% of the share capital 
are subject to approval of NBK.
6 Since the late 1990s, bank lending has grown by about 50% per annum in real terms. 
7 Broad money comprises currency in circulation and deposits. Data are provided by World Bank 
(2004), International Financial Statistics, and IMF.
8 From 1999 to 2004, the number of branches has been reduced from 426 to 385. 
9 See IMF (2005b: 21).
10 Fostering housing construction is one of the priorities of the 2030 Strategy of the Kazakhstani 
government. This strategy aims to maintain a stable rise in new construction and to improve housing 
aﬀordability through a better supply of housing loans and cheaper interest rates on loans. See 
Kazinform at www.kazinform.kz.
11 The KZT/USD exchange rate is 149.58 (as of 2003).
12 This information is provided by KMC. The market share of Halyk Bank is unknown. 
13 The credit bureau replaced the existing credit registry. 
14 Unfortunately, no further information on bond issuance is available.
15 Insurance companies active in the market are Kazkommerts Policy, AIG Kazakhstan, Kazinstrah, 
BTA-Insurance, Eurasia, Dynastia, and KBS Garant. The two latter companies re-insure their risk on 
the international market. 
16 Besides collateral, the borrower may also present third party guarantees for prompt payment of the 
loan and accrued interest. 
17 The interest rate is adjusted twice a year, on April 1 and October 1.
18 In the auction, the participants decide on the spread over inﬂation of the KMC bonds. Currently, it 
is 0.39. The total coupon is 8.09% (conditions as of December 2004). The spread is adjusted every 
third year. 
19 Structure of KMC bondholders as per October 2004. The remaining 6% represent other groups 
(ﬁgures are provided by KMC). 
20 In order to mitigate uncontrollable interest rate rises, KMC has introduced an interest rate cap. The 
maximum rise is limited to 4.5 percentage points within one calendar year. NBK authorized this 
policy. See OECD (2004: 7). 
21 Banks still have to bear up to 50% of the losses on defaulted loans.
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22 See Diamond (2005).
23 Since KMC has been active for only three years, prepayment patterns are still developing, thus 
requiring further scrutiny. 
24 This structure contains a partial VRM. Loans are indexed to inﬂation but changes in the structure 
of real interest rates are not indexed. As developments in Kazakhstan have shown, structural changes 
have led the real interest rate to decrease, which has encouraged borrowers to reﬁnance. 
25 See OECD (2004: 4). 
26 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprises the following countries: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
27 Currently, defaults are not widespread. Thus, KMC appears to be protected by the recourse (buy-back) 
feature in the structure. However, there is reportedly some uncertainty among market participants on 
the true quality of the protection provided by the individual pools of collateral. See IMF (2004b).
Contrast—Germany
PA R T  I V.

279
PA R T  I V.
C O N T R A S T — G E R M A N Y
 
 Mortgage Lending and Risk Management 
 in Germany
 Dr. Friedemann Roy
 ABSTRACT
 Mortgage lending in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition 
economies has developed over just the last 15 years. In contrast, Germany 
has an experience of more than 200 years, dating back to the late 18th 
century when the first covered bond was issued in order to refinance 
mortgage loans.  The article is aimed at analyzing and assessing the mort-
gage lending market in Germany. First, it outlines the main conditions 
of the housing market. The second part concentrates on the description 
and analysis of the individual lending instruments (bauspar system, pfand-
briefe, two-tier models). The third part takes on the existing risks and the 
risk management techniques in view of the overall economic context in 
the country. 
  Savings banks and cooperative banks are the most important loan 
providers of residential mortgage loans in Germany. The most impor-
tant funding instruments are the pfandbrief, bauspar funds, and other 
retail deposits. Banks, mortgage banks, and bausparkassen “securitize” 
their mortgage loan portfolios in order to achieve equity relief (through 
synthetic RMBS issues). Despite well-established credit, interest rate, and 
liquidity management instruments, the long-term future for mortgage 
lending looks bleak. This is mainly due to a shrinking population and 
resilient households’ housing investments for fear of unemployment as 
a result of the stagnating economy. In addition, the government has cut 
back spending on housing. Lenders have reacted to these developments 
through mergers, outsourcing and the selling of parts of their mortgage 
portfolios.
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Mortgage lending in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies 
has developed over just the last 15 years. In contrast, Germany has an experience of 
more than 200 years, dating back to the late 18th century when the ﬁrst covered bond 
was issued in order to reﬁnance mortgage loans. Thus, knowledge and familiarity with 
the diﬀerent ﬁnancial circuits have been determined for a long period, encompassing 
several waves of activity. In this way, the German housing ﬁnance models diﬀerentiate 
largely from those in the CEE countries, adopted only recently. Systems or models in 
theses countries have not seen an organic development as in Germany. Often, they 
are the result of a combination of Anglo-Saxon and European approaches. In 1900, 
the German Mortgage Bank Act was established, providing a legal framework for the 
so-called pfandbrief market (covered mortgage bonds). The housing shortage after the 
Second World War also favored the development of other ﬁnancing mechanisms like 
the bauspar system (contractual savings schemes for housing). In the following years, 
the bausparkassen specialized in subordinated mortgage loans while bank and mortgage 
banks granted mortgage loans up to an LTV ratio of 60 percent (secured through a ﬁrst 
lien in the land register). 
The German legislator conﬁrmed this emerging “division of labor” between banks 
and bausparkassen in its legislation on mortgage banks (i.e., pfandbriefe) and bauspar-
kassen in the mid-1930s, which also laid the legislative foundations in West Germany 
after the Second World War.
German housing policy after the Second World War can be roughly divided into 
two periods:1
 1. Reconstruction and stabilization (1945–1989):  
As a result of war damage, the country suﬀered from a shortage of more than 6 
million dwellings. The distress was aggravated through a rising inﬂux of refugees 
(about 12.5 million) from the eastern territories invaded by Russia. In 1950, just 
10.1 million dwellings were available for 16.65 million households. Since 1936, 
the number of persons living in one household had on average doubled (from 
3.6 to 6 persons per household). In order to overcome the housing shortage, 
the German government concentrated on measures dedicated to social housing 
(mainly rental housing). From 1950 to 1956 alone, the government spent €5.55 
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billion on social housing (4 percent of the total state budget). The promotion 
of owner-occupied ﬂats started later. Existing ﬁnancing techniques (pfandbrief 
and bausparen) were conﬁrmed or revived through revised legislation. Because 
of government involvement, the housing market was balanced by the 1970s, 
producing stable volumes of new construction from then on. By 1990, the value 
of all subsidized dwellings amounted to €141 billion.
 2. Shortage and oversupply (1990 to the present):  
The housing situation in the former German Democratic Republic was char-
acterized by lack of owner-occupied ﬂats and modern dwellings as well as 
considerable volumes of dilapidated dwellings. After reuniﬁcation, the gov-
ernment responded to these diﬃculties with various measures, encompassing 
urban redevelopment, social rental housing, and programs dedicated to foster 
owner-occupied housing. The strong involvement of the government fuelled a 
housing boom in East Germany: while the population grew by 300,000, supply 
of dwellings increased by 690,000. Housing companies invested more than €105 
billion. These high investments sparked over-capacity in the building industry 
and a price bubble that burst in the late 1990s. The resultant over-supply has 
driven down house prices by more than 14 percent (Commerzbank Securities 
2004: 10). Tumbling house prices were also fuelled by rising migration to West 
Germany in search of employment.2 As a consequence, East Germany has faced 
a dramatic rise in unoccupied dwellings. In 2003, 15.7 percent of the East 
German housing stock was unoccupied (1.2m dwellings).3 Half this number is 
oﬀered in the market. The other half is uninhabitable. It is estimated that the 
number of unoccupied dwellings will rise to approximately 1.75m dwellings 
by 2020.4 
This short historical overview of the development in housing ﬁnance is aimed at 
assisting the following analysis and assessment of mortgage lending in Germany—the 
objective of this article. It is organized in the following way: the ﬁrst part outlines 
the main conditions of the housing market (housing production, house prices, legal 
framework, etc.). The second part concentrates on the description and analysis of the 
individual lending instruments (bauspar system, pfandbriefe, two-tier models). The third 
part takes on the existing risks and risk management techniques in view of Germany’s 
overall economic context.
For a correct assessment of today’s situation, it should be taken into consideration 
that Germany was once divided in two parts with two diﬀerent political and economic 
systems. The western part opted for a market economy whereas the eastern part intro-
duced a centrally planned economy. The merger of these two systems (in 1990) provoked 
many diﬃculties the impacts of which are still perceivable in the German economy and 
will remain so. Housing policy has also been inﬂuenced by these developments.
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1. THE GERMAN HOUSING MARKET
This section provides an overview of the main conditions which inﬂuence demand and 
supply of housing in Germany. In addition, the legislative infrastructure and promotional 
measures in housing will be described. 
Homeownership in Germany
The German housing market is a place of contradictions: on one hand, it has one of 
the biggest mortgage markets (€1,000 billion outstanding). On the other hand, it has 
one of the lowest homeownership rates in Europe (43 percent).
Figure 13.1 
Homeownership rates in selected countries in Europe, 2003
Source: Institut für Städtebau 
According to Figure 13.1 above, only Switzerland has a lower homeownership 
rate (36 percent) than Germany. Hungary records the highest homeownership rate in 
Europe (91 percent), followed by Spain with 86 percent. Despite a slight increase in 
homeownership levels over the past years, German private households have a strong 
preference for renting ﬂats or houses. 
This preference can be attributed to the following factors: high construction costs 
have been caused by high salaries in the construction industry and high land prices 
due to strong land-use controls. House prices in relation to income are higher than in 
other developed countries. In Germany, this ratio is between 6 and 7 (4–5 in the UK 
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and 2–3 in the US). Local authorities’ restrictive land zoning has left insuﬃcient build-
ing land. City councils are reluctant to release land, because they must incur the costs 
associated with developing necessary infrastructure. Tenant-friendly legislation deters 
potential investors. Although rents are negotiated freely, they can only be increased by 
20 percent within three years. 
In contrast to other European countries like Spain or the United Kingdom, Germany 
does not dispose of lower price entry segments, which allow young families to purchase 
a home. Surveys have found out that Germans are on average over 40 years old when 
they purchase their own home. The French become homeowners at 39; Americans at 
31, and Britons at 24 (Braun and Pfeiﬀer 2004).
Housing Production in Germany
Figure 13.2 
Construction output in Germany, 1999–2004 [billion euros]
Source: German Institute for Economic Research, Association of Private Bausparkassen, and author’s 
calculations.
Since 2000, housing production has shown a declining trend. In 2003, it shrunk 
by 7.4 percent to 268,000 dwellings. In 2004, new construction is likely to further de-
crease. Household incomes are not expected to rise and people resist investing because 
of fear of joblessness. 
However, expenditure on renovation/modernization of the existing housing stock 
has remained more or less constant. In 2003, its ﬁnancing volume (amounting to 
€82.4 billion) exceeded the volume in new construction (amounting to €63.7 billion) 
by about 29 percent.
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Housing Prices in Germany
In the past three years, the total value of residential property in developed economies has 
increased by an estimated USD 20 trillion, to over USD 60 trillion. Countries, which 
have beneﬁted most from this trend, include the US and the UK (see Figure 13.3). The 
average price of a US home jumped 13 percent by the third quarter of 2004. In Britain, 
ﬁgures published by the Oﬃce of the Deputy Prime Minister show a 14 percent rise 
in the same period—that after an 11 percent rise in 2003. However, at the same time 
house prices in Germany declined by 1.7 percent. From 1997 to 2004, prices fell by 
3 percent (Economist 2004). Germany has experienced years of weak economic growth, 
coupled with high unemployment and an oversupply of houses (mainly in the east of 
the country).
Figure 13.3 
Development of house prices in Germany, the USA, and the UK 
(inﬂation-adjusted in relation to 1975)
Source: The Economist, Bulwien AG.
 
A further explanation for this diﬀerence is shown by Figure 13.4. In Germany, 
house prices are very income sensitive, but not greatly sensitive to changes in interest 
rates. In this regard, the country has an inverse interest rate curve. The regular shape of 
the curve is as follows (like the slope in Britain): when interest rates rise, house prices 
will decline. Otherwise, when house prices rise, interest rates will fall. Thus increasing 
interest rates in Germany mean increasing house prices. Another reason for this deviation 
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is that there are usually no variable mortgage loans available. In addition, prepayments 
are the exceptions (since they are very costly for the customer). 
Figure 13.4 
House prices and interest rates in Germany and the UK, 1986–2002
Source: Nationwide, Bulwien AG, Deutsche Bank Research (2003).
A closer look into individual price structures show that price developments across 
the country have been quite unequal. In principle, house prices in the former West 
Germany are higher than in the East (see Figure 13.5): higher unemployment and 
on-going emigration to the West has led to a deterioration in house prices in the 
East.
However, the West has also been confronted with declining house prices in rural 
regions whereas in economic centers like the Rhine-Maine region, Greater Stuttgart, 
or greater Munich, prices are expected to remain stable or to rise. 
In the future, location will largely inﬂuence house prices, with economic centers 
enjoying price stability and rural regions facing declining prices caused by higher un-
employment and higher emigration to bigger cities.
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Figure 13.5 
Average prices of single-family owner-occupied dwellings in Germany, 2003
[thousand euros]
Sources: LBS-Research.
Government Support for Private Housing Finance
The German government supports housing in several ways. Most popular are the fol-
lowing:
 • Support to tenant-occupied housing through tax write-oﬀs: On buy-to-let 
properties, homeowners are entitled to deduct their mortgage interest payments 
from their tax bill. This subsidy is of special interest to higher income groups, 
because they can reduce their tax burden by buying property to rent (and as 
consequence reduce their payment burden of the mortgage loan). 
 • Homeownership grant: Homeowners are entitled to claim a homeownership 
grant when they purchase or construct a house. In order to be eligible for this 
grant, disposable income in two consecutive years may not exceed €70,000 for a 
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single and €140,000 for a married couple. For every child, the income threshold 
is increased by a further €30,000. The state will provide the beneﬁciary with an 
amount of €1,250 annually for a maximum period of 8 years. For every child, 
the amount will be increased by €800. However, homeowners may not deduct 
their interest-rate payments from the tax bill.5 In 2003, the government spent 
€8.5 billion on this subsidy. At present, this subsidy is a contested issue. The 
government intends to abandon it completely.6 The opposition, however, rejects 
this plan. The pending cancellation has been submitted to an arbitration com-
mittee by Parliament. 
 • Savings premium dedicated to housing: This subsidy is aimed at supporting 
savings activities. People who want to apply for this subsidy must conclude a 
bauspar contract and save regularly. The beneﬁciary can claim the subsidy with 
his tax declaration. Similar to the homeownership grant, the payment of this 
bonus is subject to income thresholds (taxable yearly income up to €25,600 for 
a single person and €51,200 for a married couple) and is linked to a minimum 
savings period of seven years.7 If the saver fulﬁls these criteria he will receive a 
bonus of 8.8 percent of his annual savings up to a maximum of €45.06 (for a 
single person) or €90.11 (for a married couple). The government does not grant 
any tax exemptions. In 2003, the government spent about €0.5 billion on this 
subsidy.
The Legal Framework for Housing Finance
Most of the legislation related to housing ﬁnance is embedded in the Civil Code (BGB), 
for example, regulations on loans or liens/mortgages. In principle, all banking activities 
are regulated in the Banking Act. The Central Bank Act is mainly directed to regulating 
the structure of the German banking system (a two-tier system) and the management 
of banks’ liquidity.8
In addition, there are regulations on specialized funding instruments: on one hand, 
the mortgage banking act regulates the activities of mortgage banks and the issuance 
of pfandbriefe. The act also governs the establishment of specialized mortgage banks. 
However, new legislation will abandon the principle of specialization and replace it by the 
general right of banks to issue covered mortgage bonds (pfandbriefe) provided they meet 
certain qualiﬁcations.9 The new law was expected to go into eﬀect July 19, 2005.10
The Bausparkassen Act regulates the activities of the bausparkassen and the man-
agement of the bauspar business. Parliament justiﬁed the introduction of specialized 
institutions as follows (1972):11 securing access to subordinated loans at reasonable costs, 
thus conﬁrming the division of labor among banks and bausparkassen. Furthermore, it 
states that the speciﬁc characteristics of the bauspar business require specialized knowl-
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edge, which is not necessarily known to a universal bank. Specialized institutions appear 
as a more adequate way to avoid a misuse of funds than in a universal bank model. 
The following rule governs the relationship between general and specialized legisla-
tion: as long as there is no speciﬁc regulation, the general rules apply. Hence, specialized 
banks also have to respect the general legislation on banks. 
During the last decades, EU legislation has strongly inﬂuenced German banking 
legislation and business practices. Recent examples of this process are consumer protec-
tion rules aimed at creating a European-wide market for mortgage loans. This objective 
is to be a priority of the work of the EU Commission in the next years. The ﬁrst step 
was the establishment of a code of conduct: ﬁnancial institutions that grant mortgage 
loans have committed themselves to give detailed information about their loan products 
as well as their terms and conditions so that borrowers are more capable of comparing 
diﬀerent loan oﬀers. 
In order to stimulate cross-border lending, the EU Commission wants standardized 
rules for the calculation of the eﬀective interest rate on mortgage loans. In addition, 
borrowers should be entitled to prepay a mortgage loan in the ﬁrst years without 
penalties.12
2. LENDING MODELS IN HOUSING FINANCE
This section will describe the ﬁnancing techniques that lenders in Germany apply to fund 
mortgage loans. The ﬁrst part will give a brief overview of mortgage loan characteristics 
and current trends in housing ﬁnance. Regarding diﬀerent lending models, the second 
part will concentrate on the bauspar system and the reﬁnancing of mortgage loans through 
the issuance of pfandbriefe and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
Mortgage Loan Characteristics
German lending conditions are the result of the already mentioned division of labor 
among mortgage lenders, banks, and bausparkassen. On average, loans extended by banks 
have terms ranging from 25 to 30 years. However, interest rates are ﬁxed for a period 
of 5 to 15 years because legislation forbids longer terms.13 If their LTV ratio does not 
exceed 60 percent, mortgages can be reﬁnanced by pfandbriefe.14 Customers rarely ask 
for adjusted rated mortgages (ARM). 
Mortgages extended by bausparkassen have a term of 7 to 16 years. Their LTV ratio 
may not exceed 80 percent (according to the Bausparkassen Act). They are ﬁnanced by 
the bauspar deposits, which the bausparkasse has previously collected before granting 
the loans. 
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The division of labor between these two ﬁnancial institutions is constituted through 
the lien structure of the land registry: whereas the mortgage loan is secured through 
a ﬁrst ranked lien, the bauspar loan is usually secured through a second ranked lien. 
This approach implies for the bausparkassen a higher risk, which is understood to be 
compensated by the pre-savings requirement.
Pre-payment is not a hot topic in Germany because banks impose heavy prepayment 
penalties:15 about 5 percent of mortgage loans are reﬁnanced each year. Banks justify 
these penalties with the probable loss of interest revenues since they still have to honor 
the obligations to reﬁnance the mortgage loan. The prepayment penalty therefore is 
aimed at compensating for the lost income.
Further characteristics of German housing practices are low foreclosure rates, which 
oscillate around 1 percent of mortgage-ﬁnanced properties, although they are slowly 
rising. These favorable ratios are the result of the property valuation process. Usually, 
banks discount 10 to 15 percent of the market value of a house. This appraisal value is 
then the basis for the LTV ratio.16
Lending procedures of German banks or bausparkassen are quite similar. Banks 
make the following steps: 
 • Banks ask for an income statement and for a copy of the land register. In addi-
tion, they require a statement about the creditworthiness of a borrower through 
Schufa Holding (credit bureau).17
 • If the ﬁrst assessment is satisfactory, banks determine the loan amount which 
is based on the property value and the creditworthiness of the borrowers (and 
any additional securities he may oﬀer). In general, banks’ underwriting criteria 
are understood to be rather stringent.18
Current Trends in Housing Finance
In contrast to ﬁnancing practices in the US or UK, mortgage lending for individuals 
in Germany comprises both ﬁnancing of owner-occupied ﬂats and the purchase or 
construction of dwellings for rental purposes in multifamily buildings. The proportion 
of this loan business amounted to 20 percent in 2003.19
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Figure 13.6 
Outstanding residential loans (in billion euros) 
and market share of German banks, 2003 (percent)
Source: German Central Bank, Association of German Mortgage Banks, author’s calculations.
According to Figure 13.6, savings banks and cooperative banks are the most impor-
tant providers of residential mortgage loans in Germany.20 This is due to their strong 
local presence and the focus on retail banking. The market share of specialized mortgage 
banks (excluding HVB) has consistently declined in recent years. From the early 1990s 
to 2003, it fell from 18 to 13 percent. It seems that specialization in mortgage lending 
provides an obstacles to achieve suﬃcient revenues. In addition, the bursting price bubble 
in the East in the late 1990s has lead to considerable losses.21 Consequently, mortgage 
banks have undergone several restructuring programs in order to regain proﬁtability. 
Further consolidation is likely in the next years.22
Over the last decade, the German mortgage market has experienced rising standardi-
zation of the mortgage business. It is estimated that 98 percent of the market volume 
derives from annuity loans with a ﬁxed interest rate of 10 years on average and ﬁxed terms 
of repayment. The high number of lenders has resulted in ﬁerce competition, which has 
lead to consumer-friendly prices of 30 to 60BP (basis points) over the swap curve.
In general, banks and bausparkassen dominate the market. Independent ﬁnancial 
advisors are slowly advancing; thereof the biggest are MLP and AWD.23 They focus on 
higher income groups and try to attract them with a wide array of sophisticated products 
and a high standard of services. 
Another feature of the German market is the fact that more and more banks act as 
intermediaries (e.g., Citigroup, cooperative banks). The selling of externally originated 
loan products through bank branches is the result of the ongoing focusing on core 
competencies. This trend, for example, is supported by the strategic initiatives of the 
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cooperative association, which arranges eﬃcient centralized servicing, risk spreading, 
and reﬁnancing in specialized head oﬃces for the 1,500 cooperative banks.
The small margins in the mortgage business have favored the emergence of third 
party specialists such as Kreditwerk or Hypotheken Management in order to reduce 
costs. However, many lenders are still hesitant to outsource to processing units entirely 
and try to gain eﬃciency with in-house departments instead. 
Eurohypo and Citigroup recently established an operational platform in order to 
take on the purchase and service of delinquent loans. This platform comprises two 
specialized institutions: the ﬁrst (domiciled in the U.S.) purchases the loans and the 
second (domiciled in Germany) is responsible for their servicing. Currently, this platform 
manages a portfolio of €2.4 billion which has been sold by Eurohypo.24
Banks and bausparkassen secure their mortgage loan portfolios in order to achieve 
equity relief. Due to the lack of a well-deﬁned framework for securitization and to tax 
barriers, banks have stuck to synthetic RMBS issues.25 Rising RMBS issues have been the 
result of KfW’s securitization programs (PROMISE and PROVIDE). These programs 
allow banks to transfer the risk of mortgage pools into the capital markets through an 
established vehicle.26 Currently, these programs are the de facto standard for synthetic 
securitization transactions. 
In 2003, KfW and 13 commercial banks launched the True Sales Initiative (TSI) in 
order to develop a true sales market in Germany. TSI is aimed at mutually improving 
the legal framework and establishing standards for true sale transactions27 and creating 
a liquid market. Since the pfandbrief is expected to remain the most important fund-
ing source for ﬁrst lien mortgage loans, TSI wants to oﬀer a cheap funding source for 
subordinated mortgages or consumer loans. Irrespective of their own rating, banks may 
refer to TSI in order to address more risky loans through TSI or to achieve a cheaper 
funding of regular loans due to the better rating of the TSI bond issue.28
The development of true sales-transactions has taken place in the face of some dif-
ﬁculties. One problem is the tax discrimination by value added tax, lacking separation 
of the underlying receivables from the selling bank’s assets in case of its bankruptcy. 
However, this issue was solved this year when the Ministry of Finance exempted true 
sales transactions from value added tax.29 A remaining issue is that the necessary equity 
to be held against securitization transactions has not been clariﬁed yet in view of the 
Basle II requirements. 
Lending Models in Germany
In Germany, the following models are used to provide mortgage loans:
 1. Vertically integrated models: their business comprises the whole value chain 
of the mortgage lending business (originating, servicing, booking, etc.). Most 
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private banks (like Deutsche Bank AG or Commerzbank AG), bausparkassen, 
and mortgage banks can be put in this category.
 2. Two-tier models comprise the issuance of RMBS (mainly through KfW as the 
main provider). As an example, the securitization program of the cooperative 
banks will be shown.30
 3. The retirement provision model as a response to expected demographic changes 
in and the rising need for citizens to care for their own retirement provisions. 
These institutions oﬀer a plethora of insurance and ﬁnancing products through 
diﬀerent subsidiaries which all belong to the same group. A part of their portfolio 
is secured through the KfW programs (e.g., BHW).31
Vertical Models
The German bauspar system oﬀers a dedicated loan-linked form of saving. It links a 
phase of contractual savings, usually remunerated at below market interest rates, to the 
promise of a housing loan at a rate ﬁxed below the market level at the time of the conclu-
sion of the bauspar contract. Despite its existence in Germany for more than 80 years, 
the underlying construction of the bauspar product has been more or less identical: it 
starts with a savings period in which the saver is required to regularly save, eventually 
accumulating about 50 percent of the previously agreed contract sum. Subsequently, he 
is entitled to a loan oﬀer. The bauspar loan, which is made up of the remaining balance 
between the contract amount and the amount saved, will be paid out to the customer 
together with his savings. During the loan period, the customer repays his bauspar loan 
in regular installments.
Figure 13.7 
The bauspar system
Source: Roy (2004). 
Inflow of funds Outflow of funds
Allocation pool
Savings Loans
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The German bauspar system operates as a closed system. Thus, it can be also described 
as a “time-money” system: on conclusion of the bauspar contract, all conditions will be 
ﬁxed (including the interest rate on the savings and the loan), i.e., the bausparkasse can-
not use the interest rate to balance supply and demand of funds. The allocation pool is 
therefore the decisive management tool in a closed system because the bausparkasse can 
only allocate those funds in the form of bauspar loans that it has previously collected. 
Hence, customers are subject to a waiting period the length of which depends on the 
availability of funds. The challenge for the bausparkasse in managing such an “allocation 
pool” is to balance ﬂuctuating inﬂow and outﬂow of funds in order to meet future loan 
demands within a reasonable time span. In order to reach short and consistent waiting 
periods, bausparkassen stick to speciﬁc queuing rules that determine the sequence of the 
loan disbursements. In conclusion, the concept of the bauspar system makes external 
funding less relevant. However, overall market conditions inﬂuence fund supply and 
loan demand.
Figure 13.8 
Issuance of pfandbriefe through a mortgage bank
Source: Lassen (2004) and Roy (2004).
The pfandbrief (covered mortgage bond) is a debt instrument secured against a 
dynamic pool of speciﬁcally identiﬁed eligible mortgages. The fundamental concept 
of this security is the reliance on collateral (mortgage) as the primary source of credit 
quality, which signiﬁcantly reduces the risk to the bondholder. Typically, pfandbriefe 
have a ﬁxed coupon and a bullet payment at maturity.
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Pfandbriefe in Germany are currently obligations of a specialized mortgage bank 
that provide credit enhancement. There is no implicit or explicit government guarantee 
for the pfandbriefe; their market acceptability depends completely on the quality of the 
underlying loan pool and the legal structure, ensuring the security of the bonds (even 
in the case of loan defaults or bankruptcy of the issuer).
The German Mortgage Banking Act (GBMA) ensures the safety of the pfandbriefe 
by establishing the following benchmarks for pfandbriefe issuances:
 1. Principle of coverage: pfandbriefe (principal and interest) are covered at all 
times by loans (principal and interest) at least equal to the nominal value of all 
outstanding issues and yielding at least an equal interest return. 
 2. Conservative lending limits: only the portion of the loan at or below 60 percent 
LTV is eligible to be included in the pfandbriefe cover pool. Valuation rules for 
mortgaged real estate are strictly regulated.
 3. Comprehensive regulation and protection for investors: a trustee oversees the 
characteristics of the mortgage collateral. The Central Bank regularly monitors 
the correct coverage of mortgage bonds. In the event of bankruptcy of the lender, 
the bondholders have priority in access to the cover pool.
 4. Principle of specialized banking: at the present time, only specialized, highly 
regulated mortgage banks are entitled to issue pfandbriefe. Their business is 
restricted to public sector and mortgage lending (as noted above, this limita-
tion was to be removed in 2005, to be replaced by the imposition of additional 
regulatory safeguards on commercial banks that issue covered mortgage bonds). 
Banks issuing pfandbriefe are portfolio lenders with the mortgage assets remain-
ing on their balance sheet.
Two-tier Model
Upon originating a mortgage loan, a local cooperative bank has a choice whether to 
retain the mortgage loan in its portfolio or sell it internally to one of the three mortgage 
banks of the cooperative banking group (DG Hyp, Muencher Hypo, or Westfälische 
Landschaft). This structure allows for internal competition among these three lenders 
to buy the mortgages from the local cooperative bank. The credit manager of the co-
operative can directly decide during the underwriting process to which mortgage bank 
he will pass through the loan. Typically, the mortgage bank will be chosen that oﬀers 
the best rate. 
Servicing of the loan can either be executed by the local cooperative bank or out-
sourced to Kreditwerk. This institution was founded in July 2000 in order to service 
(mainly standardized) mortgage loans (as well as bauspar contracts issued by Bausparkasse 
Schwäbisch Hall, the bausparkasse of the cooperative banking group). Kreditwerk is not 
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a bank, but only a service provider to local cooperative banks and the three mortgage 
banks. The local cooperative bank still remains the point-of-sale for the client for the 
whole lifetime of the loan (even in case of a pass-through).32
Figure 13.9 
Two-tier model—the approach of co-operative banks
Source: Roy (2004) 33
The establishment of Kreditwerk was a strategic move in order to tackle the decreas-
ing margins in mortgage lending. In 1995, margins oscillated between 98 and 112 BP. 
In the future they are expected to vary between 45 and 55 BP. Under this projection, 
proﬁt margins are likely to fall from 31–33 BP to only 4 BP. Through Kreditwerk, unit 
cost of the loan processing should be reduced by 30 to 48 percent. Participating banks 
may improve their productivity by 20 to 30 percent.34
German RMBS Volumes
Despite the recent initiative of KfW, the RMBS market in Germany is still in its infancy 
when it comes to the volume of mortgage loans being securitized (not the techniques). 
As Figure 13.10 indicates, there have been 37 publicized RMBS issues aggregating 
€62.12 billion between May 1998 and May 2004. Of these 37 transactions, only two 
were true sales, the rest were synthetic transfers. 
Loan
Co-operative bankCostumer
Retaining or selling
Bausparkasse
Schwäbisch Hall Kreditwerk
Processing and servicing
Mortgage banks
DG Hyp
Muenchener Hypo
Westfaelische
Landschaft
297
M O R T G A G E  L E N D I N G  A N D  R I S K  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  G E R M A N Y
Figure 13.10 
German RMBS volumes in comparison to lending volumes of mortgage banks 
and bausparkassen, 1998–2003 [million euros]
Source: Commerzbank Securities, Association of Private Bausparkassen, Association of Mortgage 
Banks.
When banks are asked which kind of securitization they prefer, they reply that they 
will stick to synthetic transactions to free up economic capital. For them, the pfandbrief 
still remains the preferred funding instrument since spreads are considerably lower. For 
example, HVB Group mentioned that their last benchmark was a 10-year pfandbrief 
issue that priced at 10BP over Euribor. It also states that with Basle II, the pfandbrief 
will become even more attractive because the risk weighting for the mortgage will be 
reduced while the pfandbrief itself continues to have a low weighting, which will be 
beneﬁcial to bank investors.35
The graph also shows that the most important funding instruments in Germany 
are the pfandbrief and bauspar funds. Thus, these large funding bases will limit the need 
for true-sale securitization as a funding technique. It is likely that synthetic structures, 
which help achieve capital relief by a risk transfer, to remain the force behind German 
mortgage securitization for the foreseeable future.
3. RELATED RISKS IN MORTGAGE LENDING IN GERMANY
In contrast to the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany dis-
poses of a broad array of diﬀerent lenders and well-developed funding mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the legal framework smoothly supports the lending process both in lending 
0
20
25
30
35
40
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mortgage Banks
15
10
5
Bausparkassen RMBS
298
H O U S I N G  F I N A N C E  • •  PA R T  I V  • •  C O N T R A S T — G E R M A N Y
and in registering as well as foreclosing a mortgage (if inevitable). Therefore, the risk 
analysis concentrates on the whole housing ﬁnance sector and will refer to individual 
funding techniques where necessary. The analysis will take into consideration the fol-
lowing criteria:
 • Outlook for mortgage lenders: which future trends will inﬂuence the demand 
on mortgage loans in Germany? How will they inﬂuence proﬁts in mortgage 
lending?
 • Likely eﬀectiveness of the system in addressing ﬁnancial risks (i.e., credit risk, 
liquidity, and interest rate risk as well as prepayment risk).36
 • Cost to consumers: which costs are imposed on the consumer when taking 
up a mortgage loan? Costs usually consist of the interest rate and further fees, 
including notary and cadastre fees, credit report, and an application fee if the 
lender requires one.
 • Role of government: this part of the analysis focuses on the involvement in 
regulating the market and the cost the government incurs for the support of 
individual instruments.
Outlook for Mortgage Lenders
The long-term future for mortgage lending in Germany looks a bit bleak: over the next 
50 years, we expect the population to shrink (due to low birth rates) and live longer. 
The percentage of people over 65 years will rise from 17 percent (2004) to 30 percent 
by 2050 (Deutsche Bank Research 2004: 3). Simultaneously, the number of people ﬁt 
for employment will shrink from 55 m as per today to 44 million—a 20 percent reduc-
tion (Deutsche Bank Research 2004a).
 The emergence of regional economic centers (e.g., the Rhine-Main area, greater 
Stuttgart, greater Munich, etc.) will reinforce demographic eﬀects. The East will espe-
cially suﬀer from this trend: the ongoing emigration and high unemployment makes 
a rebound in property prices unlikely. Experts estimate that a loan volume of about 
€40 billion may default in this region.37 One reason for this high ﬁgure is that many 
commercial properties leased for long periods and high rents shortly after reuniﬁcation 
are now becoming vacant and cannot be rented out again.38
The following trends will have a considerable impact on mortgage lending (i.e., 
proﬁtability of institutions involved in mortgage lending):39
 • Declining house prices are expected across all major cities, both East and West. 
In general, they will be sharper in the East. Individual price drops will strongly 
depend on location, the condition of the building, its size, and the layout of the 
dwelling. In any case, price decreases will be lower in areas that already have a 
solid industrial base or can attract industries over the next years. Areas or cities 
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with the potential to attract companies should be those with renowned universi-
ties that release a highly qualiﬁed young workforce on an ongoing basis.40
 • The number of unoccupied dwellings will rise further, generally being higher in 
the East. In the West, this number amounts to 7 percent of the total housing 
stock (about 2.5m dwellings as per 2002).41
 • Foreclosure sales have also surged. The German courts recorded 92,000 cases in 
2003, worth about €18 billion.42 Courts in the East record the highest increases, 
which corresponds with the higher unemployment in this region.43
Households are expected to remain cautious. Fear of unemployment and stagnating 
real incomes will back this trend. As a consequence, loan-growth is likely slow down, 
which—combined with competition—makes it even harder for lenders to retain their 
market share. In additions, margins are expected to decrease. In view of the aging housing 
stock, one segment of growth will be small loans for renovation or modernization.44
Lenders have reacted to these developments through mergers (e.g., the establish-
ment of Eurohypo AG), outsourcing (e.g., the establishment of Kreditwerk AG) and the 
selling of parts of their mortgage portfolios (mainly delinquent loans) as the example 
of Citibank and Eurohypo AG shows. 
Moreover, banks and bausparkassen will more and more stick to RMBS issues in 
order to achieve capital relief, thus freeing capital for new loan business and improving 
their proﬁtably. In this context, KfW will remain the main platform for these transac-
tions. Its work may help to lead to more homogenous RMBS issues. However, it remains 
unclear how far true sales will play a stronger role in funding, which will depend on the 
pricing of the securitized debt in relation to pfandbriefe.
Likely Eﬀectiveness of the System in Addressing Financial Risks
The mortgage loan is the most important loan type in Germany. About 60 percent of 
all loans (about €2,230 billion as of the 2nd quarter of 2004) granted to private persons 
and enterprises concern property investments. 84 percent of these loans are securitized 
through a mortgage. 
 • Credit risk: Although the number of defaulted loans has increased, the German 
Bundesbank does not see a systemic risk for lenders. It still considers house-
holds’ creditworthiness suﬃcient.45 Even for the savings banks and cooperatives 
banks, which have the highest share of mortgage loans in their portfolios (about 
€351.2 billion as of June 30, 2004), the Bundesbank does not make out a sub-
stantial increase in credit risk. 
   In addition, credit risk seems to be limited through conservative underwriting 
standards. Furthermore, it is not expected that banks will underwrite high-risk 
mortgage loans as the Basle II regulation will then increase their capital costs.
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 • Liquidity and interest-rate risk: the market is not expected to suﬀer from a 
liquidity shortage. To give an example, the bausparkassen alone have attracted 
about €17.3 billion of savings so far this year.46 Since the pfandbrief enjoys 
a good international reputation, it provides banks with a cheap funding in-
strument, thus further guaranteeing suﬃcient liquidity in the market. 
 Therefore, interest rate risk may be of less concern for lenders. However, 
the high inﬂux of funds to the bausparkassen may deteriorate their proﬁtability: 
often, interest rates on bauspar savings are relatively higher than market rates. 
Since they have ﬁxed all conditions on conclusion of the bauspar contract, in-
terest rates on the bauspar loan appear relatively higher than market rates when 
the contract is due for allocation. As a result, customers do not take up the 
bauspar loan that is more expensive than a regular mortgage loan in the market. 
Bausparkassen face diﬃculties to achieve a suﬃcient yield on the free funds in 
order to meet the commitments in the savings period of their customers.47 
 The low margins in mortgage lending are also problematical for the special-
ized mortgage banks. The margins in public ﬁnancing (their second business 
segment) are so low that they do no suﬃce to balance the losses in mortgage 
lending. The abandonment of the principle of specialization (as a result of the 
new Act on Pfandbriefe) is not expected to increase competition for the mortgage 
banks since nearly all banking groups are already active in this type of business. 
Since margins are low, new entrants in this segment are not likely. In addition, 
the law requires them to prove high credibility and to issue high volumes, which 
serves as another obstacle.48
 • Prepayment risk: at present, there are no signs that prepayment patterns are 
going to change (although legislation is likely to change). The pfandbrief as the 
core-funding instrument for long-term mortgage loans is unlikely to change 
into a ﬂoating rate bond. In addition, German mentality prefers safe condi-
tions ﬁxed for a long time and will therefore abstain from ARMs. It is diﬃcult 
to assess how far EU-legislation in this area will inﬂuence prepayment patterns 
among German borrowers in the future.
Cost to Consumers
The ﬁerce competition among lenders is beneﬁcial to customers. Interest rates on loans 
are relatively low, varying from 4.25 to 4.7 percent p.a.49 Some banks charge a closing 
fee which is usually a ﬁxed amount. Notary and fees for registering a mortgage also vary 
from town to town. On average, the cost of taking out a mortgage amount to 1.2 percent 
of the purchase value of the dwelling.50 Since house prices are relatively low, potential 
buyers can count on favorable conditions. However, the current economic climate has 
discouraged them from taking up a mortgage loan.
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The Role of Government
As in other developed European countries, the German government has constantly 
reduced spending on housing. It does not grant any interest rate subsidies. State sup-
port for the bauspar bonus and the homeownership grant was reduced last year: the 
bauspar bonus was cut by 10 percent and the homeownership grant by 30 percent. On 
the other hand, the support of tenant-occupied housing through tax write-oﬀs has not 
been decreased. 
To date, German housing policy has pursued the right approach in supporting 
incomes instead of subsidizing interest rates. It has not managed, however, to encour-
age more people to acquire a home. Homeownership stands at 43 percent. Despite the 
right concept and declining house prices, income growth has lagged behind swings in 
house prices. In the future, the indebtedness of the state and demographic trends are 
likely to curtail budgetary possibilities. Hence, support for homeownership is likely to 
become more diﬃcult, even unaﬀordable.
4. CONCLUSION
Germany has managed to set up stable conditions for mortgage lending. The plethora of 
diﬀerent lenders and funding mechanisms allow for healthy competition, which fosters 
innovation in new products and funding (e.g., the recent developments of RMBS is-
sues). The popularity of the pfandbrief in Germany has induced the development of a 
covered bond market in Europe and in many transition countries in Eastern Europe.51 
Nearly every country has adopted a legislation on covered mortgage bonds that has been 
modeled after the German pfandbrief. The bauspar system has also appeared in some 
Eastern European countries.
These highly developed and sophisticated instruments and techniques have been the 
result of a long process encompassing several waves of activity: the ﬁrst change occurred 
when the German legislator cemented the division of labor between bausparkassen and 
mortgage banks (in the 1930s). The second incision happened after the Second World 
War when there was an urgent need to rebuild the destroyed housing stock. From the 
1990s, reuniﬁcation called into question the strong involvement of the government in 
housing (especially in social housing). The next change is expected with the abandonment 
of the specialty principle for the mortgage banks which may pave the way for stronger 
demand for RMBS issuances. However, because of its  high reputation the pfandbrief 
is likely to remain the most popular funding instrument in the near future. 
In contrast to the broad German experience, CEE countries have a much shorter 
record. Germany disposes of three well established ﬁnancing circuits (the bauspar sys-
tem, pfandbriefe, and RMBS issuances). Thus, modiﬁcations and revamps of the already 
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implemented systems in these countries are likely to further adapt to changing market 
conditions. Moreover, new instruments may be introduced. In line with the develop-
ment in Germany, the establishment of credit processing centers (such as Kreditwerk) is 
likely to appear in these countries when margins will shrink and the pressure for market 
consolidation further increases.
A further diﬀerence is the knowledge and availability of risk management instru-
ments. For example, synthetic RMBS issues are not used in CEE countries since these 
markets have not yet developed the necessary derivatives to allow for this type of secu-
ritization. As a result, true sales are the preferred ﬁnancing technique. 
In Germany, mature legislation has also assisted in shaping these ﬁnancing instru-
ments although there are still obstacles to overcome (especially in view of true sale 
securitizations). However, the German case underlines the importance of a well-func-
tioning and reliable legal framework for their establishment, reﬁnement, and further 
development. 
In the future, Germany will also experience a rise in RMBS issuances. The main 
objective for banks in turning to RMBS will be to achieve capital relief. Since the pfand-
brief already provides cheap funding for ﬁrst lien mortgages, true sales may become an 
adequate funding mechanism for subordinated loans.
However, it remains unclear whether more Germans are prepared to take up a loan. 
Although 80 percent of the population dreams of owning a dwelling,52 most are likely 
to remain tenants. High construction costs and favorable rent conditions, coupled with 
a weak economic climate, prevent citizens from acquiring a home. As opposed to CEE 
countries, the sluggish demand for housing loans in Germany is not due to the interest 
rate environment.53 Currently, the low interest rate in Germany should favor demand 
for housing. 
Although the government successfully overcame the housing shortage after the 
Second World War, the preference for large subsidized housing programs (including 
social housing) have appeared to create the wrong incentives in the market. CEE 
countries which have abstained from similar programs are likely to create more robust 
and sustainable ﬁnancing circuits than those countries which have opted for large gov-
ernmental housing schemes (although there is a strong demand in many countries for 
strong state involvement).
The German housing policy after reuniﬁcation has led to strong failures in the mar-
kets. Politicians distorted supply and demand by subsidizing the rental sector with tax 
write-oﬀs on investment properties (until 1997). As a result, supply was mainly driven by 
wealthier parts of the primarily West German population who longed for opportunities 
to reduce their taxable income and not by the demand of potential tenants in the East 
(especially given what they were willing and able to aﬀord). The government still faces a 
considerable burden as it now subsidizes demolition (mainly of panel block buildings).54 
Thus, the major challenges for the government will be to reduce oversupply in the East 
and adapt its housing policy to demographic developments. 
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ENDNOTES
1  See Roy (2004). 
2  As in other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the industry in East Germany faced 
a great deal of restructuring and reorganization in order to be adapted to standards which prevail in 
a market economy. 
3  The total housing stock in East Germany amounts to 7.6 million dwellings (Berlin included).
4  The considerable number of unoccupied dwellings results from the following: ﬁrst, the government of 
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was not capable of maintaining the old buildings, 
which are now often uninhabitable. Second, the GDR government expropriated many house-owners 
or took possession of dwellings the owners of which left the GDR when the regime was established. 
These dwellings were often transferred to citizens of the GDR. After reuniﬁcation, many former 
owners (living in West Germany) sued for restitution according to legislation of the united Germany. 
Since their claims have been arbitrated by the courts, the dwellings could not have been used or 
have been left by the current owners. As a result, these dwellings became dilapidated and are often 
uninhabitable. Third, many panel-block buildings have emptied in rural areas where GDR attempts 
to promote industrialization were abandoned. 
5  This measure only applies if the house will be rented. In this case, the borrower is not entitled to the 
homeownership grant.
6   Arguments in favor of its cancellation are the oversupply of dwellings (especially in the East) and a 
declining demand for new houses in view of the shrinking population. The new government planned 
to channel the freed funds into educational measures. 
7  If bauspar funds are used for housing purposes within a period of seven years, the debtor is not 
obliged to pay back the bonus. 
8  Supervision of banks is executed by the German Bundesbank (liquidity) and the German Federal 
Financial Services Supervision Agency (Baﬁn), which grants licenses to banks and for speciﬁc ﬁnancial 
products (assurances, bauspar contracts, etc.). 
9  Baﬁn grants pfandbrief issuer licenses and checks whether the applying banks meet the criteria for 
pfandbrief issuances stipulated in the new law. 
10 See Bundesrat (2004). 
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11  See  Bundestags-Drucksache (1992).
12  See Financial Times Deutschland (2004).
13  Mortgage maturity is typically longer than the pfandbriefe maturity: the mortgage loan term is about 
25 to 30 years but the rate can be ﬁxed for a maximum of 10 to 15 years. Consequently, the mortgage 
bank will issue matching maturity debt to fund the loan during its ﬁxed rate period.
14  In case the LTV ratio exceeds 60%, banks split the mortgage into diﬀerent parts in order to reﬁnance 
a part of the mortgage through pfandbriefe. Often, loans above 60% LTV are ﬁnanced by a third 
party lender (e.g., bausparkasse).
15  Prepayment penalties of German banks are the highest in Europe: for a €100,000 mortgage loan with 
an interest term of 10 years and a prepayment after 5 years, German banks charge on average €11,000 
whereas banks in France charge on average €3,000, in Portugal €1,400 and in the Netherlands 
€2,000. See Kusitzky (2004).
16  This concept is also called “loan-to-appraised-value (LTAV) concept.” Calculation of LTV is based 
on the property’s value and not the market value. Usually, the appraised value is 5 to 10% lower than 
the market value depending on the property type, location, and size. For further information, see 
Commerzbank Securities (2002).
17  “Schufa” collects data of every borrower on his outstanding loans and payment behaviors. All banks 
except savings banks provide information to Schufa. Banks are automatically informed when one of 
their clients takes up another loan at a diﬀerent bank. In addition, Schufa collects information about 
existing bank accounts and credit cards. 
18  See Commerzbank Securities (2002: 7).
19  See Kretschmar and Damaske (2003: 3).
20  If loans disbursements are taken into consideration, bausparkassen appear as the most important loan 
providers, showing a market share of 29% (in 2003). For further details, see Association of Private 
Bausparkassen (2003). 
21  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). 
22  The ﬁrst wave of consolidation was initiated through the merger of the mortgage banks of the three 
private banks Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG and Commerzbank AG. In August 2002, they 
merged their mortgage bank subsidiaries in one specialized mortgage bank (Eurohypo AG).
23  For further information about MLP (Marschollek, Lautenschläger, und Partner) and AWD (Allge-
meiner Wirtschaftsdienst) see their websites mlp.de and awd.de.
24  See Börsenzeitung (2004). This transaction has two advantages: ﬁrst, it reduces the risk in the balance 
sheet. Second, it releases equity which can now be used to fund new business. 
25  In a synthetic RMBS issue, the originating bank does not sell any mortgage loans. It only transfers 
the risk of loss associated with these mortgage loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or a diﬀerent 
bank against payment of a premium or a fee. See Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Deringer (2004). 
26  Despite being issued under one umbrella of the KfW program, so far each transaction has been 
unique in terms of collateral and the nature of risk being transferred through the swap. For further 
information, see Miehs (2004: 238).
27  In a true sales securitization, the originating bank sells a pool of mortgage loans to an SPV. The SPV 
issues bonds in order to ﬁnance the purchase of these mortgage loans. See Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus 
Deringer (2004).
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28  See Glüder and Bechtold (2004: 19).
29  See Tartler (2004).
30  The savings bank group is heading for a trust solution: local savings banks transfer mortgage loans 
to their responsible landesbank which issues pfandbriefe against these funds. See Waas (2004) and 
Ruhkamp (2004).
31  See Börsenzeitung (2004).
32  See VR Kreditwerk (2003).
33  See also Dübel (2004: 6).   
34  See VR Kreditwerk (2004) and Speck and Golembiewski (2004: 24). 
35 Structured Finance International (2004: 31).
36 Few loans are denominated in foreign currency (e.g., CHF, USD) in Germany. Therefore, this risk 
type will not be tackled. 
37 See Balzli and Pauly (2004). These ﬁgures also comprise commercial property loans. 
38 See IMF (2004: 15).
39 See Kornemann (2004).
40 In his article, Kornemann predicts that it is unlikely that those regions in which citizens have already 
left are capable of turning round this development. 
41 In the East, 13% of the housing stock is unoccupied. 
42 Die Welt (2004).
43 The borrowers, whose loans are defaulting, have incomes below average. The debt-to-income ratio 
is usually higher than 30%. In addition, the down-payment share was lower. Often, young families 
with children belong to this group. See Association of Private Bausparkassen (2003).
44 This feature may be beneﬁcial to bausparkassen since they typically grant small loans. The average 
bauspar loan is €23,917 (see Association of Private Bausparkassen 2004).
45 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004: 44). Moreover, the Bundesbank does not recognize any correlation 
between the development of house prices and the debt service capability of the households. This 
argumentation is reinforced through decreasing the debt ratio of the households. In 2003, it fell from 
113 to 111% of the disposable income.
46 See Federal Statistical Oﬃce (2004). They expect the inﬂow of savings to rise up to €26 billion by the 
end of 2004.
47 See Kort (2004).
48 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004: 56).
49 These conditions are valid for a loan amount of €50,000 with an LTV ratio of 60% for a 10-year term 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung 2004).
50 See Hardt (2002).
51 See Simensen (2004). 
52 See LBS (2004: 31).
53 Although interest rates have already fallen in most of the more mature transition countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, they are still higher than in Germany (or other Western European countries). 
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54 For example, in the eastern province of Saxony there are 414,000 unoccupied dwellings. The local 
government spends  €190m every year on demolition and modernization of these dwellings. Provided 
that no further unoccupied dwellings appear in the market, the clearing up of the housing stock will 
take about 13 years. See Schmidt-Eichstaedt (2004: 190).
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Table A.4 
Exchange rate [USD] in 2002 and 2003 in Russia, Romania, Poland, 
Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Germany 
Local Currency [USD rate]
2002 2003
Russia RUR 31.8 29.5
Romania ROL 31.3 37.6
Poland PLN 3.6 3.7
Kazakhstan KZT 153.5 143.3
Czech Republic CZK 35.0 30.3
Croatia HRK 7.2 6.1
Hungary HUF 225.2 207.9
Slovenia SIT 240.2 207.1
Germany EUR 1.0 1.3
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Table A.6 
Primary and secondary institutions and the year of establishment 
in Russia, Romania, Poland, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, and Germany 
 Banks Mortgage 
banks
Bau–
sparkassen
Secondary 
institutions
State 
agencies
Commercial 
banks*
Mortgage 
bond 
issuers
Russia Y    1997  
Romania Y   2004  1999
Poland Y  1998   1999
Kazakhstan Y 2002  2003 2000 2003**
Czech 
Republic
Y 1995 1995 1993  2000
Croatia Y   1997  1997
Hungary Y  1998 1997   
Slovenia Y     1991
Contrast
Germany Y Over 100 
years ago
Over 100 
years ago
Y Since 2000 
securitization 
programs 
by KfW.
1948
Note: * Some commercial banks operated in the countries before the socialist era, but most restarted 
operation only after transition.
 ** KMC became a state agency in 2003.
  An empty cell means there is no such institution.
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Table A.9 
Ratio of stock of outstanding (residential mortgage) loans over GDP 
in Russia, Romania, Poland, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, and Germany (2000–2003)
Ratio of stock of outstanding loans over GDP [%]
2000 2001 2002 2003
Russia na 0.0 0.0 0.1
Romania na na 0.2 1.0
Poland 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.7
Kazakhstan na na 0.2 0.6
Czech Republic na 1.4 2.0 3.0
Croatia 5.5 5.7 7.6 9.6
Hungary 1.5 2.3 4.8 7.8
Slovenia 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.5
Contrast
Germany 54.1 54.1 54.0 54.3
Remarks: for Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, and Hungary (2001–2003) data source is: Housing Statistics 
in the European Union (2004) and Boverket (2005).
  na: no data available.
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